

YOUTH-INCLUSIVE MECHANISMS FOR PREVENTING AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE IGAD REGION

A CASE STUDY OF KENYA



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EDITED BY

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About the IDRC

The International Development Research Centre (IDRC) supports research in developing countries to advance knowledge and solve practical development problems. IDRC supports knowledge, innovation, and solutions that help build more prosperous, just and resilient societies, promote economic growth, strong governance, foster sound public policies and drive large-scale positive change. IDRC's work is aligned with global and continental frameworks including the attainment of sustainable development Goals, the 2030 Agenda, and achievement of the African Union Agenda 2063.

IDRC'S Governance and Justice Programme

The Governance and Justice program is part of IDRC's Inclusive Economies program area which supports knowledge, innovation, and solutions that help build more prosperous, just and resilient societies, by focusing on economic growth, sound governance and public policies, and quality and accountability. The Governance and Justice Programme supports research and processes that address stronger and more inclusive mechanisms of governance and justice, contributing to the development of safer spaces, free from violent conflict and insecurity. Such research support enables the creation of conditions where vulnerable groups, particularly women and girls, can empower themselves to prevent and overcome gender violence. A core and cross-cutting theme in the Governance and Justice Programme is focused on improving access to effective and responsive justice for populations facing vulnerability.

The GJ Programme recognizes that more broadly, in many parts of the world, public institutions often fail to reach the poor and vulnerable or have distorting effects, which undermine government decision-making, human rights, the rule of law and fuel inequality, impunity, crime, and conflict. The GJ programme also recognizes that violent conflict has emerged as a central obstacle to development, whether in terms of building social, cultural or economic prosperity of societies. For the 1.5 billion people currently living in communities affected by repeated cycles of violence and conflict the impact of insecurity for poor and vulnerable populations is far ranging: from sexual violence against women, to outbreaks of political and inter-community violence, and fear and violence that often permeates the slums of rapidly growing cities. This insecurity is particularly devastating for women, youth and other vulnerable groups who tend to have less access to the resources needed to protect themselves, including political influence, economic opportunities and access to justice.

GJ Programme's Africa Youth Cohort

It is against this background that IDRC'S Governance and Justice Programme has, over the years, built a portfolio of research focused on youth. IDRC'S Governance

and Justice Programme has been targeting young people for the past 5 years through some projects that focus on the following themes:

- i) Violence prevention;
- ii) Urban security;
- iii) Gender based violence;
- iv) Promoting citizen engagement; and
- v) Leadership Development and Capacity Strengthening.

However, a more dedicated focus on youth issues emerged in 2016 with the development of a Research Support Project (RSP) titled, “*Engaging Youth to Build Resilient Societies,*” in addition to the development of specific projects within the thematic area of youth issues in Africa, Latin America and Asia. For example, in Africa, the project, “*Understanding and addressing Youth exposition to violence, exclusion and injustice in Africa;*” was developed and it has benefitted 15 research teams from East, West, Southern and North Africa (with a remaining research project idea to be finalised in Q4 of 2019 at the time of writing). In other regions, namely - Latin America and South Asia, a closed call was launched to explore youth led field experiences on “*Violence prevention and civic engagement,*” which has selected a first cohort of seven projects to be implemented. The Governance and Justice Programme also launched an initiative to address the linkages between *Youth, violence and economic opportunities* in a joint effort with IDRC’s Employment and Growth Programme.

Africa Youth Cohort: Justification

The thematic focus on the youth is informed by the reality that over two-third of the Africa’s population across the continent is under the age of 35 years – making it the “youngest” continent. With such a critical mass of young people on the continent, the persistent unemployment crisis combined with social unrest in many countries are among many factors that have contributed to the highlighting of this demographic in public policy discussions and development priorities.

While the nature of the youth challenges varies across regions, there are growing concerns that lack of opportunities – including the lack of (decent) jobs – and the limited inclusion of the youth in decision making processes undermine social cohesion and pave the way to the youth rejecting the social construct. Such rejection can take the form of involvement in gang violence, crime, organized crime, gender violence, political radicalization, and armed conflicts. This then can potentially compound their vulnerability and reduce the set of economic opportunities available to them, marginalizing them further and creating a vicious cycle.

Objectives of The IDRC GJ Programme's Youth Cohort

The objective of the IDRC GJ Programme's Africa Youth Cohort are outlined as follows:

- Reflect on the intellectual and research evidence regarding the nexus between youth socio-economic vulnerabilities, inequalities, exclusion, and violence in Africa;
- Support the development of an evidence-based policy and practice agenda on effectively addressing youth socio-economic vulnerabilities, inequalities, exclusion, and violence in Africa;
- Harness the knowledge and experiences of various actors, including policy makers, civil society, practitioners, development partners and the private sector towards developing context-specific and responsive programmes targeting young people;
- Support several research projects, looking at the experiences of youth with violence, insecurity, exclusion and injustice, with a strong emphasis on solutions
- Develop and support a cohort of projects to produce research and evidence-based analysis on resilience strategies and obstacles of vulnerable communities;
- Utilize the generated knowledge and scale-up these findings to influence the relevant policy, academic and community forums at national, regional and international levels; and
- Generate a strong body of scientific and applicable knowledge, based on sound and rigorous methodologies while strengthening peer learning and networking between research teams, policy makers, practitioners and youths

Executive Summary

This Research Evidence Paper (REP) is a product of a baseline survey conducted by OSSREA, PeaceNet Kenya and IGAD-CEWARN and funded by IDRC. OSSREA was among the 11 successful grantees by IDRC-The Department of Governance and Social Justice. **The main research question was: to what extent were mechanisms for preventing and countering violent extremism in the IGAD region youth inclusive?** The Youth-Inclusive Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in the IGAD region study's pragmatic research approach mixed qualitative and quantitative methods gave voice to young people and the communities in which they live, and led to practical policy recommendations. This study took a multi-stakeholder engagement approach centering on the Community –Based Participatory Research Approach (CBPRA). Contrary to the scattered strategies used to counter and/or prevent violent extremism in the region, militaristic approaches have always been preferred. The main aim of preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE) is to reduce the support for or participation in violent extremism through non-coercive means by identifying and addressing factors conducive to the spread of terrorism. There are allegations that the youth and the communities that they come from have not been fully engaged in designing strategies, policies and interventions targeting them to prevent radicalization by extremist groups or prevent/counter violent extremism in the IGAD region. The extent to which these allegations are true has not been documented. This study seeks to inform policy debates and practices within the IGAD region in order to engage and empower youth, both male and female in P/CVE. The overall goal is to develop a holistic and integrated approach for ensuring policy and institutional environment is improved to enable engagement and mainstreaming of youth in P/CVE to reduce attraction of youth to radicalization and violent extremism, strengthen community cohesion and trust, encourage constructive ways to redress grievances, discrimination, exclusion and violation of human rights by delivering a more holistic focus on political, economic, social and cultural factors necessary for P/CVE legislation plans, strategies and human rights obligations.

This study collates gender-disaggregated data on the contextual analysis of the theories and structural factors underpinning youth exclusion, the injustices they face, and their likely consequent engagement in violence, extremism and radicalization. The aim is to strive to increase the shared understanding of the context, and to inform evidence-based policy making on P/CVE programming in the IGAD. The specific objectives of this research are: to identify and analyze the factors that predispose youth, male and female, to engage in radicalization and VE in Uganda and Kenya; to analyze existing/emerging policies and practices related to P/CVE that create safe spaces for youth voices to be heard; to identify interventions by state and non-state actors to engage and empower youth in P/CVE in Kenya

and Uganda ; and to establish (with respect to all the above) what has worked, where; and what has not worked and why.

