YOUTH-INCLUSIVE MECHANISMS FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE IGAD REGION

A CASE STUDY OF UGANDA

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Sunday Angoma Okello (PhD)

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PREFACE

The book, **Youth-inclusive mechanisms for preventing and countering violent extremism in IGAD region: A case study of Uganda,** is a result of a baseline research survey that was conducted by the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern Southern Africa (OSSREA), IGAD-CEWARN and PeaceNet Kenya. IDRC – The Department of Governance and Social Justice provided a 3-year funding to 11 organizations, including OSSREA. The focus of the research was on two countries; Kenya and Uganda as case studies to unearth deeper understanding around the mechanisms that have been put in place to prevent and counter violent extremism. Further, the research sought to gain insights on how such mechanisms have been made youth-inclusive for purposes of informing P/CVE policy process in the IGAD region. The overall research question for the study was, **"to what extent were mechanisms for preventing and countering violent extremism in the IGAD region youth inclusive?"**

In order to effectively respond to the research question, the following specific objectives were adopted with a focus on the intended outcome of the research:
  i.   To identify and analyze the factors that predispose the youth both male and female to engage in Violent Extremism in Uganda;
 ii.   To identify avenues and establish strategies as interventions by state and non-state actors for creating and engaging youth in P/CVE in Uganda.
iii.   To identify policies and practices in Uganda, related to P/CVE that give the youth a voice and create space for male and female youth to participate.
 iv.   To find out and document what has worked, what has not worked and why on countering and preventing violent extremism in IGAD region, more specifically in Uganda.

To achieve the stated objectives, the research applied the following research questions as the basis for study interrogation:
  i.   What factors predispose the youth, male and female to engage in violent extremism in Uganda?
 ii.   What avenues and strategies as interventions have been put in place by state and non-state actors to engage youth in preventing and countering violent extremism in Uganda?
iii.   What policies and practices in Uganda, related to P/CVE give the youth (male and female) a voice and create space for them to get engaged?
 iv.   What has worked, what has not worked and why on preventing and countering violent extremism in Kenya and Uganda?

Adopting cross-disciplinary mixed research methods, the research focused on data collection in three main study sites in the Republic of Uganda namely, (i) Kampala (in the localities of Kisenyi, Makerere, Wandegeya, Katanga, Kawempe, Kasubi and Forgod, (ii) Gulu (in the localities of Kitgum, Kirombe, Layibi, Kisubi, Pece Pawel Pudkek, Bar-Dege and Pece Vanguard; (iii) Mayuge (in the localities of Zigambwa, Bedhebera, Mpungwe, Igamba, Katwe and Imanyiro). A total of 270 youth survey questionnaires were administered, ensuring 50% balance between males and females; 9 Focus Group Discussions conducted, and 210 community survey questionnaires administered as well. The data was then triangulated to identify key findings and generate recommendations captured in this report.

The data collection was not without challenges. For example, data collectors were unable to reach some study sites due to the topographical and security concerns. However, in such instances the team was able to conduct literature reviews to help in synthesizing and corroborating primary data collected from other sites.

Some of the key findings include: -

(a) Preventing or countering violent extremism is a very complex endeavor as there are layers upon layers of community dynamics, interests, frustrations, and relationships laterally across society and vertically with state actors and authorities.

(b) That there were traceable patterns of youth engagement in VE across the study areas, which affirmed congruence with previous studies. One of the major patterns is that addressing VE through hard security responses by the state tended to be counterproductive as more youth gravitated towards joining the VEGs the more.

(c) That there exist elaborate structures through which the VEGs operated within and outside the community.

(d) Socio-economic and political factors are more responsible for either pushing and /or pulling (enticing) the youth into VEGs than religious or ideological considerations.

(e) An intergenerational marginalisation of certain areas by successive regimes has played a significant role in pushing the youth into VEGs as they feel that their needs would be addressed through them

(f) While the government of Uganda has made significant effort to effectively respond and counter terrorism, it has not effectively dealt with youth-inclusive programmes to prevent or counter violent extremism in an institutional manner.

The research makes critical conclusion that the P/CVE mechanisms existing in Uganda are not youth-inclusive, majorly because the state opts more for hard security approaches to deal with VE and terrorism with little or no opportunity for community level actors (especially youth) to make contribution to prevention or countering VEGs functions and operations.

There however, exists opportunities within existing or emerging regional and international mechanisms being undertaken by IGAD, AU and UNDP at different levels to institutionalize youth participation in P/CVE in Uganda

The culmination of the research was a set of recommendations including the need to embrace IT in an effort to monitor VEGs and their activities for prevention and or response purposes. This would provide the youth with an opportunity to participate in efforts for P/CVE.

THEORY OF CHANGE

If we take an all-government and all-community approach to preventing and countering violent extremism that is context-specific, gender-sensitive, multi-layered and multi-pronged…

And build individual, household, community/local, national resilience to violent extremism through youth-led P/CVE actions, such as youth-friendly national action plans and policies, human-rights approaches to conflict resolution, tolerance and recognition of the potential of youth as agents of change….

Then, PCVE will give the youth a voice and space and reduce their vulnerability to multiple drivers of violent extremism that are interconnected and interwoven like a spider web, with unpredictable dynamism as an amoeba…

If we adopt participatory soft approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism…

And teach young people peace through civic engagement, skills for inter-cultural dialogue, human rights, dignity, tolerance and solidarity, trust, confidence, leadership, critical thinking, problem-solving, partnership, inclusion and peacebuilding. This will lead to social cohesion, nurturing and empowering the youth, enhanced use of mediation, sharing information and research for P/CVE, strengthened links between development and peace processes, enhanced capacities of youth, CSOs, policy makers and other stakeholders in P/CVE, creation of legislation to guide policy implementation of national youth policies, nurturing of cultural diversity, embracing digital learning programmes and strengthened gender equality in P/CVE…

Then, we can engage youth as beneficiaries, partners and leaders in P/CVE through formal and informal youth-led multi-stakeholder collaboration that adopt continual learning and adjustment, monitoring and evaluation and go beyond community-based projects…

Overall, we would have reduced attraction of youth to radicalization and violent extremism and strengthened community cohesion and trust by supporting peace, protecting vulnerable communities, encouraging constructive ways to redress grievances, discrimination, violations, exclusion or any other rights abuses by delivering a more holistic focus on the political, economic, social and cultural factors necessary for the development of CT-P/CVE plans, legislation, strategies and human rights obligations.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning & Response Mechanism
COMESA	Common market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
EAC	East African Community
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FBO	Faith Based Organizations
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
HIV	Human Immune-deficiency Virus
HSM	Holy Spirit Movement
ICPAT-IGAD	Capacity Building Program against Terrorism
IDRC	International Development Research Centre
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
ICGLR	International Conference for the Great Lake Region
LEA	Learning Alliance
LRA	Lord's Resistance Movement
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NSC	National Steering Committee
NUSU	National Union of Students of Uganda
NUYO	National Union of Youth Organisation
NYP	National Youth Policy
OSSREA	Organization for Social Sciences Research in Eastern and Southern Africa
RoL	Rule of Law

SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
STDs	Sexually Transmitted Diseases
UDHS	Uganda Demographic and Health Survey
UGX	Uganda Shillings (Denomination to the international Standards)
UN	United Nations
UN-CTITF	UN Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USD	United States Dollars
USAID	US Agency for International Development
UYDO	Uganda Youth Development Organisation
UNYC	Uganda National Youth Council
VE	Violent Extremism
YCS	Young Christian Students
YES	Youth Enterprise (Credit) Scheme
YFU	Young Farmers Union
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association

ABOUT THE IDRC

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) supports research in developing countries to advance knowledge and solve practical development problems. IDRC supports knowledge, innovation, and solutions that help build more prosperous, just and resilient societies, promote economic growth, strong governance, foster sound public policies and drive large-scale positive change. IDRC's work is aligned with global and continental frameworks including the attainment of sustainable development Goals, the 2030 Agenda, and achievement of the African Union Agenda 2063.

IDRC'S GOVERNANCE AND JUSTICE PROGRAMME

The Governance and Justice program is part of IDRC's Inclusive Economies program area which supports knowledge, innovation, and solutions that help build more prosperous, just and resilient societies, by focusing on economic growth, sound governance and public policies, and quality and accountability. The Governance and Justice Programme supports research and processes that address stronger and more inclusive mechanisms of governance and justice, contributing to the development of safer spaces, free from violent conflict and insecurity. Such research support enables the creation of conditions where vulnerable groups, particularly women and girls, can empower themselves to prevent and overcome gender violence. A core and cross-cutting theme in the Governance and Justice Programme is focused on improving access to effective and responsive justice for populations facing vulnerability.

The GJ Programme recognizes that more broadly, in many parts of the world, public institutions often fail to reach the poor and vulnerable or have distorting effects, which undermine government decision-making, human rights, the rule of law and fuel inequality, impunity, crime, and conflict. The GJ programme also recognizes that violent conflict has emerged as a central obstacle to development, whether in terms of building social, cultural or economic prosperity of societies. For the 1.5 billion people currently living in communities affected by repeated cycles of violence and conflict the impact of insecurity for poor and vulnerable populations is far ranging: from sexual violence against women, to outbreaks of political and inter-community violence, and fear and violence that often permeates the slums of rapidly growing cities. This insecurity is particularly devastating for women, youth and other vulnerable groups who tend to have less access to the resources needed to protect themselves, including political influence, economic opportunities and access to justice.

GJ PROGRAMME'S AFRICA YOUTH COHORT

It is against this background that IDRC'S Governance and Justice Programme has, over the years, built a portfolio of research focused on youth. IDRC's Governance and Justice Programme has been targeting young people for the past 5 years through some projects that focus on the following themes:

 i) Violence prevention;

ii) Urban security;

iii) Gender based violence;

iv) Promoting citizen engagement; and

v) Leadership Development and Capacity Strengthening.

However, a more dedicated focus on youth issues emerged in 2016 with the development of a Research Support Project (RSP) titled, "***Engaging Youth to Build Resilient Societies,"*** in addition to the development of specific projects within the thematic area of youth issues in Africa, Latin America and Asia. For example, in Africa, the project, "***Understanding and addressing Youth exposition to violence, exclusion and injustice in Africa;"*** was developed and it has benefitted 15 research teams from East, West, Southern and North Africa (with a remaining research project idea to be finalised in

Q4 of 2019 at the time of writing). In other regions, namely - Latin America and South Asia, a closed call was launched to explore youth led field experiences on "*Violence prevention and civic engagement,*" which has selected a first cohort of seven projects to be implemented. The Governance and Justice Programme also launched an initiative to address the linkages between *Youth, violence and economic opportunities* in a joint effort with IDRC's Employment and Growth Programme.

AFRICA YOUTH COHORT: JUSTIFICATION

The thematic focus on the youth is informed by the reality that over two-third of the Africa's population across the continent is under the age of 35 years – making it the "youngest" continent. With such a critical mass of young people on the continent, the persistent unemployment crisis combined with social unrest in many countries are among many factors that have contributed to the highlighting of this demographic in public policy discussions and development priorities.

While the nature of the youth challenges varies across regions, there are growing concerns that lack of opportunities – including the lack of (decent) jobs – and the limited inclusion of the youth in decision making processes undermine social cohesion and pave the way to the youth rejecting the social construct. Such rejection can take the form of involvement in gang violence, crime, organized crime, gender violence, political radicalization, and armed conflicts. This then can potentially compound their vulnerability and reduce the set of economic opportunities available to them, marginalizing them further and creating a vicious cycle.

OBJECTIVES OF THE IDRC GJ PROGRAMME'S YOUTH COHORT

The objective of the IDRC GJ Programme's Africa Youth Cohort are outlined as follows:

- Reflect on the intellectual and research evidence regarding the nexus between youth socio-economic vulnerabilities, inequalities, exclusion, and violence in Africa;

- Support the development of an evidence-based policy and practice agenda on effectively addressing youth socio-economic vulnerabilities, inequalities, exclusion, and violence in Africa;

- Harness the knowledge and experiences of various actors, including policy makers, civil society, practitioners, development partners and the private sector towards developing context-specific and responsive programmes targeting young people;

- Support several research projects, looking at the experiences of youth with violence, insecurity, exclusion and injustice, with a strong emphasis on solutions

- Develop and support a cohort of projects to produce research and evidence-based analysis on resilience strategies and obstacles of vulnerable communities;

- Utilize the generated knowledge and scale-up these findings to influence the relevant policy, academic and community forums at national, regional and international levels; and

- Generate a strong body of scientific and applicable knowledge, based on sound and rigorous methodologies while strengthening peer learning and networking between research teams, policy makers, practitioners and youths

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sunday Angoma OKELLO (PhD)

Sunday Angoma OKELLO holds a PhD in Public Policy majoring in Conflict, Security and Development from the International Development Department at the University of Birmingham, UK. His thesis focused on *Post-War Social Recovery: Grassroots Perspectives and Non-Governmental Organisations.* His Masters of Arts in Peace and Reconciliation Studies from Coventry University, UK; Earlier, he obtained a Post Graduate Certificate in Conflict Resolution Skills from Lancaster University, UK. This was a shift in education after his Manufacturing and Systems Engineering studies from Vaxjo University, Sweden.

He is currently a *Conflict Analyst (CA)* with Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Mechanisms (CEWARN) unit of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Before Joining CEWARN, he was an assistant Professor and senior researcher at the Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Addis Ababa University for seven years. He has conducted extensive research on behalf of the African Union, African Peace and Security Programme (APSP) at IPSS. While at IPSS, he was actively involved in the flagship research of the African-led Solutions (AfSol) to Peace and Security. His extensive research in South Sudan has produced a compendium of 90 community conflicts that were systematically analysed for over 2 years in South Sudan and with South Sudanese. He is currently sitting member on the peer review committee of ISS-ENACT Project in Pretoria, the African Solutions for African Problems (AfSol) Journal of Addis Ababa University, and IGAD-CEWARN Conflict Analyst peer review chairman. Okello is currently the Principal Investigator of this 3-year project named *Youth Inclusive Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in the IGAD Region* funded by IDRC.

He has published 3 peer reviewed books, 6 chapters in 6 edited books, 9 journal articles, several policy briefs and analyses, working papers, OpEds, and many editorials. All these have been in areas of peace and security, governance, state building, international relations and politics, management, elections and political parties and their funding, development studies, political economy and public policy, institutionalism, engineering, social policy of transportation, migration and refugees, and many more. With close to 30 years of experience, Dr Okello has extensive knowledge of Africa; in particular, the Great Lakes Region, Horn and Central Africa, and South Africa. He has worked in Uganda, South Sudan, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, and in Eastern DRC following the activities of the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and state building in South Sudan. He has also travelled extensively and lived in Serbia, UK, Sweden, Canada, Cambodia, Norway, Denmark, Tanzania, France, and Italy.

CHAPTER ONE
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

1. INTRODUCTION

This book is a compilation of outputs and outcomes realised out of the research project on **Youth Inclusive Mechanisms for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in the IGAD-Region**, focusing on Uganda as a case study. The research that was conducted between May and June 2017 in both Uganda and Kenya sought to establish "to what extent P/CVE mechanisms in the IGAD region and particularly the two countries were youth inclusive". It outlines key issues of involving Ugandan youth (with gendered perspectives) to prevent and counter violent extremism. The perspectives of various stakeholders and youth (male and female) on their inclusivity in designing mechanisms and policies, programming and actively be involved in P/CVE were widely sought.

Ugandan government and IGAD welcomed the need to research on an inclusive mechanism for youth to fully participate in P/CVE. The suggestions herein are to propose bridges to the substantive conceptual, methodological, policy and practical gaps that is eluding P/CVE, and more specifically where youth are involved in Uganda.

Uganda's neighbouring countries constituting the Horn of Africa (HoA) region have been overwhelmed by fragility, fluid, dynamic and volatile conflicts. Violent Extremist Groups (VEGs) in the HoA, mostly Al-Shabbab[1] and their annexes have added and impeded "new war" tactics and changed narratives and perspectives about VE. Uganda has made commendable attempts in equipping itsef better and to continuously improve its approaches to P/CVE from time to time.

The context of Uganda has stood out as a matter of concern since the emergence of VEGs such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Allied Democratic Force (ADF) and the suicide bombings in Kampala on 11, July 2010. These have demanded different forms of interventions from the government in P/CVE. Irrespective of the different strategies and responses to P/CVE, there are cases and lessons that have been documented and could serve as tools for the inclusion of the youth in P/CVE.

This report produces nuanced empirical information from Kampala, Mayuge and Gulu/Kitgum to suggest "Inclusive mechanism that targets youth in P/CVE". It also serves to generate more discussion on how to improve Uganda's intervention strategies to P/CVE. More specifically on what works, what does not work and might work once youth are included from areas of policy design to implementation and are moreover practical at grassroots levels

This study was conducted in Uganda as part of bigger study in the Horn of Africa, with the view that it would assist the Ugandan government and IGAD in conceptualising and designing youth inclusive

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[1] AL-SHABAAB MEANS "THE YOUTH" OR "THE YOUNGSTERS", IS ALSO TRANSLATED AS "THE GUYS"', IS A JIHADIST FUNDAMENTALIST GROUP BASED IN EAST AFRICA. AL-SHABAAB IS ALSO KNOWN AS A MUJAHIDEEN YOUTH MOVEMENT" OR "MOVEMENT OF STRIVING YOUTH".

mechanisms to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE). It comes from the previous assessments of the general issues that involved youth, more specifically on VE.

It is a known fact that, from the outlook of today's increasing world population, which stands at nearly 7.5 billion people, the youth are the highest in numbers. Of these, Africa's population has grown to a total of 1.24 million people.[2] The age composition of youth between 10 and 24 on the globe today is about 1.8 billion,[3] making up just less than one quarter of the world's population[456] with over two-thirds of Africa's population under the age of 35.[7]

Although the Ugandan government has made commendable efforts on interventions towards addressing the growing violent extremism phenomenon, it is clear that such interventions have been slow, inappropriate, and to some extent non-inclusive of the youths. In this regard, violent extremist incidences in Uganda have actively implicated young men and women. From late 1986, youths have mainly understood reactionary and punitive, militaristic approaches to P/CVE without proactively and fully engaging them.

Terrorist attacks in Uganda have implicated neighbouring countries like Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania, though Uganda does not have clear cooperation and extradition agreements with the neighbouring countries. Uganda's 1964 law on extradition fails to address the current dynamic nature of violent extremism. The existing Extradition Act does not have or is not clearly articulate on the crime of terrorism. However, the Uganda Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002 regards terrorism as an extraditable crime, but it lacks ratification of regional cooperation agreements to combat cross border organized crimes. These problems were tested in the case of the 11th July 2010, Al Shabaab terrorist bomb attacks in Uganda, specifically in Kampala, Lugogo and Kabalagala while a third one failed to explode in Makindye House. Ten suspects were arrested in Kenya and Tanzania (six Kenyans, two Tanzanians and two Ugandans) however, without a clear extradition process a between the three countries, the extraditions of the suspects was made through ad-hoc arrangements without any legal backing.

Like elsewhere, the decadal problems on how to address the issues of P/CVE in Uganda have been dynamic and require continuous review and change. These forms part of the problems that need to be investigated so as to address key drivers that continuously enhance VE, and yet those that have been tried and suggested are likely to achieve limited, if not counterproductive results. In Uganda, there have been trends of increased P/CVE based on the hard approaches that have been heavily criticized, for example in countering LRA and ADF as well as UPDF's contribution to AMISOM. The marginalization

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[2] HTTP://WWW.WORLDOMETERS.INFO/WORLD-POPULATION/AFRICA-POPULATION/ ACCESSED 07-MARCH 2017

[3] IBID.:

[4] UNFPA, 2014. THE POWER OF 1.8 BILLION. THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION

[5] MIHYO,P. 2014. EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.ADDIS ABABA; OSSREA

[6] MIHYO,P. AND MUKUNA,T. 2015. URBAN YOUTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: FEATURES, CHALLENGES, CONSEQUENCES AND CUT-BACK STRATEGIES. ADDIS ABABA: OSSREA. ISBN 97899944-55-83-6

[7] IBID.;

of Northern, Eastern and Western Ugandan communities has created vulnerable segments in the communities, who in turn have become more susceptible to the attractions of violent ideologies.

However, there seems to be a general lack of awareness of the best practices in P/CVE among the growing number of stakeholders, governmental and non-governmental alike; including how existing strategies targeting vulnerable populations might give sustained considerations to contextual issues linked to poverty reduction, governance, human rights, and livelihoods challenges.

1.1   THE PROBLEM STATEMENT

This study was conducted in Uganda with the view that it would assist the Uganda government and IGAD in designing youth inclusive mechanisms to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE). It comes from the previous assessment of the general issues that involved youth, more specifically on VE.

From the outlook of today's increasing world population, which consist of nearly 7.5 billion people, Africa's population has grown to a total 1.24[8] billion. Of this global figure the age of youth between 10 and 24 years today stands at about 1.8 billion,[9] making up just less than one quarter of the world's population[10][11][12] with over two-thirds of Africa's population under the age of 35.[13]

Uganda has gone through violent conflicts that have had far-reaching impacts on the population. Violent extremism has also emerged as one of the most serious crosscutting challenges to Uganda's political, territorial, ideological, religious, social, economic and cultural dimensions. In Northern Uganda, the LRA has been persistently targeting its own community as grounds for recruitment through abduction. These have contributed to the growth of violent extremism. The ADF have as well targeted youth (both male and female) to be recruited in joining violent extremist groups (VEGs).[14]

However, Uganda's interventions that have been so far deployed to P/CVE have been slow, inappropriate and to some extent non-inclusive of youth (male and female). Therefore, violent extremist incidences in Uganda have implicated young men and women actively. From late 1986, youth (male or female) have mainly understood there to be a reactionary and punitive, militaristic approach to P/CVE without proactively and fully engaging them.

Like in many other places, the decadal problems on how to P/CVE in Uganda have been dynamic and require continuous review and change. These form part of the problems that are needed to be investigated on how to address key drivers that continuously enhance VE, and yet those that have been tried and suggested are likely to achieve limited, if not counterproductive results. In Uganda, there have

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[8] HTTP://WWW.WORLDOMETERS.INFO/WORLD-POPULATION/AFRICA-POPULATION/ ACCESSED 07-MARCH 2017

[9] IBID.:

[10] UNFPA, 2014. THE POWER OF 1.8 BILLION. THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S POPULATION

[11] MIHYO,P. 2014. EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA.ADDIS ABABA; OSSREA

[12] MIHYO,P. AND MUKUNA,T. 2015. URBAN YOUTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA: FEATURES, CHALLENGES, CONSEQUENCES AND CUT-BACK STRATEGIES. ADDIS ABABA: OSSREA. ISBN 97899944-55-83-6

[13] IBID.;

[14] A SIMPLE GOOGLE SEARCH ON VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA GAVE A RESULT OF ABOUT 1,650,000 IN 0.31 SECONDS.

been trends of increased P/CVE based on the hard approach that are heavily blamed, like in countering LRA and UPDF contributions to AMISOM. The marginalization of Northern Uganda and Western Ugandan communities has created vulnerable segments in the communities, who in turn have become more susceptible to the attractions of violent ideologies.

However, there seems to be a general lack of awareness of best practices in P/CVE among the growing number of stakeholders, government and non-governmental alike; including how existing strategies targeting vulnerable populations might give sustained considerations to contextual issues linked to poverty reduction, governance, human rights, and livelihoods challenges.

1.2   PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

The purpose of this research is to investigate to what extend mechanisms for preventing and countering violent extremism in the IGAD region are youth inclusive. This study rigorously follows a gender-disaggregated data procedure done within the contextual analysis of the theories and structural factors underpinning youth exclusion, the injustices youth face, and their likely consequent engagement in violence, extremism and radicalization.

The objectives below strive towards increasing shared understanding of the context, and to inform evidence-based policy making on P/CVE programming in the IGAD region for violence free nations.

1.3   OVERALL OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The major objective of this study in Uganda was to create space and time for youth to engage and empower both male and female youth in an inclusive manner and be part of the solution.

The specific objectives are:

1. To identify and analyse factors that predispose youth, male and female to engage in violent extremism in Uganda

2. To identify avenues and strategies for creating as well as deepening interventions to engage and empower youth in P/CVE interventions in Uganda.

3. To analyse existing/emerging policies and practices related to P/CVE in the direction in creating safe spaces and sustainable opportunities for youth participation in P/CVE.

4. To establish what has worked, where and what has not worked and why.

Research Questions: The research was driven by the main research question that focused on how the research evidence will inform policy debates and practices in P/CVE interventions that can engage and empower youth, both male and female.

The specific research questions were:

1. What are the driving factors that incentivise youth both male and female, to engage in VE in Uganda?

2. What are the mechanisms, infrastructure and resources available for engaging and empowering youth in P/CVE interventions in Uganda?

3. How can policies and practices related to P/CVE enhance the creation of space for male and female youth to participate?

4. What evidence are there to suggest both the good and bad practices exist/existed? What has worked / has not worked in as far as youth inclusivity in P/CVE is concerned and why?

1.4 DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS

Defining key terms – such as 'radicalization', 'violent extremism' and 'terrorism' is a challenge for all stakeholders in this field, as the terms are complex, contested and constantly shifting. As noted in the literature review, even international and regional organizations, such as the UN, the EU and the AU, do not have clear and official definitions of these concepts. Language variations also played a role in defining the key terms for this study.

Countering violent extremism: The term countering violent extremism, often referred to by its acronym, CVE, is officially referred to as "countering violent extremism and radicalisation that lead to terrorism. It involves no prosecutions, arrests, or threats of force, and seeks to mobilise and empower actors that are not traditionally associated with national security, such as local governments, educators, social workers, and civil society. The aim is not to reach active terrorists but create resilience among populations that are seen as potentially vulnerable ("prevention"), or assist individuals who are open to turning away from extremism ("de-radicalisation")[15]. The concept of 'violent extremism does not exist in most local lexicon including Swahili, making any translation of the phrase imprecise. Instead, violent extremism is understood or described as 'terrorism', or *ugaidi* in Swahili. Government policy documents and frameworks in East Africa, such as Kenya's National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, do not explicitly define violent extremism, but instead they describe the actors involved in extremist violence as 'radicalized individuals who are prepared to engage in, or actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies.'

Counter-Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism refers to all measures aimed at thwarting terrorist plots and dismantling terrorist organisations. This typically includes the arrest of suspected members, the disruption of terrorist attacks, recruitment, propaganda, travel, and logistics, countering terrorist finance, the protection of potential targets, and the pooling and exchange of data with foreign countries. In nearly all countries, counterterrorism is the primary responsibility of law enforcement, intelligence services, and, in some cases, the military. Counterterrorism is a central pillar of any effort aimed at countering threats from violent extremism. When targeted and effective, counterterrorism not only helps to prevent attacks and protect lives, it also preserves the integrity of the state and its institutions, and sends a powerful message to the terrorists and their supporters that violence is ineffective. However, when threats are more persistent and widespread, counterterrorism is often perceived as inadequate, because it fails to counter processes of radicalisation and leaves the underlying political, economic, and

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[15]Neumann, P. (2011). Preventing Violent Radicalization in America. Bipartisan Policy Center. Retrieved from http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf

social drivers of violent extremism unaddressed. Moreover, when counterterrorism is purely repressive and targets the wrong people, it can become a grievance in its own right.

De-radicalisation: De-radicalisation is aimed at radicalised individuals. It is based on the assumption that not everyone who becomes radicalised remains committed to their cause, and that every extremist movement has followers who are disillusioned, have doubts, or simply want out. In practice, de-radicalisation programmes target radicalised individuals at different stages of the extremist "lifecycle ": immediately before joining a group or network, as active members, or following their exit. The objective more often than not is to stop their involvement in violence (behavioural de-radicalisation), or change their attitudes and ideological assumptions (cognitive de-radicalisation). Just like radicalisation, de-radicalisation is a process, which plays out over time and draws on a combination of instruments, including but not limited to psychological counselling, ideological re-education, vocational training, re-socialisation, and job opportunities[16]

Extremism: The term extremism describes ideas that are diametrically opposed to a society's core values, could be various forms of racial or religious supremacy, or any ideology that systematically denies basic human rights. Or it can refer to the ruthless methods by which political ideas are realised, namely by "show[ing] disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others "Extremism, by contrast, is context-dependent, which means that its definition can easily be challenged and manipulated[17].

Prevention: Prevention seeks to "inoculate "on-radicalised individuals against the appeal of violent extremism. The underlying logic is identical to other forms of prevention, for example, drugs, alcohol, or gang prevention, where "at risk "populations and their wider communities are encouraged to participate in programmes that create awareness and strengthen the mental, intellectual, and social capacity to resist recruitment. This includes public information campaigns and capacity building across entire communities, as well as targeted programmes in specific locations, such as schools, universities, youth and sports clubs, in mosques and churches, prisons and refugee centres, or on the internet[18].

Radicalisation: Radicalisation is the process whereby people turn to extremism. There is no single driver of radicalization as experts have identified a number of recurring factors and dynamics.[19]They are: Grievance: All forms of radicalisation are based on societal tensions, conflicts, and fault lines, which may cause thwarted expectations, conflicts of identity, or feelings of injustice, marginalisation and exclusion. Needs: Being part of an extremist group satisfies followers 'emotional needs, such as the desire for belonging, community, adventure, power, significance, or glory. In some cases, this involves taking advantage of psychological vulnerabilities. Ideas: For discontent to be turned into a political project, it requires ideas that "make sense "of the grievance, identify a scapegoat, and offer solutions. When those ideas amount to a (seemingly) coherent worldview, they are called ideology. People: with rare exceptions, radicalisation is a social process in which authority figures, charismatic leaders or tightly knit peer groups are key to generating trust, commitment, loyalty, and (peer) pressure.

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[16] Botha, A. (2016). Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: Radicalization from a Political Socialization Perspective. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books

[17] See Peter R. Neumann, "The Trouble with Radicalization", International Affairs, 89(4) (2013), p. 875-6.

[18] Neumann, P. (2011). Preventing Violent Radicalization in America. Bipartisan Policy Center. Retrieved from http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf

[19] Ibid

Violence: Becoming involved in violence is often the result of being exposed to violence, causing individuals to seek revenge or become "brutalised ". This frequently happens in the context of violent conflicts. While there is no universal formula, as pathways into radicalisation differ depending on context and location, there are patterns that governments should make an effort to understand and consider, especially when formulating counter-measures.

Reintegration: This refers to the achievement of a sustainable return to a country/community/family of origin. It is the ability of returnees to secure the political, economic, and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity.

Returnee: This refers to a person in the act of going back to their point of departure. This could be within the territorial boundaries of a country or between the host country and country of origin. In this study, returnees refer to ex-combatants who go back home.

Social cohesion: This refers to the nature and set of relationships between individuals and groups in a particular environment (horizontal social cohesion) and between those individuals and groups and institutions that govern them in a the environment (vertical social cohesion). Strong positive and integrated relationships and inclusive identities are perceived as indicative of high social cohesion, whereas weak negative or fragmented relationships and exclusive identities are taken to mean low social cohesion. It is the social connectedness that brings about social capital, tolerance, non-discrimination, and social justice, upholding the human rights obligations.

Youth: The Uganda national youth policy defines youth as all young persons, female and male, aged 12 to 30 years. In Youth Map: A cross-sectional situational analysis on Youth in Uganda (2011) notes the draft national youth policy (2011-2016), referring to youth as 15-29.[20]

However, a study conducted by The East African Institute of the Aga Khan University define Uganda's youth, as individuals between the ages of 18 and 35.[21] The study also finds that Uganda is the most youthful country in East Africa. The median age is estimated at about 16 years, and about 80 % of the population is below the age of 35 years.[22]

With or without parental consent, male and female can get married at the age of 18 years. The law prohibits same sex marriage.[23] Without a criminal age limit of 12 years old, any Ugandan who is 18 years of age can vote and also stand as political representative to the lower house (members of parliament).[24]

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[20] *THE NATIONAL YOUTH POLICY OF UGANDA: A VISION FOR YOUTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY; MINISTRY OF GENDER, LABOUR AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT; KAMPALA, 2001*

[21] *DR. ALEX O. AWITI (AUGUST 2016) THE UGANDA YOUTH SURVEY REPORT; THE EAST AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF THE AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY.*

[22] *DR. ALEX O. AWITI (AUGUST 2016) THE UGANDA YOUTH SURVEY REPORT; THE EAST AFRICAN INSTITUTE OF THE AGA KHAN UNIVERSITY.*

[23] *HOMOSEXUAL ACTS ILLEGAL. SOURCE: UNSD, ILGA*

[24] *SOURCE: INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION PARTIALLY INDIRECTLY ELECTED OR OTHER MEANS.*

CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1 RESEARCH APPROACH

The research project applied a multi-sectorial pragmatic approach, which brought together state institutions, civil society organizations, the academia, media and grassroots communities. The consortium of these actors brought together complimenting synergies that aimed at empowering targeted communities to engage and include youth in preventing and countering violent extremism. This research project adopted mixed methods; both qualitative and quantitative research designs. A multi-method research approach was applied to a case study through Participatory Appraisal Research. In the IGAD region, two case studies were selected thus Kenya and Uganda. They were selected following the United States Department of State categorization of Kenya as an active target of radicalization and terrorism and Uganda as a dormant target. [25] The comparison between these two countries was intriguing. The aim is to provide in-depth data and to generate practical findings that can influence policy change, through lessons learnt.

We employed a cross-disciplinary comparative mixed research methodology with focus on analysing various contexts, avoiding generalizations and disaggregating youth by gender and other social sifters to capture the gender dimensions of youth and violent extremism and violence, as well as the experiences of female youth in Africa. The study was interested in carrying out a comparative research that includes case studies from different regions and with mixed profiles to compare the experiences and perspectives of youth. We sought to understand the extent to which policy initiatives and interventions address issues of youth marginalisation and exclusion (with focus on structural barriers), and the extent to which progress has been made, or not, in the IGAD region. We intended to shed light on link between youth, peace and security at global, continental, and regional level in Africa. We analyzed the policy environment in which the youth operated at the national and community levels so as to have a bottom-up, top-down approach to preventing and countering violent extremism among the youth. We also endeavored to find out the contributions of youth to peacebuilding.

This study also took a "whole-of-society approach," gender-sensitive dimension by engaging women as positive change agents in their communities. We aimed at developing home grown solutions to radicalization and P/CVE through empowering communities to develop a counter narrative to the violent extremist narrative and amplify the alternative message through all forms of media. Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) method, in-depth case study, and group discussions have been employed to get into the depths of violent extremism and radicalization among youth in the IGAD region. A multi method research allows for both in-depth inquiries into particular cases and examination of trends and characteristics over large populations. Multi-method research is a linking of the qualitative and

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[25] UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION (2017). COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2016

quantitative approaches in order to capitalize on the complementary strength of different methods of enquiry. The main research questions that needed answers were:

I.   What evidence is there from the contextual analysis of the theories and structural factors underpinning youth exclusion, injustice and engagement in violence, extremism and radicalization in the IGAD region?

II.   What strategies can be used by the various actors in implementing the UN Strategy for counter terrorism to engage youth's views as a long-term measure for P/CVE programming?

It is important to note that the study was interested in more than the causal explanations of youth involvement in violent extremism and radicalization. The following four methods were used to generate empirical data:

a)   desk-top literature reviews,
b)   questionnaires,
c)   in-depth interviews and
d)   focus group discussions, which gave voice to the youth and members of the communities in which they live.

Since this was a comparative study, the same data collection instruments were developed and applied in both Kenya and Uganda.

The three research organizations involved, namely, OSSREA (academia), PeaceNet (CSOs) and IGAD- CEWARN (policy makers) formed a transformative network for co-production of knowledge among different sections of the society for understanding and dialoguing P/ CVE using the youth experiences for multi- stakeholder engagement. The target populations were clustered to reflect the diversity of youth characteristics and experience. Three research sites were selected in the two countries applying a criterion that considered historical acts of terrorism and radicalization in the selected sites. In the in-country selected sites, further targeting was done to ensure that the study was holistic and inclusive without leaving any youth behind.

Respondents included youth in rural and urban areas, in school and out of school, employed and unemployed youth; as well as students and non-students both male and female. The instruments used were all designed to secure basic information on respondents, identify their major preoccupations, describe their participation in youth programmes, CSOs working on youth and P/CVE, security personnel, policy makers in the sector of peace and security, clergy, local leaders, and community members including families of ex-combatants and returnees. Trained youth, research assistants administered questionnaires to fellow youth. The research team from the 3 institutions conducted Desktop literature review, FGDs and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs). Due to the sensitive nature of the research, the respondents chose the most comfortable and secure places to conduct the interviews and hold FGDs. Some of the sites included mosques, hotels, county halls, SO offices, policy makers' offices etc.

2.2   THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

This project was based on Social Control Theory by Hirsch (1969) who asserts that strong bonds to family, community and society are fundamental to violence prevention because they both provide a

conduit for conveying social norms and expectations in addition to abiding by the norms. Community-Based Participatory Research as a branch, was adopted. It focuses on a process of sequential reflection and action, carried out with and by local people rather than on them. CBPR is an approach to research that looks at participants or consumers (especially vulnerable or disenfranchised participants) as key and equal partners. CBPR promotes community ownership of research. Key principles of CBPR include approaching the community as a "unit of identity" and working with community members as a group, enhancing strength and resources in the community, ensuring that community-research partnership is reflected in all stages of the project, valuing knowledge from all partners, using knowledge and action for the benefit of all participants, promoting co-learning, addressing social inequalities and contributing to "reciprocal transfer of knowledge, skills, capacity, and power"[26]. The outcome of this process is meant to benefit all stakeholders, including community participants, practitioners, and researchers, and result in greater connection between those who are being studied and those who study with greater benefit to both[27].

In CBPRA the community is regarded as a unit of identity, work with community members, enhance strength and resources of the community, ensure that community-research partnership is reflected in all stages of the project, value knowledge from all partners, use the knowledge and action for the benefit of all participants, promote co-learning, address social inequalities and contribute to reciprocal transfer of knowledge.

The community-based participatory research (CBPR) collaboration with the youth and the community in which they live treats them as an equal partner in the research project. They have a big stake in identifying the problem and solutions to the same problem. Community leaders in each of the study locations ensure that the study is mindful of the ways in which their community is unique. They helped to interpret the usefulness of the project to the community and committed to dissemination of findings and implementation of interventions. Security development actors, policy makers, civil society organizations, youth, community members, academia and media personnel formed multi-sector platforms for collaboration and worked with all stakeholders were brought together to co-produce knowledge according to the set objectives.

5 strategies suggested by The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) we applied; namely: 1) focusing on prisons and delineating good practices on rehabilitating and reintegrating into society violent extremist offenders who have disengaged from violent extremism; 2) enumerating good practices on working with victims of terrorism in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack; 3) exploring the importance of multi-sectorial (i.e., government institutions, agencies, the private sector, and civil society) approaches to P/ CVE; 4) examining the methods of P/CVE communications most resonant

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[26]Israel,B.A., Barbara A. Israel, Amy J. Schulz, Edith A. Parker, and Adam B. Becker(1998). Review of Community-Based Research: Assessing Partnership Approaches to Improve Public Health. Annual Review. Public Health.

[27] Viswanathan, M., Ammerman, A., Eng, E., Gartlehner, G., Lohr, K. N., Griffth, D., et al. (2004). *Community-based participatory research: Assessing the evidence* (Evidence Report/Technology Assessment No. 99; Prepared by RTI International-University of North Carolina). Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.

with key audiences; and 5) measuring the effectiveness of P/CVE programming[28]. We focused on strategies 2,3,4 and 5 with the aim of developing solutions relevant to the audience being addressed. Oblivious of the fact that there is growing importance of the Internet but radicalization to violence continues to take place primarily at the local level, often through face-to-face engagement. Therefore, locally relevant P/CVE initiatives are central to the success of any strategy.

Community engagement and community-oriented policing are related tools that focus on building trust with local communities and engaging with them as partners to develop information-driven community-based solutions to local issues.[29] Such engagement is meant to raise community awareness about the threat of violent extremism, to provide them with the necessary tools, and to empower them to intervene and prevent radicalization and violence. The more aware communities are of potential threats to their security, the more empowered they are to be resilient against it and the better prepared they can be to counter the threats themselves. Community engagement therefore requires building trust between officials and community members in order to establish a relationship of collaboration. Experience proves that such relationships cannot be built overnight and should be cultivated and maintained over time in order to have effect.

The approach was to first conduct research in order to understand local problems and grievances that local communities in target areas' experience so that as we engage on interventions, these communities are not targeted for security reasons but are engaged for their own benefit. Through this research, we approached communities with basic knowledge of their local dynamics and the issues they face in order to demonstrate to the community that they are not engaging the community solely because of potential security threats arising within the community. The research undertook a holistic approach to community engagement and community-oriented policing that involves all sectors of the society in order to find the right partners and sustain the engagement. Multiple sectors within a community were involved in the research at both the local household and community level and at the national level. The goal was to develop trust with different levels in the community. It was oblivious hat cooperative and constructive dialogue between society and government agencies, including at the municipal level, is a prerequisite to success in P/CVE.

The research also embarked on desktop review and research on communities that were purposefully sampled for the research. The researchers were interested in understanding the intra-generational relationships and how they contributed in alienation of youth and lack of cohesion, trust and inclusivity for youth. The research delved on understanding the power and gender relations in the communities and how this played in marginalizing and humiliating young people while projecting local leaders as very powerful. The local government and civil society organizations were engaged throughout the research process.

2.3 RESEARCH DESIGN

This research methodology employed a mixed research method in this project. A case study design that went further into case-in-case study was chosen. The research adopted both qualitative and quantitative

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[28] The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)(2013). Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism.https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/159885/13Aug09_EN_
[29] Ibid

research paradigms with triangulation of data from findings. This research adopted a predominantly qualitative approach complemented by quantitative methods.

2.3.1 CONSTRUCTING THE RESEARCH

The research was constructed to address the following:

1. Addressing constraints: What is the budget and allocated time frame? What are the places that must be visited? What are the priority issues?
2. With the research constraints in mind, the following questions were asked: What is the overall strategy for the research plan? How would the findings be analysed? Does the research feature comparative analysis and what exactly will be compared? What will be the criteria for site selection? What is the rationale? If comparative analysis is employed, was sites selection done within the comparative framework in mind? How long time will be taken in each of the field site? Who are the main people who should be interviewed? While interviewing, what information is needed to get the most of them? Are the supporting agencies needed to help facilitate the research? (This is common). How can one make a balance of government approval with the need to conduct ethical research? Who is the primary audience?
3. Development of a work plan – with a rationale for each step: Where will the researcher go? When will the researcher go? How will the researcher get there? What will it cost? Who does the researcher want to talk to?

2.3.2 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH-PROCESS-TRACING

For the qualitative paradigm, this research employed process-tracing technique so as to dig into as much information as possible from the study sites.

Process tracing is the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the researcher. It helps the researcher to describe both political and social phenomena including evaluating causal claims like in this particular case, answering the question – what drives youth into radicalisation and violent extremism? This process responds to causal-process observations, that is to say, analyses trajectories of change and causation as it gives attention to sequence independent, dependent and intervening variables. It goes further to evaluate prior explanatory hypotheses, discover new ones and assess new causal claims. A content analysis tool was developed for desktop review using this principle. The researcher reviewed previous literatures to find inter-related concepts and misconceptions, established patterns of violent extremism and identified statements that explain them.

Principles of process-tracing helped the researcher to identify the theoretical underpinning of this study. Process-tracing techniques was used to prove the selected theory that guided this study or events over time, and multiple data collection tools in an iterative manner was used to understand the historical growth of violent extremism in the IGAD region. Recurrent events about terrorism, drivers, policies and programs on P/CVE and interventions that have been put in place by state and non-state actors were used.

Under process tracing, using multiple methods of data collection (Questionnaires, Key Informant Interviews, FGDs and participant observation), we gathered multiple data sets to help us trace causal mechanisms of drivers of youth involvement in VE, policy environment in which youth operate, causes

of success or failure of state and non-state interventions towards P/CVE. The researcher was interested in finding the links of the causes to outcomes and give explanations to the why and how things have been done so that advice can be given on ways of improving or getting better outcomes. The researcher were also interested in finding out areas of convergences and divergences in terms of radicalisation and violent extremism of youth in Kenya and Uganda. The researcher wanted to find out the inter-relationships and patterns of phenomena in the IGAD region and elsewhere in Africa. The researcher wanted to unravel the puzzle of how comes similar conditions or histories are not yielding similar outcomes in the same country, across countries, and among female and male youth? The researcher interrogated the intervening variables and how strong they were. This was important particularly where there are similar conditions in terms of history, geographical locations, cultural, social and political dispensations.

2.3.3 RESEARCH CONTEXT

This research stressed on understanding the importance of context. It is highlighted and identified trends, correlations and comparisons. A comparative analysis was conducted to explore differences between respondents by significant characteristics, such as economic status, gender, location, age, and educational achievement. This was particularly important because of the "clustering" phenomenon. During data analysis, we compared roughly the same sample of youth, ordinary adults, and leaders in two similar locations, in an attempt to uncover why youth are getting radicalised and engaging in violent extremism in one location and not the other. The researcher looked deeply into causes of youth involvement in radicalisation and violent extremism and the trends that people are experiencing today. The researcher probed for links between causes and outcomes. The researcher analysed the micro and macro level data in a bottom-up approach. The research analysed individuals, dynamics at the national, regional and global level. Data analysis was also done using this process tracing technique.

2.3.4 INCEPTION MEETINGS

The research team organised two inception meetings. One in Kenya and the other in Uganda, and brought all stakeholders on board; first to create awareness of the project, and secondly to get government buy-in. Thirdly, to gain the community participation and ownership of the project so that they develop home grown solutions to the violent extremism problems. This move was very much appreciated. The research team got linkages and more research reports from the floor of the workshops. All these inputs were incorporated in the revised research proposal. In the research design also, priorities were given to sharing the findings of the research with all the stakeholders at the local community level, national level and finally regional level.

These inception meetings were guided by the following questions: Why are we carrying out this research? What is the purpose – overall goal? This is important to clarify, so we can communicate it to others. What do we want to investigate? And what will we do with the new information that we shall gather? The research team explained the research objectives clearly to the audience and made clear our intentions. We expressed our commitment to doing research to change the lives of beneficiaries and empower youth so that we amplify their voices and provide space for them at the policy makers' table. This would make youth to be included in matters that concern them and their governments' development agenda. We made it clear that this research was intended to lead to action so that the evidence and

knowledge that it would generate would improve policy decision making by making them youth-led and mainstreaming youth in policy making.

A research up-take plan was developed and was managed by the Knowledge and Research Uptake Manager. We also developed a logical framework in which every objective had activities that would be engaged in, inputs, expected outcomes – both short and long term, impacts, and indicators of performance. The Monitoring and Evaluation Officer for this project has been managing the logical framework. The indicators are both qualitative and quantitative used to explain the impacts that this research has had.

Together with the logical framework, we designed a Theory of Change (see table one on page viii) for this particular project and a budget. The inception meetings that were organised in Kenya and Uganda respectively, was meant to bring the stakeholders on board, share their research proposal, forge theory of change, budget, and monitoring and evaluation framework. We also south government buy-in and brought the stakeholders on board and created awareness of this project.

2.3.5 *WHY THE CASE STUDY?*

This research adopted a case study design that went further into case-in-case study. First it is the IGAD region, then Kenya and Uganda and within Kenya and Uganda, there were selected study areas. Still within Uganda and Kenya, we were interested in selected research clusters. In the selected research clusters, we selected specific hot spots where radicalisation and violent extremism are earmarked. We still had to look at individuals, communities, nations and the IGAD region.

This approach made it possible to make comparisons across countries and within the same country across different sites. Thus, due to the complex social dynamics of violent extremism and radicalization, comparisons within countries and across countries are critical. The research hopes to contribute to ongoing debates about why youth engage or do not engage in violent extremism, what drives youth into violent extremism and radicalization, how the various interventions and strategies by national governments to include youth in development manifest and if there are good practices of youth inclusive mechanisms in preventing ad countering violent extremism. The case study approach allows the investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristic of real-life events. The need to use a case study approach arises whenever an empirical inquiry must examine a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident.

The case study method of research is a rigorous methodology that allows decision-making processes and causality to be studied. It is suitable when, why and how questions are asked about a set of events. A case study examines a phenomenon in its natural setting, employing multiple methods of data collection to gather information from one or a few entities. The case study as a research strategy comprises an all-encompassing method, covering the logic of design, data collection techniques and specific approaches of data analysis. Case studies are frequently used in policy research as they offer the opportunity to examine the process of policy implementation and at the same time outline recommendations for future policy development and implementation.

2.5. RESEARCH STUDY AREA

Figure 1 below shows the research area where the project was carried out.

Figure 1: Research Area

The IGAD region has multiple conflicts; and all its countries have been victims of terrorist acts due to their geographical location, persistence of conflicts, absence of effective state structures, and despair from the loss of hope and the growth of extremism. It is considered to be the most vulnerable region to terrorism of all regions in sub-Saharan Africa. Hereunder is a map showing global terror attacks since 2012. The IGAD region has suffered immensely.

Fig 2: Global terror attacks since 2012

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Turning Points: A Report of the CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extremism, November 2016

The region's terrorist acts are perpetrated by and against a country's nationals for a domestic cause, or are focused on extra-national or extra-regional targets. It has fragile states and vulnerable youths, and is a host to the largest populations of refugees in Africa. It has been purportedly cited that Eritrea is providing support to religious extremist groups with links to al-Qaida, to further Asmara's military agenda.

The IGAD region also has unsecured border territories.[30] The high presence of the international community in the region offers international terrorists more "high value", Western-related targets. Further, the presence of different faiths and the growth in religious assertiveness has resulted in enhanced tensions, and created an enabling environment for resort to terrorist violence. Additionally, there are gaps in state institutions and technical capacity for P/CVE. There is a general lack of respect among the regional member States for human rights and the rule of the law.

IGAD region is linked to other regional blocks in Africa namely East African Community (EAC), Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), South African Development

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[30] (http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp).

Community (SADC) and ECOWAS. Therefore, lessons learnt from this study will have impact on a wide population. The UN Security Counterterrorism Framework is being implemented by IGAD's Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), which has established a CVE Centre of Excellence and is the interlocutor of other institutions working on CVE in the region. The Greater Horn of Africa faces a range of challenges, including persistent threats posed by transnational terrorists and other violent groups. These security challenges are exacerbated by an array of chronic problems, ranging from underdevelopment and weak governance to high unemployment, particularly among youth, potentially making them more vulnerable to empty promises of a better life and financial incentives offered by terrorist organizations.

The sub-region has also been heavily affected by destructive cross border communal conflicts often triggered by resource scarcity due to rapid population growth and facilitated by porous borders. Disproportionate military and other repressive reactions to security threats such as terrorism often end up delegitimizing local authorities and undermining efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism through community engagement. Moreover, the underdevelopment and fragility that characterizes the sub-region has given rise to a range of grievances that foster an enabling environment for terrorist groups to spread their message and recruit support. Terrorist groups operating in the sub-region and other armed non-state actors have capitalized on economic weaknesses, governance deficits, violent conflicts, and the lack of effective services delivered by governments to recruit from politically and economically marginalized populations.

Marginalized segments of the sub-region's growing youth population are particularly vulnerable in this regard. These structural "push" factors, accompanied by "pull" factors such as charismatic recruiters, appealing ideologies, and material and social incentives, have fuelled radicalization and recruitment in the sub-region efforts often include empowering local communities and civil society actors, increasing social resilience, facilitating constructive dialogue between communities and the government, promoting education and economic opportunities, encouraging credible narratives to counter violent extremist ideology, and providing disengagement and reintegration opportunities. Relevant actors include law enforcement officers and criminal justice personnel such as prosecutors, judges, and corrections officers, as well as officials working on related areas of development, education, youth, and social welfare.

2.6. TARGET POPULATION

The target population primarily was the youth in and out of school, between ages 15 to 35. In this study, context was a critical factor. The current population of Uganda is 45,537,415 as of Thursday, May 23, 2019, based on the latest United Nations estimates. Uganda population is equivalent to 0.59% of the total world population. Uganda ranks number 31 in the list of countries (and dependencies) by population. The population density in Uganda is 229 per Km^2 (593 people per mi^2). The total land area is 199,810 Km2 (77,147 sq. miles). 17.5 **%** of the population is urban (7,993,711 people in 2019). The median age in Uganda is 15.9 years**.**

Uganda's youth development index stands at 0.39 making it 143 out of 170 countries in the world.[31] Generally, Uganda's literacy rates stand high at 90.72%. Both sexes are recorded at (15-24) % where Male representations of the (15-24) % are at 90.50% literacy levels while female representation of the (15-24) % average 90.95%.[32] literacy levels. There is high rate of HIV prevalence estimated at 2.4% infected males; male youth take a good share of (15-24) %. Out of the 4.2% of Uganda's Infected female, 15-24) % are female youths.[33]

2.7   RESEARCH SAMPLE

Sampling is a very important issue in research as the chosen respondents have a significant impact on the results. This study employed multi-stage sampling technique. Firstly the research team purposively sampled Kenya and Uganda as case studies. These two countries in the IGAD region have experienced terrorist attacks with Kenya being more vulnerable. Kenya is categorized as moderate vulnerability while Uganda less vulnerable according to the UN Strategy of Counterterrorism of 2006. During the inception meetings in both countries with stakeholders, the Ministries of Internal Security advised the research team on areas that had been marked as hot spots. The team also selected the research areas guided by reviewed literature on terrorist attacks in Kenya and Uganda. The sample size was determined by researchers, paying due attention to the gender balance of respondents and researchers. We purposively sampled the categories of respondents thus youth, policy makers at local and national level, community members, and security personnel.

2.8   WHY UGANDA?

A number of questions were raised as to why the research picked on Uganda, and more specifically, Mayuge, Gulu and Kampala.

Uganda was chosen for this research to test a case of a country that has been classified as "at risk". The rating pits Kampala, the Capital city of Uganda as being a medium-threat location for terrorist activity.[34] Unlike Somalia and Kenya where manifestations of terrorist activities have been very frequent, the evidence from Uganda becomes relevant to the study's primary focus on enhancing preventive measures. A relapse to the LRA and preventing the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) escalation of the conflict gave more justification to Uganda's study. It is instructive also to note that while VE generally has been associated with Islamists groups, Uganda's experience with LRA and ADF extremists has been non-Islamic but religious nevertheless. It was therefore important to focus on Uganda to draw knowledge and learning from such experience considering commonalities of extremism driven by religious ideologies, persuasions, poverty and political power struggles.

On the Somalia case, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized the African Union to lead a peacekeeping force in Somalia, which is known by its acronym, AMISOM, in February 2007 by unanimously adopting Resolution 1744(2007). Uganda was the first nation to send forces into Somalia and still maintains the largest contingent. Other countries like Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and

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[31] Source: Commonwealth Youth Programme, 2013.

[32] Source: UNESCO, Year: 2015

[33] World Bank, 2013

[34] https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=24140

Sierra Leone later on deployed forces in Somalia under AMISOM. The largest terrorist threat in Uganda comes from al-Shabaab in Somalia that objects to Uganda's support for the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). On 11th July 2010, Al Shabaab terrorist group attacked Uganda in the Capital City of Kampala. The attack involved simultaneous suicide bombings at Lugogo and Kabalagala, which claimed 76 lives of innocent civilians who were watching the FIFA World Cup finals. A third bomb placed at Makindye House, which was to be denoted remotely using a mobile telephone, did not go off. The suicide bombers were Somali and Kenyan nationals.

Unlike Somalia and Kenya where manifestations of terrorist activities have been very frequent, the evidence from Uganda becomes relevant to the study's focus on primarily prevention. In Gulu, post-radicalisation community and possible relapse to the LRA activities has raised concerns amongst the post-war communities. On the one hand, preventing the Allied Democratic Force (ADF) from escalating their recruitment, purportedly coming from Mayuge was of great concern to this research. Kampala presents a mix of many factors, including policy issues regarding youth affairs.

The IGAD region has unsecured border territories.[35] The high presence of the international community in the region offers international terrorists more "high value", Western-related targets. Further, the presence of different faiths and the growth in religious assertiveness has resulted in enhanced tensions, and created an enabling environment to resort to terrorist violence. Additionally, are the gaps in state institutions and technical capacity for CVE.[11] are is a general lack of respect among the region's countries for human rights and the rule of the law. IGAD region is linked to other regional blocks in Africa namely East African Community (EAC), Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), South African Development Community (SADC) and ECOWAS. Therefore, lessons learnt from this study will have impact on a wide population.

Since 9/11 attacks in USA, security procedures and frameworks have mushroomed, primarily not excluding the IGAD region where Al-Shabaab operates. IGAD's Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), which formed the backbone of IGAD's Centre of Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICE-PCVE) was established out of the UN Security Counterterrorism Framework, and is now being implemented. The Centre is an interlocutor of other institutions that are working on CVE in the region.

It is worth mentioning that, the Greater Horn of Africa faces a range of challenges, including persistent threats posed by transnational terrorists and other violent groups. These security challenges are exacerbated by an array of chronic problems, ranging from underdevelopment and weak governance to high unemployment, particularly among youth, potentially making them more vulnerable to empty promises of a better life and financial incentives offered by terrorist organizations and Violent Extremist Groups (VEGs). Uganda is not an exceptional country from these problems.

The sub-region has also been heavily affected by destructive cross border communal conflicts often triggered by resource scarcity due to rapid population growth and facilitated by porous borders. Disproportionate military and other repressive reactions to security threats such as terrorism often end up delegitimizing local authorities and undermining efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism

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[35] (http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp).

through community engagement. Moreover, the underdevelopment and fragility that characterizes the sub-region has given rise to a range of grievances that foster an enabling environment for terrorist groups to spread their message and recruit support. Terrorist groups operating in the sub-region and other armed non-state actors have capitalized on economic weaknesses, governance deficits, violent conflicts, and the lack of effective services delivered by governments to recruit from politically and economically marginalized populations.

Marginalized segments of the sub-region's growing youth population are particularly vulnerable in this regard. These structural "push" factors, accompanied by "pull" factors such as charismatic recruiters, appealing ideologies, and material and social incentives, have fuelled radicalization and recruitment in the sub-region efforts often include empowering local communities and civil society actors, increasing social resilience, facilitating constructive dialogue between communities and the government, promoting education and economic opportunities, encouraging credible narratives to counter violent extremist ideology, and providing disengagement and reintegration opportunities. The relevant actors include law enforcement officers and criminal justice personnel such as prosecutors, judges, and corrections officers, as well as officials working on related areas of development, education, youth, and social welfare. At the same time, community leaders, civil society actors, grassroots organizations, and other non-state actors should be empowered and engaged to work on count.

2.9   DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE

The research team applied 5 strategies that has been suggested by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) namely:

1. Focusing on prisons and delineating good practices on rehabilitating and reintegrating into society violent extremist offenders who have disengaged from violent extremism;
2. Enumerating good practices on working with victims of terrorism in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack;
3. Exploring the importance of multi-sectoral (i.e., government institutions, agencies, the private sector, and civil society) approaches to P/ CVE;
4. Examining the methods of P/CVE communications most resonant with key audiences; and;
5. Measuring the effectiveness of P/CVE programming36. We focused on strategies 2, 3, 4 and 5 with the aim of developing solutions relevant to the audience being addressed. Oblivious of the fact that there is growing importance of the Internet but radicalization to violence continues to take place primarily at the local level, often through face-to-face engagement. Therefore, locally-relevant P/CVE initiatives are central to the success of any strategy.

Community engagement and community-oriented policing are related tools that focus on building trust with local communities and engaging with them as partners to develop information-driven community-based solutions to local issues.[37] Such engagement is meant to raise community awareness about the threat of violent extremism, to provide them with the necessary tools, and to empower them to intervene

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[36] The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)(2013). Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent
Extremism.https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/159885/13Aug09_EN_
[37] Ibid

and prevent radicalization and violence. The more aware communities are of potential threats to their security, the more empowered they are to be resilient against it and the better prepared they can be to counter the threats themselves. Community engagement therefore requires building trust between officials and community members in order to establish a relationship of collaboration. Experience proves that such relationships cannot be built overnight and should be cultivated and maintained over time in order to have effect. We put this in mind as we went to the communities to collect data.

Our approach was to first conduct research in order to understand local problems and grievances that local communities in target areas experience so that as we engage on interventions, these communities are   not targeted for security reasons but are engaged for its own benefit. In this research, we approached communities with basic knowledge of their local dynamics and the issues they face in order to demonstrate to the community that they are not engaging the community solely because of potential security threats arising within the community. We took a holistic approach to community engagement and community-oriented policing that involves all sectors of the society in order to find the right partners and sustain the engagement. Multiple sectors within a community were involved in the research at both the local household and community level and at the national level. Our goal was to develop trust with different levels in the community. We were oblivious of the fact that cooperative and constructive dialogue between society and government agencies, including at the municipal level, is a prerequisite to success in P/CVE.

2.9.1. THE RESEARCH TEAM

To start with, this research identified a research team from the IGAD region with a gender balance. Gender was mainstreamed in the project starting from the research team, research objectives, data collection methods, and data dissemination. Gender and ethnic balance were critical to us. During the research design, we asked ourselves questions like: Will men be able to interview female youth and adult women at the research sites? These were local researchers who understood the IGAD region context and the case study countries-Kenya and Uganda. We considered whether the nationality, religion, or ethnicity of a potential research team member would negatively impact the ability of the research team to secure quality findings. As such, PeaceNet, the implementing partner, identified research assistants with experience and adequate knowledge in conducting securitized research. This helped the research team to maintain the ethical considerations.

All the research assistants were female and male youth from the local areas where the research was carried out. The research team was then trained on security intelligence. This was a Trainer of Trainers workshop. The team developed the data collection tools, ethical considerations in the research, a training curriculum for the research assistants and firmed up the proposal by incorporating views that they had gathered from the inception meeting.

2.9.2. TRIANGULATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS

All the KIIs, FGDs and any observations, comments or qualitative research responses were written. Corroborating evidence in the field (Triangulation) Considered employing triangulation methods: Triangulation "is based on the premise that no single method ever adequately solves the problem of rival explanations." The process of "triangulating with multiple data sources, observers, methods, and/or theories" can allow researchers to "make substantial strides in overcoming the scepticism that greets singular methods, lone analysts, and single-perspective interpretations.

2.10 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTNER INSTITUTIONS

OSSREA-Organization for Social Science Research for Eastern and Southern Africa[38] is an academic Think Tank with over 36 years' experience in collaborative high-quality interdisciplinary research and capacity building that impacts on policy. It has a wide network with a presence in 21 Eastern and Southern African countries. OSSREA shares its research findings with policy makers, the media, CSOs and communities for research uptake by translating knowledge into information for public policy. OSSREA disseminates research findings through book publications, journal articles, knowledge sharing workshops, knowledge to policy dialogues, bulletins, E-learning alliances, and e-policy dialogues on thematic issues. It also works closely with policy makers and government institutions, and has signed Memoranda of Understanding with CEWARN- IGAD, EALA, SADC Parliamentary Forum, and Centre for Parliamentary Studies and Training in Kenya. Her latest multi-country studies on various themes, namely Youth Unemployment, Election Violence, Inclusive Development, International Migrations, and Food Security all identified the youth bulge in Africa as a threat to peace and security because youth are marginalized in policy discourse. OSSREA is the project manager and lead organization in facilitating the merger of analyses from academia, policy makers and civil society. It takes the lead in documenting the whole process and in supporting the development of various training curricula, training manual, synthesis reports, and policy documents and briefs on holistic for CVE programming in the IGAD region; ensuring that gender is mainstreamed in the project; and disseminating knowledge collated. OSSREA is providing project related financial and technical support to partners for the operationalization of the initiative with the support from IDRC.

IGAD-CEWARN: The IGAD Centre for Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (IP/CVE) delegated IGAD-CEWARN- to be the partner in this project. IP/CVE is the interlocutor between the UN system and bilateral donors, all state authorities with a P/CVE interest, including the law enforcement and justice sectors, social services, education, and the sub-regional focal points on implementation of the UN Strategy on P/CVE. They analyze conflicts and sent early warning to all affected communities and national governments. Through the IP/CVE Centre for Excellence, IGAD-CEWARN will ensure harmonious implementation of the UN framework, and ensure government/policy makers buy in, advising on policy actors and security personnel to engage with, identifying research population, taking leadership over policy recommendations from the international knowledge to policy conference for the UN Strategy and P/CVE programming; mainstreaming security concerns of national governments in the project and training OSSREA and Peace and Development Network Trust (PeaceNet – Kenya) about it. They are tasked with research uptake at the policy level by ensuring that the policy inputs that will come out of the project get ownership of the policy recommendations and facilitate the adoption, internalization and implementation of these inputs by P/CVE Centre for Excellence. They have done intelligence training for researchers and mainstreamed ethics and human rights of respondents in the research instruments. They have also sensitized the research team on how to ensure the protection of respondents from stigmatization. The tripartite team has relied heavily on IGAD-CEWARN to help identify policy makers who are respondents in this study both at the community and national level. The partners are also relying on them to share best practices

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[38] www.ossrea.net

case studies from different regions and organize a regional knowledge-sharing platform with policy makers. We are also relying on them to help identify key participants in the e-policy dialogue on P/CVE.

PeaceNet Kenya is a national networking and partnership building organization providing a platform for CSOs, and other peace actors committed to collaboration and mobilization of national and regional initiatives for peace building, promotion of justice and conflict transformation. PeaceNet-Kenya, is currently the coordinating CSO working group that brings together all NGOs working on Peace, Governance, Conflict, Natural Resources, and Gender Based Violence. It is currently implementing a two-year project called *Jamii Thabiti*, which focuses on violence against girls and women, inter-communal violence, and criminal violence (involving children, youth, women and elders). It also coordinates the localization of the Kenya National Action Plan for implementing UNSC Resolution 1325 on women peace and security.

In this project, PeaceNet is the implementing partner. It has taken the lead in identifying trusted civil society networks used by embassies and aid agencies as the vehicle for change in the IGAD region. It has helped to collect data on the experiences of the youth on violence, extremism, radicalization, exclusion and injustices against youth. It has provided guidance in the harvesting, documentation and compilation of knowledge from the various CSOs and Faith Based Organizations on CVE due to their hands-on experience in collecting data of this nature. They have further spearheaded the building of local support and awareness of the UN Strategy. The tripartite team is relying on PeaceNet to use its network and strengthen inter-community dialogue and tolerance and organize for regional knowledge harvesting forums. They will participate in the international knowledge-to-policy fora and help identify key participants in the e-policy dialogue on P/CVE.

2.11 RISKS AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS/MEASURES TO MITIGATE RISKS

I.   *Stigmatization of respondents: youth and community members* - All respondents participated on voluntary basis and were assured of anonymity and security without victimization and stigmatization. We sought their consent to be respondents in the study after explaining to them the objectives of the project.