Counter-Terrorism approach focussed on hard approaches to radicalization and violent extremism. This report emphasizes soft approaches and how to implement them. It highlights new trends in radicalization and violent extremism, innovative methods of researching and engaging with youth and ways of mainstreaming youth in P/CVE programming. We analyzed the causes and dynamics of VE and radicalisation - distinguishing between structural factors, individual, group and enabling factors. We also did an analysis of factors providing resilience to violent extremism. Gender dynamics are critical in this analysis. In this research project, we used a Gender Transformative approach to explore how radicalisation processes and dynamics affect both men and women because the factors fuelling radicalisation may affect men and women differently. Thus, men and women may have different motivations. In analyzing the policy environment and interventions in place for P/CVE, we focused on stakeholders, exploring their interests, goals, positions, capacities and relationships including capacity or institutional gap analysis of key government institutions. We conducted both desktop analysis and field research to allow for synergies to develop with successful interventions and prevent duplication of activities. A deep knowledge of local, national and regional issues is necessary to develop a context-specific needs assessment. This was done by identifying and assessing the relevance of past, ongoing or planned initiatives in P/CVE, whether by public authorities at state, regional and local levels; civil society; academia; international/regional/sub-regional organisations; or bilateral assistance projects; Identifying main lessons learned in the case study country, drawing also on relevant lessons from related fields like security sector reform, rule of law, development, education, communications and community engagement. We were keen on possible changes in radicalisation/recruitment trends and the constellation of factors potentially precipitating violent extremism and reflecting on the role of gender in these.

This study found out that the drivers of violent extremism are complex and inter-linked like a spider web and keep shifting like an amoeba. They are however linked to the political, economic, ideological and social circumstances in which the youth live in. Context matters in regard to drivers of radicalization and violent extremism. Focussing only on economic or religious drivers of violent extremism is misleading. We found out that a direct causal linkage to VE is rarely the product of a single factor. Social, economic or political factors that do not directly contribute to the terrorist threat, but create a permissive environment for extremist groups should be taken in perspective. Identifying the factors of terrorism and VE will therefore require an understanding of the structural, individual, group and enabling factors. We also found out that ideology powered by IT, media and the internet was emerging as the main driver of radicalization and violent extremism in the IGAD region today. We also found out that

there are misconceptions that youth are disinterested in what is going on around them. Instead, youth are ready to engage with other stakeholders especially in policy formulation on matters that concern their lives. Unfortunately, policy engagement with youth takes a top-down approach and fails to meet the needs and aspirations of youth. There is also a general misconception that youth are a homogeneous group and therefore need uniform programs.

It was noted that in spite of the Kenya government making a lot of effort to invest in many youth employment policies and programs, their success rate was too low because of the gaps in policy implementation, politicization of the projects and corruption. The interventions that have been put in place by state and non-state actors are still being implemented in silos leading to duplication of efforts and unnecessary competition instead of harnessing on each other's synergies. However, the non-state actors' interventions have more grip on youth and their communities than the state-led interventions despite the political will and commitment to P/CVE. A majority of state-led initiatives on youth are largely non-functional, non-participatory, short-lived or driven by the calculation of immediate political gains. It emerged that not all youth are violent; most youth are engaged in peacebuilding and supporting efforts of P/CVE although they are underfunded and their efforts are undocumented. It also emerged that contrary to the misconception that women are weak and victims of terrorism, women just like men are perpetrators, victims and agents of change in P/CVE. In Kenya, there is evidence of an upsurge of women in radicalization and violent extremism. There is also home-grown terrorism that is closely linked to gangs.

Finally, in regard to what has worked, what has not worked and why. Other than what we have already stated above as challenges to their success, we found out that the hard approaches by the government on radicalization and violent extremism which included extra-judicial killings, disappearances of suspects, indiscriminate repression, corruption, mistrust of the youth, weak coordination of the interventions, lack of capacity on P/CVE for the government officials and youth and exclusion of the youth in matters that concern them and their lives had backfired. We have made some recommendations for policy makers, youth and communities in which they live which include: taking a holistic approach that is whole community in researching the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism; mainstreaming youth in national youth policies and program by engaging youth as beneficiaries, collaborators and leaders in P/CVE; building an all-government and all-community approach to P/CVE; giving P/CVE a human rights approach for social cohesion, trust and harmony in the community; making a multipronged, multi-layered and multi-stakeholder partnership; strengthening the role of women in P/CVE; building community resilience to youth radicalization and violent extremism and using soft approaches to preventing and countering radicalization and violent extremism among the youth.

Table 1: Theory of Change for the Youth-Inclusive Mechanisms in P/CVE

If we take an all-government and all-community approach to preventing and countering violent extremism that is context-specific, gender-sensitive, multi-layered and multi-pronged...

And build individual, household, community/local, national resilience to violent extremism through youth-led P/CVE actions, such as youth-friendly national action plans and policies, human-rights approaches to conflict resolution, tolerance and recognition of the potential of youth as agents of change....

Then, PCVE will give the youth a voice and space and reduce their vulnerability to multiple drivers of violent extremism that are interconnected and interwoven like a spider web, with unpredictable dynamism as an amoeba...

If we adopt participatory soft approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism...

And teach young people peace through civic engagement, skills for intercultural dialogue, human rights, dignity, tolerance and solidarity, trust, confidence, leadership, critical thinking, problem-solving, partnership, inclusion and peacebuilding. This will lead to social cohesion, nurturing and empowering the youth, enhanced use of mediation, sharing information and research for P/CVE, strengthened links between development and peace processes, enhanced capacities of youth, CSOs, policy makers and other stakeholders in P/CVE, creation of legislation to guide policy implementation of national youth policies, nurturing of cultural diversity, embracing digital learning programmes and strengthened gender equality in P/CVE...

Then, we can engage youth as beneficiaries, partners and leaders in P/CVE through formal and informal youth-led multi-stakeholder collaboration that adopt continual learning and adjustment, monitoring and evaluation and go beyond community-based projects...

Overall, we would have reduced attraction of youth to radicalization and violent extremism and strengthened community cohesion and trust by supporting peace, protecting vulnerable communities, encouraging constructive ways to redress grievances, discrimination, violations, exclusion or any other rights abuses by delivering a more holistic focus on the political, economic, social and cultural factors necessary for the development of CT-P/CVE plans, legislation, strategies and human rights obligations.

Abbreviations and acronyms

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ATPU	Anti-Terror Police Unit
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
EU	European Union
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IS	Islamic State
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KCPCVE	Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KNAP	Kenya National Action Plan on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325
Ksh	Kenyan shilling
MOYAS	Ministry of Youth Affairs
NCTC	National Counterterrorism Center
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
P/CVE	Preventing and/or Countering Violent Extremism
SAVE	Sisters Against Violent Extremism
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
STRIVE	Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USIP	US Institute of Peace
WPS	Women, Peace and Security

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Truphena E. Mukuna is the Executive Director of the Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA). She holds a PhD in Education with specialization in curriculum and instructional technology. She is a Multi-disciplinary social science researcher with extensive, hands-on experience and technical expertise on issues in Education; Research and Capacity Building, leadership and governance, institutional strengthening and Mentoring early career researchers; Disaster Risk Reduction; Climate Change, Social Protection, Gender studies, Resilience analysis, Adolescents and Youth affairs. Dr. Mukuna has technical expertise in linking Research to Policy with experience of working in multi-disciplinary and multi-cultural teams. She is also a Human Rights advocate with keen interest on social protection and gender issues of the marginalized vulnerable groups of people. Mukuna is presently the co-principal investigator of this 3-year project named *Youth Inclusive Mechanisms in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in the IGAD Region* funded by IDRC. She also sits on the *steering committee of the Technical Working Group to operationalize the African Youth Researcher Programme for the African Union*. She is the Co-editor and author of two chapters in *Urban Youth Unemployment in Eastern and Southern Africa: Features, Challenges, Consequences and Cut-Back Strategies*. Addis Ababa: OSSREA. ISBN 97899944-55-83-6; *Student Activism, Political Party Alliances and Election Violence in Kenyan Public Universities*. In Mihyo, P.B (2015). *Election Processes, Management and Violence in Eastern and Southern Africa*. ISBN 978-99944-55-85-0. Addis Ababa; OSSREA She is also a co-author of the *Evidence-Based Digital and Soft Skills Manual on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism among Youth*. African Union Borderlands Dynamics in the Horn of Africa Project, funded by NORHED. She is the OSSREA coordinator of the *Informal Cross-Border Trade in the IGAD Region*, funded by SIDA and a member of the project Quartet sitting at Life and Peace Institute. Truphena has conducted research, analyzed and published extensively (see LinkedIn:<https://www.linkedin.com/in/truphena-e-mukuna-phd-98099429>).

1. Introduction

There are about 1.8 billion people in the world today between the ages of 10 and 24, making up just less than one quarter of the world's population.¹ Globally, the last two decades have seen an increased focus on the role of youth in situations of social and armed conflict and violence especially young men as the perpetrators of violence and a threat to security and stability.² In the media and popular literature, boys and young men are often portrayed as cheap, ruthless manpower, manipulated by warlords or extremist groups and induced by drugs, alcohol, spiritual or material rewards to commit atrocities. Over two-thirds of Africa's population is under the age of 35, making Africa the most youthful continent. Cognisant of this reality, the African Youth Charter outlines young citizens' rights and responsibilities, affirming that "(the) youth are partners, assets and a prerequisite for sustainable development and for the peace and prosperity of Africa"³. Article 11 of the Charter gives every young citizen "the right to participate in all spheres of society." However, very little is known about the youth today. They are often either essentialised as a source of violence and insecurity, or are held up as a limitless economic resource with a potential to transform the future of African development. As such, debates on Africa's youth have left us with little knowledge about the young people themselves and how they view their world and how they are viewed by the communities that they live in.

Throughout history, young people, especially young men have dominated the ranks of national armies, elite battalions, organised armed opposition, militia groups, criminal gangs and extremist groups⁴. Whilst research has demonstrated an association between a high relative youth population and a higher statistical risk of armed conflict, these findings are not a straightforward predictor of violence.⁵ Other studies show that demography is not the only risk factor and other variables (e.g. economic stress and associated levels of unemployment or underemployment; lack of access to quality education; poor governance; an absence of rule of law; high levels of inequality particularly between ethnicities or groups; and resource

¹ UNFPA (2014). The Power of the 1.8 Billion Adolescents, Youth and the Transformation into the Future: NNFPA State of the World Population 2014.

² UN (2017). Expert Group Meeting "Youth, Peace and Security: Social Issues and Social Policies. FAO Headquarters Rome, Italy

³ African Union Commission (2006). The African Youth Charter. Addis Ababa; AUC

⁴ Danesh, R (2008). Youth and Peace building", in M. Bajaj (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Peace Education. Charlotte: Information Age Publishing. <http://www.tc.edu/centers/epe/entries.html>

⁵ Lyndsey, M (2016). Violence Peace and Stability; The Youth Factor. <https://www.unicef-irc.org/article/1061-violence-peace-and-stability-the-youth-factor.html>

scarcity) are all important factors associated with the onset of violence.⁶ While young men make up the majority of combatants and perpetrators of violence in most contexts, the majority do not get involved in violence. Furthermore, there is a dearth of information about the daily lives of young people who do not engage directly in violence, what they do and why in the lead up to, during and after violent conflict.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 calls for a holistic and inclusive approach to counter terrorism. The Strategy re-asserts the position that an effective counterterrorism strategy must combine preventive measures with efforts to address both real and perceived grievances and underlying social, economic, and political conditions. It provides a “human security” approach⁷. The Strategy has tasked member states to reflect this perspective in their policies, to place emphasis on targeting disaffected and marginalized groups and areas which are potential breeding grounds for terrorism. Several international organizations have adopted this strategy, such as the AU 2002⁸, The UK’s Counter Terrorism Strategy-2011⁹ and The EU’s Counter Terrorism Strategy, 2005¹⁰. The strategy identifies the major motivation for terrorist violence to be the struggle for power and justice. However, United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security stresses the importance of engaging youth as partners and leaders in peacebuilding and urges member states to increase inclusive representation of the youth in decision-making, at all levels, as well as institutions and mechanisms to prevent and resolve conflict and counter violent extremism.¹¹

Violent extremism has become an area of interest to government, policy makers, civil society organizations, media, private practitioners and academic researchers. All these stakeholders have highlighted the

⁶OSCE. 2014. Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach. OSCE Secretariat, Vienna. ISBN 978-92-9235-023-9

⁷UN (2007). Implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy: 42nd Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade. The Inn at Perry Cabin, St. Michaels, Maryland.

⁸AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.

⁹ HM Government (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism.

https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-summary.pdf

¹⁰ EU (2005). The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Prevent, Protect, Pursue, Respond.

<https://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2014469%202005%20REV%204>

¹¹ UN Security Council (2015). Resolution 2250 (2015) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7573rd meeting. S/RES/2250 (2015)

importance of building a strong and resilient community to resist violent extremism and terrorism¹². The rise in terrorism and violent extremism in Africa has created severe security threats as this growing phenomenon has resulted in death, destruction and instability in the countries and regions where terrorist groups operate. Terrorists have created a continental dilemma as they threaten the larger African political, social and economic security. Coordinated and harmonized efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism are underway among and between states, together with regional, continental and international organizations. These efforts include collaboration on border security, sharing intelligence, and the development of strategies and frameworks, such as the African Union's (AU) Counter Terrorism Framework and the United Nations' (UN) Global Counter-terrorism Strategy¹³.

Since the infamous 9/11 attacks in New York, military intervention has become synonymous with countering terrorism and violent extremism. In spite of this "hard power" approach, the threat is still very prevalent.¹⁴ Military intervention has brought its own challenges, in the form of a high number of civilian fatalities and damage to infrastructure. This then begs the question: what alternate approach can be used that is less fatal and destructive in responding to terrorism and violent extremism. Efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and radicalization require a combination of security and law enforcement responses, and broader strategies to enhance social cohesion and resilience that lessen the appeal of extremist ideologies that fuel terrorism.¹⁵

The root causes of violent extremism are complex, multi-faceted and intertwined, and relate to the structural environment in which radicalization and possibly violent extremism starts to take hold. Preventing violent extremism focuses on strengthening communities' efforts to resist radicalization and extremism. It aims at reducing the appeal of extremists to young people. However, the dynamics of youth radicalization is a complex phenomenon, and has yet to be fully understood. P/CVE offers the potential to address factors directly associated with extremism and to energize action to address structural and developmental problems that

¹² OSCE. 2014. Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach. OSCE Secretariat, Vienna. ISBN 978-92-9235-023-9.

¹³ Marisha, R. 2017. Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa. Conflict Trends; ACCORD, July

¹⁴ Ibid

¹⁵ OSCE. 2014. Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach. OSCE Secretariat, Vienna. ISBN 978-92-9235-023-9

contribute to the grievances associated with extremist actions.¹⁶ Global, regional and national policies offer substantive guidance on the content and actions that could be taken. However, a great deal depends on the translation of the theories and ideas associated with P/CVE into practical efforts, and how these actions are designed to achieve their intended results. What would an alternate approach be to preventing and responding to terrorism and violent extremism that would minimize the high fatality rate and level of destruction?

Current P/CVE initiatives are testing the many ideas about what will prevent violent extremism. P/CVE solutions emphasize localized programmes, driven by local actors. How such initiatives will address structural factors such as development, governance and justice that may be associated with violent extremism in that locality remains to be seen. Researchers are still grappling with questions such as: Can National Action Plans help to align localized goals with broader structural goals to achieve prevention objectives? It is therefore important for them to be based on local research and good practices from other fields, effectively evaluated and well documented, with the results made publicly available. Only through such processes can evidence-based practices be identified and scaled up or applied in other locations.