II. *Adverse effects of the research:* The study subject was a highly emotive issue that stood the risk of potentially provoking emotional outbursts among victims and even the perpetrators. Signed consent was sought from all respondents to give them opportunity to voluntarily participate or exclude themselves from the process. Further, data collection tools were presented to Uganda National Council of Science and Technology for approval. All the research team members undertook training in intelligence and research ethics training.

III. *Keeping the research team together:* Academia, civil society organizations and policy makers each have their own style of conducting and generating research. Putting this diverse teams together for co-production of knowledge, posed a challenge with regard to harmonizing of approaches. This risk was mitigated by IDRC conducting a research methodology training to firm up proposals. OSSREA the lead organization also included senior members of these organizations in the field research in order to harness their strengths.

Figure 4: Research Process

2.12 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethical practices were planned way in advance of field research, and then periodically during the field research period to keep reminding the research team and research assistances the importance of adhering to them.

The balance between the search for scientific knowledge and respect for the rights of those studied was carefully taken into consideration. Before the interview begun, the researcher gave the respondents a general explanation of the purpose of the study and asked them for their consent before the interviews begun. At this point, three of the informants withdrew from the interview. Their wishes to not be interviewed were respected.

Additionally, the informants were assured of confidentiality, privacy and anonymity. To make sure those interviewed were comfortable, the researchers signed a Non-Disclosure agreement guaranteeing the respondents privacy and confidentiality since the interviews were being recorded. Notes were also taken during the interviews; particularly taking note of dynamics that could not be captured through the recordings such as facial expressions and gestures. We applied and were granted a research permit by National Council of Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). Due to the sensitivity of the

research, the Ministry of Internal Security sought to go through the manuscript before publishing it. We also agreed to share copies of our research output with NACOSTI.

All consent was written and signed off by the researcher and the interviewees. All the recorded interviews and information collected was stored safely on the researcher's personal laptop. The transcribed data does not contain any personal markers such as participant name, phone contact and was coded to ensure confidentiality. However, there were few cases of respondents who accepted to be video and audiotaped. Finally, all interviews were conducted in a private and closed room, often in the respondents' office. This enhanced the confidentiality of all the interviews.

CHAPTER THREE

UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL TERROR IN UGANDA'S CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

3.1 THE INTRICATE LINKAGES OF TERROR ATTACKS FROM THE GLOBAL TO LOCAL

Globally, terrorism and acts of violent extremism have increased. Amongst them are violent Islamist extremism that are globally problematic. There were 7,841 attacks in 48 countries in 2017, and related counter-measures in a total of 66 countries.[39] Extremism affected 18 of the world's most developed countries. A total of 121 violent Islamist groups were active in 2017. Of these, 92 perpetrated violence in at least one country. Nigeria's Boko Haram and Mali's Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin demonstrated the fluidity of violence across the Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, instigating attacks in four countries each.[40]

According to the Tony Blair Institute for Global Studies, an average of approximately 21 violent Islamist attacks occurred per day in 2017. Of all those killed during the year, 57 per cent (48,164) were extremists, 26 per cent (21,923) were civilians, 12 per cent (10,337) were security personnel and 4 per cent (3,307) were non-state actors. The identities of 292 of those who died could not be confirmed.[41]

FIG. 1.1 Countries Affected by Violent Islamist Extremism, 2017

VIOLENT ISLAMIST INCIDENTS AND COUNTER-MEASURES

0	21-50	176-300	2,570
1-6	51-100	301-600	17,422
7-20	101-175	601-2,000	

Source: Tony Blair (2018) Monitor Violent Islamist Extremism in 2017, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

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[39] *TONY BLAIR (2018) MONITOR VIOLENT ISLAMIST EXTREMISM IN 2017, TONY BLAIR INSTITUTE FOR GLOBAL CHANGE.*

[40] *IBID.;*

[41] Tony Blair (2018) Monitor Violent Islamist Extremism in 2017, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

The changing role of gender in extremist activities have shown what groups are doing to ensure their survival and expansion, and maximize damage.

About 181 female suicide bombers have been recognized to have strategic value in female recruits. VEGs are showing increasing signs of a concerted effort to employ women for their ability to evade security and arouse less suspicion than men. According to Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (2018) there are links between women and terrorism, borne out by the data, which reflected a real shift in Islamist extremism. Many women plotted and orchestrated deadly attacks targeting civilians. The deployment of women on the battlefield showed violent Islamist groups adapting and strategically shifting their principles in favour of operational gains. Operational pressures have encouraged the most expansionist groups to adopt more flexible rulings on women and their place in the global violent jihadi movement.

Below are few summarized timelines of violent Islamist incidences ever recorded from 1980s onwards.

FIG. 1.3 Timeline of Selected Violent Islamist Incidents, 1979–2016

Source: Tony Blair (2018) Monitor Violent Islamist Extremism in 2017, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

Central and South Asia

| 1980 | 1982 | 1984 | 1986 | 1988 | 1990 | 1992 | 1994 | 1996 |

Islamist fighters begin forming mujahideen in Afghanistan to combat Soviet invasion

Taliban and Haqqani Network emerge out of Afghan mujahideen

Extreme anti-Shia group Sipah-e-Sahaba forms in Pakistan

Soviets leave Afghanistan; Taliban fills the political vacuum

Osama bin Laden sets up Afghan Services Bureau and training camp to recruit fighters for war against Soviets

Hizbul Mujahideen bombs market in Jammu, India

Merged Islamist militants, including Sipah-e-Sahaba fighters, form Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

Taliban seizes Kabul and declares Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

East and Southeast Asia

| 1980 | 1982 | 1984 | 1986 | 1988 | 1990 | 1992 | 1994 | 1996 |

Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, formerly of the Afghan mujahideen, returns to the Philippines and establishes Abu Sayyaf

Two exiled Indonesian extremists living in Malaysia form Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), drawing on personal links with al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda-linked Islamists bomb Philippine Airlines flight 434

Post-9/11

| 1998 | 2000 | 2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 |

Second Chechen War begins; a network of violent Islamist groups is involved in the fighting

AQ launches attacks on New York World Trade Center and other US targets, killing 2,996

AQ kills 193 in Madrid train bombings

7/7 bombings in London kill 52

Caucasus Emirate, an AQ affiliate, vows to create Islamic state

Two female suicide bombers linked to AQ kill 40 in Moscow

Boston Marathon bombing claims three lives

Large numbers defect from AQ-linked Caucasus Emirate in Russia to join ISIS in Iraq and Syria

AQAP claims attack on *Charlie Hebdo* magazine staff and a kosher supermarket in Paris

ISIS claims Paris attacks killing 130

ISIS-inspired attacks target everyday life with everyday weapons in Brussels, Orlando, Nice and Berlin

| 1998 | 2000 | 2002 | 2004 | 2006 | 2008 | 2010 | 2012 | 2014 | 2016 |

Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, precursor to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), forms in Jordan, with headquarters in Iraq

Al-Qaeda bombs US Navy's *USS Cole* in Yemeni harbour, killing 17

US announces Operation Iraqi Freedom; Islamists target UN, Red Cross and Shia leaders

Militant groups from Algerian Civil War merge to form basis of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

AQI established, pledges allegiance to Bin Laden

AQI joins Mujahideen Shura Council as sectarian violence in Iraq escalates, rebranding to Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)

Al-Qaeda's Yemeni and Saudi branches merge into al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

Arab Spring uprisings begin peacefully

Syrian and Libyan Civil Wars begin as anti-regime protests turn violent; existing jihadi networks mobilise, centred on al-Qaeda and ISI

ISIS captures Mosul, declares caliphate in Iraq and Syria; militant operations in Libya, Yemen and Egypt pledge allegiance

ISIS-inspired violence spikes; attacks target tourist hotspots across the region, Europe and North America

ISIS bomb attack in Baghdad kills nearly 400 civilians during Ramadan

Source: Tony Blair (2018) Monitor Violent Islamist Extremism in 2017, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

Timeline 1 (1998–2016)

- Al-Qaeda suicide bomber attacks US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224
- Boko Haram forms in Nigeria as Islamist group that seeks to establish Islamic state
- Al-Shabaab emerges out of civil war in Somalia
- Boko Haram begins violent assaults in northeastern Nigeria
- Al-Shabaab pledges allegiance to al-Qaeda
- Boko Haram kidnaps 276 Chibok schoolgirls, declares caliphate in northeastern Nigeria
- Al-Shabaab vows to carry out jihad in Kenya and Uganda
- Al-Shabaab attacks Westgate shopping mall in Kenya, killing 67
- Boko Haram claims first attack in Chad
- Boko Haram pledges allegiance to ISIS
- ISIS in Somalia is formed
- AQIM kills 30 in Burkina Faso's worst Islamist terrorist attack

Timeline 2 (1998–2016)

- Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan established
- Taliban captures more territory in Afghanistan; Hazara minority indiscriminately targeted
- US-led campaign begins in Afghanistan, targeting Taliban and al-Qaeda training camps
- 13 militant groups join to form Pakistani Taliban
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi conducts shootings and bombings in Mumbai, India, killing at least 166
- Bin Laden killed by US troops in Pakistan
- Al-Qaeda announces new branch on Indian subcontinent
- ISIS-Khorasan forms in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Timeline 3 (1998–2016)

- JI relocates to Indonesia from Malaysia following Suharto government collapse
- Abu Sayyaf raids western Philippines resort and seizes 18 hostages
- Abu Sayyaf claims bombing of ship off coast of Manila, killing 116
- JI claims multi-casualty on Australian embassy in Jakarta
- On US request Moro Islamic Liberation Front expels JI members training in its camp
- Bali nightclubs attacks kill 202; JI members, backed by al-Qaeda, claim responsibility
- Two brothers form Islamist militant group Maute in the Philippines
- Maute pledges allegiance to ISIS
- ISIS claims first attack in Indonesia

Source: Tony Blair (2018) Monitor Violent Islamist Extremism in 2017, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change

The Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (2018) has identified five of the ten deadliest countries that are very fragile states, and four are outside major conflict zones. Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq not only suffered high numbers of fatalities in 2017 but were also ranked among the world's ten most fragile states. Beyond major conflict areas, Mali, Egypt, Nigeria and Pakistan were also on the list of countries most affected by violent Islamist extremism.

3.2   AL-SHABAAB FACTOR IN IGAD REGION

Historically, Al-Shabaab rose to create the greatest terror threat in East Africa. The group originated as an armed faction of the Islamic Courts Union a strict Sharia administration set up as an alternative to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was established in Somalia in 2004 as part of the terms to end the lengthy civil war. Government forces defeated the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 but Al-Shabaab remained. These groups retain a limited common agenda of defeating AMISOM and the TFG and extending an extreme interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) across Somalia. The TFG, with support from AMISOM, managed to expel Al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in 2011; however, the group

continues to launch attacks on the capital and has waged open warfare against the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM in southern Somalia. There have been repeated threats and one attack by Al-Shabaab against Uganda, in retribution to Uganda's contributing troops to AMISOM and for carrying out military operations against the terrorist organization in Somalia.[42] Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate, is seeking to create an Islamic state in Somalia[43].

On August 7, 1998 Al-Shabaab was signalled as an Anti-American terrorist group who targeted American Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam while a third attack on the US Embassy in Kampala failed to come through. More frequent threats began to emerge in Uganda after Uganda began serving as a proxy for American intervention in Somalia under AMISOM. [44] Therefore, the origins, manifestation and support of most extremist groups in Africa should not be seen in isolation. They stem from a vast number of factors, intermingled with allegiances and alliances that create a firm connection among them.

In the IGAD region, the fragile states like Eritrea, South Sudan and Somalia pose a threat to peace and security of the entire region.[45]Somalia, which has experienced various forms of conflict since 1991, has often been seen as the source of extremism in the region, especially following the attacks on the United States (US) embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi on 7 August 1998. The wave of terror attacks could be said to have started with the twin bombings of the United States Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998.

Yet closer investigation reveals that Somali nationals were not behind most of the incidents outside Somalia's borders. Somalia provides a safe haven, training camps and opportunities for extremists to fight the 'enemies of Islam', but al-Qaeda and later Al-Shabaab has executed attacks in the region by relying on local assistance and support. At the same time, Al-Shabaab managed to recruit Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian nationals to its ranks in Somalia.46 Of the three countries mentioned above, Uganda experienced one serious attack, while Kenya has experienced the most attacks within its borders. Although Kenya's intervention in Somalia served to incite a terrorist response, the experience of Uganda, Ethiopia and Burundi, all of which have had troops in Somalia since 2006, showed different trends. Only the attacks in Uganda and Kenya were attributed to those countries' interventions in Somalia. And, despite the fact that those directly involved in these attacks were Ugandan nationals, Kenyans and Tanzanians helped plan and execute the attacks. These were not members of traditional

[42] Ndung'u I., Salifu & Sigsworth, R(2017).Violent Extremism in Kenya:Why women are a priority.Monograph 197/November 2017. Institute of Security Studies.

[43] Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2016, New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016,

[44] Vadlamudi, S. (2007). The U.S. Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in Forest, J. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 103-127.

[45] [45] Aronson,S.L (2011). United States Aid to Kenya: A Study on Regional Security and Counterterrorism Assistance Before and After 9/11. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS, Vol.5, #s1 &2. ISSN 1554-3897.

[46] [46] United Nations Report. (2012). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution. Retrieved from http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/UN_REPORT_2012.pdf (Accessed on May 2, 2016)

Somali communities, an affiliate of al-Qaeda is Al-Shabaab.[47] Al-Shabaab has launched series of attacks against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The group has become notorious for infiltrating local organisations to recruit and train Somali youth.

Radicalization of young people has raised considerable alarm even when Uganda got involved in Somali. The context of youth being radicalized raised concerns when the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eretria reported that hundreds of impoverished youths, mainly from Kenya and also parts of Uganda were recruited into Al-Shabaab.[48]

Youth are affected from the lack of socio-economic opportunities, discrimination resulting from marginalization, poor governance abetting the deteriorating state-citizen relationship, violation of human rights, and selective application of the rule of law. These have resulted into many youth expressing themselves with more aggressive means of using collective grievances. These are some of the factors that are pushing them as easy recruits, thus embracing violent extremism[49],[50]. Al-Shabaab recruiters exploit these collective grievances in their radicalization and recruitment strategies by crafting ideologically driven narratives focusing on a common enemy, the Western government partners',[51] while highlighting the plight of communities and individual victims (Badurdeen, 2016). Recruiters follow up by responding to their needs in terms of materialistic and/or spiritual support[52]by addressing the collective grievances of the youth and communities that they live in. Al-Shabaab, thrives on narratives pegged to collective grievances.

3.3   GENERAL LEVELS OF YOUTH MOTIVATIONS IN JOINING VEGS

There are general motivations and enablers that can be identified at the individual, group, and community, national, regional and global levels on why youth join VEGs. However, it should quickly be noted that context-specific issues play a great role in radicalization process, leading to violent extremism.

The individual level: According to Saltman and Smith (2015) and Alao (2015)[53] individuals who have susceptibility to powerful messaging, narratives and imagery via social media networks and person-to-person channels has been highlighted by several researchers as being particularly significant in the

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[47] R Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, New York: UN Women, 2015, 222, http://reliefweb.int/report/world/preventing-conflicttransforming- justice-securing-peace-global-studyimplementation

[48] United Nations Report. (2012). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution. Retrieved from http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/UN_REPORT_2012.pdf (Accessed on May 2, 2016)

[49] Badurdeen, F.A. (2012). Youth Radicalization in the Coast Province of Kenya, Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, 5(1): 53-64.

[50] Botha, A. (2013). Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies

[51] R Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, New York: UN Women, 2015, 231.

[52] USIP, Women and Violent Extremism: A Growing Threat Demands Concerted Action, August 2015, https://www. usip.org/publications/2015/08/women-and-violentextremism- growing-threat-demands-concerted-action.

[53] SALTMAN AND SMITH (2015); ALAO (2015) AND OTHERS.

context of violent extremism. These are possible when there are situations of conflict and state fragility, vulnerability and breakdown of family. Youth who are faced with such problems tend to move to urban areas in search for jobs, lose touch with families, lack safety-guided support and become vulnerable. Recruiters fill in the gap of such youth as potential father figures, role models, peer-group and mentor while providing basic support and holding tight social cohesion with them.

The community level: Within the community, the roles of formal and informal institutions and the dynamic interplay it has on members of the community are very crucial. The family and religious institutions can be attached to each other in one way or the other, which are important in the early lives of youth. Lack of guidance may lead youth to follow Imams, teachers, priests, pastors and bishops. Religious institutions can easily identify youth who are easy targets for recruitments, radicalisation and those who can propagate extremist-related messaging.[54] It is purported that in recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of madrassas (1:7 ratio of mosque to madrassa), which in many communities are the sole providers of education for the youth.[55] Lack of control of the teachers, pastors and preachers, the content of the curriculum, religious institutions have easy means of proliferating extremist ideologies.[56] A community that is subjected to exclusion from political, social and economic processes, partly due to weak or lack of State-society platforms and deprivation from state benefits are ripe drivers of radicalization.

The State level: The failure of the State to execute its responsibility can be a major driver of violent extremism. When the Authority of the state is questioned, Capacity of the state is minimized, and Legitimacy of the state are doubted by citizens and external actors, there stands a very high risk of youth getting into VE. If such a state is challenged by the high levels of corruption, unaccountable public administration, weak or ineffective judicial systems and security services perceived as serving the political interests of elites rather than protecting the rights of citizens are all actively fuelling the rapid growth of radicalization (UNDP, 2012: 9).[57] Radicalization takes place where marginalization has created a vacuum. Extremist groups therefore thrive where State failure or collapse exists.

The regional and trans- national levels: As mentioned already, IGAD region have porous borders that have been known to be exploited to facilitate proliferation of small arms and trafficking of people, drugs, contraband and goods amongst armed groups and trans-national criminal networks. The internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees are already marginalized and are usually easy targets for radicalisation as would be exposed easily to VEGs.

The global level: The spark of Arab Spring acted as a catalyst to the rapid growth of violent extremism in Africa.[58] Additionally, the responses from the affected States increased frustration, marginalization

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[54] IBID;.

[55] IBID;.

[56] IBID;.

[57] UNDP (2012) PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA: A DEVELOPMENT APPROACH; UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME REGIONAL AND MULTI-COUNTRY PROJECT DOCUMENT

[58] UNDP, THIRD EXPERT CONSULTATION, ADDIS ABABA, 2015.

and, in some cases, extremism.[59] Besides, the youth are of the view that the international community is failing to defend Muslims and such rhetoric is often used to justify violence against 'the West'.[60] The rapid spread of access to global media and new technologies appears to be exacerbating the perceptions of relative deprivation and the ever-increasing gap between rich and poor. During the post-9/11, there grew general perceptions of selective and aggressive foreign policies on the part of "the West" against targeted countries and groups (Sharif, T.A. and J. Richards, 2016).[61] Such perceptions and actions fed into extremists' recruitment motivations and quickly manipulated other extremist groups using polarizing discourse, *"us" versus "them".[62]*

Generally, processes, motivations, drivers and enablers for youth who join VE groups have varied. Individuals who grow up in highly deprived, peripheral part of marginalized society tend to join VE groups easily. Unhappy childhood from family upbringing who perceived limited involvement of parents can drive youth to join VE groups. Other factors have shown that lack of relative exposure to other ethnic and religious groups are key drivers. While education that starts with early child growth from 4 years or less of secular education can radicalize children. Religious identity has been widely researched and found to be the main reason for joining VE groups, but it is also important to note that quite a good number of youth who join VE groups neither read nor understand religious texts.

Economic reasons have generally pointed towards youth developing high level of frustrations to get income or attain jobs and employment. This factor leads to youth developing acute sense of grievance towards governments who seem to take care of the interests of the few youths. Because, the structures of government like police, military and law enforcement officers take a hard stance on VE, youth who join VE groups agree that government actions do trigger decision to VE groups.

3.3.1 EXPLAINING THE PUSH FACTORS

According to Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter (2013), push factors are structural conditions such as underdevelopment, unemployment, political repression, or social marginalization, that have the potential of fuelling grievances, which in combination with other factors, may push individuals towards adopting violent extremist ideas and engaging in violent extremist actions. They provide a justification for individuals to join extremist groups as they envision opportunities of reprieve from suffering back home. These grievances may be real or perceived and could be felt on behalf of communities with whom individuals share a cultural, ideological, religious, or ethnic bond, even if they are at a physical distance.[63]

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[59] IBID.:

[60] IBID.:

[61] SHARIF, T.A. AND J. RICHARDS (2016). 'TOWARDS A CONTINENTAL STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA', GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS REVIEW, DECEMBER 2016. NEW YORK CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. NEW YORK, USA. AVAILABLE AT HTTP://PEACEOPERATIONSREVIEW.ORG/THEMATIC-ESSAYS/TOWARDS-A- CONTINENTAL-STRATEGY-FOR-COUNTERING-VIOLENT-EXTREMISM-IN-AFRICA/.

[62] IBDI.:

[63] GUILAIN DENOEUX AND LYNN CARTER, "GUIDE TO THE DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM," U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, FEBRUARY 2009, HTTP://PDF.USAID.GOV/PDF_DOCS/PNADT978.PDF.

A push factor may rely on individual motivations and processes, which play a key role in transforming ideas and grievances into violent extremist action. These include: Individual backgrounds and motivations; collective grievances and victimization stemming from domination, oppression, subjugation or foreign intervention; distortion and misuse of beliefs, political ideologies and ethnic and cultural differences; and leadership and social networks.[64] Push factors drive individuals to VE, such as: marginalization, inequality, discrimination, persecution of the perception thereof; limited access to quality education; the denial of rights and civil liberties; and other environmental, historical and socio-economic grievances.[65]

Other push factors may arise from State's counter-terrorism measures that may have failed to prevent, investigate, prosecute or punish the terrorists acts and that in turn may have led to perpetration of new human rights violations with impunity (CHRJG, 2011, p. 60).[66] Human rights deficiencies and violations are often cited as one of the conditioning factors (push factors) in the radicalisation process and in terrorist rhetoric (USAID, 2009). Additionally, the gender dynamics are critical in CVE programming.

Some Governments have also used stringent measures against minority and targeted groups ranging from gender inequality, abuse of minority rights and marginalization, and denial of basic human needs to targeted groups of people to counter terrorism.

3.3.2 EXPLAINING THE PULL FACTORS

Pull factors nurture the appeal of violent extremism, for example, the existence of well-organized violent extremist groups with compelling discourses and effective programs that are providing services, revenue and/or employment in exchange for membership. Groups can also lure new members by providing outlets for grievances and promise of adventure and freedom. Furthermore, these groups appear to offer spiritual comfort, "a place to belong" and a supportive social network.[67]

According to Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter (2013), pull factors are classified as more immediate incentives that make violent extremism appealing. These may be the attraction of charismatic individuals, powerful strategic communications and compelling messaging, financial or other material benefits, or the social status that some group members feel they achieve when being part of a terrorist or militant group.[68]

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[64] GENEVA CONFERENCE ON PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM – THE WAY FORWARD ORGANIZED BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND 7 AND 8 APRIL 2016 GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

[65] https://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/pages/home.aspx

[66] CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2011). A DECADE LOST: LOCATING GENDER IN U.S. COUNTER- TERRORISM. NEW YORK: NYU SCHOOL OF LAW.
HTTP://WWW.ATLANTICPHILANTHROPIES.ORG/SITES/DEFAULT/FILES/UPLOADS/DECADELOST_LOCATINGGENDER_REPOR T.PDF ALSO: CARTER, BECKY (2013) WOMEN AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST; HELPDESK RESEARCH REPORT FROM GSDRC APPLIED KNOWLEDGE SERVICES

[67] https://www.livingsafetogether.gov.au/pages/home.aspx

[68] GUILAIN DENOEUX AND LYNN CARTER, "GUIDE TO THE DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM," U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, FEBRUARY 2009, HTTP://PDF.USAID.GOV/PDF_DOCS/PNADT978.PDF.

Within the Greater Horn region, several exploratory assessments of overarching drivers of violent extremism and instability have been distinguished. The first assessment comes closer to the near-universal experience of marginalization of certain segments of national populations. The historical legacies of discrimination in the delivery of public goods, services, and infrastructure investment are a hallmark of marginalization in the region and are often supported and perpetuated by institutionalized systems of resource patronage and nepotism.[69] The Regional Integration Department, World Bank, (2014) assert that structural conditions result in unmet expectations and feelings of relative deprivation that contribute to increased friction across communities, both those that benefit from or compete for access to power and those that do not. This is experienced between communities and their governments. Guilain Denoeux and Lynn Carter (2013) agree that these tensions can be exacerbated when the political and economic climate is sustained by state coercion and violence.

Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková (2003) have long argued that poverty and violent extremism have no causal link,[70] but people living in poor countries are the most affected: only approximately 5 percent of all deaths from terrorism since 2000 have occurred in countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.[71] Although the region contains some of the world's fastest growing economies, it continues to struggle with high levels of poverty and chronic under-development. In fact, many of the focus countries rank in the bottom one-quarter of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index.[72]

3.3.3 RELIGIOUS BELIEFS

Religious ideologies have for a long time been cited as one of the primary reason why youth join VE, without possibly looking at other accompanying factors. Youth tend to engage a lot with religious ideologies for both constructive and destructive reasons; and can be used to C/PVE. For both constructive and destructive means, extremist groups justify their violent actions and express their grievances using religion. Religion has featured more prominently   as a pull-factor to youth to join violent extremist groups. This is sometimes shown from Madrassas school where, children as young as 4 years are radicalized in the name of raising the level of religious literacy. *Madrassas* schools have on several occasions been annotated negatively as being highly counter-productive to C/PVE.

Religion hardens attitudes towards others and has a discerning impact amongst youth to voluntarily join

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[69] REGIONAL INTEGRATION DEPARTMENT, WORLD BANK, "(DRAFT) REGIONAL INITIATIVE IN SUPPORT OF THE HORN OF AFRICA," 23 OCTOBER 2014, HTTP://RELIEFWEB.INT/SITES /RELIEFWEB.INT/FILES/RESOURCES/917830WP0HORN00BOX385358B00PUBLIC0.PDF.

[70] ALAN B. KRUEGER AND JITKA MALEČKOVÁ, "EDUCATION, POVERTY AND TERRORISM: IS THERE A CAUSAL CONNECTION?" JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 17, NO. 4 (FALL 2003): 119–144.

[71] INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS AND PEACE, "GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2015: MEASURING AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM," IEP REPORT, NO. 36 (NOVEMBER 2015), HTTP://ECONOMICSANDPEACE.ORG/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/2015/11/2015-GLOBAL-TERRORISM-INDEX-REPORT.PDF.

[72] THE 2014 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX RANKED DJIBOUTI RANKED AT 170, ETHIOPIA AT 173, KENYA AT 147, TANZANIA AT 159, AND UGANDA AT 164. THE INDEX DID NOT RANK SOMALIA AND SOUTH SUDAN. UNDP, "HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014," 2014, TABLE 1, HTTP://WWW.UNDP.ORG/CONTENT/DAM/UNDP/LIBRARY /CORPORATE/HDR/2014HDR/HDR-2014-ENGLISH.PDF?DOWNLOAD.

VE group. The teaching insists that the feeling about your religion that is poised under threat is a warning to your own values. The recruitment of youth in the name of religion by violent extremist groups makes sure religion becomes a touchstone for other context-based grievances. However, there are also those who express voluntary willingness to die for religion over other causes.

3.3.4 ECONOMIC FACTORS

Youth who join VE have been cited in many literatures as having motivations derived from economic factors. Key issues that emerge in many literatures are specifically talking about youth unemployment and lack of opportunities, low or non-remuneration status, and other economic privileges that could be missing, thus leading to the recruitment of youth into VE groups. For instance, youth unemployment in Kenya's coastal and northeastern counties is between 40 and 50 percent higher than the national average (UNDP, 2013).[73]

In conflict theory and policy discourse, poverty and unemployment are usually cited contributing factors that drive youth to join violent conflict. In late-1990s Paul Collier (2002) grafted an empirical research to the economic dimensions of civil wars arguing that a preponderance of young men in society with few licit earning opportunities was strongly correlated with the likelihood of civil war, particularly in contexts with a high availability of 'lootable' primary commodities.[74]

The reality of youth unemployment and underemployment is a fact and that creates more frustration amongst youth who would like to create families, set up business and get loans from the bank, for example. But often times, these youths are frustrated. Overcoming frustration creates vulnerability and once any opportunities arise to address grievances, the desperate youths simply go for that. Therefore, economic injustices and relative deprivation faced provide fertile ground for recruitment.

While relative deprivation and underemployment are economic factors that are provided for as incentivizing motivations to joining VE, religious ideas seem to be bigger motivating reasons amongst youth.

3.3.5 GENDER-BASED MOTIVATIONS

From a gendered perspective, there are some mixed findings and conclusions from the large body of literatures exploring the drivers for women's participation in violent extremism. Females who are involved are either portrayed as "pawns, victims or agents' (Jackson et al., 2011)", or are represented in the media as deviant women, monsters or victims to be rescued" (Sjoberg and Gantry, 2007, quoted in Jackson et al 2011, 144-145 and Gentry, 2010[75]).

Women who join VE groups and commit extremist violence "are driven by the organization of their social world, which is predicated on a host of structural arrangements and deeply felt moral beliefs"

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[73] UNDP (2013). KENYA'S YOUTH EMPLOYMENT CHALLENGE, DISCUSSION PAPER.

[74] COLLIER, P. (2000). 'DOING WELL OUT OF WAR: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE', IN M. BERDAL AND D. MALONE (EDS.) GREED AND GRIEVANCE: ECONOMIC AGENDAS IN CIVIL WARS. LYNNE RIENNER, BOULDER, USA

[75] GENTRY, C. (2010). WOMEN AS AGENTS OF VIOLENCE. IN THE INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ENCYCLOPEDIA, ED. ROBERT DENEMARK. HOBOKEN, N.J.: WILEY-BLACKWELL. HTTP://TINYURL.COM/BAPZA9K

(Hearne, 2009, 87).[76] Jackson et al (2011, 165, citing Alison's 2009) argues that overall, women make decision to join armed organizations for much the same reasons as men.

However, generally, women's motivations to join VE groups can include: 'adherence to a particular political ideology, such as nationalism; grievance and concern with injustice; avenging personal bereavement; a desire to improve one's social status; and a desire to change society for the better" (Jackson et al, 2011, 165). Bloom (2007, 99) argues that recruiting female suicide bombers can be a tactical response to the need for more manpower and can be used to shame men into participating. Jackson et al (2011, 161-162) report that terrorist organizations also take advantage of the extra media attention that are attracted to by female bombers, the 'invisibility' of women, presumptions of their non-violence and, in some societies, a reluctance to subject women to intimate searches.

Bloom (2007, 101) finds that female converts married to Muslim men (increasingly among female bombers) are a particularly dangerous group, not only because they can evade most profiles, but also because they carry credible documents and passports and garner a lot of media attention (see: Carter, Becky 2013).[77] Jackson et al (2011, 160-161) argues that "certain mystique" that surrounds female terrorists finds that women terrorists can be more ruthless and more efficient than their male counterparts.

Abusing the rights of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals can be used as a bartering tool to appease terrorist or extremist groups in ways that further unequal gender relations, minority rights to subject such persons to increased violence' (CHRJG, 2011, 24). Bloom (2010, 449) argues that personal trauma; widows and most notably rape are fundamental motivations behind women's involvement in violent extremism. In some countries, Bloom (2010, 449)[78] argues that "occupation forces must be aware that the imprisonment, harassment, and torture of women will likely be used as cannon fodder for terrorist organizations to recruit more fighters and will increase the likelihood of women joining the resistance movements. Equally, women are raped or sexually abused by the insurgents themselves as a recruitment tactic, as this stigmatizes the women and making them easier to exploit (Bloom, 2007).[79]

3.4   AFRICA'S EMERGING FORMS OF VIOLENCE

While the use of violence and political motivations are overshadowing the use of the word "terrorism" outlined in sub-section 1.9, terrorism has become sensitive and illegal in its use where own citizens exercise protests and demonstrations against the state. Protestors, rioters, noncombatants who may have

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[76] HEARNE, E. (2009). PARTICIPANTS, ENABLERS, AND PREVENTERS: THE ROLES OF WOMEN IN TERRORISM. DECEMBER 2009. RESEARCH PAPER PRESENTED AT THE BRITISH INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION ANNUAL CONFERENCE, LEICESTER, UK, DECEMBER 2009.

[77] CARTER, BECKY (2013) WOMEN AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST; HELPDESK RESEARCH REPORT FROM GSDRC APPLIED KNOWLEDGE SERVICES

[78] BLOOM, M. (2010). DEATH BECOMES HER: WOMEN, OCCUPATION, AND TERRORIST MOBILIZATION. POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS, VOLUME 43 (3), JULY 2010, 445-450. HTTP://TINYURL.COM/BR2LND6

[79] BLOOM, M. (2007). FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBERS: A GLOBAL TREND. DAEDALUS, VOL. 136, NO. 1, ON NONVIOLENCE & VIOLENCE (WINTER, 2007), PP. 94-102. HTTP://WWW.MITPRESSJOURNALS.ORG/TOC/DAED/136/1

political motives are charged with cases of terrorism, but with different interpretations of treason cases. Political violence and protests in Africa is showing emerging trends of unique events and cannot be neglected in the study of violent extremism. It also encompasses different forms of responses the states and citizens deploy to counter and prevent violent extremism and terrorism.

Source: https://www.acleddata.com/2019/05/21/regional-overview-africa-21-may-2019/

Major root causes of political violence that may drive individuals or groups to be radicalized can be viewed from an economic perspective and ideology. There is widespread acknowledgement of the fact that there is demand for and supply of violent extremists and a marketplace where the two meet. Ideology is the glue.