Al-shabaab has gained a strong foothold in Kenyan towns, and carried out a number of attacks throughout the country. Between 2000 and 2016, over 1000 people were killed and over 2000 injured in terror-related incidents in Kenya, and over the past nine years the country has experienced approximately 600 terrorist attacks, with Al-shabaab claiming responsibility for the majority.^{17, 18} The terrorist threat in Kenya is further worsened by radicalized Kenyans contributing to the spread of Al-shabaab's ideology. Radicalization in the country has been on the rise with an intensification of youth indoctrination to join violent extremist groups.¹⁹ Kenya's youth bulge, in addition to various micro- and macro-level factors, such as socioeconomic challenges and marginalization; have contributed to

¹⁶ Ibid

¹⁷ Global Terrorism Database (2016, December 23). [Graphic illustration on terrorist attacks in Kenya]. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. Retrieved from <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?country=104>

¹⁸ Ombati, C. (2016, March 11). 900 Kenyans killed in terror attacks in past 16 years. Standardmedia.com. Retrieved from <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000194525/900-kenyans-killed-in-terrorattacks-in-past-16-years>

¹⁹ Mwangi, J. (2017). The process and Trends of Youth Radicalization in Kenya's Mombasa and Nairobi Counties. United States International University. Retrieved from <https://misr.mak.ac.ug/sites/default/files/events/Mwangi-MISR-GSC%202017.pdf>

the increase in youths' vulnerability to extremist groups.²⁰ Despite the implementation of several counterterrorism policies addressing the issue of youth radicalization, the Kenyan government's efforts have been undermined by the actions of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). Extrajudicial killings and mass arrests have contributed to heightened frustration, especially among the Muslim population who are frequent victims of ATPU's harassment.²¹ The frustration felt by many young Kenyans stems from perceived government neglect and marginalization of religious and ethnic groups, which adds to the vulnerability of respective youth, pushing them towards extremist groups offering both income and support.²²

The purpose of this research is to investigate to what extent mechanisms for preventing and countering violent extremism in the IGAD region are youth inclusive. A mixed methods research approach with a case study design was adopted. Using a gender-sensitive and multi-stakeholder Community-Based Participatory Research Approach, this research explores the range of inter-related factors that influence how and why particular young people engage in violence in particular contexts. It has explored where, when and how young people's grievances are harnessed and documented experiences of youth who resist to engage in violent extremism and radicalization but instead play a great role in building peace and promoting recovery and development, support their families and communities during and after war and violence. It has also documented the perceptions of the youth, community leaders and policy makers towards interventions that the Kenyan government has put in place to prevent and counter violent extremism among the youth. Additionally, this report has explored the policy environment in which the youth live, together with state and non-state actors' activities towards P/CVE. Finally, this report has documented what has worked, what has not worked and why.

²⁰ Cachalia, R.C., Salifu, U., & Ndung'u, I. (2016). The dynamics of youth radicalization in Africa. Reviewing the current evidence. Institute for Security Studies, 296. Retrieved from <https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/paper296-1.pdf>

²¹ HRW (2015, January 2015). Kenya: Counterterrorism Operations Undermine Rights. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/01/29/kenyacounterterrorism-operations-undermine-rights>

²² Villa-Vicencio, C., Buchanan-Clarke, S. & Humphrey, A. (2016). Community Perceptions of Violent Extremism in Kenya. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Retrieved from <http://life-peace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/IJR20Violent20Extremism20in20Kenya20final20web2028129.pdf>

With the aforementioned background, it is clear that violent extremism and radicalization of youth and their communities is detrimental to development and achievement of the Global Agenda 2030 of Sustainable Development and the African Agenda 2063. Preventing and countering violent extremism is therefore critical to all globally and in the Horn of Africa, in particular. Special attention is put on youth as members of the community who feel excluded from all decision-making processes concerning them. The lack of or limited form of inclusive participation and effective collaboration of youth and other stakeholders in their communities implies social injustice against the youth. It is hoped that the findings of this research report will form part of the evidence-based policy making on P/CVE in the IGAD region and Kenya in particular.

1.1 Statement of the Problem

While the innovative collaborative efforts among East African states, external donors, and civil society through the establishment of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN)-Intergovernmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) are making significant strides toward the development of a coherent approach to counterterrorism capacity building in the region, there remains significant challenges to effective cooperative action. The UN Strategy on counterterrorism of 2006 offers countries in East Africa the broad-based, long-term framework needed to thwart and respond to terrorist attacks and prevent the violent radicalization of local populations. However, there seems to be a general lack of awareness of the Strategy among many stakeholders in East Africa (and beyond), including its principles on targeting populations that are most at risk and how development interventions focused on preventing and countering violent extremism in the region are addressed. Additionally, the strategy lacks clear communication guidelines on how to ensure sensitization of unsuspecting poor youth about P/CVE.²³ Moreover, there seems to be a general lack of awareness of the Strategy among many stakeholders in East Africa (and beyond), including its principles on targeting populations that are most at risk, and how development interventions focused on poverty reduction, governance, human rights and livelihoods.

In the IGAD region, most counterterrorism efforts have focused on short-term security and law enforcement measures, to the near exclusion of longer-term efforts to address the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Further, it is not clear how the youths' voices are engaged in P/ CVE activities, program and policies. Most P/CVE interventions in the IGAD region have concentrated on strengthening

²³ UN (2007). Implementation of the UN Global Counterterrorism Strategy: 42nd Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade. The Inn at Perry Cabin, St. Michaels, Maryland.

capacities of law enforcers, security personnel and civil society organizations working on P/CVE (hard approaches)^{24, 25}. In spite of young men making up the majority of combatants and perpetrators of violence in most contexts, the majority do not perpetrate violence²⁶. Data on the drivers into violent extremism and radicalization in the IGAD region have been oversimplified and over-generalized without empirical data, with most studies focusing on the role of Islam in violent extremism and youth unemployment and poverty as the main drivers of radicalization and violent extremism.²⁷ As a result, job and employment creation schemes have dominated policy and programmatic responses to youth and violence extremism in Africa. However, the theoretical and empirical case for using youth employment programmes as the exclusive tool for reducing violence has been under researched. In other words, the extent to which these programmes have succeeded in preventing and countering violent extremism has not been well documented.

To compound this problem, there is also a dearth of knowledge on the policy environment in IGAD countries that supports preventing and countering violent extremism while giving youth safe spaces and a voice to speak about how they want to be engaged in the design of policies targeting them.²⁸ Understanding the extent to which policy initiatives and interventions address issues of youth marginalisation and exclusion (with particular focus on structural barriers), and the extent to which progress has been made, or not, in Kenya and Uganda is at a nascent stage. Moreover, micro-level studies to uncover the incentives and disincentives for violence at individual and household level for male and female youth are scarce.²⁹ Of importance to note is the fact that comparative studies on youth and violence in Africa are limited, particularly those examining similar types of

²⁴ Mellisa et. al., 2016. Youth Evaluations of CVE/PVE Programming in Kenya in Context. Journal for deradicalization. Summer 2016, NR, 7. ISSN: 2363-9849.

²⁵ UNDP. 2016. Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach. United Nations Development Programme Regional and Multi-Country Project Document

²⁶ Lyndsay, M(2016). Violence Peace and Stability; The Youth Factor. <https://www.unicef-irc.org/article/1061-violence-peace-and-stability-the-youth-factor.html>

²⁷ Marisha, R. 2017. Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa. Conflict Trends; ACCORD, July.

²⁸ UNDP. 2016. Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach. United Nations Development Programme Regional and Multi-Country Project Document

²⁹ Mutisi, M., Olonisakin, F & Olawale, I (2017). Youth, economic vulnerability, socio-political exclusion, and violence in africa. Background paper. Prepared for IDRC: Employment and Growth, and Governance and Justice Teams, Inclusive Economies Programme, and Partnership Branch.

violence (e.g. violent extremism or communal violence) in multiple contexts³⁰. There is therefore an urgent need to have a more holistic approach to preventing and countering violent extremism that combines methodological plurality with conceptual flexibility, and incorporates micro-level analysis with national and international level assessment of the problem in the IGAD region.

There is currently little academic research on violent extremism from research institutes and think-tanks. This calls for more CVE research dissemination, the sharing of best practices and research methodologies, and lessons learned. Some examples of regional initiatives bridging academics, policy makers and practitioners include the BRICS (Building Resilience in Civil Society in Kenya), The Rift Valley Institute forums on CVE, and the policy studies by Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (CHRIPS)³¹.

Further, interventions by state and non-state actors to prevent or counter youth from violent extremism have been understudied and undocumented. There is also a scarcity of information – ideally gender-disaggregated – about the daily lives of young people, in relation to their decisions on involvement or non-involvement in violence and terrorism. Moreover, there is limited data on their experiences, including the positive contributions of victims of violence and terrorism, dealing with trauma and loss, or building resilience against violence and terrorism. The involvement of female youth is also a controversial issue³². Besides, studies in the IGAD region have under-researched context, government policy, role of state and non-state actors, and gender-sensitivity of P/CVE. Neither have they documented good and bad practices in the specific countries of the Horn of Africa. Most studies have focused on the economic and religious drivers of radicalization and violent extremism.³³ A research of this nature that harnesses the synergies of academia, policy makers and CSOs, is therefore long overdue in the IGAD region.

³⁰ Ibid

³¹ Badurdeen, F.A Goldsmith, P(2018): Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya. Journal of Deradicalization.Vol 16. ISSN 2363-9849.

³² Mutisi, M., Olonisakin,F& Olawale,I(2017). Youth, economic vulnerability, socio-political exclusion, and violence in Africa. Background paper. Prepared for IDRC: Employment and Growth, and Governance and Justice Teams, Inclusive Economies Programme, and Partnership Branch.

³³ Ibid.

1.2. Purpose of this study

This study collates gender-disaggregated data on the contextual analysis of the theories and structural factors underpinning youth exclusion, the injustices they face, and their likely consequent engagement in violence, extremism and radicalization. The purpose of this research is to investigate to what extent mechanisms for preventing and countering violent extremism in the IGAD region are youth inclusive. This objective strives to increase the shared understanding of the context, and to inform evidence-based policy making on P/CVE programming in the IGAD region for violence free nations.

1.3. Specific Objectives

- i. To identify and analyze the factors that predispose the youth – male and female – to engage in VE in Kenya and Uganda;
- ii. To identify avenues and establish strategies as interventions by state and non-state actors for creating and engaging youth in P/CVE in Kenya and Uganda.
- iii. To identify policies and practices in Kenya and Uganda, related to P/CVE that give the youth a voice and create space for male and female youth to participate.
- iv. To find out and document what has worked, what has not worked and why on preventing and countering violent extremism in the IGAD region.

1.4. Research Questions

- i. What factors predispose the youth, male and female to engage in violent extremism in Kenya and Uganda?
- ii. What avenues and strategies as interventions have been put in place by state and non-state actors to engage youth in preventing and countering violent extremism in Kenya and Uganda?
- iii. What policies and practices in Kenya and Uganda, related to P/CVE give the youth (male and female) a voice and create space for them youth to get engaged?
- iv. What has worked, what has not worked and why on preventing and countering violent extremism in Kenya and Uganda?

1.5. Study Area

RESEARCH AREA

Youth-Inclusive Mechanisms for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in the IGAD Region

270 Youth Survey Questionnaire (135 Male, 135 Female)

9 FGDs with Male Youth, Female Youth and Community Leaders


210 Community Survey Questionnaire (105 Male, 105 Female)

270 Youth Survey Questionnaire (135 Male, 135 Female)

9 FGDs with Male Youth, Female Youth and Community Leaders

210 Community Survey Questionnaire (105 Male, 105 Female)

KENYA




Dandora, Babandogo, Mandera, Dump Site, Central Nairobi, Eastleigh

Garissa, Sankuri, BuraGarissa, Jarajila, Mbalambala

Majngo, Kisauni, Likoni, Frere

UGANDA




Kitgum, Kirombe, Layibi, Kisubi, Pece Pawel Pudkek, Bar-Dege, Pece Vanguard

Zigambwa, Bedhebera, Mpungwe, Igamba, Katwe, Imanyiro


Kisenyi, Makerere, Wandegya, Katanga, Kawempe, Kasubi, ForGod

IGAD



The IGAD region has multiple conflicts; and all its countries have been victims of terrorist acts due to their geographical location, persistence of conflicts, absence of effective state structures, and despair from the loss of hope and the growth of extremism. It is considered to be the most vulnerable region to terrorism of all regions in sub-Saharan Africa. Hereunder is a map showing global terror attacks since 2012. The IGAD region has suffered a great deal.

Fig 2: Global terror attacks since 2012



Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Turning Points: A Report of the CSIS Commission on Countering Violent Extremism, November 2016

The region's terrorist acts are perpetrated by and against a country's nationals for a domestic cause, or are focused on extra-national or extra-regional targets. It has fragile states and vulnerable youths, and is a host to the largest populations of refugees in Africa. Eritrea is providing support to religious extremist groups with links to al-Qaida, to further Asmara's military agenda.

The IGAD region also has unsecured border territories (<http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp>). The high presence of the international community in the region offers international terrorists more "high value", Western-related targets. Further, the presence of different faiths and the growth in religious assertiveness has resulted in enhanced tensions, and created an enabling environment for resort to terrorist violence. Additionally, are the gaps in state institutions and technical capacity for CVE. There is a general lack of respect among the region's countries for human rights and the rule of the law. IGAD region is linked to other

regional blocks in Africa namely East African Community (EAC), Common Markets of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), South African Development Community (SADC) and ECOWAS. Therefore, lessons learnt from this study will have impact on a wide population. The UN Security Counterterrorism Framework is being implemented by IGAD's Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT) which has established a CVE Centre of Excellence and is the interlocutor of other institutions working on CVE in theregion. the Greater Horn of Africa faces a range of challenges, including persistent threats posed by transnational terrorists and other violent groups. These security challenges are exacerbated by an array of chronic problems, ranging from underdevelopment and weak governance to high unemployment, particularly among youth, potentially making them more vulnerable to empty promises of a better life and financial incentives offered by terrorist organizations.

The subregion has also been heavily affected by destructive cross border communal conflicts often triggered by resource scarcity due to rapid population growth and facilitated by porous borders. Disproportionate military and other repressive reactions to security threats such as terrorism often end up delegitimizing local authorities and undermining efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism through community engagement. Moreover, the underdevelopment and fragility that characterizes the subregion has given rise to a range of grievances that foster an

enabling environment for terrorist groups to spread their message and recruit support. Terrorist groups operating in the subregion and other armed nonstate actors have capitalized on economic weaknesses, governance deficits, violent conflicts, and the lack of effective services delivered by governments to recruit from politically and economically marginalized populations.

Marginalized segments of the subregion's growing youth population are particularly vulnerable in this regard.⁴ These structural "push" factors, accompanied by "pull" factors such as charismatic recruiters, appealing ideologies, and material and social incentives incentives, have fueled radicalization and recruitment in the subregion efforts often include empowering local communities and civil society actors, increasing social resilience, facilitating constructive dialogue between communities and the government, promoting education and economic opportunities, encouraging credible narratives to counter violent extremist ideology, and providing disengagement and reintegration opportunities. relevant actors include law enforcement officers and criminal justice personnel such as prosecutors, judges, and corrections officers, as well as officials working on related areas of development, education, youth, and social welfare. At the same time, community leaders, civil society actors, grassroots organizations, and other nonstate actors should be empowered and engaged to work on coun The project was implemented in the high-at-risk areas where communities

are vulnerable to and are victims of violent extremism, these included the counties of Garissa, Mombasa and parts of Nairobi.