In Africa, and Uganda inclusive, many posit that an economic analysis of radicalization starts with an individual who decides to join a terrorist organization after weighing costs and benefits. Weighing these options expand beyond financial to include family ties and/or loyalty to certain groups and ideology. According to Lazear and Oyer (2012)[80] the central role of radicalization in a terrorist group is to

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[80] LAZEAR, E. AND OYER, P. 2012. "THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS." PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, DECEMBER, PAGES 479-519.

understand the "business model". First, the provision of non-monetary benefits such as a sense of mission is a substitute for monetary compensation, which is critical for cash-strapped organizations. Terrorist organizations rely on multiple sources of funding including donations and illegal activities (CFR 2006).[81] In some cases, evidence shows that operations of terrorist groups are supported by limited activities such as the selling of counterfeit goods (Naim 2006).[82] They also target excluded youth from society, expelled by law, and neglected by their families.

A study conducted by Daesh – Mena Economic Monitor in October 2016 suggest that, while terrorism is not associated with poverty and low levels of education, the lack of inclusion seems to be a risk factor of radicalization into violent extremism.[83] This general conclusion was drawn to apply to almost all cases of radicalization, VE and terrorism in the world over. Moreover, the study finds that, unemployment certainly has explanatory power. Policies that promote job creation, therefore, not only benefit young people seeking jobs, but may help thwart the spread of violent extremism and its attendant effects on national and regional economic growth.[84]

While security measures seem to only contain   the problem of VE, solving it requires preparing for a generational struggle against the ideas that underpin extremist violence. Ideology – the glue is the greatest tool of radicalization in many cases so far registered in Africa in general and Uganda in particular.

There are many suggestions today, that, education is one of the most effective instruments to counter extremist ideologies. These arguments suggest that national education systems that legitimize the stereotypes and prejudices that bolster extremist narratives are a major block   to countering the spread of extremism.

On the other hand, VEGs operate on simplicity but with central values to defend, which is primarily grounded in their ideological and religious belief system. There are so many policy initiatives out there; some of them still need to be further worked on. However, critical research like this should be evidence-based.

This section concludes that, while there are so many VEGs out there in the continent and world, African youth are becoming politically aware and many forms of violence and violent extremisms are becoming political in nature. Uganda presents such typical cases, as is reviewed in the next sub-section.

3.5 CONTEXT OF VIOLENCE AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN UGANDA

The context of violence and violent extremism in Uganda lies in a historical context since independence

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[81] CFR. 2006. "TRACKING DOWN TERRORIST FINANCING." COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (AUTHOR: KAPLAN, E), APRIL 4. AND; CFR. 2010. "AL-QAEDA'S FINANCIAL PRESSURES." COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (AUTHOR: BRUNO, G), FEBRUARY 1.

[82] Naim, M. 2006. "Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Anchor; 9.10.2006 edition.

[83] WORLD BANK MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION, MENA ECONOMIC MONITOR: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INCLUSION TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM, OCTOBER 2016.

[84] IBID;.

in 1962. All Uganda's regime changes from one leadership to another have been through military takeovers. The country has therefore registered different context of state-inspired violence.

Although state-inspired violence and terror on citizens were registered in previous regimes, Uganda did not face direct confrontational violent extremist forms of attacks until after 1986 after the National Resistance Army, now called Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF) took over power. The formation of extremist groups like Holly Spirit Movement (HSM) and Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) were unique; and emerged to fight the government of Uganda in 1987 and 1989 respectively. Historically, there have been cases of these natures but with little influence to claim to overthrow of sitting governments.

The establishment of UPDF saw revolts from Holy Spirit Movement led by Priestess Alice Auma Lakwena in late 1986. Lakwena fought a conventional war with the belief that "The Holy Spirit" would guide her to the defeat of the NRA/M. Lakwena was defeated in Jinja, near Maga Maga before crossing over River Nile. Soon after her defeat, Joseph Kony formed the Lord's Resistance Army, which carried on a similar concept and context to that of HSM. Kony's LRA engaged Uganda in a long and intense war, until when it was formerly proscribed as a terrorist group. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has ceased operating in Uganda and moved to South Sudan (during the 2006-2008) peace talks, to DRC as regrouping location and to Central Africa respectively.

LRA operated with the central idea of fundamentalism and through radicalization of those who were forcefully abducted, mostly children and young boys and girls. It should be quickly noted that LRA and HSM formations in mid to late1980s in a form of violent extremism was primarily linked to national and to some extent regional conflicts.

LRA operations as an extremist group were mainly met with militarized counter-terrorism response by Ugandan government. It was also countered by portraying LRA as rag-tag, useless, no vision and unsubstantial to assume power. Military approach on LRA temporarily halted the most radical manifestations, but also proved incapable of addressing the complexities behind the drivers of LRA extremism. The connection between conflicts, historical marginalization of northern Uganda and the magnitude of violent extremism only prolonged the operations of LRA.

LRA embarked on affirming the search for new generations, personalized Acholi breeds with new identities, amongst those, Joseph Kony would urge his fighters to defend Acholi people. LRA did not entirely embark on understanding the rapid social change in Uganda, but the Northern populations were increasingly becoming vulnerable.

The prolonged existence of LRA was exploited by extremist ideologies and proxy support from Sudan. While in Northern Uganda, inequality and institutionalized discrimination increased, LRA's religious doctrine and ethnic fault-lines were increasingly showing LRA's line of radicalization and mobilization from South Sudan, DRC and Central African Republic.

On the one hand a group, The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) became active in Western Part of Uganda, with some scores of their operations in Kampala and closer cities to Kampala. The figure below shows how persistent ADF has been.

Understanding the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Central Africa: A Newly Newsworthy but Long-Standing Phenomenon

On April 18th, the Islamic State (IS) claimed an attack on Congolese security forces by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in Beni, Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), causing concern that IS could gain a toe-hold in central Africa. However, the ADF had been ramping up violent activities prior to this purported alliance and is a long-standing phenomenon in the Great Lakes Region. The ADF, which was formed as a coalition of various rebel movements in opposition to the Ugandan government, has been active in Central Africa for more than two decades. Though the group has portrayed itself as defending Islam, it has not articulated a coherent ideology or strategy. Similarly, despite reports of financial support from transnational jihadist groups, little is known about the group's internal structure and financing. When considering what drives ADF activity, *purported ties between IS and ADF are less significant than the group's resurgence in Eastern DRC and increased targeting of civilians and the DRC's security sector.*

The number of violent events involving the ADF fell between 2001 and 2012, following the introduction of an amnesty program in Uganda. Some analysts believe that the rebels went to the DRC and recouped in that period. Since 2013, the ADF's violent activity has surged. In 2018, the group was involved in more than 150 violent events, making it the most active year in the group's history.

From a Rear Base to the Front Line: Targeting of Congolese Security Forces and Civilians in ADF's Latest Surge

Since re-emerging in 2013, the ADF's pattern of violent events has shifted. The proportion of the ADF's violent activities involving the DRC's military forces in the DRC has risen from 8% between 1997-2012 to 58% since 2013.

Across the DRC and Uganda since 2013 more than 35% of the ADF's violent activities has consisted of civilian targeting; this is consistent with the group's violence between 1997-2012, when 33% of the group's activities targeted civilians.

Source: https://www.acleddata.com/2019/05/21/regional-overview-africa-21-may-2019/

When ADF was first formed in 1995, there were radical elements who entered into partnership with Uganda's Tabliq Muslim sect and Bakonjo fighters who advocated for the secession, in a Rwenzururu movement. ADF rebranded themselves as the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU). Like LRA, they lacked ideological commonality. The Tabliqs and NALU met in their mutual usefulness of conducting operations in Kampala, and Western Uganda. The Tabliq faction was led by a radical young convert named Jamil Mukulu, who had been educated in Saudi Arabia, and trained in military

camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan. With Mukulu's connections, the Tabliqs were able to source considerable funds from international supporters of Islamist causes, and from Sudan.[85]

Both LRA and ADF fundamentalist groups that were formed from within Uganda have had varying ideologies compared to the externally driven terror attacks that were carried out by al-Shabaab in Kampala on 11 July 2010. Al-Shabaab is a terrorist group that originated in Somalia, a country that collapsed and became very fragile.

Nonetheless, the Kampala 11, July 2010 attacks marked coordinated suicide bombings that were carried out on by al-Shabaab on the grounds that Uganda sent troops to Somalia, something that angered by al-Shabaab. The bombing affected crowds that were watching 2010 FIFA World Cup Final match at two locations in Kampala, the capital city of Uganda. The attacks left 74 dead (62 Ugandans, 6 Eritreans, 1 Ethiopian, 1 Irish from Ireland, 1 Kenyan, 1 Sri Lankan, 1 Indian, and 1 U.S citizen) 71 people were injured. The first bombing was carried out at a restaurant called the Ethiopian Village, situated in the Kabalagala neighborhood with many of the victims being foreigners. The second attack, consisting two explosions in quick succession, occurred at 11.18 pm at Kyadondo Rugby Club in Nakawa.

While some threads of ideologies of the terror groups have political connotations attached to their internally driven needs to take over the government, both domestic and externally driven terrorist threats have also continued.

Generally, Uganda has been experiencing socio-economic tensions, and deep political divides with historical legacy of ethnic and regional discrimination. According to Eelco Kessels, Tracey Durner and Matthew Schwartz (2016)[86] the level of corruption and nepotism in Uganda has become so alarming to an extent that public institutions have lost credibility from the public, with little credibility for better economic mobility in different parts of the country. However, the country has invested heavily in building a strong security platform and indicated an interest in developing a P/CVE strategy.

While the CVE strategy is near completion, there are skepticisms on the implementation of the strategy itself.[87] Civil society organisations have been advocating for more open political space which is hoped to pave way for building inclusive, representative, and equitable systems of governance that is able to P/CVE.[88] It is hoped that such change would strengthen community resilience in countering violent extremism.

Based on the historical and differing forms of internal and external style of VEGs in Uganda, a good number of Ugandans still do not understand clearly how, why and what extremist religious ideology means in today's complex situations, compared to Kenya and Somalia. However, the extent to which

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[85] ELEANOR, BEEVOR (JAN 2019), THE ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES: THE DRC'S MOST DEADLY JIHADIST GROUP?, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES (IISS)

[86] IBID.;

[87] EELCO KESSELS, TRACEY DURNER AND MATTHEW SCHWARTZ, "VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSTABILITY IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA: AN EXAMINATION OF DRIVERS AND RESPONSES," GLOBAL CENTER ON COOPERATIVE SECURITY, APRIL 2016.

[88] IBID.:

religious extremism has become a combustible mix of frustrations and contradictions leading to radicalization of youth to carry out violent attacks are of a reality. Religious assertiveness is deepening in many parts of the country and has resulted in further tensions and created an enabling environment for the resort to terrorist violence.

Uganda faces challenges of diverse nature which speaks to capacity gaps and makes infiltration a possibility. Some parts of the country have porous borders with insufficiently patrolled borderlines, inadequate strategies and little or no clear legislative framework to P/CVE. These are because many potential cases of conflict in Uganda have been attached to political party ideologies, identity and ethnic, resources-based conflicts like land, water, grazing land, election related violence and grievances. So much blame has been directed at the State and its machinery as having failed to protect its own citizens. Recent accusations on the Uganda Police suggest that a large number of targeted killing of young women have been noted, but the UP failed to keep law and order amidst the spectrum of insecurity. The youth have felt they are not protected and not fully integrated into the programs that can engage them as part of the solutions and societal fabrics of the country.

The religious groups like the LRA and ADF whose reason to fight is based on certain ideologies of governance (Jihad) (ADF) or by way of Biblical Ten Commandments of God (LRA) have failed. They exhibited rather a means to an end form of war. Uganda's case rests mostly on the belief that extremist movements, such as LRA and ADF have been fuelled by, and most often stemmed from ongoing instability and past violent conflicts, coupled with the presently complex challenges of economic, social, and political factors in the country.[89] Therefore, it is not enough to explain the actions of LRA and ADF only along religious terms so as to invoke religious motivating factors. The roots and drivers of violent extremism have multiplied and can now be used to facilitate the expansion of actions related to kidnapping, targeted killing, and more. Although there are changes in the way religious ideologies have been introduced in Uganda, much have remained closer to the affinity of their globalized discourse and practices in Uganda.

These may not appeal so much to the youth who can get easily recruited into violent extremist's radical ideologies and groups. Some of these youth are highly educated and have access to social media. Some of these youth were absorbed into VE groups and formations based on their frustrations, grievances, hatred and struggle against unjust and morally corrupt society.

However, Uganda has progressed in many ways to realise the role of youth in conflict resolution and development as a means of preventing them to joining VEGs, and by encompassing those youths who in many ways or the other have been implicated as sympathisers, mobilisers, and perpetrators. In most cases the implications of youth in VEGs, rampant conflict situations and development are rooted in the discourses and derivatives of understanding poverty eradication.

Unfortunately, some of the economic policies to boost youth development programs have been marred by corruption. Further, even the existing policies for example those meant to transform land management and agriculture which is the mainstay of Uganda, have tended to ignore the plight of the

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[89] HTTPS://WWW.USIP.ORG/ISSUE-AREAS/VIOLENT-EXTREMISM OBTAINED 10 JANUARY 2018

youth. For example, in a review workshop on *"Policies for Improved Land Management in Uganda"* held in Kampala in June 2001, it was identified that while there had been improvement in infrastructure that had an impact on agricultural productivity, food insecurity had worsened. This strengthens the assertion that difficult livelihoods are among key push factors driving youth to lookout for opportunities that would economically better their lives and those of their families, which increases their vulnerability to land in the hands of recruiters of VE groups who then take advantage of the situation to promise them better lives.. Therefore, the policies of youth development projects have not been able to overcome the inertia of extreme poverty that impedes progress and prevent conflicts. Youth who move to urban areas in search for jobs, hoping that development in such areas can provide for them are failing in such dreams, thus are exposed to VEGs. More of such youth are also getting involved in gang-related conflicts that can act as easy routes to joining VEGs.

In Uganda, young girls and women are getting involved in urban violence than younger males. In many cases, the young women are subdued and subjected (forced) into prostitution, drug trafficking and gang-fights. While young men (usually) make up the majority of gang members, combatants and perpetrators, majority of the women remain passive in violent scenarios. They have remained conspicuously victims and understood along "victim" lines.

The role of gender parity in Uganda today is understood as both a brake and driver of violent extremism (USAID, 2011, p. 4)[90]. A gender perspective of violent extremism has "gained ground in academic and media discourse" (Hearne, 2009, p. 2).[91]   Women's role, as "policy shapers, educators, community members and activists" (OSCE, 2013,   p. 2)[92], in countering violent extremism has started to be recognized. Generally, although poorly ascribed, policy coordination and programming to integrate gender and security issues within national programs to address counter-terrorism and VE is increasing in Uganda.[93] Such initiatives have spanned beyond the understanding of gender dimensions domestic and sexual violence. However, McKay and Mazurana (2004)[94] argue that Ugandan women who join the armed military confrontations tend to nature support "ideological" armed struggle than other types of forceful conscriptions and abduction to join VEGs. This is because women who are forcefully coerced and forced to join VE groups get radicalised and begin to support VE ideologies rather than

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[90] USAID (2011). THE DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY. PUTTING PRINCIPLES INTO PRACTICE. USAID POLICY. SEPTEMBER 2011. HTTP://TINYURL.COM/CHCMFEB

[91] HEARNE, E. (2009). PARTICIPANTS, ENABLERS, AND PREVENTERS: THE ROLES OF WOMEN IN TERRORISM. DECEMBER 2009. RESEARCH PAPER PRESENTED AT THE BRITISH INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ASSOCIATION ANNUAL CONFERENCE, LEICESTER, UK, DECEMBER 2009.

[92] OSCE (2013). WOMEN AND TERRORIST RADICALIZATION. FINAL REPORT. FEBRUARY 2013. OSCE SECRETARIAT – OSCE ODIHR EXPERT ROUNDTABLES. ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE. HTTP://WWW.OSCE.ORG/SECRETARIAT/99919?DOWNLOAD=TRUE

[93] FINK, NAUREEN CHOWDHURY, BARAKAT RAFIA AND SHETRET, LIAT (2013); THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN TERRORISM, CONFLICT AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM), POLICY BRIEF, CENTRE ON GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM COOPERATION (CGCC).

[94] MAZURANA, DYAN AND SUSAN MCKAY (2004) WHERE ARE THE GIRLS? GIRLS IN FIGHTING FORCES IN NORTHERN UGANDA, SIERRA LEONE AND MOZAMBIQUE: THEIR LIVES DURING AND AFTER WAR. CANADA: RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY.

institutionalised government military. Women who have tended to prefer to remain with the extremist groups also tend to become agents of recruiting other women to joining violent extremist groups.

The Ugandan context of youth and violent extremism is an active topic of discussion and cuts across development, poverty, ideologies, religion, socio-economic and politics, land grabbing, etc. In the recent past, VE has become so general that economic and social insecurity, education employment opportunities and socio-economic are factors, and motivations to joining VE.

There is also a general shift in Uganda's political landscape where youth's political ambitions in taking positions of leaderships are attracting support through demonstrations, riots and protests. The state has met these with force, arrests, beatings and even killings.

Figure 1: Number of Conflict Events and Riots/Protests in Uganda, January - February 2016

Source : https://www.acleddata.com/2019/05/21/regional-overview-africa-21-may-2019/

A case in point is a Musician turned politician, Bobi Wine, also known as, Kyagulanyi Ssentamu has been winning hearts and minds of young people across the country but the state has responded to the growing popularity of the young man with significant brutality in an apparent move to silence him and perhaps nib the emerging revolutionary tendencies in the bud.

Source: https://www.acleddata.com/2019/05/21/regional-overview-africa-21-may-2019/

President Museveni has therefore warned that: "…. *allowing hate preachers to carry on unabated, terrorism and violent activities have thrived in countries such as Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Belgium, Norway, which has led to the murdering of a lot of people and loss of property through looting. You cannot be rallying and processioning for an illegitimate reason – preaching lies, preaching sectarianism, preaching hate. Did you see the massacre in New Zealand? How about the ones in Sri Lanka recently, in France, in Belgium, in Norway etc.? How about the mega problem that occurred in Rwanda? These tragedies in those areas started with pseudo – and bogus preachers.*"[95]

Clearly, the President underlines such political ambitions and youth movements to acts of terrorism. References are made to other countries that have primarily not been exposed to VE per se, but where political activism, genocide and targeted killings had taken place.

[95] Museveni warns Bobi Wine, Besigye over 'hate speech'; Observer Newspaper of May 6, 2019.

CHAPTER FOUR

DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN UGANDA

4.1   FACTORS THAT PREDISPOSE UGANDA'S YOUTH (MALE AND FEMALE) TO ENGAGE IN VIOLENT EXTREMISM

From the literatures, over 88.2 million youth are unemployed worldwide with 47% of all unemployed (ILO), yet youth make up only 25% of working-age population. The graph below shows the steady increase in the global youth unemployment rate from 2009 to 2014 with a forecast to 2019. Over 90% of the world's unemployed youth live in developing countries. The regions with the largest shares of youth within the working age population fare the worst in terms of youth unemployment. Africa is the youngest continent with a youth bulge of 60 %[96.] There are 200 million people in Africa between 15 and 24 years of age. This represents about 20% of the population.

According to the Population Research Bureau, Africa has the fastest growing and most youthful population in the world. Over 40 % of its population is under 15. Africa's high fertility rate is responsible for this. Some researchers have described African youth as out of school, unemployed, loose molecules in an unstable social fluid that is threatened to ignite.[97]Many researchers on conflicts in Africa too have focused on the role played by unemployment.[98,99]

Global youth unemployment rate from 2009 to 2014 with a forecast up to 2019

Source
ILO
© Statista 2018

Additional Information:
Worldwide; ILO; October 2014; 15-24 years

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[96] Mihyo, P.B &Mukuna, T.E (Eds) (2015).Urban Youth and Unemployment in Eastern and Southern Africa: Features, Challenges, Consequences and Cut-back Strategies. Addis Ababa: OSSREA. ISBN 97899944-55-83-6.

[97] Kaplan(1996).

[98]Urdal,2006

[99] Kagwanja,2005a

Research shows that insufficient jobs are the highest priority that youth believe should be addressed by their governments. The African Union Commission recognized the importance of investing in young people by adopting the African Youth Charter[100] about 12 years ago and later declaring 2009 through to 2018 ''the African Youth Decade"[101]. It went further to develop an action plan to empower the youth and promote their participation in politics. This was in a bid for the youth to be engaged at the leadership and decision-making level. In 2012, the African Union issued a document" Accelerating Youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development" that focused on implementation of the Youth Charter.[102]Similarly, the High Level Panel (HLP) report on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, youth are given specific attention emphasizing that youth must be subjects and not objects of the Post 2015 development agenda. [103]All governments should strive to provide for their needs especially job creation and employment. After the end of the youth decade, there is not much evidence that governments have conceived let alone implemented youth targeted programmes to encourage their participation in the political processes (Ibid).

African Union Agenda 2063 aims at putting Africa a strategic player in the global economy through improved education and the application of science and technology in development. In order to achieve these, Africa needs to align education research and innovation with long-term socio-economic objectives[104].

From the figure 3.1 above, the global figures from ILO and statistics coming from Africa, youth unemployment in Uganda is a ticking bomb.

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[100] AUC (2006).Afrcan Youth Charter. Addis Ababa.
[101] AUC (2009).African Youth Decade 2009-2018: Accelerating Youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development.Addis Ababa.
[102] ILO(2012)
[103] UN(2013)
[104] AUC (2016). The African Agenda 2063.Addis Ababa.

Although the figures show some improvements from 2013 to 2017, there are increases in youth unemployment in Uganda, as the graph says, "additional information". The increase portends challenges and opportunities, mainly to the economic and social factors, which are very intertwined. The population of Uganda is fast increasing with les jobs opportunities. This is making many Ugandan young people unemployed. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), 3 out of 5 unemployed people in Africa are young people. Uganda is on the same page with countries that have the youngest population in the world. It's true this may be a blessing but do not pop champagne because this gigantic percentage of the youth is unemployed.

Major findings in Uganda have firstly, looked into details of what have been the drivers of violent extremism. The findings come from the identification and analyses of factors that predispose youth, male and female to engage in violent extremism in Uganda. In the past decade and a half, scattered authoritative statistical data on the pathways to individual radicalization emerged within the context of what has been alluded to in the previous chapter.

Both "Push" and "Pull" factors predispose Ugandan youth in joining VEGs. Push factors are those structural conditions like underdevelopment, unemployment, political repression, or social marginalization. These factors in turn can fuel grievances, which, in combination with other factors, may help push youth towards adopting violent extremist ideas and engaging in violent extremist actions.

The pulling factors have been identified as being more immediate incentives that make violent extremism appealing to youth. The attraction of charismatic individuals, powerful strategic communications and compelling messaging are additional factors to financial or other material benefits gains youth get from recruiters. There are some youth who are pulled into VEGs because of a particular social status that they feel they can achieve when they become part of a terrorist or militant group.

There are compounded factors that include historical injustices, migration economic burden, illiteracy, poverty, gender-based inequities and location-based disparities. Despite all these, the attitudes of Uganda's youth remained positive, especially where many have spoken putting their energy, resilience, and having un directed desire to receive education, find work, and contribute to peace and development

Source: United Nations Population Division - Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Population Prospects The 2012 Revision (Estimates): http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Excel-Data/population.htm (accessed July 2013)

Source: United Nations - Department of Economic and Social Affairs - Population Division

With the realization that Uganda has the world's youngest population with over 78 percent of its population, it faces significant challenges in meeting its young people's needs and tackling challenges as its population continues to grow below the age of 30. With just under eight million youth aged 15-30, the country also has one of the highest youth unemployment rates in Sub-Saharan Africa, although Uganda is making strides to grow at a rate of 3.2 percent annually.

in their communities. Many youths have talked about how government should support their development efforts and boost their knowledge and tap into their potentials. Creating substantive roles for youth to engage in peacebuilding and civic activities, would not only divert their attention from joining VEGs, but also give them confidence and sense of hope in life.

Generally, there are recognizable trends and patterns that have been traced to be in existence in Mayuge, Kampala, Gulu/Kitgum. However, areas that researchers could not reach like in Kasese, and West Nile were studied based on secondary data. Some of the findings suggest few areas of consensus with previous studies.

The findings delved deeply into identifying avenues and strategies that have been created for the purposes of deepening interventions, and that, which can engage and empower youth in P/CVE interventions. Analyses of existing/emerging policies and practices related to P/CVE in Uganda have been realised youth participation in P/CVE, but not consultative and inclusive enough. The findings are based on the qualitative and quantitative data that has been refined.

The research findings from Uganda strongly suggests that context and historical facts matter. Even within the locations in Mayuge, Kampala, and Gulu/Kitgum, vary in their local contexts. These determining factors have made the research to conclude that there are no one-size fits all while dissecting predisposing factors that lead youth to join VEGs. There are therefore particular factors that requires delineation from another, be they pushing or pulling youth to VEGs.

4.2   Motivations, drivers for joining violent extremism

Many but varying literatures have suggested that the drivers and enablers of violent extremism in Uganda are multiple, complex, context-specific and have indicated similar secondary information, that has religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions (UNDP, 2012) [105]. Majorly, addressing the drivers of violent extremism has been counterproductive. There are increased vertical and horizontal axis of political marginalization of communities that have created vulnerable groups including youth who suffer from chronic unemployment or under-employment, and susceptibility to be lured into violent extremist ideologies.[106]

The researchers administered over 340 questionnaires and found several possible push and pull factors. Statistical representation summarises corruption, poverty, unemployment, religious ideologies, political ideologies, migration (rural to urban and across borders) and climatic change have shown strong tendencies as motivating factors of youth to joining VEGs.

The statistical representation in Figure 3.1 below are key motivating factors that categorises "strongly agree" push and pull drivers of youth to joining VEGs in Uganda.

FIGURE 3.1: DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN UGANDA

Source: Field data obtained from Uganda from May 2017 to June 2018.

In the order of ranking, youth unemployment, poverty, corruption, political ideologies, migration, religious ideologies and migration were the main drivers of radicalization and violent extremism among youth in Uganda. Issues related to religious ideologies and climate change scored lowest of the drivers for radicalization and violent extremism among Ugandan youth. Moderately, corruption and political ideologies are factors that predominated the mid-range varying views of youth in Uganda.

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[105] UNDP (2012) Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach; United Nations Development Programme Regional and Multi-Country Project Document.

[106] http://www.globalcenter.org/project-descriptions/strengthening-regional-capacities-to-prevent-and-counter-violent-extremism-in-the-igad-region-and-the-greater-horn-of-africa/

It is worth recalling that on the 08th June 2006, Uganda's employment acts fail to clearly spell out the roles and responsibilities of youth but talks in general terms of apportioning legislation and policy administration and jurisdiction under labour act. Part III of Uganda's employment act, section 8 of labour administration act gives administrative responsibilities of Director of Labour acting under the authority of Minister of Labour as well as local authorities under local Government Act. The Act also contains the Labour Institutions Act, Labour Relations Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act and Work Injury Benefits Act, Persons with Disability. Uganda has signed and ratified the UN Charter in which it adopts a set of 17 sustainable development global goals among them goal 5 on gender equality, goal 8 on decent work and economic growth and goal 10 on reduced inequalities.[107] African Union has Youth Charter that has not permeated well into the mainstreams of relevant authorities in Uganda.

Among the key labour laws in Uganda are, the Workers Compensation Act 2000, the Minimum Wages Act 2000, the Employment Act 2006, the Labour Union Arbitration and Settlement Act 2006 and the Occupational Safety Act 2006. Some, like the Minimum Wages Act 2000, though entrenched in law are however hardly enforced.

However, Uganda's economic and social effect of youth unemployment, coupled with early unemployment is negatively affecting future employability of young people, thus reducing their hopes and self-esteem.

> *…." Unemployed youth have registered reduced levels of happiness in the society with many getting into depression, stress and mental health problems, drug use and anti-social criminal activities"* (Youth in Mayuge, Uganda).

The cleavage of youths' economic, cultural and social exclusion is widening in Uganda, to an extent where social stability and future investors are worried.

> *"….. we have been in internally displaced camps for over 20 years, but everyone now assumes that the war is over and we have the same level of economic, social and educational development"* (Male youth in Gulu, echoed in Female youth in Kitgum, Northern Uganda). *Many of us lack competitive qualifications for better-paid jobs (Youth group in Mayuge).*

Many youths do not have proper skills and that is a countrywide structural unemployment problems. Reliance on subsistence farming is not working, and even the government is slow with its policy of commercialising farming. The education curriculum does not incorporate skills and enterprise

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[107]   UN.   (2017).   Sustainable   Development   Goals.   Retrieved   from   United   Nations: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-developmentgoals/

development. It is better is a special program is designed for low-skilled youth in vocational centres. Incentives should be provided to small and medium enterprises that promote student internships.

There is Boda-Boda madness in Uganda where many youth are engaged in disguised unemployment of riding Boda-Boda and transporting people and goods.

Many youth are in unskilled jobs like restaurant and bar (waiters and waitresses, hotels, and supermarket checkout, security guards, road cleaning, hawkers, etc.

Source: http://www.sunrise.ug/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/BODA-MADNESS.jpg

Other youth have used elections to champion their causes to the government. In 2016 elections, the National Association of the Unemployed (NAU) rallied the youth saying that unemployed Ugandans will not participate in the 2016 general elections if government doesn't address the high unemployment problem in the country.

This government is not giving youth enabling environment that can sustain them in progressive jobs. It is not how much you know, but who you know and that is not a fair system. Contracts, positions and opportunities are offered to relatives and youth cannot sustain mutual trust with this government anymore (Makerere University Professor, Kampala, Uganda).

Youth in this country do not have equal opportunities, but maybe we can reinforce *regional policy for economic integration* that is currently on paper and not being implemented in real terms, across the borders (Opinion leader, Mayuge).

Key Narratives of Youth Unemployment in Uganda

The narratives from respondents suggest that the radicalisation process amongst youth to make them engage in violent extremist activities have a lot of push factors/motivators. Violent extremism and radicalization in Uganda has a regional dimension too, where the North, East, Central and South Western regions of Uganda face varied levels of marginalization and fragmentation of the society. While some areas were developed earlier enough, north and most parts of eastern Uganda were engulfed by war for nearly two decades. The East and North have been put in Internally Displaced camps, which were poorly governed or even sometimes unprotected by the government.

The LRA attacks from South Sudan borders have open rangelands. Both LRA and government repression and violations of rights have made communities very vulnerable. On the one hand, the government realises that there are endemic corruption and to a greater extent has elite impunity. Tribalism and neglect of other ethnic groups have firmly asserted the perceptions that Northern and Eastern Uganda pose threats to the government that is predominantly steered by people from western part of the country who are also generally perceived to be a violent group.

Most youth of Uganda are generally being pulled into cities, leaving agriculture, which predominates Uganda's key support to over 80 per cent of the population. Youth are pulled to join other youth groups to access material resources, gain social status and find peers who speak their language. It is in this kind of setting that VEGs assert their radicalisation tactics to radicalise these youths. The VEGs fill in the gaps to these youths to find comfort, adventure and acceptance, self-esteem/personal, empowerment, prospect of glory/fame, and social networks.

This study finds that most youth in Uganda do not quite understand details entailing VE except in context to the scanty memory of the bombing at Kyadondo Rugby ground in Kampala. However, from Northern (LRA), Western (ADF) and Central Uganda, most youth do understand drivers of youth radicalization and engagement in violent extremism, fairly in different ways based LRA and other wars in northern Uganda, ADF and Central Uganda settings.

It was found out that not all youth, in different parts of Uganda have the same motives and drivers to join VEGs. These variations suggest that the findings cannot be generalised to all youth cases elsewhere. For example, there are many youths who have migrated to Kampala from rural areas with the hope of finding sustainable livelihood have different thinking from youth who graduate from Universities and prefer to stay in the city. Educated youth who are remaining in big cities believe that the city can and may offer much better opportunity of getting employment after graduation.

A summary of the answers given by different youth's categories in the 3 regions of Uganda the researchers visited is represented in Table 3.1 below with brief description of the drivers.

TABLE 3.1: DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN UGANDA

STRONGLY AGREE ON DISTRICT	CORRUPTION	POVERTY	UNEMPLOYMENT	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGIES	POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES	MIGRATION	CLIMATE CHANGE
GULU/KITGUM	14	14	18	5	16	15	8
MAYUGE	26	31	31	7	12	9	1
KAMPALA	18	30	30	2	10	3	1

Source: Field data obtained from Uganda from May 2017 to June 2018.

Youth unemployment has direct linkages with poverty. The Uganda National Youth Council (UNYC) has indicated that 89% of Uganda's youth remain unemployed despite several government poverty alleviation programs.[108]

Poverty: The general understanding of poverty spans beyond the description of poverty is the lack or insufficiency of money to meet basic needs, including food, clothing and shelter. Because, poverty is measured in monetary terms based on the monthly (or annual) expenditure of a given individual, expenditure is compared to a threshold called the poverty line. However, and in Uganda, poverty amongst youth has more to lack of money, but the deprivation youth are exposed to, for example youth wellbeing to get quality education, access to affordable health facilities, water, and housing.

From Uganda's 45.5 Million people, nearly 17 Million people (37 %) are living in extreme poverty. Uganda's poverty threshold shows that 16 Million (42%) people live in rural areas while 1 million (12%) live in urban areas. Amongst the poverty threshold, 8.44 million (37%) are male while 8.43 (37%) are female.