1.6. Why Kenya?

Kenya has suffered far more terrorist attacks compared to the other countries in the region. Widespread corruption and porous borders have contributed to ease al-Shabaab's expansion into Kenya, providing a permissive environment for terrorists. The presence of al-Shabaab makes Kenya a "high-risk" country when it comes to terrorist attacks.^{34,35} Additionally, Kenya's military intervention in Somalia in 2011 increased al-Shabaab's motivation for further expansion.^{36,37} Having gained substantial support among local Kenyans, al-Shabaab has established sleeper cells throughout the country and rely on local support when carrying out attacks³⁸. There are no official numbers of how many Kenyans have joined al-Shabaab, but there is an estimate of 700 individuals³⁹. In order to develop effective counterterrorism policies to prevent youth radicalization, it is of essential value to increase research on why Kenyan youth join al-Shabaab.

Despite ranking as a lower middle-income country, weak governance and corruption continues to threaten further Kenya's economic development.⁴⁰ Additionally, the unstable situation in Somalia has resulted in an influx of Somali refugees to Kenya, as well as elevated the threat of al-Shabaab members entering Kenya claiming to need

³⁴ Bogorad, O. (2016). Kenyans on High Alert as Threat From al-Shabaab Rises. IPI Global Observatory. Retrieved from <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2016/03/kenya-threat-from-al-shabaab-rises/>

³⁵ OSAC (2016). Kenya 2016 Crime & Safety Report. United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Retrieved from <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=1960>

³⁶ Elbagir, N. (2015, July 24). The 'back door' to Kenya: Security threat from porous Somali border. Cnn.com. Retrieved from <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/07/24/africa/kenyaback-door-porous-border-security-threat/>

³⁷ Torbjörnsson, D. (2017). Explaining the differences in al-Shabaab expansion into Ethiopia and Kenya. Studies in African Security. Retrieved from <https://www.foi.se/download/18.2798873115c0ac874a84d5/1494935094959/Daniel%20Torbj%C3%B6rnsson%20al-Shabaab.pdf>

³⁸ Botha, A. (2013). Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalization and extremism. Institute for Security Studies Paper, 254. Retrieved from <http://dSPACE.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/33717/1/Paper245.pdf?1>

³⁹ Torbjörnsson, D. (2017). Explaining the differences in al-Shabaab expansion into Ethiopia and Kenya. Studies in African Security. Retrieved from <https://www.foi.se/download/18.2798873115c0ac874a84d5/1494935094959/Daniel%20Torbj%C3%B6rnsson%20al-Shabaab.pdf>

⁴⁰ Central Intelligence Agency (2017). The World Factbook: Kenya. Retrieved from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html>

protection.⁴¹ Kenya hosts the world's largest refugee camp, Dadaab, which according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) accommodates over 245,000 registered refugees. The number of Dadaab residents has drastically decreased as a result of the Kenyan government's decision to close the camp in 2017. Although the Kenyan High Court overturned the decision, tension remains high among the remaining refugees. Humanitarian aid workers have also been withdrawn from the camp due to the heightened security risk. The ability of al-Shabaab to infiltrate and operate within the camp mirrors the failed efforts to secure the refugee camp, and alleged terrorist activity is one reason why the government has demanded its closure.⁴²

Many Kenyans have joined al-Shabaab and contributed to the spread of the organization's extremist ideology. According to Chome⁴³, al-Shabaab has "been able to exploit a combination of political realities, socioeconomic factors, and individual characteristics that render many people – and youth in particular – vulnerable for recruitment." Having established sleeper cells through radicalization of primarily Kenyan youth, al-Shabaab has relied on local assistance and support when carrying out attacks in Kenya.⁴⁴ The increase in terrorist attacks in Kenya by local al-Shabaab members is a manifestation of the growing threat of violent extremism in the country.⁴⁵

1.7. Roles and Responsibilities of Partner Institutions

OSSREA-Organization for Social Science Research for Eastern and Southern Africa (www.ossrea.net) is an academic Think Tank with over 36 years' experience in collaborative high-quality interdisciplinary research and capacity building that impacts on policy. It has a wide network with a presence in 21 Eastern and Southern African countries.

⁴¹ Goldman, D. (2014). Kenya To Send Somali Refugees Home UNHCR. Strategic Intelligence Service. Retrieved from <http://intelligencebriefs.com/kenya-to-send-somali-refugeeshome-unhcr/>

⁴² Mc Sweeney, D. (2012). Conflict and deteriorating security in Dadaab. Humanitarian Practice Network. Retrieved from <http://odihpn.org/magazine/conflict-anddeteriorating-security-in-dadaab/>

⁴³ Chome, N. (2016). Violent Extremism and Clan Dynamics in Kenya. United States Institute of Peace. Retrieved from <https://www.usip.org/publications/2016/10/violentextremism-and-clan-dynamics-kenya>

⁴⁴ Botha, A. (2013). Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalization and extremism. Institute for Security Studies Paper, 254. Retrieved from <http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/33717/1/Paper245.pdf?1>

⁴⁵ Getachew, A. (2016). Radicalization of children and youth in Kenya: A new challenge to child protection. Life and Peace Institute. Retrieved from <http://lifepeace.org/hab/radicalization-of-children-and-youth-in-kenya-a-new-challenge-tochild-protection/>

OSSREA shares its research findings with policy makers, the media, CSOs and communities for research uptake by translating knowledge into information for public policy. OSSREA disseminates research findings through book publications, journal articles, knowledge sharing workshops, knowledge to policy dialogues, bulletins, E-learning alliances, and e-policy dialogues on thematic issues. It also works closely with policy makers and government institutions, and has signed Memoranda of Understanding with CEWARN- IGAD, EALA, SADC Parliamentary Forum, and Centre for Parliamentary Studies and Training in Kenya. Her latest multi-country studies on various themes, namely Youth Unemployment, Election Violence, Inclusive Development, International Migrations, and Food Security all identified the youth bulge in Africa as a threat to peace and security because youth are marginalized in policy discourse. OSSREA is the project manager and lead organization in facilitating the merger of analyses from academia, policy makers and civil society. It takes the lead in documenting the whole process and in supporting the development of various training curricula, training manual, synthesis reports, and policy documents and briefs on holistic for CVE programming in the IGAD region; ensuring that gender is mainstreamed in the project; and disseminating knowledge collated. OSSREA is providing project related financial and technical support to partners for the operationalization of the initiative with the support from IDRC.

IGAD-CEWARN: The IGAD Centre for Excellence in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (IP/CVE) delegated IGAD-CEWARN- to be the partner in this project. IP/CVE is the interlocutor between the UN system and bilateral donors, all state authorities with a P/CVE interest, including the law enforcement and justice sectors, social services, education, and the sub-regional focal points on implementation of the UN Strategy on P/CVE. They analyze conflicts and sent early warning to all affected communities and national governments. Through the IP/CVE Centre for Excellence, IGAD-CEWARN will ensure harmonious implementation of the UN framework, and ensure government/policy makers buy in, advising on policy actors and security personnel to engage with, identifying research population, taking leadership over policy recommendations from the international knowledge to policy conference for the UN Strategy and P/CVE programming; mainstreaming security concerns of national governments in the project and training OSSREA and Peace and Development Network Trust (PeaceNet – Kenya) about it. They are tasked with research uptake at the policy level by ensuring that the policy inputs that will come out of the project get ownership of the policy recommendations and facilitate the adoption, internalization and implementation of these inputs by P/CVE Centre for Excellence. They have done intelligence training for researchers and mainstreamed ethics and human rights of respondents in the research instruments. They have also sensitized the research team on how to ensure the protection of respondents from stigmatization. The tripartite team has relied heavily on

IGAD-CEWARN to help identify policy makers who are respondents in this study both at the community and national level. The partners are also relying on them to share best practices case studies from different regions and organize a regional knowledge sharing platform with policy makers. We are also relying on them to help identify key participants in the e-policy dialogue on P/CVE.