According to youths interviewed across Uganda during the research,

> *"The government gives money to open business but if the home has no money they use it to marry, enjoy them etc. We now have a lot of trouble recovering the money. Many poor youths have resorted to using drugs and those poor youth feel neglected and identify with those who give them drugs. This has links in many factors too, like education system that does not take into consideration on skills development and more also speak to the historical perspectives of unequal development across the country" (Youth Groups, 2018).*

> *The youth have lost hope, for example, we expect youth who have gone to school to come and create jobs. But we see graduates drinking local brew just like someone who has never been in school. Young male and female suffer a lot in conflict. We have a lot of child mothers. What are you doing about it, except for the use of advocacy to sensitize the youth. The unfortunate thing*

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[108] http://radioonefm90.com/poverty-among-the-youth-on-the-increase-youth-council/

is in as much as vocational skill training is on-going now they give very little start-up kits. This is discouraging (Youth in Uganda, 2019).

Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP) failed because it only comes in especially during election time. The political leaders stand on the way and we know that YLP is only supporting the President's interests to win the favour of youth. The youth then begin to internalize it that they were given money. Later when we follow up this money so that it may be paid back, they become hostile (Kampala Youth, Uganda 2019).

Corruption: Corruption in Uganda is widespread across the country, groups of people, professions and offices, etc. *"Corruption is institutionalised everywhere you go" (Youth Leader, 2-018).* The most widespread corruption risks with very high and under-the-table cash payments are the police, schools, government offices, the judiciary, procurement and tenders.

Legally, Uganda's anti-corruption framework is contained in the Anti-Corruption Act, the Penal Code, the Inspectorate of Government Act 2002, the Public Finance Management Act 2015 and the Leadership Code Act 2002 (LCA). Instruments contained in the Penal Code targets punishing many corruption offenses like embezzlement, causing financial loss, abuse of office and fraud. The purpose of LCA is to increase transparency and to curb corruption among senior public officials, criminalize anyone or groups; etc. who attempts to exercise acts relating to corruption, active and passive bribery, extortion, bribery of a foreign public official and abuse of office. LCA dictates that gifts or donations must be declared if they exceed **five currency points**[109] in value.

Many youths who were interviewed agreed that, *acts relating to the various challenges of widespread corruption are linked to the weak law enforcement, especially when it support the widely practiced and acceptable culture of impunity. It starts from the top leadership and yet the preaching is that the Ugandan law does not have any distinction between a bribe and a facilitation payment (Makerere University Professor, Kampala 2018).*

Political Ideologies: Ideology is a set of beliefs or principles, especially one on which a political system, party or organisation is based. Today, youth of Uganda have the ideology that is grounded on activism, leadership ideas, thoughts, beliefs or opinions, and finding means of economic survival, all of which purposes and/or reasons target participation in political leadership. This is making political ideology in Uganda very synonymous with monetised culture of politics and traditional form of politics Uganda has been having. Historically, previous regimes in Uganda have been built following mega-political thoughts like based on religious affiliations, maxims and communism or mixed, but other thoughts became militarised under Idi Amin's rule and his overthrow following it up many rebel groups, like Museveni's National Resistance movements, Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Holly Spirit Movement (HSM), Allied Democratic Movement (ADF), etc.

The youth in Uganda are becoming more involved in politics, most of who are following hard activists' and radical approaches. The Uganda Youth Network (UYONET) is an organisation that trains youth to take leadership roles in Uganda. Youth are trained to claim political space in the society. However, there

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[109] One currency point under Uganda's law is equivalent to UGX 20,000 approximately 6 USD.

are historical phenomena where Ugandan youth have been marginalized from political participation and used for the wrong causes. Young men have been recruited in political parties to act as young democrats as well as militant wing. Because young people are often regarded or overlooked to be political candidates, the politics of the country regard then as inexperienced leaders. These have led the youth to be marginalised and minimised their opportunities.

Musician "Bobi Wine" was overwhelmingly elected after coming from his music business into politics that attracted huge numbers of youth. There are many followers of Bobi Wine's political thoughts of "People's Power". Although it is not a registered political party, People's Power fits into Ugandan political context where there are many political confusions and rallying after any challenger to President Museveni's political movement of National Resistance Movement (NRM). Uganda's politics does not strictly condone misuse of public goods and services, the military and corruption.

Many youths have begun to realise the work of Bobi Wine in a more global way. For example, many cite the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that was developed in a youth Strategy (2014-2017) that recognises the work of youth calling it "Empowered Youth, Sustainable Future" combined with the UN System-Wide Action Plan on Youth (2013). The 2013 published "Enhancing Youth Political Participation throughout the Electoral Cycle: A Good Practice Guide". Youth Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 on youth, peace and security is boosted by the Youth Global Programme for Sustainable Development and Peace – Youth-GPS (2016-2020). The "Not too Young" UNDP and IPU global campaign initiatives to promote young people's right to run for public office and address wide-spread issue of age discrimination.

Educated youth of Uganda know very well many principles like the IPU 2016 "Rejuvenating democracy, giving voice to youth", "No decisions about us without us", especially when it comes to political decision-making process. Many youth females cited the UN Women that established the Youth Forum at the CSW in March 2016 to help deliver on the Sustainable Development Goals, especially Goal 5 on gender and equality. UN Women published CEDAW for Youth in 2016 a report call "Increasing Youth Participation throughout the electoral cycle: Entry Points for electoral Management Bodies". Many educated females argue that this has helped young women to be aware of political process of decision-making.

Migration: Majority of youth in Uganda move from rural areas to Kampala city. Youth are attracted to the city, particularly the capital city Kampala based on stories they have grown up hearing about the allure of urban life. Peer to peer influence and stories from Kampala attract the rural youth. Overall, 92% of youth in Kampala are employed informally.[110] Major migration trends are triggered by conflicts especially from South Sudan.

Religious Ideologies: This study finds that most youth who join extremist groups have very low levels of religious or formal education and less understanding of the meaning of religious texts. Most of them do not necessarily belong to Islamic religion, rather are driven by other factors like unemployment and

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[110] https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1320719/youth-migrating-kampala-report

poverty. Educated youth are more oriented towards seeking for better employment opportunities. Most youth could have been exposed to some forms of abduction, gangs, family rejects, drugs and alcohol abuse and peer pressures.

Climate Change: Climate change in Uganda's relation to violent extremism is attributed to very many frequent / intense extreme weather events that influence social and economic factors. Climate change affects environmental changes that trigger natural resource scarcity. Where environmental changes occur, intermediary mechanisms like change in access, availability of natural resources, bring grievances between societal groups and Violent Extremist Groups take advantage of such fragility and conflict risks factors of climate induced changes.

4.2.1 FINDINGS FROM KAMPALA

The findings from Kampala derived from the quantitative data revealed that the leading driver of youth radicalization and engagement in violent extremism was poverty and unemployment. While corruption in Kampala takes third place, political ideologies present fairly moderate views. Migration in Kampala is increasing and so are the religious ideologies while climate change scored lowest.

DISTRICT								
DISTRICT	POVERTY	UNEMPLOYMENT	CORRUPTION	POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES	MIGRATION	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGIES	CLIMATE CHANGE	CHANGE
KAMPALA	30	30	18	10	3	2	1	

FIGURE 3.2: DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KAMPALA

Attention areas in Kampala: Poverty (30), Unemployment (30), Corruption (18), Political ideologies (10), Migration (3), Religious Ideologies (2) and Climate Change (1)

The major push factors in Kampala is mainly security clampdown on riots of any nature, be it political or otherwise, demonstrations by students, teachers, and any others, but mainly whenever there are cases of corruption which is openly seen are taking place. By no doubt, issues of corruption have been expressed to exist on a huge scale across the society and country.

There is also a push factor where a steady increase in youth unemployment and a corresponding increase in criminal activity, increasing the number of gangs and gang related crimes, drug abuse, marginalization of slums and the poor, racial and cultural/ethnic profiling, lack of social amenities among the poor, poverty, youth estrangements and frustrations and lack of a holistic approach to deal with youth bulge. Ugandan youth are being pushed out by widespread marginalization leading them to feel alienated thus propelling them towards breaking the rules by joining criminal groups. The youth further have adopted a tendency to dislike the government, a thought that has come to be described as "bad political-spiritual" dislike for the government and the rule of law. There are scores of young people who are frustrated, angry, have become aggressive and insensitive towards policies. Some take religious teachings seriously and violently while others join opposition parties. Ethnicity and structural marginalization/exclusion from jobs in Uganda is pushing youth who lie at the periphery of power away from competing equitably.

The pull factors include political ideologies, leniency towards powerful and extremist figures, radicalized groups who respect royalty, and wrong interpretation of religious teachings. There is an alarming increase of radical preachers and religious leaders, who enjoy or abuse the freedom of worship. There are multiple unchecked channels being used to propagate hatred and desperation among adherents thereby creating an environment of hate. Both Radios and TV medias are known to have been making personal appeals to the youth to support global brotherhood of the Muslim who are under attack, and quite a number of youth have headed to that call. Influences from social media, recorded videos, action movies, corner shops and Internet café, free Wifis zones coupled with lack of parental guidance to the youth are pulling factors. Youth in Kampala tend to gather very fast to riot, and have been faced with security clampdown because youth have very wide areas of socialization and domestication. There have emerged many cases where politicians are investing heavily in recruiting youth to join their political ideologies. Some youth have indicated "revenge" as one reason why they have to join extremist groups.

4.2.2 FINDINGS FROM MAYUGE DISTRICT

DISTRICT	POVERTY	UNEMPLOYMENT	CORRUPTION	POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES	MIGRATION	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGIES	CLIMATE CHANGE
MAYUGE	31	31	26	12	9	7	1

Figure 3.3: Drivers of Violent Extremism in Mayuge

*Source: Field data obtained from Uganda from May 2017 to June 2018.*

The research in Mayuge covered 3 major areas, Imanyiro sub County at Imanyiro village, Mpungwe Sub County at Mpungwe village and Mayuge town council at Igamba "A" zone. The respondents in Mayuge do acknowledge that acts of violence existed starting from the movement of priestess Alice Lakwena who also abducted some people including Amir of Imanyiro Sub County whose body was later found in a swamp.

"The recruitment of youth and others is real and is being done silently in areas like Malongo and others", is statement from one of the respondents affirming the reality of youth recruitment into extremist groups. There is redundancy amongst the youth of Mayuge. This alone has made them very vulnerable and easy to be lured into violence activities. There are government programs and policies like the youth livelihood program but it has not been successful because it was not properly disseminated. Mayuge has the highest childbirth in the country, with each woman with an average of 6 children before age 35. There are definitely, poor parenting skills which, lead to indiscipline of the youth who are easily lured into illegal activities. Additionally, there is a high divorce rate leaving many broken homes with single parents that are unable to take care of the children effectively including instilling good societal values. Some of the youth are heavily addicted to drug use and abuse which is amongst the factors that give them false courage to engage in wrong activities rather than activities that could have benefited them better, such as agriculture.

4.2.3 FINDINGS FROM GULU / KITGUM DISTRICTS

Drivers of violent extremism in Gulu and Kitgum (N. Uganda) are compounded by a number of factors. The immediate issues of land in Apaa are pit the Madi and Acholi ethnic groups against each other.

DISTRICT	UNEMPLOYMENT	POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES	MIGRATION	POVERTY	CORRUPTION	CLIMATE CHANGE	RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGIES
GULU/KITGUM	31	31	26	12	9	7	1

Attention areas in Gulu/Kitgum: Unemployment (30), Political ideologies (16), Migration (15), Poverty (14), Corruption (12), Climate Change (8) and Religious Ideologies (5)

Drivers of Violent Extremism in Gulu/Kitgum District

FIGURE 3.4: DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN GULU/KITGUM

Youth Unemployment: Majority of the youth in Northern Uganda are unemployed, Northern Uganda has been faced with economic crises following over 20 years of war and conflict. Recovery efforts have been insufficient, leaving many traumatised. Some of the youth, many of whom suffered the effects of the protracted war, are yet to heal from the trauma of relatives being killed abducted, radicalised and dehumanised. The survivors and returnees have found it difficult to integrate back into the society and therefore becoming easy targets of recruitment having been exposed to violence and internalised the same as a way of life. Even those who lived in IDP camps had been exposed to violence and upon returning to the community they do not receive the support that had been promised them.

These categories of youth have been highly vulnerable to joining any VEG activities. For example, the insecurity in South Sudan has attracted a number of young northern Uganda youths who have joined the rebels in South Sudan, majorly from Lamwo and West Nile. They have been recruited by SPLA in opposition groups to fight the government of Salva Kiir.

On the other hand, many unemployed youths get exposed to watching videos and movies of violence such as Rambo, the ISIS/ISIL videos. These videos are stark reminders and hardening effect on their mental configuration on matters pertaining to violence and extremism.

The government of Uganda has not dealt well with youth developmental programmes, especially the youth livelihood programme. Many youths have gone to exile because they cannot afford to pay back loans advanced to them for education or business. This was expressed by respondents from Gulu, in the northern Ugandan study area that… "young people are running away from northern Uganda because they are unable to pay back loans advanced to them".

SUMMARY OF MOTIVATING FACTORS IN UGANDA

Push factors have been identified as political grievances that have manifest into bigger governance structures in the country. Youth are motivated to join VEGs, because they feel totally neglected and that no one is ready to listen to their expressed ideas. Secondly, there are growing concerns that resources and necessary infrastructure do not reach the youth thereby getting disempowered. This phenomenon is experienced across the country and has been sustained over the years, perpetuating a culture of injustice and marginalisation. The worst affected are the minority who blame the majority and especially those in power for deliberate marginalisation.

Youth policies are designed without engaging the youth, just the same way education programmes and curriculum have been designed devoid of due participatory processes. It ends up that the provisions of such policies are not responsive to the needs of youth.

There is growing tension among religious groups as many churches mushroom all the time in the country.

In northern Uganda, trauma arising from years of atrocities being meted on the populations such as rape, abduction, violence and torture, is still prevalent with the community. Additionally, land grabbing has become rampant thereby leaving many people frustrated and therefore pushed into lawlessness including VE as opportunities present.

Factors pulling youth have been summarised as peer influence or peer pressure, seeking to find sense of belonging, identity, as many appeal to strong propaganda and narratives from social media. Many youths are also seeking revenge or justice for past crimes committed against them and their families.

4.3   EMERGING ISSUES FROM DRIVERS AND PERCEPTIONS

Youth Bulge: As stated elsewhere in this report Uganda's youth accounts to about 78% of the population. This group is increasingly becoming politically aware and seem energised in making demands for socio-economic and politival changes. However, the government of the day has not provided an enabling environement for dialogue with the youth or space for meaningful participation in decision making processes. With surpressed voices and constrained space for expression, some youth are lapsing into mechanisms they describe as geared towards revenging against the systen and all those they feel have been part of denying them opportunity and space to develop and empower themselves, socially and economically. Under such circumstances predisposition to extremist ideas almost becomes an obligation or the only option for them.

Land issue: Repeatedly, issues of land grabbing notably in Gulu - Apaa, Kampala – in many locations; Mayuge mostly for sugar plantation were brought up. These issues appear to be a national vice. It has had the net effect of disgruntling the youth who have in due course lost hope of ever getting justice and hence their bitterness and anger that is bringing some to radical groupings.

As a result of repeated marginalisation and other social pressure, the youth have lost societal values that demanded that the young be loyal to and listen to the elders. Clearly, from the study sites, the role of elders in providing leadership and advise at the community level is fast diminishing and rapidly changing as the youth come up to challnege some of their ideas and decisions. The societal traditional values and norms are inreasingly becoming invisible or absent all together. What is now driving the community is the philosphy of individualsim in which everyone especially the youth trusts no one else but themesleves.

From a casual look at the youth in the research study sites, one cannot tell how deep their hurt and discontent goes. However, arising from discussions and interaction, it emerges that there exists **passive radicalisation** which may manifest into violence at any time. The study found that there have been very limited development intrreventions in effort to reverse the radicalistion processes by providing short term projects to the youth, mainly by NGOs. Their programmatic interventions however, lack sustainability dimesions and therefore their effect on the community is shortlived. Dealing with historical pain and rejection requires sustained engagement targetting a complete mental and behavioural change that is anchored on policies that are youth inlcusive and responsive. There is lack of psychosocial support for trauma healing and the few Centres of rehabilitation identified in the area are not professional. It is also noteworthy that with instability in neighbouring South Sudan, there is a real danger of spill over effects into Uganda which would adversely affect communities in the bordering region.

There is an assumption that poverty and development are understood uniformly across communities. The reverse of this statement is true as rural communities have their own understanding of development as opposed to that of populations living in towns and urban places. This therefore calls for appropriately targetted policies and frameworks in order to be responsive enough.

While there is a perception that Uganda has better legislation to deal with PCVE, it does not have an extradition treaty with neighbours. Extradition treaty is a critical aspect where arrest and prosection of perpetrators of VE who commit crimes in another country but ran to hide in another country like Uganda could be implemented.

The role of IT and Social media communications

The role that the media and communications play in responding and contributing to terrorism, violent extremism and the countering aspects is manifold. First, the media, whether in its negative portrayal of Arabs and Muslims or the uncensored images of Arab satellite channels *Al-Jazerra* or *Al-Arabbiya* - have contributed to the anger and radicalisation of the affected communities, as well as forged further distrust of the media and Western foreign policies.[111] With more independent news channels emerging,

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[111]   DSTO-TR-2522   Countering   Violent   Extremism   (CVE)   Literature   Review https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a543686.pdf

and countering dominant narratives of conflicts and crisis, the reality is that media and presentation of political developments will vary according to region, culture and affiliation. This in turn, has considerable consequences on "how the general public perceives and experiences terrorism and how it affects their personal lives. There is further scepticism towards the media's agenda, for example, the lack of good news stories on the day-to-day services provided by religious charity groups - instead media focuses on the negative socio-political and religious tensions and conflicts."[112] It has been noted that since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there are an estimated 5,000 terrorist related websites now available[113]. It is a concern that with the fast-paced evolution and accessibility of technology, future terrorist attacks may be more lethal[114].

Violent extremists and terrorist organisations also use the media for "critical processes such as recruiting, training, propaganda, planning, surveillance, coordination and communication. New approaches to countering violent extremism and terrorism are increasingly oriented to networked communication technologies such as the Internet and World Wide Web[115]. By actively exploring the potential of new media platforms like blogs and social networking sites to propagate counter-narratives, are part of the broader approach to countering violent extremism. It is one of the strategies used by practitioners to disrupt or censor media online. Other approach is through technical, legal restrictions or by monitoring the use of media by terrorists in order to gather intelligence on ideology and motivation. Counter-measures need to be directed towards the "flow" of information and should aim at creating disturbances that interrupt the flow or generate disinformation to confuse and subvert the message of violent extremists.

To effectively generate intelligence from online media,[116] Kohlmann argues that governments need to develop IT capacity to learn how to monitor online terrorist activities and also develop cultural and linguistic capacity for assessing online contents. In terms of media coverage following a violent attack, a number of commentators in the literature have made calls for or have offered recommendations for media guidelines to inform 'responsible' coverage emphasising the deployment of a diverse range of counter-narratives[117].

Extremist groups were some of the Internet 's earliest adopters and continue to be among its most enthusiastic users. The growth of hate speech and incitement to violence often directed against minorities, such as Muslims and Jews – is closely linked to the rise of social media.[118] Policymakers and technology companies have long grappled with this phenomenon. The most obvious solution is to remove illegal content, although this can be technically difficult, given its volume and the number of channels through which it is disseminated. Moreover, not all content that is hateful, offensive, or

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[112] Ibid

[113] Jongman, B. (2007). Research Desiderata in the Field of Terrorism. In M. Ranstorp (Ed.), Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction (pp. 255-291). Oxon: Routledge.

[114] Ibid

[115] Stevens, T. (2010). New Media and Counter-Narrative Strategies Countering Violent Extremist Narratives (pp. 112-123). The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism

[116]Kohlmann, E. (2006). The Real Online Terrorist Threat. Foreign Affairs, 85(5), 115-124.

[117] Chowdhury, A., & Krebs, R. R. (2010). Talking about Terror: Counterterrorist Campaigns and the Logic of Representation. European Journal of International Relations, 16(1), 125-150.

[118] DSTO-TR-2522 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a543686.pdf

extremist is necessarily illegal, which means that content removal or censorship can only ever be part of the answer.[119] Another approach is to push back against extremist content, for example through so-called counter-narratives or alternative narratives. [120]From this perspective, the Internet is not a threat, which needs to be curtailed or censored, but an opportunity to reach people, challenge their views, and prevent them from being sucked into extremism.

"Counter-speech", as it has recently been called, seeks to counter extremist content as well as engage with people who are looking for answers and may be vulnerable to extremist radicalisation and recruitment[121]. This can take many forms: videos and advertisements, comments on Facebook pages, or one-on-one conversations that eventually move from online to offline. The key to producing more and better content is to reverse the top-down approach that many governments instinctively favour, and instead empower young people and civil society to take the lead. This may happen through contests, grassroots funds, or projects like Peer-to-Peer (P2P), which organises counter-speech competitions among university students.

Terrorist organisations have increasingly seized upon the opportunity afforded by the rapid emergence of new Internet technologies as an avenue for recruiting individuals and mass dissemination of their ideologies. Online technologies are not the cause but rather serve as facilitators of radicalization.[122] Extremist organisations have carefully and strategically tailored their online strategies of recruitment in order to particularly lure young people through job offers and promises of academic scholarship opportunities. Technology users in search of religious information are likely to also find themselves lured by recruiters online. As is the trend with terrorist groups, the lure of romance and the motivation of revenge are also drivers regarding the recruitment of women. The online frontier in terms of recruitment may seem like the problem however, political and socio-economic issues, which are manifested offline, are the real drivers to extremism.

This study sought to understand the perceptions of the youth towards the role of ICT and media. The questionnaire that we administered to youth generated the responses in Figure 17 below:

Figure 17: Perceptions of the youth towards the role of ICT and media

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[119] Ibid

[120] Nesser, P. (2015). Islamist terrorism in Europe: a history. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

[121] Grossman, M. (2014). Disenchantments: counterterror narratives and conviviality. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(3), 319–335. https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.937097

[122] UNESCO (2017). Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media :Mapping the Research. ISBN: 978-92-3-100245-8

Social media such as Facebook, twitter, YouTube, Instagram play a role in driving the youth to violent extremism.

Social media such as Facebook, twitter, YouTube, Instagram play a role in driving the youth to violent extremism.

Source: Field data

Majority of respondents strongly agreed that the Internet, and social media like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and WhatsApp play a big role in radicalizing youth and leading them into violent extremism. They reckon with the facts that Internet is the easiest and fastest way to pass information and therefore, is the most preferable means of communication. With advanced technology, it is easy to reach a wider audience and silently pass information that one needs it shared. They cited the example of fundamentalist Muslim preachers who radicalize youth online as cyber preachers. They also reported that sometimes, false information and fake news is passed on and it angers the Muslim brotherhood especially in cases that targets their ethnic profiling. The youth then sympathize with fellow youth or tribesmen or Muslims. The youth also indicated that money laundering to support Al-shabab and ISIS activities was easy due to on-line banking.

Cultural dimensions of P/CVE: This study found out that the traditional structures of governance, peace and security are critical but seem to have been overlooked by the government. The respondents stated that culture has a great influence in generating and resolving conflicts. Cultural leaders in some instances were listened to more than the government of the day especially when dealing with land issues.

Education: This study found out that TVETs were highly recommended as beneficial and solution to youth unemployment by the African Charter and in the Decade of Youth Action. The African Development Bank followed up this by supporting 17 African states in setting up education plans for TVETs. However, these programmes continue to be marred with a myriad of problems. In Kitgum, while respondents expressed gratefulness for the introduction of polytechnics in the community, there

were concerns that the same were not properly implemented to support the youth technical skills. Implementation of education policies is no responsive to local needs of the youth. One of the respondents quipped "that in Uganda we say policies have been piloted in Kenya and implemented in Uganda". There was a general feeling that implementation of education and training policies has not been able to address the mismatch of skills and labour market needs. They have failed to prepare youth adequately for transformative digital jobs of today and tomorrow. The curriculum lacks soft skills, the publics have a negative attitude towards TVET and the curriculum has not been revised in a long time making it obsolete. The youth who were interviewed said that they preferred the general education because it had better career mobility and wages than TVET. They also spoke about the view that, TVET graduates faced a bleak future in the absence of manufacturing industries in the country. In their opinion, TVETs did not have well-structured work-based programmes on jobs/internships which renders their hopes for employment a pipe dream. Just like in the neighboring country Kenya, the curriculum was too theoretical, the laboratories ill equipped and the trainers (lecturers) lacked new methodologies of delivering learning.

Prison: Prisons are frequently described as "hotbeds "of radicalisation, because they are places in which (predominantly) young men experience personal crises and are cut off from traditional social relationships, such as family and friends. At the same time, prisons can offer opportunities for de-radicalisation and disengagement, and enable terrorists to re-integrate into society in a safe and orderly manner and therefore these should be every government's priority. It was found out training prison staff especially the frontline guards who typically are the first ones to notice suspicious behaviour, would be an important factor in helping to detect signs of radicalisation and extremist characteristics among inmates. This should be complemented by sophisticated systems of reporting and intelligence, which would make it possible for prison authorities to report information and consult with relevant authorities and intelligence systems. It should be noted however that this study did not interview youth in prisons.

Returnees: Although the threat from returnees can easily be exaggerated, studies demonstrate that returnees have diverse motivations, which means that each case needs to be dealt with individually. Some are disillusioned and want to turn away from extremism, while others are traumatised and need psychological treatment. Yet others are dangerous and pose a significant risk, not least because they have taken part in a violent conflict, acquired fighting skills, and may have integrated into international terrorist networks.[123] Moreover, there are women and children who have not participated in fighting but may have been radicalised to varying degrees. Based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, many countries have made it easier to stop individuals from participating in foreign conflicts and prosecute them upon their return. Even so, prosecution may not always be appropriate, effective, or sufficient. In many cases, prosecutors find it hard to prove an individual's membership in a terrorist organisation or their involvement in atrocities, resulting in acquittals or very short sentences. Given the large number of ongoing investigations, governments have prioritised cases in which the evidence is clear or when suspected individuals pose an imminent danger.

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[123] Badurdeen, F. A. (2017). An evaluation of the Anti-Terrorism Laws in Kenya. Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference on Law and Religion in Africa, African Consortium for Law and Religion Studies (ACLARS), International University of Rabat, Morocco 14-16 May 2017.

Returnees are marginalized, making them quite vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism. They are considered culturally "unclean "and are not trusted by their communities, government and families. Some families and communities demand that they undergo cleansing before they can be accepted back into the society. This study found out that many returnees keep hiding and moving to different towns to avoid stigmatization. The reintegration and rehabilitation procedures are weak so most returnees seek to go back to Al-Shabab or other criminal groups. If their families do not welcome them, the youth reported that the rejected returnees often turn to gangsterism and drug addiction. It emerged that in most cases, the returnees did not have a source of livelihood, nor skills for job creation making their re-integration very difficult

Refugees, migration and P/CVE: One of the most hotly debated political issues in recent years has been the connection between migration and terrorism. There is no empirical evidence to support the claim that migration as such causes terrorism. Instead, the link seems to change depending on the circumstances in which migration takes place and the kind of terrorism it may (or may not) produce. It is important to keep in mind that only a miniscule percentage of migrants will ever turn to terrorism. Just like all other populations that are thought to be "at risk", the vast majority will remain peaceful. Fake migrants- terrorists pose as refugees and use migration routes in order to cross international borders and traffic weapons and small arms. "we have a spill-over effect of refugees… some of them come with weapons which poses a security threat to our community…", said a respondent in Gulu. Genuine immigrants sometimes become vulnerable to radicalization as a result of their migration experience. The underlying driver may be a sense of cultural and social dislocation – being removed from family and friends, overwhelmed by a new country, culture, and language, and with no clear perspective or certainty for the future. Over time, this sense of dislocation can be amplified by thwarted expectations, experiences of rejection, and economic frustrations. From the extremists 'perspective, such migrants offer a pool of grievances and potential resentments that can be activated and channelled into violence.

It is necessary to analyse the linkages between migration and violent extremism for a number of reasons: First, there have been isolated incidents of violent extremism perpetrated by migrants, which calls for need to try and understand why these occurred. Secondly, it is important to bring data and evidence to bear on an often-misinformed public debate, acknowledging from the outset important research and data gaps. Thirdly, there are linkages between migration and violent extremism, but not those that normally attract attention. Finally, looking to the future, the risk of radicalization among migrants may grow unless evidence-based policies and interventions to prevent violence are put in place. Data on the intersections between migration and violent extremism is very scarce making it difficult to make necessary mitigating recommendations.

Some refugees may be fleeing away based on their direct exposure and dire experiences of violent extremism that predispose them of. Others may leave their homes because of factors related to the emergence of violent extremism, such as lack of opportunities to make a living for themselves and their families. Some migrants and refugees may themselves perpetrate acts of violence because of their traumatic migration experience and yet others partly due to conditions in the countries where they arrive, or for reasons not related to either situation extremism are developed now.

Almost all the examples discussed here concern cross-border or international migration, although there is also limited evidence of radicalization to violent extremist agendas among internal migrants and internally displaced persons (IDPs). While statistical systems on migrants and migration remain underdeveloped – especially for irregular migration, which may be particularly relevant for analyzing violent extremism – they are certainly more robust than data on violent extremism. Where such data does exist, it tends to focus more on incidents and victims, rather than on perpetrators. It points to the in-[immigration] or out-movement [emigration] of (groups of) people from one place to a usually distant other location, with the intention to settle at the destination, temporarily or permanently. This process can be voluntary or forced, regular (legal) or irregular (illegal), within one country or across international borders.

 Refugees are a sub-group of international migrants who seek asylum or have obtained protection abroad under the terms of the UN Refugee Convention of 1951. Causes of forced migration include civil war, government repression, state failure, or (also) something else.

Refugees experience crises of identity, which result in them questioning their sense of belonging. While they no longer identify with the culture and traditions of their parents or grandparents, whose countries they often only know from holidays, they are equally alienated from their countries of residence, where they feel unaccepted and sometimes experience discrimination (counter-terrorism). Creating resilience (countering violence extremism), and wider political efforts, such as human rights education, promoting inclusion, as well as combating intolerance and discrimination are linking migrants and migration with the rising threat of violent extremism. Terrorism migrants, asylum seekers and refugees are more likely to be the victims of violent extremism than the perpetrators. It is therefore difficult to draw a direct causal relationship between refugee emigrants with extremism and terrorism.

Prejudices about migrants' nationality, race and religion create tenuous ties to terror.

Fragile, weak or failing states have been associated with terrorism for some time. Somalia which, since the ousting of Mohamed Siad Barre who had been Somalia's dictator from 1969 to 1991, has drifted from one crisis to the next. The country, formerly colonized by Italy and Great Britain, broke up into several parts (Puntland, Somaliland, Jubaland and the Federal Republic of Somalia) and has seen the rise of Al-Shabaab, which in addition to the "work" already done by various warlords, further devastated the country. After a futile intervention of Ethiopia in 2006, the terrorist organization al-Shabaab came out on top and produced further large refugee outflows, especially in the direction of Kenya where Dadaab, the largest refugee camp in the world (in fact a complex of three camps, with, as of 2016 330,00074 refugees – down from half a million) was in existence since 1991. Despite the presence of UN and AU troops, al-Shabaab has not been defeated.

Many governments' first priority is the detection of "fake migrants ", that is, terrorists who pose as refugees in order to cross international borders. This is the principal responsibility of law enforcement and the intelligence services, although awareness raising efforts among the employees and volunteers at refugee holding centres, as well as the refugees themselves, can contribute to making sure that suspicious individuals are found and reported. Indeed, as various examples have shown, it is by enlisting the support of the vast majority of law-abiding refugees that the authorities are most likely to detect the small number that are intending to cause harm.

To prevent (genuine) refugees from becoming vulnerable to radicalization, it is essential to provide the full spectrum of counter-radicalization responses. Where possible, the authorities need to prevent extremist groups from gaining access to refugee centres and monitor refugees who are believed to have been recruited, while staff, volunteers and the refugees are well positioned to recognize early signs of radicalization and pay attention to changes in behaviour. This means that reporting, intervention, and support mechanisms that are available to non-refugees need to be tailored – and made available – to refugees. Most importantly, given that refugees are likely to feel overwhelmed by a new culture, language, and environment, and many experience feelings of dislocation and anxiety (which in turn can be exploited by extremists), it is vital for policymakers to create certainty, establish clear pathways, ensure that decisions are taken transparently and swiftly, and support their integration as soon as it has been decided that they can stay. There are no in-depth studies on the intersection of the two phenomena.

International migration is driven not just by political violence, armed conflict and state repression but just as much by economic and environmental factors. This type of migration is likely to grow enormously in the years to come due to climate change and loss of employment opportunities due to globalisation. Migrants can be terrorists and terrorists can be migrants. The arrival of large refugee populations, when not properly handled, increases the risk of attacks in the recipient country by both domestic and transnational terrorists. The interface between terrorism and migration is a rich field for research that deserves all the attention it can get so that well- and ill-founded concerns can be separated and policies can be built on solid evidence.

There have been examples of refugee (and IDP) camps becoming spaces for violent extremism in at least three ways. One is where camps may become bases for violent extremist fighters to rest and recuperate. A second and related example is where refugee camps may become recruitment grounds for violent extremist groups. The Kenyan authorities have also expressed similar concerns that Al-Shabaab may be recruiting in the Dadaab camp complex in the north of the country. Third – and perhaps the most pervasive example of the intersections between refugee camps and violent extremism in the still limited literature – is the risk of refugees becoming radicalized to violent extremism. Existing literature highlights three particular conditions that allow for radicalization to violent extremism to take root in refugee camps: poor education, especially where the gap is filled by extremist religious indoctrination; a lack of work; and the absence of freedom of movement any effective programme will require the collaboration, sharing of information and alignment of objectives among donors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the local population and the host government, as much as with the refugees.