PeaceNet Kenya is a national networking and partnership building organization providing a platform for CSOs, and other peace actors committed to collaboration and mobilization of national and regional initiatives for peace building, promotion of justice and conflict transformation. PeaceNet-Kenya, is currently the coordinating CSO working group that brings together all NGOs working on Peace, Governance, Conflict, Natural Resources, and Gender Based Violence. It is currently implementing a two-year project called *Jamii Thabiti*, which focuses on violence against girls and women, inter-communal violence, and criminal violence (involving children, youth, women and elders). It also coordinates the localization of the Kenya National Action Plan for implementing UNSC Resolution 1325 on women peace and security. In this project, PeaceNet is the implementing partner. It has taken the lead in identifying trusted civil society networks used by embassies and aid agencies as the vehicle for change in the IGAD region. It has helped to collect data on the experiences of the youth on violence, extremism, radicalization, exclusion and injustices against youth. It has provided guidance in the harvesting, documentation and compilation of knowledge from the various CSOs and Faith Based Organizations on CVE due to their hands-on experience in collecting data of this nature. They have further spearheaded the building of local support and awareness of the UN Strategy. The tripartite team is relying on PeaceNet to use its network and strengthen inter-community dialogue and tolerance and organize for regional knowledge harvesting forums. They will participate in the international knowledge-to-policy fora and help identify key participants in the e-policy dialogue on P/CVE.

1.8. Risks and Ethical Considerations/Measures to Mitigate Risks

- i. *Stigmatization of respondents: youth and community members* -All respondents participated on voluntary basis and were assured of anonymity and security without victimization and stigmatization. We sought their consent to be respondents in the study after explaining to them the objectives of the project.
- ii. *Adverse effects of the research*: This is a highly emotionally charged research. Signed consent was sought from all respondents. The data collection tool was presented to the Research Ethics committee at the National Council of Science, Technology and Innovation in Kenya and the Uganda National Council of Science and Technology for approval. Each researcher and research assistants went through the intelligence and the

research ethics training.

- iii. *Keeping the research team together*: Academia, civil society organizations and policy makers each have their own style of conducting and generating research. Putting this diverse team together for co-production of knowledge is a challenge. This risk was mitigated by IDRC conducting a research methodology training to firm up proposals. OSSREA the lead organization also included senior members of these organizations in the field research so as to harness on their strengths.

1.9. Definition of Key Terms

Defining key terms – such as ‘radicalization’, ‘violent extremism’ and ‘terrorism’ is a challenge for all stakeholders in this field, as the terms are complex, contested and constantly shifting. As noted in the literature review, even international and regional organizations, such as the UN, the EU and the AU, do not have clear and official definitions of these concepts. Language variations also played a role in defining the key terms for this study.

Countering violent extremism: The term countering violent extremism – which is often referred to by its acronym, CVE countering violent extremism is officially referred to as “countering violent extremism and radicalisation that lead to terrorism. It involves no prosecutions, arrests, or threats of force, and seeks to mobilise and empower actors that are not traditionally associated with national security, such as local governments, educators, social workers, and civil society. The aim is not to reach active terrorists, but create resilience among populations that are seen as potentially vulnerable (“prevention”), or assist individuals who are open to turning away from extremism (“deradicalization”)⁴⁶. The concept of ‘violent extremism’ does not exist in the Swahili lexicon, making any translation of the phrase imprecise. Instead, violent extremism is understood or described as ‘terrorism’, or *ugaidi* in Swahili. Kenya’s National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism does not explicitly define violent extremism – it describes the actors involved in extremist violence as ‘radicalized individuals who are prepared to engage in, or actively support, acts of violence in furtherance of radically illiberal, undemocratic political systems or ideologies.’

Counter-Terrorism: Counter-Terrorism refers to all measures aimed at thwarting terrorist plots and dismantling terrorist organisations. This typically includes the arrest of suspected members, the disruption of terrorist attacks, recruitment, propaganda, travel, and logistics, countering

⁴⁶Neumann, P. (2011). Preventing Violent Radicalization in America. Bipartisan Policy Center. Retrieved from <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf>

terrorist finance, the protection of potential targets, and the pooling and exchange of data with foreign countries. In nearly all countries, counter-terrorism is the primary responsibility of law enforcement, intelligence services, and – in some cases – the military. Counter-terrorism is a central pillar of any effort aimed at countering threats from violent extremism. When targeted and effective, counter-terrorism not only helps to prevent attacks and protect lives, it also preserves the integrity of the state and its 19 institutions, and sends a powerful message to the terrorists and their supporters that violence is ineffective. However, when threats are more persistent and widespread, counter-terrorism is often perceived as inadequate, because it fails to counter processes of radicalisation and leaves the underlying political, economic, and social drivers of violent extremism unaddressed. Moreover, when counter-terrorism is purely repressive and targets the wrong people, it can become a grievance in its own right.

De-radicalisation: De-radicalisation is aimed at radicalised individuals. It is based on the assumption that not everyone who becomes radicalised remains committed to their cause, and that every extremist movement has followers who are disillusioned, have doubts, or simply want out. In practice, de-radicalisation programmes target radicalised individuals at different stages of the extremist “lifecycle”: immediately before joining a group or network, as active members, or following their exit. The objective may be to stop their involvement in violence (behavioural de-radicalisation), or change their attitudes and ideological assumptions (cognitive de-radicalisation). Just like radicalisation, de-radicalisation is a process which plays out over time and draws on a combination of instruments, including – but not limited to – psychological counselling, ideological re-education, vocational training, re-socialisation, and job opportunities⁴⁷

Extremism: The term extremism describes ideas that are diametrically opposed to a society’s core values, could be various forms of racial or religious supremacy, or any ideology that systematically denies basic human rights. Or it can refer to the ruthless methods by which political ideas are realised, namely by “show[ing] disregard for the life, liberty, and human rights of others “Extremism, by contrast, is context-dependent, which means that its definition can easily be challenged and manipulated.⁴⁸

Prevention: Prevention seeks to “inoculate “on-radicalised individuals against the appeal of violent extremism. The underlying logic is identical to other forms of prevention – for example, drug, alcohol, or gang prevention – where “at risk “populations and their wider communities are encouraged to participate in programmes that create awareness and strengthen the

⁴⁷ Botha, A. (2016). *Terrorism in Kenya and Uganda: Radicalization from a Political Socialization Perspective*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books

⁴⁸ See Peter R. Neumann, “The Trouble with Radicalization“, *International Affairs*, 89(4) (2013), p. 875-6.

mental, intellectual, and social capacity to resist recruitment. This includes public information campaigns and capacity-building across entire communities, as well as targeted programmes in specific locations, such as schools, universities, youth and sports clubs, in mosques and churches, prisons and refugee centres, or on the internet⁴⁹.

Radicalisation: Radicalisation is the process whereby people turn to extremism there is no single driver of radicalization. – experts have identified a number of recurring factors and dynamics.⁵⁰ They are: **Grievance:** All forms of radicalisation are based on societal tensions, conflicts, and fault lines, which may cause thwarted expectations, conflicts of identity, or feelings of injustice, marginalisation and exclusion. **Needs:** Being part of an extremist group satisfies followers' emotional needs, such as the desire for belonging, community, adventure, power, significance, or glory. In some cases, this involves taking advantage of psychological vulnerabilities. **Ideas:** For discontent to be turned into a political project, it requires ideas that “make sense “of the grievance, identify a scapegoat, and offer solutions. When those ideas amount to a (seemingly) coherent worldview, they are called ideology. **People:** With rare exceptions, radicalisation is a social process in which authority figures, charismatic leaders or tightly knit peer groups are key to generating trust, commitment, loyalty, and (peer) pressure. **Violence:** Becoming involved in violence is often the result of being exposed to violence, causing individuals to seek revenge or become “brutalised “. This frequently happens in the context of violent conflicts. While there is no universal formula, as pathways into radicalisation differ depending on context and location, there are patterns that governments should make an effort to understand and consider, especially when formulating counter-measures.

Reintegration: This refers to the achievement of a sustainable return to a country/community/family of origin. It is the ability of returnees to secure the political, economic, and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity.

Returnee: This refers to a person in the act of going back to their point of departure. This could be within the territorial boundaries of a country or between the host country and country of origin. In this study, returnees refer to ex-combatants who go back home.