Addressing economic and financial needs is also important, even if these are not the main drivers of radicalization. Refugees seek means to support their families and skills that might be useful for the longer term. Those needs must be fulfilled within the country of refuge, where refugees may compete with local people for both jobs and consumer goods. This means that attempted solutions should engage local players not usually directly involved in refugee issues, such as the business community.

Respondents recommended that funding streams by donors need to be flexible and less "siloed" to accomplish this successfully. Another common problem with international relief funds is that they are

available at the start of a crisis but dwindle over the long term. Policymakers and stakeholders can increase their dialogue about long-term financial planning for refugee crises.

At the same time, jobs and education are only a partial answer. Psychological and security needs are key components. Refugees have experienced trauma in escaping their country of origin and often face abuse, humiliation and powerlessness in their place of refuge. This arena is where militant groups may step in and try to radicalize vulnerable populations with narratives of empowerment through violence. Providing refugees opportunities to participate in their own governance, such as in camp administration, can also help mitigate this risk. A fourth intersection between migration and violent extremism takes place after migrants and refugees have settled; there is wide acknowledgment that radicalization to violent extremism among settled migrants and refugees and their descendants is a symptom of social exclusion (Undocumented, no IDs, feel excluded, sympathize with Somali).

Refugee camps are characterized by a continuum of inclusion/exclusion conditions with unequal access to resources, capabilities and rights, which then leads to inequalities. New trends have been witnessed where terrorist attackers are citizens from within country but working in cahoots with immigrants from neighbouring countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. Most of those radicalized have been targeted by jihadist groups after they left their home countries. Many migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have experienced difficult situations in their lives and face discrimination. Furthermore, they are also often tainted by false or dubious assertions concerning their impact on the economy, social cohesion, ideological beliefs and motivations, and national identity. To portray them additionally as a threat to national security and seeing them as potential terrorists only adds to their hardship. It may result in the unintended consequence of further alienating them, thus increasing their susceptibility to violent extremist narratives and agendas.

Two themes have been central to global security debates over the past few years: migration and violent extremism. These two phenomena are happening at the same time and are consequently often conflated, but are they really related? In East Africa, there is yet no empirical evidence that confirms any direct link between migration and violent extremism, says Dr Simon Nyambura, director of the Intergovernmental Agency on Development's Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. Dr. Nyambura says, when taken within the context of the masses of people migrating, 'those who engage in violent extremism are statistically insignificant'. This assertion, at a time when populist discourse attempts to suggest that any and all migrants from communities affected by terrorism are themselves terrorists, is important. It doesn't deny that some migrants may engage in activities relating to violent extremism, but it clarifies that the actions of a few individuals should not be conflated with the whole. Nyambura was speaking at a technical workshop on migration and countering violent extremism convened by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The workshop is part of ongoing applied policy research being carried out by the ISS that aims to improve policies and practices on both issues.

Anti-immigrant sentiments suggesting that the recent rise in forced migration is, at least partly, responsible for violent extremism are not being effectively countered by facts, research has shown. A lot of these sentiments are rooted in stereotypes and prejudice. Effective responses need to move away from these generalisations and focus on the facts that explain these dynamics. The actual relationship

between migration and violent extremism remains largely unexplored. Attempts to understand both migration and violent extremism through a global lens have largely ignored issues relating to xenophobia and racism, losing sight of key facts and nuances needed to guide action. However, some critical conversations have begun to confront the emerging realities of migration and violent extremism. These must be guided by evidence over rhetoric.

What we know so far is that conflict, instability and repression are driving many people away from their communities. Dr Khalid Koser, executive director of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, notes that it is critical to understand 'migration as a consequence, not a cause, of fragility'. Indeed, in Africa – from Northern Nigeria across the continent to Somalia – some people, dreading continued insecurity and terrorism, are leaving their homes to seek (and hopefully find) refuge elsewhere. Majority of Africans forced to move are internally displaced and/or settle in neighbouring countries, while others travel further afield, to other parts of Africa, to Europe, the Middle East and the Americas.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that about 5.1 million Syrians have fled the country and are now refugees. The majority of Syrian refugees are currently in neighbouring countries (specifically Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey), while just over one 10th have fled to Europe. Approximately 6.5 million are internally displaced.

Attempts to understand migration and extremism have not taken xenophobia and racism into account. At the same time, there has been significant migration within and out of Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, owing, in part, to volatility in some parts of those countries. The people moving include victims and witnesses to atrocities and acts of terrorism in search of peace, stability and a better future – for many, just a future. However, beyond this, and without detailed studies that include interviews with migrants on their reasons for leaving, the actual relationship between migration and violent extremism, particularly from a causal point of view, remains largely unexplored.

There is also a dearth of research into links between migrating communities and their involvement in violent extremism. It is this latter issue that is most contentious and has been used in populist and nationalist rhetoric geared to rejecting inward migration. The best policies and practices are ones rooted in evidence and informed by experience. Building that evidence base is key. Mass migration and violent extremism must be examined separately and in conjunction. Both are important, and both require careful thought and action.

Concerns are being expressed that internally displaced person (IDP) and refugee camps may become fertile recruitment grounds for violent extremism. There is certainly evidence in countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, of radicalization leading to violence within refugee camps. Making the link between displacement and violent extremism may reinforce efforts to find solutions for refugees. The risk of radicalization is especially heightened where IDPs and refugees find themselves in protracted situations: marginalized, disenfranchised, and excluded. Finding solutions for displaced populations should be an urgent priority for humanitarian reasons but also as a security issue. The engagement of development actors is particularly needed to ensure that IDPs and refugees find solutions—whether return, local integration, or settlement elsewhere—that are sustainable. As a way to counter violent extremism collaboration between development and humanitarian organizations should now become an urgent priority. The link to displacement can illustrate that countering violent extremism is as much

about human rights, development, and empowerment, as it is about military, intelligence, and security interventions a rights-based approach to displaced persons can be an integral component of the global effort to counter violent extremism.

Systemic mistrust and profiling the youth remains one of the most significant impediments to increased inclusion of young people in P/CVE decision-making. This stems from a general tension between government security forces and young people. Within government, a closed-door approach to security matters and the perception that youth are either troublemakers or are not credible or qualified counterparts may discourage otherwise champions from pushing for greater youth cooperation and partnership (an opinion voiced in four of the consultations). In parallel, youth are wary of ulterior motives behind government engagement, particularly in environments with a history of domestic spying. Such dynamics of mistrust also discourage otherwise peace ambassadors or champions from partnering with other stakeholders on P/CVE. It also fuels the frustrations and grievances of the youth, further making them vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism. When we asked the youth whom they trust, they responded as follows:

> *…I doubt if the youth trust anyone else other than fellow youth. You see, we are treated with suspicion everywhere we go…in the community, by police, by the government. In fact, they look at us as trouble makers.”*

> *…If only the government and community realized the great potential in youth, they would partner with us rather than mistrust us. It seems to be something deep rooted in them and we cannot change that.”*

Lack of voice: Channels for youth input and collaboration at the local and national level are often unknown, unclear, or nonexistent – from curricula reform promoting tolerance to budget allocation for youth-led job force training programs and effective counter-messaging campaigns. The youth are not consulted on matters that affect them. Decisions are made for them which results into provoking anger among them. A lack of open and equitable access to policy and decision-making processes in general, but particularly related to P/CVE, is a challenge. If consulted, the youth said, that they can partner with the government, CSOs, media, academia and other stakeholders to openly share their knowledge and experiences especially the ex-combatants/returnees. They wanted their views to be incorporated in policies of youth employment, rehabilitation, reintegration, prison reforms, and relationships with police, education curricula, anti-corruption dialogues etc.

’’The spider web and amoebic ‘’nature of drivers of terrorism and radicalization has revealed that it is neither economic reasons, nor Islamic religion that are the main drivers of VE. Drivers of violent extremism are like a spider web. They are interconnected, intertwined and interwoven. No single driver can stand on its own. While we have explicit drivers, others are implicit and act as catalysts to others. There is need to refocus on ideology powered by ICT as the main driver of VE. This is a threat to human security and all have to be on a high alert.

CHAPTER 5

GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL PROGRESS TOWARDS P/CVE[124]

This chapter analyses the existing or some of the emerging policies and practices that are related to P/CVE, all of which should be able to create safe spaces and sustainable opportunities for youth participation in P/CVE. It is important for this study to understand how some of the policies and practices relating to P/CVE can enhance the creation of space for male and female youth to participate in P/CVE.

5.1   GLOBAL FRAMEWORKS FOR PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The UN-SC has been increasingly emphasizing on the need for a comprehensive approach to countering the spread of terrorism and violent extremism. In its resolution 2178 (2014), the council underscores that CVE is an essential element. Many practices to P/CVE give reference to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other international human rights instruments, General Assembly resolutions, such as the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and Security Council resolutions, such as resolution 2178 (2014).[125] This charter also provides for common commitments and political will to all countries that would like to put it into practice. It allows it to be translated to bring real change and come up with new ways of formulating public policy to prevent violent extremism in each country and region. The recognition herein is that each solution will be unique in each case in addressing the threat to international peace and security. The council encourages Member States to engage with local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism. It also calls on Member States to address the conditions conducive to the spread of VE, including empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders and all concerned civil society in promoting social inclusion and cohesion.

This is a rejoinder to the UN Security Council Resolution 1624(2005), which calls states to commit to countering acts of terrorism and incitement motivated by extremism and intolerance. It led to the formulation of a UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 calls for a holistic and inclusive approach to counter terrorism. The strategy re-asserts the position that an effective counterterrorism strategy must combine preventive measures with efforts to address both real and perceived grievances and underlying social, economic, and political conditions.

According to UNDP report (2017), the 2015 United Nations Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism urges the global community of states to pay closer attention to the root causes and drivers of violent extremism, after decades of overconcentration on militarized approaches.[126] The UN Secretary General's Plan of Action of 2016 provided impetus to the growing focus on prevention, reasserting the call to member states 'to enhance efforts to counter this kind of violent

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[124] *GENEVA CONFERENCE ON PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM – THE WAY FORWARD ORGANIZED BY THE UNITED NATIONS IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND 7 AND 8 APRIL 2016 GENEVA, SWITZERLAND*

[125] *THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY (2006), UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK.*

[126] *UNDP (2017) JOURNEY TO EXTREMISM IN AFRICA: DRIVERS, INCENTIVES AND TIPPING POINT FOR RECRUITMENT; UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME REGIONAL BUREAU FOR AFRICA 1 UN PLAZA, NEW YORK, USA.*

extremism. The *Plan of Action* advanced a 'whole of society' approach, and states were encouraged to complement counter-terrorism strategies with proactive measures to deal with the range of factors associated with the growth of violent extremism. The plan promoted efforts such as dialogue and conflict prevention; strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law; engaging communities; empowering youth; promoting gender equality and empowering women; facilitating education, skill development and employment; and strategic communications, including the use of the Internet and social media.[4] It affirmed that both security and development actors were necessary contributors to solutions and that non-state actors should have a stake in these processes. National action plans on PVE were promoted as the means for achieving these goals.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) United Nations, New York. Here, the council stresses the role of media, CSOs, business communities and academia in broadening the dialogue on P/CVE to promote understanding and inclusion. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (hereafter the 'Strategy') adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006 represents an important milestone in our collective pursuit towards strengthening the global response to terrorism, based on a common strategic and operational framework. Four pillars of action underpin the Strategy, namely: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; Measures to prevent and combat terrorism; Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard; and Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

The Strategy calls on Member States to ensure its implementation at the national, regional, and international levels, and for enhanced coordination and coherence within the United Nations system in promoting international cooperation in countering terrorism. However, despite this expression of political commitment and important institutional progress, widespread and integrated implementation of the strategy remains elusive in many regions of the world. In addition to the general capacity challenges confronting a wide range of Member States, a contributing factor to this is the lack of in-depth knowledge and understanding of the Strategy in several capitals and the role that different stakeholders, including the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), can play in supporting national, regional, and sub-regional implementation. The CTITF Office in partnership with the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, organized a Regional Workshop for Member States of the Eastern African region and relevant international partners that was aimed at increasing awareness and understanding of the Strategy and thereby attaining broader political support from officials of ministries and agencies in capitals and the wider sections of civil society. The discussions at the workshop provided positive indications towards enhanced regional efforts to implement the Strategy in all its dimensions, with the support of the United Nations system through the CTITF framework. The UN, through the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Office, its Country Teams and an "All-of-UN" approach[127], is ready to support Member States in developing their own policies and plans.

In 2009 a report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering violent extremism noted the need to integrate a gender perspective into

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[127] I*BID.*:

policy design. It also suggested that gender perspectives be included in evaluations of P/CVE of the UN-programming to assess the differential impacts on men and women.[128] Since the February 2015 White House CVE Summit, the international community has increasingly converged and coordinated on two multilateral agendas: that of CVE and that of Youth, Peace and Security. Milestones such as the Amman Youth Declaration and the Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism later that year paved the way for the adoption of the first-ever United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Youth, Peace, and Security in December 2015, UNSCR 2250[129]. Calling for youth inclusion in peace and decision-making processes that affect their lives, UNSCR 2250 highlights the need to engage and invest in young women and men as partners in preventing conflict and pursuing peace. The convergence of these two agendas presents an opportunity to build partnership between youth and government, at all decision-making levels and across sectors, in preventing and countering violent extremism (referred to as P/CVE throughout the rest of this document)[130]. Making that happen requires a tangible shift in policy.

Government and youth can work together in addressing violent extremism at the national and local level, recognizing youth as partners in peace and agents of positive change. Injustice and corruption; lack of (quality) education, socio-economic marginalization and unequal opportunity, alienation, and lack of voice are vices that should be worked on. There is global momentum and recognition behind the need and value of working with youth at all levels of decision-making to effectively address violent extremism[131] and programming. The 2016 UNDP report *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity* emphasized the complexity of PVE and the structural factors contributing to the problem.

Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violent Extremism and Promote Peace produced at the Global Youth Summit against Violent Extremism[132] revealed that many CVE initiatives frame youth as either perpetrators of violent extremism or as possible victims of recruitment into violent groups. But this narrative fails to capture the fact that most young people are part of the solution. They are not turning to violence but working to build peace and prevent violent extremism. Violent extremism needs meaningful youth participation at all levels. To effectively address the drivers of violent extremism and promote peace, youth must be engaged as partners in the design and implementation of relevant programs and policies. With commitments to learning, to partnership, to innovation, to prevent and counter violent extremism, young people and youth organizations around the world are already building peace and preventing violent extremism.

 The Youth Action Agenda is focusing on preventing violence and recruitment into violent groups; facilitating young people's disengagement from violent groups; producing and amplifying new narratives; fostering effective and meaningful partnerships; providing opportunities to partner with young people to counter violent extremism and build positive peace. They are also taking part in multidisciplinary task forces and other initiatives to counter violent extremism at the national, regional, and global levels. Some of these initiatives include:
- Initiating partnerships with local and national governments, intergovernmental organizations, civil society, the private sector, and the media;

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[128] *UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY: PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS WHILE COUNTERING TERRORISM: NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, A/64/211, 17 MARCH 2010 (REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS WHILE COUNTERING TERRORISM).*

[129] http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12149.doc.htm. December 2015.
[130] 2016 US State Department and USAID Joint Strategy on CVE,
[131] http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674
[132] https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-Youth-Action-Agenda-1.pdf

- Undertaking contextual research and using the findings to guide and inspire policy and programs; and
- Working together with other youth and youth-led organizations working on countering violent Extremism

Other policies/programs and strategies at the global level in P/CVE include:

- Guiding Principles on Youth in Peace building: A Practice.[133]
- Young Peoples Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note[134]
- Youth Global Programme for Sustainable Development and Peace (Youth GPS) 2016-2020[135]
- United Nations Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism[136]
- Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals[137]

5.2   REGIONAL P/CVE PLANS OF ACTION

Initially, this was the basis for forging a regional cooperation that could enhance comprehensive P/CVE strategies and strengthen sub-regional and regional organizations relied more on the questions of mobilising resources in order to accomplish the seven priority areas of planned actions in P/CVE in the region.

- **Mobilizing Resources:** Existing funds dedicated to countering terrorism and violent extremism should be adjusted to also address the drivers of violent extremism, other funding sources need to be identified, e.g. adapting existing funds to expand programming that is sensitive to preventing violent extremism.

The suggested seven priority areas to take action included:**[138]**

1. Dialogue and Conflict Prevention: In the framework of the broader prevention efforts of the Secretary-General, recommendations include the need to engage opposing parties and regional actors, forge international consensus and engage religious leaders.

2. Strengthening Good Governance, Human Rights and the Rule of Law: To strengthen trust between Government institutions and communities to prevent marginalization and exclusion, recommendations include providing access to justice and strengthening fair, effective, accountable and inclusive institutions, reforming national legal frameworks and penitentiary systems and fostering basic service provision in a non-discriminatory manner.

3. Engaging Communities: For genuine community engagement, recommendations include developing participatory strategies with civil society and local communities, adopting community-oriented policing models, and developing local and family-based mentorship programmes.

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[133]   http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Practice%20Note%20Youth%20&%20Peacebuilding%20-%20January%202016.pdf

[134]   http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Practice%20Note%20Youth%20&%20Peacebuilding%20-%20January%202016.pdf

[135]   http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Youth/Youth-GPS%20-%20Overview_final_UNDP50logo.pdf?download.

[136] http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674

[137] SDG – United Nations

[138] THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY (2006), UNITED NATIONS, NEW YORK.

4. Empowering Youth: To harness the idealism, creativity and energy of young people and others who feel disenfranchised, recommendations include supporting and enhancing young people's participation in PVE activities and integrating them into decision-making processes at local and national levels.

5. Gender Equality and Empowering Women: To foster women as a critical force for sustainable peace, recommendations include mainstreaming gender perspectives across efforts to prevent violent extremism and investing in research on women's roles in violent extremism. In the recent past, there has been increased dialogue amongst civil society, UN Women, the CTITF and other entities, where the UN tend to draw on convening capacity building training on dialogue, information sharing, and exchange of lessons learned amongst actors working on P/CVE, gender experts and practitioners.

6. Education, Skill Development and Employment Facilitation: To promote respect for human diversity and prepare young people to enter the workplace, recommendations include investing in programmes that promote "global citizenship" and provide comprehensive primary through tertiary education, including technical and vocational education.

7. Strategic Communications, the Internet and Social Media: To communicate a vision that offers tangible change to the disillusioned and disenfranchised, recommendations include developing and implementing national communication strategies and empowering victims to turn their suffering into a constructive force.

However, the region plan of action changed after the 9/11 attacks in New York. The changes required tackling major international terrorism using amongst other measures widespread military campaign against terror. In Africa, however, national, regional and continental efforts to address this growing crisis have been underway as far back as the early 1990s. African Union Commission had been blamed for long for not having a well-coordinated counter terrorism strategy yet most of her Member States who are also signatories to the UN Security Council expected concerted efforts towards P/CVE at the regional level. Besides, researchers have identified Africa to be the 5th most targeted region after Latin America, Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In October 2017, African Union and European Union had their first Annual US-African Union Countering Violent Extremism conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, Africa has a Continental Framework for Counter-Terrorism, which is made up of the 1999 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The AU Action Plan supplemented this in 2004 for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. AU has appointed a Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Co-operation in 2010. The 2004 supplementary protocol has only 15 ratifications out of the 41 Member States of the OAU. This protocol mandates the AU Peace and Security Council powers limited to information gathering and sharing to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on terrorist activities. According to Article 7(i), the Peace and Security Council must ensure the implementation of the AOU convention at the regional level. For example, from 1992 onwards, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) had adopted various counterterrorism frameworks that focused on the efforts of cooperation and recognising terrorism and violent extremism as criminal acts. These frameworks were refined and expanded after the transition of the OAU into the AU.

In 2002, the AU adopted the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which embraces practical measures that substantially address Africa's security challenges. It takes into consideration measures in areas such as police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, the financing of terrorism and the exchange of information. A key outcome of the 2002 Plan of Action was the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which serves as a structure for centralising information, studies and analyses on terrorism and extremist groups. It further promotes the "coordination and standardization of efforts aimed at enhancing the capacity of member states to prevent and combat terrorism".[7] The AU's Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism, adopted in 2004, takes cognisance of the links between terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organised crime, money laundering and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

In 2007, the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) created AMISOM. Initially with a six-month mandate, the mission aimed to provide support to the transitional government of Somalia and to take all necessary measures appropriate and, in coordination with the Somali national defence and public safety institutions, to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups,[12] among other responsibilities. AMISOM has been working together with the Somali National Army (SNA) and through coordinated efforts in 2014, gained back some towns initially seized by the insurgents. Whilst some progress has been made by AMISOM and the SNA's counter-efforts, al-Shabaab continues its attacks, specifically targeting these military operations. Apart from the attacks and human rights abuses orchestrated by al-Shabaab, reports by Human Rights Watch indicate that government security forces, AU troops and allied militias have also been responsible for indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and detention.

Given the challenges and hostilities that result from military intervention, alternate approaches must be considered – for example, a dual-track approach where mediation is used together with military intervention, or other soft power approaches. African leaders and delegates attend the Africa Union Peace and Security Council Summit on Terrorism in Nairobi, Kenya (2 September 2014) and propose creating a special fund to combat Islamist militant groups growing in strength from Kenya to Nigeria.

The African Youth Decade, 2009-2018 Plan of Action (DPoA) is a framework for multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional engagement of all stakeholders towards the achievement of the goals and objectives of the African Youth Charter. The Regional Economic Communities are called upon to mainstream the DPoA in their youth related strategies and programmes, advocate for the accelerated implementation of the DPoA and contribute to resource mobilization efforts at regional and country levels. Bilateral organizations, multi-lateral agencies, including the UN system, Civil Society and non-governmental organizations, the private sector as well as, the Pan African Youth Union and other youth organizations are equally urged to align their activities over the next decade with this Plan of Action and to mainstream youth perspective into their programmes and interventions.

Agenda 2063, Aspiration 6 underscores the importance of engaging and empowering youth. It holds a lot of promise for the youth of Africa stating that they shall be socially, economically and politically empowered through the full implementation of the African Youth Charter; Africa will be a continent where the talent of the child and the youth will be fully developed, rewarded and

protected for the benefit of society [139]. All forms of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of young people will be eliminated and youth issues mainstreamed in all development agendas. [140];Youth unemployment will be eliminated, and Africa's youth guaranteed full access to education, training, skills and technology, health services, jobs and economic opportunities, recreational and cultural activities as well as financial means and all necessary resources to allow them to realize their full potential; Young African men and women will be the path breakers of the African knowledge society and will contribute significantly to innovation and entrepreneurship; The creativity, energy and innovation of Africa's youth shall be the driving force behind the continent's political, social, cultural and economic transformation.[141]

The AU's Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism, adopted in 2004, takes cognizance of the links between terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, money laundering and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Somalia also presents an example of a primarily military intervention to counter al-Shabaab. In 2007, the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) created AMISOM. Initially with a six-month mandate, the mission aimed to provide support to the transitional government of Somalia and to take all necessary measures appropriate and, in coordination with the Somali national defence and public safety institutions, to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups,[12] among other responsibilities. AMISOM has been working together with the Somali National Army (SNA) and through coordinated efforts during the course of 2014, gained back some towns initially seized by the insurgents. Whilst some progress has been made by AMISOM and the SNA's counter-efforts, al-Shabaab continues its attacks, specifically targeting these military operations. Apart from the attacks and human rights abuses orchestrated by al-Shabaab, reports by Human Rights Watch indicate that government security forces, AU troops and allied militias have also been responsible for indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and detention.[13]

In January 2016, the United Nations Secretary General presented to the General Assembly a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/RES/70/254 -PVE) which is a comprehensive approach to countering violent extremism as well as systematically preventing drivers of violent extremism at the local, national, regional and global levels. In July 2016, the Assembly adopted a resolution with reference to the Plan of Action and invited Member States, regional and sub-regional organizations to consider national and regional plans of action for P/CVE. AMISOM, which held a conference on the role of women in P/CVE in December 2015, has been involved in efforts aimed at 'strengthening the role of Somali women in countering violent extremism in Somalia, [and] providing support to the government in developing the appropriate policy framework to support protection of their rights'[142].

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, which comprises of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda, and UN Women signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in June 2016 that prioritizes women and countering violent

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[139] AUC(2014).The African Agenda 2063.Addis Ababa,Ethiopia

[140] Ibid

[141] AUC (2014).The African Agenda 2063.Addis Ababa,Ethiopia.

[142] United States Department(2017). Country Reports on Terrorism 2016. Bureau of Counterterrorism. United States Department of State Publication

extremism.[143] Meanwhile, the European Union's (EU) Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) project has been engaging with women's organizations 'to contribute to building greater resilience in communities vulnerable to radicalization'. Part of this initiative has been to conduct training workshops that 'provide guidance to women's organizations on how to increase engagement with security providers at both the state and clan level, in order to establish or improve de-radicalization initiatives'[144].

Violent extremists not only cause death and destruction, they poison societies with hateful ideologies, and hinder peaceful development, dialogue, and cooperation. There can be no doubt that violent extremism – in all its forms and manifestations – will continue to represent one of the major challenges to peace and security in the IGAD region.

- IGAD countries need to create awareness of the importance of dealing with persistent political and structural drivers of radicalization.
- New issues, such as the security implications of migration.
- Intensify its capacity-building efforts
- Re-examine own policies and actions.

There is practically no country in the IGAD region that has not been affected by violent conflicts some of which have led to extremism. Threats from violent extremism are constantly changing, and they come in different forms and manifestations. IGAD has acknowledged the multi-faceted nature of the problem, and called on states to pursue "comprehensive and sustainable efforts" in countering "the manifestations of terrorism" as well as the "various social, economic, political and other factors, which might engender conditions in which terrorist organizations could engage in recruitment and win support. Furthermore, the Declaration made it clear that countering violent extremism was not just the responsibility of governments or security agencies, but should involve, where appropriate, "young people, families, women, victims of terrorism, religious, cultural and educational leaders, civil society, as well as the media. One of the principal objectives in writing the report was to offer practical suggestions; nearly half of the document consists of examples of good practice that were found. The motivation for doing so was to demonstrate that countering violent extremism is not a revolutionary new idea that countries can learn and benefit from each other's 'experiences.

The strength of countering violent extremism lies in offering a systematic framework for the mobilization of groups and individuals that are not typically involved in security issues. By giving a role to mayors, teachers, religious leaders, youth workers, bloggers, and even students, it reaches out to all sectors of society and defines the struggle against violent radicalization as a collective task. In doing so, it recognizes the social roots of the problem, enables early interventions, promotes non-coercive solutions, and serves as an early warning system for emerging conflicts and grievances. Indeed, even governments who have been suspicious of the "CVE agenda" tend to agree that, in the long term, threats from violent extremism cannot be contained through security measures alone. Critics have pointed out that the effects of countering violent extremism

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[143] Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD and UN Women to promote gender and resilience initiatives within the IGAD region, July 2016, http://africanewswire. za.com/igad-and-un-women-to-promote-gender-and resilience- initiatives-within-the-igad-region/
[144] European Commission, STRIVE for Development, Luxembourg: European Commission, 2015, 20.

programmes can be difficult to measure[145] Others have argued that countering violent extremism has "securitized" civil society by turning religious leaders and educators into government "spies", while failing to address the underlying structural drivers and root causes from which manifestations of violent extremism cannot be separated[146].

In April 2018, the **Inter-Governmental Authority on Developmen**t inaugurated its Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Djibouti. The ICEP/CVE centre is an institution that is offering a dedicated platform to institutionalize the prevention and countering violent extremism in the Horn and Eastern Africa. This centre is expected to serve as a resource to CSOs, media, academia, governments, youth, religious and cultural leaders, peace and security experts, business practitioners and all partners interested in P/CVE. This centre endeavours to empower youth, women, religious leaders, CSOs to enhance resilience and build capacity in CVE. It will engage in training and learning, networking, counter-messaging, state and non-state actors working together, research and innovation. The ICEPCVE has developed a regional strategy that mainly targets efforts of harnessing soft power in dealing with radicalization and violent extremism. It aims at deepening the understanding of the drivers of VE, the role of research and analysis in deepening the understanding of drivers of VE for evidence driven policy responses, capacity development, and strategic communication on matters CVE. This centre works closely with the IGAD Peace and Security Sector Program together with the Conflict Early Warning and Response unit (IGAD-CEWARN).

Attempts at dialogue and mediation produced some positive results. These attempts provided an opportunity for the perpetrating groups to present their grievances and have these issues addressed, to an extent, as in the case of Mali. The second lesson is that where mediation and dialogue took place, although it may not have resolved the conflict, the ceasefires prevented further violent conflict from occurring for a period of time.

The past few years have witnessed the rapid expansion of P/CVE initiatives climaxed by the establishment of the P/CVE Centre of Excellence in Djibouti. It is intended to contribute to the growing body of information about P/CVE, and promote an effective evidence-based approach to addressing terrorism.

Coordinated and harmonised efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism are underway among and between states, together with regional, continental and international organisations. These efforts include collaboration on border security, sharing intelligence, and the development of strategies and frameworks, such as the African Union's (AU) Counter Terrorism Framework and the United Nations' (UN) Global Counter-terrorism Strategy awareness-raising was described as, for example, enlightening the youth on the need for peaceful coexistence, patriotism, accountability, obedience to rule of law and good governance.

The Eastern Africa region continues to face serious counter-terrorism problems due to limited State capacity, inter-State disputes, socio-economic challenges, porous borders and more recently, radicalization and extremism. Almost all States in the region have experienced terrorists' attacks.

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[145] Newman, P(2017). Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London
[146] Ibid

Terrorists exploit geographical spaces where State penetration is limited, inter-ethnic strife, differences in governance systems and judicial procedures, lax or non-existent border controls and a variety of transnational organized criminal networks to carry out their activities. Somalia, which has increasingly become a hub for terrorists to recruit and train, presents a growing challenge for States of the region and the international community (CTITF, 2011). The objectives of the meeting were four-fold: to promote more effective leadership at national and regional levels to address key challenges under the respective pillars of the Strategy; enhancing operational cooperation within the region on key areas relevant to the Global Strategy; a regional action plan for the implementation of the Global Strategy in the region while enhancing and recognizing the role of civil society in the implementation of the Global Strategy. This meeting was building on P/CVE work that was already underway in the region under the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Capacity-Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT), the Strategy on Combating Terrorism in East Africa of the East African Community (EAC) and the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO).

The US East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative, intended to improve police and judicial anti-terrorist capabilities of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. On 2 September 2014, African leaders and delegates attended the Africa Union Peace and Security Council Summit on Terrorism in Nairobi, Kenya and propose creating a special fund to combat Islamist militant groups growing in strength from Kenya to Nigeria.

In striking a way to strengthen women roles in combatting VE, AMISOM held a conference on the role of women in P/CVE in December 2015. The aim has been to 'strengthen the role of Somali women in countering violent extremism in Somalia, [and] providing support to the government in developing the appropriate policy framework to support protection of their rights' 147. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development member states and UN Women signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2016 that prioritises women and countering violent extremism.[148]

Meanwhile, the European Union's (EU) Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) project has been engaging with women's organisations 'to contribute to building greater resilience in communities vulnerable to radicalisation'. Part of this initiative has been to conduct training workshops that 'provide guidance to women's organisations on how to increase engagement with security providers at both the state and clan levels, in order to establish or improve de-radicalisation initiatives'[149].

In May 2016 several major donors, UN agencies and women's organisations met in Nairobi 'to discuss ways in which women can be pushed to the front of the security agenda' in P/CVE.[150]The intention is that the inputs to the discussion will be used to draft a joint programme aimed at strengthening women's abilities to counter violent extremism, including 'training for mothers on

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[147] AMISOM, AMISOM Conference on the role of women in countering extremism ends in Djibouti, December 2015, http://amisom-au.org/2015/12/amisom-conference-on-therole- of-women-in-countering-extremism-ends-in-djibouti/.

[148] Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD and UN Women to promote gender and resilience initiatives within the IGAD region, July 2016, http://africanewswire. za.com/igad-and-un-women-to-promote-gender-and resilience- initiatives-within-the-igad-region/

[149] European Commission, STRIVE for Development, Luxembourg: European Commission, 2015, 20.

[150] F Bagenal, Somali Women Raise Voices Against Extremism, *News Deeply,* May 2016, www.newsdeeply. com/womenandgirls/somali-women-raise-voices-againstextremism/.

how to respond and react to children when they express radical thoughts and opinions as well as a call for more research into women's roles in extremist organisations.

5.4   NATIONAL P/CVE STRATEGY

Currently, there is an attempt in Uganda to develop the national P/CVE strategy report that adheres to the UN Secretary General Ban's 2015 "Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism". In the Ugandan P/CVE strategy, there are provisions to include youth, social service providers, military, law enforcement, religious leaders, civil society organizations (CSO), and non-governmental actors. What has worked in Uganda is the application of equal protection under the law. However, more needs to be done where transparency is exercised with as many institutions at all levels, as possible. These institutions should be more responsive and representative in the national government's P/CVE action plans.[151]

Uganda is already seeking support from the U.S. government to build the capacity and boost the interests of not only completing the strategy but also to support the implementation. On the one hand the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Centre of Excellence in P/CVE (ICE-PCVE), East Africa's regional economic community, have developed their own regional CVE strategy. These are meant to enhance the capacity of all regional actors through "empowering local communities, addressing the push factors, and promoting CVE diplomacy across the Eastern Africa region."[152]

Uganda's immediate approach to implement the P/CVE is designed to take between 0-2 years. The areas include strengthening the reintegration of refugee and settlement program. Uganda's refugee resettlement program is a key source of resilience that addresses a potential conflict trigger. Under Uganda's current program, refugees are granted full freedom of movement, the right to work and establish businesses, access to land, and social services through a generous asylum policy.

The second area in the strategy is professionalizing the security forces. Trust is beginning to erode on the use of securitized rather than soft power approaches. The professionalization and empowerment of the security forces (both police and military) through a deliberate security sector reform (SSR) program with U.S is underway with assistance coming primarily from AFRICOM. The reform initiative is deploying the law enforcement professionals from the U.S. Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) to develop Uganda's "professional and transparent law enforcement institutions. The target is to usher protection of human rights, combat corruption, and reduce the threat of transnational crime and

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[151] U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 70TH SESSION, BAN KI-MOON, "PLAN OF ACTION TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM: REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL," UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, A/70/67424, DECEMBER 24, 2015, PP 12/22, HTTP://WWW.UN.ORG/EN/GA/SEARCH/VIEW_DOC.ASP?SYMBOL=A/70/674. IN THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

[152] INTERGOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY ON DEVELOPMENT (IGAD), REGIONAL STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN EASTERN AFRICA, (FEBRUARY 2017), 25. IN THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

terrorism."[153]

The other areas of the immediate strategy are the engagement with CSOs. Currently there is an NGO Act that many NGOs are clamoring for its repeal so as to enable grassroots CSOs to flourish. By starting at the national level, encouraging the use of non-coercive measures, and creating an unwelcoming environment for terrorists, Uganda can, according to former Ambassador Daniel Benjamin in a 2010 U.S. Senate hearing, promote "capacity-building, outreach to civil society, education, and messaging."[154]Benjamin maintained that this approach would help to dissuade potential extremists from using violence and thus avoid the onset or spread of conflict.[155]

The medium term strategy lacks clear support from the community level, the local action plan, which is important to Uganda's P/CVE approach. Unlike Uganda's CT strategy, which relies exclusively on its security forces, a local P/CVE plan is not clear on how it intends to support current sources of resilience and represent a whole-of-community and youth approach. The Ugandan government is taking the lead to coordinate among numerous actors, the civic leaders, CSOs, NGOs, law enforcement, schools, mentors, businesses, religious institutions. Youth are not clearly articulated in these groups and issues of local grievances that could drive radicalization must be addressed. Fortunately for Uganda, a maturing civil society already exists and, if given the space to operate, can serve as a force multiplier for P/CVE.[156] Uganda's civil society includes youth, and must be strengthened to carry out an effective local action plan that incorporates community policing and strategic communications, and builds human capital with consistent support from international partners.

Uganda's current community policing initiative that trains "tens of thousands of 'crime preventers to guard against crime in their communities"[157] is very strong. The Programme is driving towards achieving a population-centered community policing benefits to communities by first improving communication, transparency, collaboration, and respect, and subsequently creating formal and informal mentors that can deter youth radicalization. [158] Although currently small in scale, Uganda's program has been lauded for preventing crime, reporting suspicious activities, and

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[153] US DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, "INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE TRAINING ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (ICITAP)," (WASHINGTON, DC), HTTPS://WWW.JUSTICE.GOV/CRIMINAL-ICITAP. IN THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW**

[154] U.S. CONGRESS, SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM, 111TH CONG., 2ND SESS., MARCH 10, 2010, S. HRG.111-822, WASHINGTON: GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 2011 (63-687) PP. 9, HTTPS://WWW.GPO.GOV/FDSYS/PKG/ CHRG-111SHRG63687/HTML/CHRG-111SHRG63687.HTM. IN THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW**

[155] IBID.

[156] BERNARDO MONZANI, ET AL., "WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA," (BOLOGNA, ITALY: AGENCY FOR AGENCY FOR PEACEBUILDING, DECEMBER 2016). IN THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW**

[157] KESSELS, ET. AL., 58.

[158] INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, USING COMMUNITY POLICING TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM: FIVE KEY PRINCIPLES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, WASHINGTON, DC: OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES, 2014, IN THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW** 10, HTTPS://RIC-ZAI-INC.COM/PUBLICATIONS/COPS-P299-PUB.PDF.

offering communities a pathway to prevent radicalization.[159]With the clear deficit of trust that exists in Uganda, this program is absolutely necessary to rebuild trust between law enforcement, youth and the people. In terms of CVE, rebuilding trusting partnerships helps address grievances and achieves the appropriate balance between traditional police services and preventing radicalization.[160]

Ugandan youth form one of the majority users of social media. Therefore, one of the key aspects of Uganda's CVE strategy is its strategic communications plan. Strategic communications activities are those that enable an understanding of target audiences, identify effective conduits, and the development and promotion of ideas and opinions to promote and sustain particular types of behavior.[161] Although currently lacking violent conflict, Uganda still needs to maintain credible and consistent messaging with youth, and the bigger populations that are vulnerable to radicalization. Messaging has not worked out at the national or government level, but has been working very well within communities. Messaging or the follow up of information between Uganda's Somali communities, influential religious or other individuals, victims of violent extremism, integrated refugees, and local CSOs are to counter radical ideology.[162]

At the global level, the United Nations, through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and UN Development Program (UNDP), and the United States through Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS) and Agency for International Development (USAID) are playing a major role in developing the Uganda P/CVE strategy. The UN is paving ways to bolster its own programs especially, its UNDP and UNHCR efforts that directly address core grievances. There are no specific addresses to youth in P/CVE.

As the country's largest international partner, the United States is already providing significant development and security assistance to Uganda, with a total assistance budget exceeding $840 million per year.[163]This budget funds much of Uganda's health, education, and security sectors, providing much-needed support to otherwise overburdened systems.[164] Aside from assisting in the development and implementation of the national P/ CVE strategy, the United States must work side-by-side with Uganda to foster a strong civil society, youth inclusivity in PCVE.

One other resilience-building areas that the United States is supporting is developing human

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[159] KESSELS, ET. AL., 58. IN THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

[160] International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2014, 9, https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops- p299-pub.pdf

[161] S. A. TATHAM, "STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION: A PRIMER," ADVANCED RESEARCH AND ASSESSMENT GROUP, SPECIAL SERIES 8/28, SHRIVENHAM, UK: DEFENCE ACADEMY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, 2008, 3, HTTPS:// WWW.FILES.ETHZ.CH/ISN/94411/2008_DEC.PDF. SEE: THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

[162] SHIVIT BAKRANIA, "STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS," GSDRC APPLIED KNOWLEDGE SERVICES, AUGUST 29, 2014, 2, HTTP://WWW.GSDRC.ORG/DOCS/OPEN/HDQ1139.PDF. SEE: THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

[163] U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, "U.S. RELATIONS WITH UGANDA," FACT SHEET, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 2 JUN 2017, HTTPS://WWW.STATE.GOV/R/PA/EI/BGN/2963.HTM. SEE: THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

[164] USAID MISSION DIRECTOR, INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, US EMBASSY KAMPALA, KAMPALA, UGANDA; US SECURITY COOPERATION PROGRAMS OFFICER, INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, US EMBASSY KAMPALA, KAMPALA, UGANDA, 24 NOVEMBER 2015. SEE: THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

capital, specifically through international educational exchanges. Youth have not been part of the selection, except for few cases. Numerous recent studies support a correlation between foreign education that exposes youth to democratic systems and their positive actions upon returning home.[165]According to a study exploring the link between return migration and political outcomes in the origin country, after spending significant time in a democratic society, returnees bring back new norms of democratic participation and serve as catalysts for positive change.[166] A study, conducted by Antonio Spilimbergo, examined the link between foreign-educated individuals and their promotion of democracy upon returning to their home country. Spilimbergo found that students trained abroad were not only more influential later in life, but thanks to new ideas and easier access to external media, these "foreign-educated individuals make it more difficult for dictatorial regimes to maintain repression."[167] All these have immense impacts on youth who have not travelled and not been exposed internationally.

For example, The U.S. Department of State (DOS) already conducts several exchange programs that includes the long- running Fulbright Scholar Program and the nascent Mandela Washington Fellowship Program. The latter provides outstanding young leaders from across Sub-Saharan Africa an opportunity to receive training and education in the United States focused on leadership skills, entrepreneurship, civic leadership, and public management. [168] These programs have produced numerous success stories and offer a low-cost investment in Uganda's future youth and young leaders that yields the highest return: a resilient and prosperous society. DOS has not fully expanded these programs or increased participation from countries demonstrating indicators of potential instability, like Uganda.[169]

In the long term, the national PCVE strategy should focus its attention in fully including youth in PCVE and peace building efforts will that are geared towards sustainable development and good governance. This holistic approach must therefore fully develop a robust civil society, strong and durable institutions, and an environment where economic and democratic liberalization to be fully realized. Uganda is still a free, open, enduring society that requires years, and sometimes decades, of consistent support and nurtures the youth to achieve better. Today the youth have ambitions to join politics; they need significant funding, trust-building initiatives, and cooperation from national and international partners.[170]

Dyrenforth argues that:

> As Uganda continues along this path, international partners, specifically the UN and
> United States must hold the Ugandan government accountable to preventing violent

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[165] FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AND MORE EXAMPLES, SEE CAROL ATKINSON, MILITARY SOFT POWER (LANHAM, MD: ROWAN & LITTLEFIELD, 2014). SEE: THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

[166] LISA CHAUVET AND MARION MERCIER, "DO RETURN MIGRANTS TRANSFER POLITICAL NORMS TO THEIR ORIGIN COUNTRY? EVIDENCE FROM MALI," JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS VOL. 42, NO. 3 (AUGUST 2014), 632.

[167] ANTONIO SPILIMBERGO, "DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN EDUCATION," AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW VOL. 99, NO. 1 (MARCH 2009), 539.

[168] U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, "MANDELA WASHINGTON FELLOWSHIP FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS," BUREAU OF EDUCATION AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS, "MANDELA WASHINGTON FELLOWSHIP FOR YOUNG AFRICAN LEADERS," N.D., (WASHINGTON,DC), HTTPS://ECA.STATE.GOV/PROGRAMS-INITIATIVES/MANDELA-WASHINGTON-FELLOWSHIP.

[169] See: Thomas Dyrenforth (Winter 2018) Countering Violent Extremism in Nigeria and Uganda A Comparative Case Study. **International Affairs Review**
[170] See: Thomas Dyrenforth (Winter 2018) Countering Violent Extremism in Nigeria and Uganda A Comparative Case Study. **International Affairs Review**

extremism and building a strong society. Capacity-building partnerships should be maintained and, if necessary, these outside actors must be prepared to use preventative strategies – such as public diplomacy, mediation, or even coercion – to keep Uganda focused on CVE. However, no matter the support from international partners, Uganda must be seen as leading this effort within their own society; having a "western face" in no way benefits P/CVE.[171]

5.5   THE UGANDA NATIONAL YOUTH POLICY

The Minister for Youth and Children is head of the Department of Youth and Children Affairs as part of the Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development (MGLSD). The aim of the department is to, "ensure care, protection and empowerment of children and youths," with a focus on policy, legislation, programmes, stakeholder coordination, participation, service provider training and responding to the "concerns of children and youth." At the district level, youth issues are managed within the portfolio of the Community Development Officer (CDO).

The National Youth Council (NYC) is an autonomous body established by the National Youth Council Act 1993 and seeks to be "the leading organization in empowerment of Youths" and acts as an umbrella organisation for young people and youth organisations in Uganda and seeks to "organize, mobilize and engage Youth in development activities." [172] A Cross-Sector Situational Analysis on Youth in Uganda (2011) highlighted a "distrust of the NYC by youth because of its association with government.[173] The budget allocated to the governmental authority (ministry, department or office) that is primarily responsible for youth and/or youth programming stands at UGX 26.3 MILLION USD 10,413.29.[174]

The Uganda National Youth Policy (UNYP) was developed with the premise that it will provide a step forward to invest in the youth.[175] The policy provides an operational framework to all the actors with a set of realistic guidelines from which action programmes and services can be developed to facilitate meaningful involvement of Youth in national development efforts and to respond to their various needs and problems.[176]

The policy recognizes that since independence, Uganda has lacked an explicit, coherent, and comprehensive Uganda National Youth Policy (UNYP) to guide and ensure sustainable youth development. It goes further to state that Youth planning has been organization-based and reactive to prevailing circumstances.[177]

The UNYP puts the youth between 15-19 years to constitute about 29% of the 21.6 million

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[171] SEE: THOMAS DYRENFORTH (WINTER 2018) COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA AND UGANDA A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW

[172] The National Youth Policy; A vision for Youth In The 21st Century, Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, Kampala, 2001

[173] Participants of the YouthMap Uganda: A Cross-Sector Situational Analysis on Youth in Uganda (2011)

[174] International Youth Foundation. (2011). Volume 1: Main report. In *YouthMap: A cross-sectional situation analysis on Youth in Uganda*. Retrieved from http://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Uganda_2011_Youth_Mapping_Volume_1.pdf

[175] SOME OF THE FOUNDING IDEAS CAME FROM THE THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA. (1993). NATIONAL YOUTH COUNCIL ACT 1993. RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.ULII.ORG/UG/LEGISLATION/CONSOLIDATED-ACT/319

[176] THE NATIONAL YOUTH POLICY; A VISION FOR YOUTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY, MINISTRY OF GENDER, LABOUR AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, KAMPALA, 2001

[177] IBID.;

estimated Uganda's populations.[178] Of these, females constitute 53% and males 47%.[179] Most of the youth live in rural areas. There is a growing phenomenon of large numbers of youth migrating to urban areas. A trend of rural-urban migration by the youth is majorly; to search for better social services and amenities like Education and Health services; search for employment and/or business opportunities; Insecurity; Domestic Violence; Parental Neglect. The UNYP however argues that, most of the youth fail to get jobs and end up in urban slums and streets. They engage in unproductive or anti-social activities like prostitution, thuggery, drugs and substance abuse. They increase pressure on the few urban facilities and amenities.[180]

Poverty, unemployment and underemployment have been cited several times as the main problems that are affecting the youth.[181] In many parts of the country, the major causes of these problems are: Lack of employable skills; Lack of access to resources like land and capital; Lack of focus by the existing programmes on the informal sector and agriculture; and overemphasis on experience and lack of apprenticeship schemes; Negative attitudes by the Youth towards work especially in agriculture; Lack of a comprehensive Employment Policy; Negative cultural attitudes such as gender discrimination.[182] The national development plan (2010/11-2014/15) details expenditure to "provide Entrepreneurial, Employable and Adolescent Life Skills to the Youth Outside School and provide them with Start Up Kits."[183] According to the World Bank, Uganda spent 15.09% of its government expenditure and 3.28% of its GDP on education provision in 2012.[184] The national development plan (2010/11-2014/15) details expenditure to "provide Entrepreneurial, Employable and Adolescent Life Skills to the Youth Outside School and provide them with Start Up Kits."[185] According to the World Bank, Uganda spent 15.09% of its government expenditure and 3.28% of its GDP on education provision in 2012.[186]

Youth face serious challenges of education and training. The challenges include: Inadequate education and training facilities; Lack of localisation of education at all levels; Shortage of personnel with quality practical skills training; Skewedness of education and training institutions in favor of urban areas; and Lack of equity and accessibility to education and training facilities. By 1990, 24.3% of males and 34.7% of females above 6 years were not attending school. Only 2.9 million out of 3.9 million were enrolled in school irrespective of age.[187] Amongst those attending school, the dropout rates for females was higher than that of male counterparts with

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[178] *IBID.;*

[179] *IBID.;*

[180] *IBID.;*

[181] *INTERNATIONAL YOUTH FOUNDATION. (2011). YOUTHMAP: A CROSS-SECTIONAL SITUATION ANALYSIS ON YOUTH IN UGANDA. SUMMARY DOCUMENT. RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.YOUTHPOLICY.ORG/NATIONAL/UGANDA_2011_YOUTH_MAPPING_SUMMARY.PDF*

[182] The National Youth Policy; A vision for Youth In The 21st Century, Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development, Kampala, 2001
[183] Ibid.;
[184] World Bank Report on Uganda 2012.
[185] Republic of Uganda. (2010). *National development plan (2010/11-2014/15).* Retrieved from http://www.youthpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2009_National_Development_Plan_Uganda_Eng.pdf
[186] World Bank Report on Uganda 2012

[187] *REPUBLIC OF UGANDA - MINISTRY OF GENDER, LABOUR AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. (2011). NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT POLICY FOR UGANDA. RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.YOUTHPOLICY.ORG/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/LIBRARY/2011_NATIONAL_EMPLOYMENT_POLICY_UGANDA_ENG.PDF AND ALSO GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA - MINISTRY OF GENDER, LABOUR AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. (2001). NATIONAL YOUTH POLICY OF UGANDA: A VISION FOR YOUTH IN THE 21ST CENTURY. RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.YOUTHPOLICY.ORG/NATIONAL/UGANDA_2001_NATIONAL_YOUTH_POLICY.PDF*

disparities becoming larger with the education ladder. Even the affirmative action of 1.5 points to female students on entry to Makerere University has not adequately addressed the imbalance. Overall two thirds of the youth 67.8 are literate. Like in the general population, male youth are more literate than female youth at 76.7% and 59.9% respectively.[188]

Based on the Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (UDHS, 1995) the youth in Uganda contribute significantly to the number of morbidity and mortality cases. Their health problems and needs are of basic nature as well as specific in such issues as sexual and reproductive health, substance/drug abuse and mental health. Many suffer from Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) and about 47% of the 1.8 million HIV/AIDS cases are youth, with female being more infected and vulnerable than their male counterparts. Teenage pregnancy stands at 43% (UDHS, 1995), while maternal morbidity and mortality has persistently remained high at 506/100,000 live births - many of which cases are youth. All these are partly because the youth exhibit early sexual debut averaged at 16 years for girls and 17.6 years for boys. The factors contributing to this situation are: Inadequate health facilities; High costs of health services; Lack of youth friendly health services; Lack of relevant health information; Negative cultural practices.[189]

Youth, participation and decision-making is very low in Uganda. According to UNYP, the trend analysis of involvement and participation in leadership and decision making since independence shows that the youth were mostly marginalized and their involvement seen only as beneficiaries of programmes/service rather than as active participants in the development process.[190] The UNYP states that the National Youth Council statute was enacted in 1993 as a platform to organize youth into a unified body to participate in the development process. But still participation or representation of the youth less than 25 years of age or those who are illiterate or semi illiterate in the position of leadership at all levels is limited. The low participation of the youth in decision-making is mainly due to: Lack of leadership and management skills; Organizational regulatory barriers and impediments; Low resource allocation to Youth Programmes.[191]

Sixty three percent of the in-mates in Ugandan prisons are youth and that figure is rising exponentially.[192] This locks out a large number of otherwise productive age group that could contribute positively to national development. Male youth feature more prominently in crime figures than the female counterparts. The underlying factors in all these crimes are, internal conflicts, unemployment, lack of guidance and counseling, redundancy, poverty and social wrangles. Due to erosion in culture and social support system, the country now witnesses a lot of cases of delinquencies, street youth, sex workers, drug addicts, orphans and other disadvantaged youth who are left to cater for themselves and sometimes their younger ones.[193]

The prevailing social-economic environment of the youth mainly favours the participation and

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[188] *IBID.;*

[189] *IBID.;*

[190] Ibid.;
[191] Ibid.;

[192] *IBID.;*

[193] *IBID.;*

development of the male youth. [194] For example, the female youth are mainly involved in domestic/reproductive work like collecting firewood and fetching water, cooking and caring for the children and the sick, all of which activities confine them in homes and do not expose them to outside opportunities that would enhance their participation in productive household/community management and leadership development.[195] Furthermore, in the area of health, female youth are more prone to morbidity and mortality than male youth. Many female youth have limited access to reproductive health services especially if they are unmarried and still in schools. The health service providers tend to be judgmental to them and this discourages them from seeking services. [196]

On the one hand, The Republic of Uganda Children Act 1997[197] consolidated the law relating to children, their rights, protections and provisions. The National Employment Policy for Uganda (2011) lists youth employment as a policy priority action area. The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (2007-2010) [198] details plans for post-conflict harmonization with specific actions on youth unemployment (through the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund) and the spread and impact of HIV/AIDS.[199] Regionally, the Commonwealth Youth Programme has been active in Northern Uganda and the African Youth Forum was hosted in Uganda in 2010 in partnership with UNICEF and the African Union Commission. The national development plan (2010/11 – 2014/15) details a number of initiatives relating to youth.[200]

5.6 GRASSROOTS ACTIONS

Grassroots actions are usually termed, bottom up-approaches that focus more on initiatives that grassroots community contributes to P/CVE. Ginkel (2012) asserts that locally based organisations and established civil society organizations play a crucial role in preventing and countering violent extremism in numerous ways - by working on development programs, through their work in conflict transformation, in providing a platform to raise political grievances and to facilitate dialogue, or through their work in empowering victims and survivors of terrorism.[201]

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[194] INTERNATIONAL YOUTH FOUNDATION. (2011). VOLUME 1: MAIN REPORT. IN YOUTHMAP: A CROSS-SECTIONAL SITUATION ANALYSIS ON YOUTH IN UGANDA. RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.YOUTHPOLICY.ORG/NATIONAL/UGANDA_2011_YOUTH_MAPPING_VOLUME_1.PDF AND INTERNATIONAL YOUTH FOUNDATION. (2011). VOLUME 2: MAIN REPORT. IN YOUTHMAP: A CROSS-SECTIONAL SITUATION ANALYSIS ON YOUTH IN UGANDA. RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.YOUTHPOLICY.ORG/NATIONAL/UGANDA_2011_YOUTH_MAPPING_VOLUME_1.PDF

[195] IBID.;

[196] IBID.;

[197] REPUBLIC OF UGANDA. (1997) THE CHILDREN ACT. RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.YOUTHPOLICY.ORG/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/LIBRARY/2011_UGANDA_CHILDREN_ACT_ENG.PDF

[198] REPUBLIC OF UGANDA. (2007). PEACE, RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR NORTHERN UGANDA (2007-2010). RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.YOUTHPOLICY.ORG/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/LIBRARY/2007_PEACE_RECOVERY_DEVELOPMENT_PLAN_NORTHERN_UGANDA_ENG.PDF

REPUBLIC OF UGANDA – OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER. (2012). NORTHERN UGANDAN SOCIAL ACTION FUND II (NUSAF II). RETRIEVED ON 12 SEPTEMBER 2013 FROM HTTP://WWW.OPM.GO.UG/PROJECTS/NORTHERN-UGANDA-SOCIAL-ACTION-FUND-II-NUSAF-II1.HTML

[199] REPUBLIC OF UGANDA. (2010). NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (2010/11-2014/15). RETRIEVED FROM HTTP://WWW.YOUTHPOLICY.ORG/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/LIBRARY/2009_NATIONAL_DEVELOPMENT_PLAN_UGANDA_ENG.PDF

[200] IBID.;

[201] BIBI VAN GINKEL (2012) ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM EXPERIENCES WITH THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER- TERRORISM STRATEGY; INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR COUNTER TERRORISM – THE HAUGE.

A case in point is one amongst the Uganda Somali Community who set up an initiative of the large Somali business community resident in Uganda. This civil society organization has set up programmes that provide community outreach, communication and media strategies in order to engage with the Somali community as well as with the local authorities. Their self- standing contribution to community policing, thus without compromising the otherwise legitimate goals of the local authorities is a good example of a civil society initiative that tunes into local grievances and is looking for context-specific solutions. These initiatives have proven to be important steps in preventing radicalization in Uganda as a result of societal and political exclusion (Ginkel (2012: 6).

In as far as matters of P/CVE are concerned, grassroots are not about being represented, but about participation and channeling the different voices within society. Community dialogue, platforms for inclusiveness within the society reduce exclusion that in turn can assist directly in P/CVE.

While conducting the grassroots approach, an inside approach can be deployed. This approach is usually termed holistic, encompassing top-down and meeting it with the bottom up in the mid-range level. This is where policies and strategies meet with tangible projects that engage youth from the grassroots. This is also where governance can be evaluated.

A holistic approach to countering violent extremism includes providing alternative opportunities, empowering positive role models, and engaging with the marginalized groups / people. And it is believed by many youth that it is more effective in preventing recruitment and de-radicalizing extremists than the adversarial (punitive and top-down) approaches. This model includes government officials, CSO leaders, religious leaders, elders, etc. (see: van Ginkel, 2012)[202] and (Van Ginkel, Lia van Broekhoven and Fulco van Deveter, 2010).[203]

TABLE 4.1: SUMMARY OF GLOBAL, REGIONAL AND NATIONAL POLICIES, PROGRAMS AND STRATEGIES OF PCVE

- UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005)
- UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006)
- Amman Youth Declaration and the Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism
- Resolution 2178 (2014)
- UNSCR 2250-United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Youth, Peace and Security (2015)
- UN Security Council resolutions, including 1373
- United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/RES/70/254-PVE) (2016)
- UN Women MoU on Women and Countering Violent Extremism (2016)
- UN Sustainable Development Goals 5, 8 ,10& 16

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[202] *BIBI VAN GINKEL, BIBI (2012) ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM EXPERIENCES WITH THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER- TERRORISM STRATEGY; INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM; THE HAGUE*

[203] *BIBI VAN GINKEL, LIA VAN BROEKHOVEN AND FULCO VAN DEVENTER, THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN IMPLEMENTING THE GLOBAL UN COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY, DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE OCCASION OF THE CTITF OFFICE SIDE-EVENT DURING THE SECOND REVIEW OF THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER TERRORISM STRATEGY, 7-9 SEPTEMBER 2010, HTTP://WWW.CLINGENDAEL.NL/PUBLICATIONS/2010/20100909_CSCP_PAPER_GINKEL.PDF,*

Global Policies/ Protocols	• Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violent Extremism and Promote Peace • Guiding Principles on Youth in Peace building: A Practice. • Young Peoples Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note • Youth Global Programme for Sustainable Development and Peace (Youth GPS) 2016-2020 • United Nations Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism
Regional P/CVE Policies/Strategies **(AUC & IGAD)**	• From 1992 onwards, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had adopted various counter terrorism frameworks. • AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002) • African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) • AU's Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism (2004) • AMISOM (2007) • The African Youth Decade, 2009-2018 Plan of Action (DPoA) • Agenda 2063 Aspiration 6 • AU's Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism adopted in 2004 • AMISOM Conference on Role of Women in P/CVE(2016) • IGAD-Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (2018) • The ICEPVE Strategy (2018) • Collaboration on border security • Sharing Intelligence • The development of strategies and frameworks such as African's Union Counter Terrorism Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Awareness Raising • IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) • The Strategy on Combating Terrorism in East Africa on the East African Community (EAC) • The Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) • The Kenyan National Youth Policy (KNYP-2006) • A Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MOYAS) • The Youth Enterprise Development Fund (2006) • Ratification of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, known as Maputo Protocol, (2010). • Ratification of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on "Women, Conflict, Peace and Security" (2003).
National Policies/ Strategies &Programs (Uganda)	• Republic of Uganda. (1997) The Children Act. • International Youth Foundation. (2011). *YouthMap: A cross-sectional situation analysis on Youth in Uganda*. Summary document.

- International Youth Foundation. (2011). Volume 1: Main report. In *YouthMap: A cross-sectional situation analysis on Youth in Uganda*.
- International Youth Foundation. (2011). Volume 2: Annexes. In *YouthMap: A cross-sectional situation analysis on Youth in Uganda*.
- Republic of Uganda. (2010). *National development plan (2010/11-2014/15)*.
- Republic of Uganda - Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. (2011). *National Employment Policy for Uganda*.
- Government of Uganda - Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development. (2001). *National youth policy of Uganda: A vision for youth in the 21st Century*.
- Republic of Uganda. (2007). *Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (2007-2010)*.
- Republic of Uganda – Office of the Prime Minister. (2012). *Northern Ugandan Social Action Fund II (NUSAF II)*.
- The Republic of Uganda. (1993). *National Youth Council Act 1993*
- Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MGLSD)
- Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC)
- Uganda Women's Parliamentarians Association (UWOPA)
- Department of Gender, Culture and Community Development – within MGLSD
- Department of Gender and Women's Affairs – within MGLSD
- Women in Development Division – within MGLSD
- National Women's Council
- Directorate of Gender and Mass Mobilisation – within the National Resistance Movement's Secretariat
- National Gender Forum
- Minister of State for Gender and Cultural Affairs
- Constitution (1995)
- Prohibition of Female Genital Mutilation Act (enacted in April 2010)
- *Customary Marriage (Registration) Act*
- Land Amendment Act, 2004
- Divorce Act 2004
- Penal Code Amendment Act, 2007
- NGO Registration (Amendment) Act, 2006
- Equal Opportunities Commission Act, 2007
- The HIV/AIDs Prevention and Control Bill, 2009
- Trafficking in Persons Act, 2010
- Domestic Violence Bill, 2010
- Female Genital Mutilation Act, 2010
- Kawempe bye-law on domestic violence

- Kirewa bye-law on bride price
- Tororo Bridal Gifts Ordinance
- NGO Policy of 2008
- National Action Plan on Women (2007-10);
- National Development Plan (2010/11-2014/15)
- Second Peace Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda
- National Equal Opportunities Policy
- National Action Plan on UN Security Council 1325, 1820 and the Goma Declaration

In Drafts:

- The Anti-Homosexuality Bill
- The Sexual Offences Bill
- The Marriage and Divorce Bill

INTERVENTIONS AND STRATEGIES BY STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS TO ENGAGE AND EMPOWER YOUTH IN P/CVE IN UGANDA

This chapter attempts to identify avenues and strategies for creating as well as deepening interventions to engage and empower youth in P/CVE interventions in Kenya and Uganda. The avenues and strategies focus on mechanisms, infrastructure and resources that are available for engaging and empowering youth in P/CVE interventions in Kenya and Uganda. It will be noticed that some of the mechanisms and strategies are derived from the global policy strategies.

6.1 UNITED NATION POLICY STRATEGY

This research focuses on countering violent extremisms. However, it is worth starting with understanding the UN Global Counter-Terrorism strategy of 2006 that has many aspects of violent extremism.

In General Assembly resolution A/RES/70/254 on the Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism[204], adopted by consensus on 12 February 2016, The UN Member States stressed that it is essential to address the threat posed by violent extremism as and when conducive to terrorism, and recognized that violent extremism cannot and should not be associated with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group. They welcomed the initiative of the Secretary-General and took note of his Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (the Plan) (A/70/674 – A/70/675). Member States also decided to give further consideration to the Plan at the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy review in June 2016 as well as in other relevant fora.[205]

On the one hand, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 calls for a holistic and inclusive approach to counterterrorism.[206] The Strategy re-asserts the position that an effective counterterrorism strategy must combine preventive measures with efforts to address both real and perceived grievances and underlying social, economic, and political conditions. It provides a "human security" approach. The Strategy has tasked member states to reflect human security in their policies, to place emphasis on targeting disaffected and marginalized groups and areas, which are potential breeding grounds for terrorism. Stand-alone national policies are likely to be more effective against terrorists than terrorism. However, several international organizations have adopted this strategy, such as the AU 2002 protocol on anti-terrorism, the UK's Counter Terrorism Strategy-2011 and The EU's Counter Terrorism Strategy, 2005. It identifies the major motivation

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[204] *15 January 2016: UN Secretary-General's Remarks at General Assembly Presentation of the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Available at: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-01-15/un-secretary-generals-remarks-general-assembly-presentation-plan*

[205] *Geneva Conference on Preventing Violent Extremism – The Way Forward Organized by the United Nations in partnership with the Government of Switzerland 7 and 8 April 2016 Geneva, Switzerland*

[206] *The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006), United Nations, New York.*

for terrorist violence to be the struggle for power and justice.[207]

6.2   LIBERAL, DEVELOPMENTAL STRATEGY

Liberal approach stresses on issues of development and good governance with thoughtful dialogue to be an essential, although not sufficient, condition for building social capital and trust.[208] This is also one of the strategies that UNDP advocates for.

P/CVE are better oriented in approaches that counter hateful extremist ideologies that radicalize, recruit or incite youth to violence. In a broader sense, P/CVE has also encompassed the preventative aspects of counterterrorism as well as interventions to undermine the attraction of extremist movements and ideologies that seek to promote violence. P/CVE efforts address the root causes of extremism through many ways like involving youth, community engagement, political leaders, building awareness by way of research and countering extremist narratives. Extremism is therefore derived from the movements/organisations whose ideologies seek to promote violence, has gone through radicalisations either through individuals or institutions, community, opinion leaders, etc.

Other countries like USA are already engaging youth in countering violent extremism. The USA homeland security has taken many steps including projects that provide youth with a sense of belonging, as well as technical skills and vocational training, scholarships, opportunities for civic engagement, and leadership training. As part of these efforts, the youth are trained, mentored, and provided with seed funding to young leaders, for example, who are working to counter extremists' narratives, reintegration of former violent extremists, and promotion of tolerance and non-violent dispute resolution.

Uganda is already indicated in the IGAD ICPAT and CEWARN documentations aimed at building up centres and systems in P/CVE. According to Stephen Buchanan-Clarke and Rorisang Lekalake (2016), responses and strategies used to P/CVE in Kenya and Uganda suggest that, public approval of the government's response to extremism was considerably lower among Kenyans (44%) than among Ugandans (83%). Although two-thirds (66%) of Kenyans said that the country's intervention in Somalia had been worth the extremist reprisals, only 43% would oppose a military withdrawal.[209]

Lisa Sharland, Tim Grice and Sara Zeiger (2017) suggest, "The global effort to prevent violent extremism can't succeed without the private sector." [210] They continue to argue that most counterterrorism efforts have been security and intelligence led, with an emphasis on military and kinetic strategies to 'defeat' terrorism. Over the past decade in particular, global efforts have also focused on strategies for preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE), particularly on

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[207] NASSER,J. 2010.GLOBALIZATION AND TERRORISM: SECOND EDITION. THE MIGRATION OF DREAMS AND NIGHTMARES. ROYAL MELBOURNE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND UNIVERSITY OF HAWAI' AND UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL

[208] FORST, 2009.

[209] BUCHANAN-CLARKE, S. & LEKALAKE, R. (2016). VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA: PUBLIC OPINION FROM THE SAHEL, LAKE CHAD, AND THE HORN. ACCRA AND NAIROBI: AFROBAROMETER.

[210] LISA SHARLAND, TIM GRICE AND SARA ZEIGER; PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE MINING SECTOR; THE AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE; 23 NOVEMBER 2017.

the role of international institutions, governments, regional organisations and communities.[211] Their recommendations are directed mostly for mining companies, the industry, governments and communities on approaches to engage mining companies in P/CVE efforts.

6.3   PUNITIVE - HARD RESPONSE STRATEGY

Reactionary and punitive responses by law enforcement, military, and intelligence services have frequently characterized counterterrorism policies and actions in the Greater Horn region. Heavy-handed, discriminatory, and arbitrary responses can further isolate impacted communities and reduce trust in governments, proving tactically and strategically counterproductive. Further compounding this relationship with local communities is the propensity of governments to characterize terrorism-related challenges in generally monolithic, black-and-white ideological terms. By framing the underlying challenges as ideological or discursive in nature, governments tend at best to obscure if not dismiss the political, social, and economic grievances of societies facing conflict. Interventions that aim to counter "radical" ideas or narratives while dis- regarding these grievances, whether real or perceived, are unlikely to mitigate violence and may exacerbate existing tensions.

6.4   RE-THINKING NEW STRATEGY

There has been a recent shift within the global discourse from a predominate focus on counterterrorism to recognizing the importance of developing proactive, inclusive, and durable approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism as part of a comprehensive strategy to address terrorist threats. In September 2014, the UN Security Council first adopted the language of CVE in Resolution 2178 on the threat of foreign terrorist fighters.[212] In February 2015, the United States convened a three-day White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism; subsequent regional iterations, including one held in Nairobi in June 2015, have advanced opportunities for dialogue among governments and civil society. The United States also hosted the Leaders' Summit on Countering ISIL and Violent Extremism during the UN General Assembly in September 2015, and the UN Secretary-General presented his action plan on preventing violent extremism to the General Assembly in early 2016.[213]

The existence of al-Qaida–aligned groups within the Greater Horn of Africa has made the region a matter of urgency on the international agenda. Numerous workshops and summits have been organized in the region, including one held in February 2014 by the Global Counterterrorism Forum Horn of Africa Working Group, co-chaired by Turkey and the European Union, and several forums facilitated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development for its member states on CVE, including a high-level experts workshop and the High-Level Dialogue on Peace and Security in partnership with the UN Department of Political Affairs held in Djibouti in August

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[211] LISA SHARLAND, TIM GRICE AND SARA ZEIGER; PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF THE MINING SECTOR; THE AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC POLICY INSTITUTE; 23 NOVEMBER 2017.

[212] UN SECURITY COUNCIL, S/RES/2178, 24 SEPTEMBER 2014, PARAS. 15, 16, 18, AND 19.

[213] UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, "PLAN OF ACTION TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL," A/70/674, 24 DECEMBER 2015.

and November 2015, respectively.[214] Plans are also underway to establish a new Horn and Eastern Africa Countering Violent Extremism Center of Excellence and Counter- Messaging Hub that will serve as a regional coordinating body for CVE initiatives and capacity building.[215]

Additionally, the region has received support for a number of national and regional CVE efforts from bilateral and multilateral donors. Operational since 2009, the U.S. Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, known as PREACT, focused on CVE, enhancing the capacity to respond to immediate threats, and addressing longer-term vulnerabilities in each of the countries covered in this study. The EU has issued "A Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa"[216] and the "EU Counter-Terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen"[217] and supports CVE initiatives in Kenya and Somaliland through its Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa program.

6.5   NATIONAL COUNTERBALANCE STRATEGY

National efforts are also underway to develop country-specific CVE strategies in a number of countries in the region. This partial enumeration of these types of programs reflects the growing importance placed on CVE by the international community.

Although designed to counterbalance more reactive and hardline counterterrorism approaches, the CVE field remains relatively undefined and broad in scope. It struggles with ambiguity over what constitutes CVE and a reluctance to participate by key partners and stakeholders due to concerns over stigmatization resulting from having self-selected as vulnerable to violent extremism. Further, the frameworks for monitoring and evaluating CVE programs are inadequate, resulting in limited evidence that has subsequently hindered the field's effective development.[218]

6.6   LOCALLY BASED GRASSROOTS STRATEGY

The role of locally based organisations and civil society has been emphasized in many studies as a key factor when implementing effective policies and strategies.[219] Any effort that can deepen engagement with local and civil society organizations, by engaging with national, regional and

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[214] IGAD, "TACKLING VIOLENT EXTREMISM: A REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CONCERN," 31 AUGUST 2015, HTTP://IGAD.INT/INDEX.PHP?OPTION=COM_CONTENT&VIEW=ARTICLE&ID= 1199:TACKLING-VIOLENT-EXTREMIST-A-REGIONAL-AND-A-GLOBAL-CONCERN&CATID=45:PEACE-AND-SECURITY&ITEMID=128.

[215] IGAD, "STRENGTHENING REGIONAL CAPACITIES TO PREVENT AND COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE GREATER HORN OF AFRICA," 22 FEBRUARY 2016, HTTP://IGAD.INT /INDEX.PHP?OPTION=COM_CONTENT&VIEW=ARTICLE&ID=1282:STRENGTHENING-REGIONAL-CAPACITIES-TO-PREVENT-AND-COUNTER-VIOLENT-EXTREMISM-IN-THE-GREATER-HORN-OF -AFRICA-&CATID=45:PEACE-AND-SECURITY&ITEMID=128.

[216] COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, "COUNCIL CONCLUSIONS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA," 14 NOVEMBER 2011, ANNEX, HTTP://WWW.CONSILIUM.EUROPA.EU/UEDOCS/CMS _DATA/DOCS/PRESSDATA/EN/FORAFF/126052.PDF.

[217] EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY, "JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE COUNCIL: EU COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTION PLAN FOR THE HORN OF AFRICA AND YEMEN," JOIN(2012) 24 FINAL, 31 AUGUST 2012.

[218] FOR MORE DISCUSSION ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CVE INITIATIVES, SEE PETER ROMANIUK, "DOES CVE WORK? LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GLOBAL EFFORT TO COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM," GLOBAL CENTER ON COOPERATIVE SECURITY, SEPTEMBER 2015, HTTP://WWW.GLOBALCENTER.ORG/WP-CONTENT/UPLOADS/2015/09 /DOES-CVE-WORK_2015.PDF.

[219] VAN GINKEL, B. (2012). ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM. THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM, THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS.

global policies, and adopted measures on the ground has often assisted in diminishing political space.

However, civil societies are sometimes perceived as a risk or a threat to governments. For example, in Kenya, legislation that is designed to prevent support for terrorism has contributed to a climate of suspicion against civil society actors, especially Muslim charities.[220]

In many cases, the work of NGOs, LBOs and CSOs can cause intended and unintended consequences. The results may lead government's suspicion to decide a "clamp down" on civil society. As a response, such actions have made the citizens and civil society organizations criticize government policies. Sometimes, the process of radicalization begins with an individual. An individual's radicalization process towards violent extremism can even be at the family level. Therefore, the different mix of root causes and trigger events could best be understood at the grassroots level.

According to (Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun, 2009) grassroots knowledge of societal character (social identification, social interaction and group processes, relative deprivation) or a political, economic, cultural or religious character (macro level)[221] cannot be under rated.

Pratt (2011) argues that grassroots strategy can help in generating the social basis for democracy; Promoting political accountability; Producing trust, reciprocity and networks; Creating and promoting alternatives; and supporting the rights of citizens and the concept of citizenship.[222]

Locally based organizations can detect early signs of radicalization that leads to extremism. Some of the below factors are observed by family, friends, schools and immediate circles can alert for possible prevention. These include, but are not limited to sudden break with the family and long-standing friendships; sudden drop-out of school and conflicts with the school; change in behavior relating to food, clothing, language, finances; changes in attitudes and behavior towards others: antisocial comments, rejection of authority, refusal to interact socially, signs of withdrawal and isolation; regular viewing of internet sites and participation in social media networks that condone radical or extremist views; and reference to apocalyptic and conspiracy theories.

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[220] *FRIEND NOT FOE REPORT, OP CIT., P. 5; FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2010: GLOBAL EROSION OF FREEDOM, HTTP://WWW.FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG/REPORT/FREEDOM-WORLD/FREEDOM-WORLD-2010, LAST VISITED ON 21 AUGUST 2012; FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2011: THE AUTHORITARIAN CHALLENGE TO DEMOCRACY, HTTP://WWW.FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG/REPORT/FREEDOM- WORLD/FREEDOM-WORLD-2011, LAST VISITED ON 21 AUGUST 2012.*

[221] *TINKA VELDHUIS AND JØRGEN STAUN, ISLAMIST RADICALISATION; A ROOT CAUSE MODEL¸ CLINGENDAEL SECURITY PAPER NO. 12, 2009, PP. 21-27.*

[222] *BRIAN PRATT, GLOBAL CHANGES AND CIVIL SOCIETY, BACKGROUND PAPER FOR 'CIVIL SOCIETY AT A NEW FRONTIER': INTRAC CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 2011, PP. 6-7.*

WHAT HAS WORKED, NOT WORKED AND WHY?

This study realises that Uganda has done a lot in areas of countering VE. It is arguable that some of the interventions and policies worked and others do/did not work. The question is why? This chapter delves more into interrogating those interventions and policies that were explained by theory of change for youth inclusivity. Radicalization of youth into violent extremism occurs at all levels of society and requires a multi-prong approach. The context in which radicalisation takes place is complex and systemic that requires careful and detailed understanding of why certain interventions worked, do/did not work and what might work. Although Uganda is classified as "at risk", many believe that the country is at particularly tending towards high risk of future instability due to the presence of three major indicators: neighboring country conflict, state-led discrimination, and partial democracy. The many interventions and policies that may be required must attempt to understand why it might work, is working or does not work.

7.1   WHAT HAS WORKED?

Strong and Vigilant Security Apparatus: Uganda government is aware that Uganda has ripe conditions for instability and extremism. In the neighboring East Africa countries, extremists are recruiting and radicalizing by exploiting grievances linked to motivating factors mention in the previous chapter: poverty, unemployment, corruption, exclusion, and discrimination. However, Uganda government has developed a very robust and complex security system that is able to detect early signs and formations of suspicious activities. The national intelligence apparatus has fouled many attacks in Uganda. Sources of information come all the way from international to local. The Ministry of Defence, External security organisation (ESO) and Internal Security Organisation (ISO) work hand in hand with the army, police and community. The state security apparatus evidently has been strategic and significantly efficient and effective in preventing and countering violent extremism as well as organised criminal activity.

Citizenships' vigilantism: Uganda has a well-tailored governance system that starts at local level known from Local Council Level One (LC-1), LC-2, LC-3 and LC-5 who is the chair of the District. At every level, there is a committee that deals and reports on security, youth affairs and women, finance, etc. The ability of citizen to report suspicious cases can be noticed very early at the local levels. Any new person in the village must register with the LC-1 Chairperson. Community involvement in matters relating to security is relatively mature and effective enough in Uganda, able to detect and report suspicious activities that have potential of aiding criminality, extremism and terrorism.

Judiciary: Following the July 2010 bombing in Kampala, Uganda arrested and tried suspects. Although the trial was slow, took many years and was sometimes considered impartial, the Uganda High Court finally pronounced itself on the case of the eight accused persons who were convicted of participating in the 2010 Al-Shabab bombings. Five were sentenced to life imprisonment, two to 50 years' imprisonment and one to I year Community Service. Of the eight convicted and sentenced, 4 were Kenyans, 1 Tanzanian and 3 Ugandans. This was a landmark judicial process in the history of cases of terrorism ever noted in East Africa. The success in

investigation and prosecution of the July 2010 Kampala bombings was primarily based on ad-hoc arrangements between Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda law enforcement agencies.

Amnesty Reintegration Program (ARP): The ARP was started by the government in 2000[223], but funding later ran out for the program leading to its being discontinued. Unfortunately, not all elements could be successfully implemented and the threat that former LRA members could be recruited to a different cause increased. In the late eighties, the insurgency group Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) caused significant damage to the country's morale. At its peak, the group had thousands of members, although the numbers are currently less than 120[224], although situation in Uganda still loom into categories of strong radicalization and violent extremism has been prevalent both historically and currently. This has brought in the potential radicalization factors in Uganda, which is politics. ARP therefore partially worked and many former LRA and ADF have been reintegrated into society.

Education: Many LRA returnees have gone through formal and informal education. These have worked well since the capacities and skills of youth who missed out their school life have been built. It is not only formal and informal education that has worked, but some LRA children have relocated to other neighboring districts and made their lives better.

Involving NGOs and other Non-State Actors: Many parts of Uganda have seen increasing numbers of NGOs who come to assist. Many youths in Mayuge and Gulu and Kitgum agree that NGOs and non-state actors have assisted them and these NGOs are more committed than government. The NGOs working in the local settings have better touch with youth and the empowerment programmes have worked well. Some NGOs give start-up capital to youth to allow other youth to see the benefits. Although few NGOs embarked in mentoring and capacity building programs to build the confidence of returnees, the trauma healing centres have tremendously helped in northern Uganda. However, the government is yet to fully invigorate its efforts in preventing violent extremism by using CSOs, Human Rights Groups, money transfer control etc. These require a holistic approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization. Although the involvement of NGOs has worked, most of the interventions are still done in silos without sharing information with non-state actors. A harmonized and holistic approach is required to ensure that the involvement of NGOs, civil society and other non-state actors reaps maximum benefit regarding prevention of violent extremism.

7.2   WHAT DOES NOT /HAS NOT WORKED?

Exclusion: The study, found that youth feel excluded from decision-making process in matters that directly concern them. The youth who were interviewed in Makerere University, Mayuge and Gulu assert, "Youth are excluded from decision making in matters that concern them, but youth will always find their own ways of socialising to feel a sense of purpose". The imposition of decisions to youth as a finished product for them to implement has not only confused youth but also angered them. All over the country, majority of the youth feel frustrated with the government and communities in which they lived.

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[223] OKIROR, SAMUEL, "END OF JOSEPH KONY HUNT BREEDS FRUSTRATION AND FEAR," IRIN NEWS (KAMPALA), 26 APRIL 2017, HTTPS://WWW.IRINNEWS.ORG/ANALYSIS/2017/04/26/END-JOSEPH-KONY-HUNT-BREEDS-FRUSTRATION-AND-FEAR.

[224] MDRP, MDRP-SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES IN UGANDA, (KAMPALA: MDRP, 2009), HTTP://TDRP.NET/MDRP/PDFS/MDRP_UGA_FS_0309.PDF.

Although Uganda government has good youth policy that realises the importance of youth and their contribution to national development, pertinent issues that youth are asking for are not fully met. These concerns revolve around the high unemployment and underemployment rates of youth. Uganda has policies, laws and programs aimed at reducing youth unemployment, however, these policies have overemphasized entrepreneurship to alleviate poverty and youth unemployment. These policy pronouncements have not considered the inclusive need of youth from design, implementation and evaluation. They felt, that needs assessment before enacting a policy or program was poorly done if at all there was any, because they were not consulted. According to them, the interventions that the government was putting in place to reduce youth unemployment and poverty was not their choice. They wished to be consulted and asked what was good for them instead of forcing projects that were not of their choice and hence not owned by them. For example, many used agri-businesses as an example of a project that was being forced on them when in the present knowledge economy, they preferred using ICT to explore their various talents as artists.

The youth also felt that most of the policies, programmes and frameworks put in place by the government were not quite meant to benefit them but a small clique of business class. This was expressed in the words of youth interviewed in Makerere that, "*The government (has been) supporting investors by giving subsides to them instead of supporting the youth. Yet those investors will take all profits to their country. It's better to support youth directly*". It demonstrates a sense of hopelessness, helplessness and perceived deception by the state to the youth in whose name the investment was meant to create jobs for them but ended up benefiting only other people and not themselves. It would appear that such frameworks were designed with a trickle-down effect approach in mind but the reality is that it does not work and is never likely to work in the foreseeable future.

It was further revealed that most of the government policies took a top-down approach with the Ministries of Youth and Gender coming up with blanket programmes for all the youth and expecting them to accept and implement them. Instead of these policies on youth unemployment being an intervention, they have further aggravated frustration and driven youth into VE. This was very much noticeable in Mayuge District. Most youth who took up the entrepreneurship loans have different needs because they are at different stages of their lives. Treating them as a homogenous group and making decisions about them and for them without engaging them was an act of exclusion. It sparked anger in youth who resorted to fight back. The research finds that an inclusive socio-economic development is necessary to make youth more productive if ,and when they [youth] define development in their own ways.

They went further to explain that perceptions of urban and rural youth on employment and poverty also differed a great deal. We found out that there were disparities in expectation of different categories of youth on youth employment and job creation. For example, the youth with basic education were comfortable with any wage employment while graduates were the most selective and angry with the government for not creating job opportunities for them. The youth reported that even among them, the most vulnerable group were those not in school and not in employment. Neither their families nor the government gave them any attention or a voice to be heard. At least those in schools and universities had a voice.

The youth reached a consensus that to promote social cohesion and inclusivity in communities, engaging the youth means not only giving them a voice but also partnering with and allowing them to lead the choice of what is good for them. This should be a guided process that promotes relationship building and not ordering youth to do this and that. The approach should shift from top-down to bottom-up with explanation to youth groups on why certain decisions have been made. An inclusive process will build social cohesion, trust and a common purpose to PCVE.

Use of the hard approaches: Counter-Terrorism by security forces has led to the military using excessive force on civilians. The Ugandan government considers the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) an active terrorist group. The ADF operates out of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and there is evidence that they were recruiting individuals across the Eastern border of DRC from Uganda. Originally, this group saw themselves as "religious crusaders," but have since adopted more violent and secular mechanisms of operation. However, the religious ideology may still have an influence over some Islamic groups in Uganda. Despite an ongoing amnesty program, this group still remains a threat; the ADF is suspected to have conducted attacks in the DRC such as the Beni massacre in 2016[225]and an attack in Semuliki in 2017.[226] Uganda government has used brute force to stop ADF, much the same way LRA has been subdued. But the extra-judicial killings in Kasese have infuriated some youth and the communities that they come from. The incidence has rather incited other youth to get radicalized and engage in VE with the hope of revenging on the military (UPDF) and the government that gave the order.

Yet research demonstrates that indiscriminate acts of repression are usually counterproductive.[227] When governments lash out against communities based on their presumed association with a terrorist group, this strengthens the terrorists' narrative, makes people conclude that non-violent opposition is futile, and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, as previously uninvolved community members become more inclined to shelter, support, or even join the terrorists. What governments sometimes fail to consider is that their (excessive) response may, in fact, be part of the terrorists' plan. Many terrorist groups actively seek to provoke an over-reaction, which targets entire populations and allows the terrorists to portray themselves as "defenders" of their communities. They peddle the narrative "that this government is unjust, incapable of solving problems which creates a "breeding ground" of disaffection, alienation, and the desire for retaliation in which terrorist groups could radicalise people and recruit new members.[228] The consequences of indiscriminate repression extend far beyond a single country and travel across boundaries, and help extremist groups in promoting a narrative in which their violence is portrayed as a response to "global oppression". These images can create feelings of shock and trauma, al-Qaeda and IS

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[225] MAHAMBA, FISTON, "SCORES CONVICTED IN CONGO'S BENI MASSACRE TRIAL," REUTERS, 24 JANUARY 2018, HTTPS://WWW.REUTERS.COM/ARTICLE/US-CONGO-VIOLENCE/SCORES-CONVICTED-IN-CONGOS-BENI-MASSACRE-TRIAL-IDUSKBN1FD2OV.

[226] ANSLEY, RACHEL, "ATTACK ON PEACEKEEPERS IN DRC INDICATES INCREASING EXTREMIST ACTIVITY, ATLANTIC COUNCIL, 12 DECEMBER 2017, HTTP://WWW.ATLANTICCOUNCIL.ORG/BLOGS/NEW-ATLANTICIST/ATTACK-ON-PEACEKEEPERS-IN-DRC-INDICATES-INCREASING-EXTREMIST-ACTIVITY.

[227] Newman, P. (2017). Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region. CIO.GAL/189/17. International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), King's College London.
[228] Badurdeen & Goldsmith(2018): Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya. Journal for deradicalization.(16) ISSN 2363-9849

used them in their propaganda in order to justify their own brutality, portray themselves as "defenders of Islam.

Politics of Ethnicity: Many youth had no interest in politics since it is ethnicised and involves too much money. Moreover, some religious communities become targets from government, since they [religious groups] are perceived be involved in or sympathising with terrorism. Some Islamic groups have been put under the radar of the anti-terrorism police and have seen their places of worship (Mosques) raided. Such incidences angered and strengthened the Muslim brotherhood spirit to defend each other. Moslems and some ethnic groups feel targeted, vulnerable, frustrated and excluded. The consequence of such feelings has been to energise and inspire youth organization in apparent move to defend their faith or retaliate against the state actions believed to be focused on singling them out as the villains of terrorisms.

Many Security agencies, late intervention: Much as Uganda's security apparatus is good, they sometimes get mixed up in roles there being a multiplicity of the agencies without proper coordination. Some think that one arm of security would be taking action while the other also thinks the same leading to delayed responses. There has also been infighting between ESO/ISO, police and the army on who should take what action following criminal gang activity in Uganda. The foregoing has in the past caused slow or no action taken by security forces whenever information reaches them. Clearly, there is a lack of harmonization in the information sharing and arrest of suspects with the justice system. Suspects are detained for longer periods than required by law.

Stigmatization and Discourses of Returnees: Many LRA returnees are stigmatised by the careless naming "returnees", "child mother", "abductee" etc. Such discourses have led some LRA youth fail to reintegrate properly for the fear of being identified. They feel that their personal security would be compromised, killed or even exposed to return to the bush. The government has tried to address the prevailing situation but a lot still needs to be done.

Poor and Lack of Strong Leadership at the Local Level: Where war has ravaged the north and east, including parts of Western, there are poor leadership structures. There are also very weak CSOs that can channel issues of youth to top leadership. Other parts of Uganda have seen strong civil societies who are very vocal whenever any social groups or minorities are suffering. This promotes diversity of culture and develops tolerance and pluralism.[229] Interventions that targets preventing violent extremism and de-radicalizing of youth must include civil society organizations, religious leaders like that of northern Uganda - Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiatives (ARLPI).

International Level Education: Educating youth on the Policy that has been advocating for creation of a supportive socio-cultural, economic and political environment that will empower the youth to be partners in development has not worked. Although some returnees have gone through formal and informal education, their international profiles in getting education that will leverage national and international competition is so limited. Therefore, there is a general lack of understanding of the Policy that serves to promote the values of consciousness, selflessness, voluntarism and pursuit of good moral conduct. The Policy seeks to promote the values of good

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[229]Newman,P (2005). I Towards a Democratic Response The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism:Volume III. Club de Madrid.

governance, a just and tolerant society and promotion of transparency and accountability, spirit of self-reliance, unity, national solidarity, patriotism and a sense of belonging.

The figure below illustrates a brief summary of what has worked, does not / did not work in Uganda.

FIGURE 6.1: SUMMARY OF WHAT INTERVENTIONS HAVE WORKED, AND HAVE NOT WORKED

What works in Uganda

Strong Security	Tolerant Citizen	Citizenships' vigilantism	Judiciary
Strong Intelligence to detect early warnings and quick response from government	Uganda's past has been too militant – people don't want to go back	Ability of citizen to report suspicious cases	Trials even if slow and sometimes impartial

Development of youth skills will reduce crimes   Youth can be social benefit else future burden

What does not / did not work in Uganda

Excluded youth	Hard Approaches	Peace Education	Policy orientation	Inclusive socio-economic development
Youth will always find their own ways of socialising to feel sense of purpose	Hard punitive measures only escalate VE	Encourage peace and civic education	Make inclusive policy that involves youth from design, implementation and evaluation	Make youth productive in their own ways as they define development

Education is central, build the capacities and skills of youth and allow youth of Uganda to visit other districts, ethnic groups on a continuous basis. Make it a national programme of action.

Source: Author's own conceptualization, 2019

CHAPTER EIGHT

CONCLUSIONS

From the foregoing discussions, we have drawn several conclusions:

Given the volatility of IGAD region and the presence of, for example, al-Shabaab that has metamorphosed, many youths have become susceptible to recruitment to join violent extremist groups (VEGs). The rate at which it has been increasing suggests that the highly conducive environments give it speed to recruitment.

The IGAD region, member states, AU, UN and other stakeholders can gain a lot from the many accumulated experiences in addressing gender and armed conflict from the local, regional, and international levels to inform a more tailored, effective and sustainable P/CVE.

There are gaps in state institutions and technical capacity for CVE in the IGAD region. Critical need of support in terms of equipment, training for police, judges, and prosecutors, improving border control and monitoring of unpatrolled coastlines, strengthening interdepartmental cooperation, upgrading communications equipment and facilities, combating terrorist financing, detecting document forgery, and combating arms trafficking, supporting CVE legislation, strengthening democratic institutions, judiciary systems, improving governance, etc. are all needed to put in place inclusive mechanisms for youth.

With the IGAD region, there seems to be loss of public support for Counter Terrorism efforts due to lack of appropriate response, respect for human rights and Rule of Law. It should be noted that countering and preventing VE requires not only improved security but better efforts to address the underlying conditions that give rise to violent extremism. Resolving conflicts, ending foreign occupations, overcoming oppression, eradicating poverty, supporting sustainable development, empowering the marginalized, defending human rights, promoting good governance- all are vital to the struggle against terrorism, yet addressing these challenges is made more difficult by repressive counterterrorism policies.[230]

Some lessons learnt from many other studies suggest that wide population in the IGAD region have experienced the impact of VE attacks, especially women, youth and children who are vulnerable. Therefore, in order to carry out a thorough research on P/CVE, the inclusion of women and youth (male and female) is very essential.

However, very little is practical enough when it comes to youth engagement and inclusion into national and regional formulation and implementation of legislative framework that can assist in P/CVE.

Youth in Uganda need to have more awareness creation on recruitment, radicalisation, violent extremisms, terrorism and counter-terrorism coupled with the impact they incur. Youth are

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[230] Friend not Foe report, op cit., pg. 1

vulnerable, and are yet to know about the complexities of VEGs, for example, where the borders are open, free movement of people are involved, religion, culture or ethnicity of politics and discrimination from job opportunities, the role of security, failure to protect the well-being and dignity of groups and individuals and distribution of equitable and sustainable development.

Youth need to be provided with practical tools to make them become experienced practitioners in dealing with terrorism, counter-terrorism measures. Many youth still need guidance in ensuring that compliance with their inclusion in P/CVE will assist them in dealing with many other challenges.

Youth inclusive approach to counterterrorism, violent extremism and radicalization should consider the magnitude of the complexity and dynamics of VEGs and the multi-layered threats VE poses, and therefore a multi-stakeholder and multi-agency approach must be deployed. These should include all levels of the society from individuals, communities, and groups, national and international.

The context in which Uganda is experiencing VEGs is muddled with national and regional politics, but catches youth between a rock and hard place. The radicalization and growth of violent extremism and its counter actions have implicated the role of the state, bilateral and multilateral relations as well as global contexts. For example, the drivers of violent extremism across Kenya and Uganda were similar but different. State-led approaches to radicalization and violent extremism are met with heavy-handed security apparatus in Kenya that have backfired compared to Uganda. Again, the assumptions that the main drivers of violent extremism are economic (poverty and unemployment) and religious factors are a misconception. A deeper analysis must ask beyond why poverty, unemployment, etc.

The history of youth radicalisation in Uganda, like that of LRA, suggests that, had they not been abducted and forced into extremism, their engagement in peace building and development would be greater. These youth are from diverse backgrounds, which should be borne mind before making conclusion into vilifying them corporately.

In Uganda, youth projects are under-funded in national budgets, and moreover, the representation of youth voices in designing P/CVE policies or policies and programs that affect them directly are missing. The national P/CVE policies and frameworks are mirroring national, global, regional and national level but the implementation is at a nascent stage. Like other policies of development, corruption, poor leadership and lack of technical capacity of both the government and youth in question can affect the implementation of the national P/CVE policy.

NGOs have taken a greater role, but that can only serve limited purpose, because the government-community partnership, public-private partnerships or NGO-NGO partnerships have gaps in coordination, competition and duplication of activities.

There are emerging trends in radicalization and violent extremism such as upsurge of women terrorists, radicalization of children, home grown terrorism and radicalization of security forces. Viewing women and children as vulnerable victims is a misconception. Women subscribe to ideology and can contribute a lot to the major drivers of violent extremism and radicalization.

- Youth must be guided and informed about the dangers of using media and recruitment through social media, videos, etc.

CHAPTER NINE

RECOMMENDATIONS: YOUTH-INCLUSIVE MECHANISMS IN P/CVE

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Uganda has shown many indicators relating to Violent Extremism that pose increasing worries about violent conflicts in Uganda, especially where youth are not involved. Most of these conflicts are not only related to VE, but also politically motivated, and are in their pre-conflict stages. The development of national P/CVE strategy has been slow, but even the implementation is depicting a long-term view. The following recommendations are made to enable the country effectively deal with questions of P/CVE:

(i)   Uganda government needs to put in place immediate efforts to complete the development of national P/CVE strategy and include youth in this important step. There are worrying issues of refugee resettlement programs where cases of recruitments have taken place.

(ii)   The three arms of the security structure namely, the army, security and police require professionalization of their personnel that can work together and trust the youth, civil society and religious communities. There is need to align such structural reforms with the policy frameworks of Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's (IGAD's) Centre of Excellence in P/CVE (ICE-PCVE) and the East Africa's regional economic community strategies. These will enhance the capacity of all regional actors through "empowering local communities, addressing the "push factors", and promoting CVE diplomacy across the Eastern Africa region."[231]

(iii)   The government of Uganda needs to put in place ICT policy to manage surveillance on recruitment into extremist groups. Discussions with many respondents as well as literature reviewed indicate that terrorist groups have been using technology to radicalize and recruit combatants and agents. Respondents observed that many youths were spending a lot of time on the internet on their phones yet no one knew what they were doing online.

OPERATIONAL AND RELATIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

(iv)   There has been very limited space for government-CSOs engagement in P/CVE effort in Uganda yet there is an appreciation of enormous potential that CSOs hold in reaching out to the youth with capacity building programmes, preventive approaches as well as re-integration of returnees. It is therefore recommended that the government should establish a partnership framework of operation or enter into memoranda of understanding with relevant non-state actors that would support CSOs operations on the ground with regard to P/CVE interventions including reintegration of returnees and former combatants in Uganda.

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[231] Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Eastern Africa, (February 2017), 25.

(v)   By providing, encouraging and boosting TVET opportunities to create opportunities, this would greatly contribute to reduction of vulnerabilities by empowering them economically. The "uneducated use force, while the educated use reason", is a quote from one of the respondents' in Makerere, which supports the notion that the less educated have a higher degree of vulnerability and are easy to recruit into violent extremist groups. TVET programmes would ensure that such youth have their energies directly targeted at productive sectors and hence lowering their potential of falling victims to tricks and deception of VE groups. Because most youth join VE groups at a tender age, they never have the opportunity to pursue formal education which then calls for TVET programmes where such could be absorbed

(vi)   The government of Uganda should consider developing a policy framework that would support and strengthen the role of traditional institutions in promoting restoration of their essence in the community. In Gulu, among the Acholi people, the traditional *mato-oput* ritual has effectively been used before to pacify conflicting parties. It is applied to obligate parties not to get into violent conflicts with each other ever again. The traditional ritual seems to work well at the community level as the practice has been embraced by people from across all walks of life. Finding space in the policy arena for such traditional approaches and enhancing their application would have a significant effect in deterring would be extremists from welcoming ideas of VE groups or even entertaining the thought of their being used for meting violence against communities. It is however acknowledged that younger generations does not always subscribe to the practice or indeed any other traditional practices as they view them as being backward; however, a consistent emphasis on the same has a likelihood of being increasingly appreciated and adopted.

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Zia, A.S. (2011). Female suicide bombings in Pakistan - what's in it for women? 4 October 2011. Open Democracy. http://tinyurl.com/blrj43z

APPENDICES

GRAPH SHOWING DISTRICTS AND NUMBERS OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

**Source: Findings from data that were collected from the filed from May 2017 to June 2018**

GRAPH SHOWING AGE RANGE AND GENDER

Source: Findings from data that were collected from the filed from May 2017 to June 2018

GRAPH SHOWING MARITAL AND RELIGIOUS STATUSES

GRAPH SHOWING EDUCATION LEVEL, OCCUPATION AND FAMILY BACKGROUND

Source: Findings from data that were collected from the filed from May 2017 to June 2018