Social cohesion: This refers to the nature and set of relationships between individuals and groups in a particular environment (horizontal social cohesion) and between those individuals and groups and institutions that govern them in a particular environment (vertical social cohesion). Strong

⁴⁹ Neumann, P. (2011). Preventing Violent Radicalization in America. Bipartisan Policy Center. Retrieved from <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/wpcontent/uploads/sites/default/files/NSPG.pdf>

⁵⁰ Ibid

positive and integrated relationships and inclusive identities are perceived as indicative of high social cohesion, whereas weak negative or fragmented relationships and exclusive identities are taken to mean low social cohesion. It is the social connectedness that brings about social capital, tolerance, non-discrimination, social justice, upholding the human rights obligations.

Youth: The National Constitution of Kenya (2010) defines youth as those between 18 and 34. Kenya National Youth Policy, however, defines youth as individuals between 15 and 30 years of age. While the Constitution trumps policy documents, the term youth is often used to refer to individuals between 15 and 34. Nevertheless, Kenya is a youthful country. The median age is 19 years and approximately 80 percent of Kenya's population is below 35 years old, accounting for 60 percent of the total labor force^{51, 52}. While official statistics are outdated, an increasing number of youth experience economic challenges affecting their prospects of achieving a sustainable livelihood.

1.10. Research Methodology

The research project applied a multi-sectoral programmatic approach which brought together state institutions, civil society organizations, the academia, media and grassroots communities. The consortium of these actors brought together complimenting synergies that aimed at empowering targeted communities to engage and include youth in preventing and countering violent extremism. This research project adopted mixed methods; both qualitative and quantitative research designs. A multi-method research approach was applied to a case study through Participatory Appraisal Research. In the IGAD region, two case studies were selected thus Kenya and Uganda. They were selected depending on the United States Department of State that categorized Kenya as an active target of radicalization and terrorism and Uganda as a dormant target.⁵³ The comparison between these two countries was intriguing.

We employed a cross-disciplinary comparative mixed research methodology with focus on analyzing various contexts, avoiding generalizations and disaggregating youth by gender and other social sifters capture the gender dimensions of youth and violent extremism and violence, as well as the experiences of female youth in Africa. We were

⁵¹ Ministry of Youth Affairs (2006). Kenya National Youth Policy. Retrieved from http://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Kenya_2006_National_Youth_Policy.pdf

⁵² Awiti, A., Scott, B. & Bhanjee, S. (2015). East Africa Youth Survey 2015. East Africa Institute, Aga Khan University. Retrieved from <http://data.eadialogueseries.org/docs/infograph.pdf>

⁵³ United States Department of State Publication (2017). Country Reports on Terrorism 2016

interested in carrying out a comparative research that includes case studies from different regions and with mixed profiles to compare the experiences and perspectives of youth. We sought to understand the extent to which policy initiatives and interventions address issues of youth marginalisation and exclusion (with particular focus on structural barriers), and the extent to which progress has been made, or not, in the IGAD region. We intended to shed light on link between youth, peace and security at global, continental, and regional level in Africa. We analyzed the policy environment in which the youth operate at the national and community level so as to have a bottom-up, top-down approach to preventing and countering violent extremism among the youth. We also endeavoured to find out the contributions of youth to peacebuilding.

This study also took a “whole-of-society approach,” gender-sensitive dimension by engaging women as positive change agents in their communities. We aim at developing home grown solutions to radicalization and P/CVE through empowering communities to develop a counter narrative to the violent extremist narrative and amplify the alternative message through all forms of media. Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) method, in-depth case study, and group discussions have been employed to get into the depths of violent extremism and radicalization among youth in the IGAD region. A multi method research allows for both in-depth inquiries into particular cases and examination of trends and characteristics over large populations. Multi-method research is a linking of the qualitative and quantitative approaches in order to capitalize on the complementary strength of different methods of enquiry. The main research questions seeking for answers are:

- i. What evidence is there from the contextual analysis of the theories and structural factors underpinning youth exclusion, injustice and engagement in violence, extremism and radicalization in the IGAD region?
- ii. What strategies can be used by the various actors in implementing the UN Strategy for counter terrorism to engage the youths’ views as a long-term measure for P/CVE programming?

It is important to note that we were interested in more than the causal explanations of youth involvement in violent extremism and radicalization. Four methods were used to generate empirical data: desk-top literature reviews, questionnaires, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, which gave voice to the youth and members of the communities in which they live. Since this was a comparative study, we developed the same instruments that were used in both Kenya and Uganda.

The three research organizations thus OSSREA (academia), PeaceNet (CSOs) and IGAD- CEWARN (policy makers) formed a transformative network for co-production of knowledge among different sections of the society for understanding and dialoguing P/ CVE using the youth

experiences for multi- stakeholder engagement. The target populations were clustered to reflect the diversity of youth characteristics and experience. Three research sites were selected in Kenya and Uganda. This was based on previous historical acts of terrorism and radicalization in the selected sites. Even in the selected sites, further targeting was done to ensure that the study was holistic and inclusive without leaving any youth behind.

Respondents included youth in rural and urban areas, in school and out of school, employed and unemployed youth; as well as students and nonstudents, and males and females. The instruments used were all designed to secure basic information on respondents, identify their major preoccupations, describe their participation in youth programmes, CSOs working on youth and P/CVE, security personnel, policy makers in the sector of peace and security, clergy, local leaders, and community members including families of ex-combatants and returnees. Trained youth research assistants administered questionnaires to fellow youth while desktop literature reviews, FGDs and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) were conducted by the research team from the 3 institutions. Due to the sensitive nature of the research, the respondents chose the most comfortable and secure place to carry out the interviews or FGDs. Some of the sites included mosques, hotels, county halls, SO offices, policy makers' offices etc.

1.10.1. Target population

The target population is the youth in and out of school, between ages 15 to 35. In this study, context is a critical factor. According to the 2009 Kenya population and housing census, the total population is 38,610,097 million of which 19,192,458 million are male and 19,417,639 million are female. The youth (age between 18 – 35 years) in Kenya account for more than 30 % of the total population. In terms of gender, 51.7% are female and 48.3 % are male. Of these, 58.7 % live in the rural while 12.5% live in urban areas. A total of 32,478,570 million are aged above 5 years and above of which 16,052,205 million are male and 16,426,365 million females. A total 41% are employed of which 53% are male and 47% are female. A total of 12,824,624 are economically inactive and of which 44% are male and 56% are female.⁵⁴

1.10.2. Research Sample

Sampling is a very important issue in research as the respondents chosen have a significant impact on the results. This study employed multi-stage

⁵⁴ KNBS (2010). Kenya Demographic and Health Survey 2008-09.

<https://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/FR229/FR229.pdf>

sampling technique. First the research team purposively sampled Kenya and Uganda as case studies. These two countries in the IGAD region have both had terrorist attacks but Kenya has been more vulnerable. Kenya is categorized as moderate vulnerability while Uganda less vulnerable according to the UN Strategy of Counter-Terrorism of 2006. During our inception meetings in both countries with stakeholders, the Ministries of Internal Security advised us on areas that have been marked as hotspots. We also selected the research areas guided by reviewed literature on terrorist attacks in Kenya and Uganda. The sample size was determined by researchers, paying due attention to the gender balance of respondents and researchers. We purposively sampled the categories of respondents thus youth, policy makers at local and national level, community members, and security personnel.

1.10.3. Research Design

The research methodology that we employed in this project is a mixed method. We adopted a case study design that went further into case-in case study. This has adopted both qualitative and quantitative research paradigms with triangulation of findings. This research adopted a predominantly qualitative approach complemented by quantitative methods. We employed process-tracing technique so as to dig into as much information as possible in the study sites. What this simply means is that the IGAD region is a case study. In it, Kenya and Uganda were chosen as case study countries. Still within Kenya and Uganda, we were interested in selected research clusters. In the selected research clusters, we selected specific hot spots of radicalization and violent extremism. We still had to look at individuals, communities, nations and the IGAD region.


Under process tracing, using multiple methods of data collection (Questionnaires, Key Informant Interviews, FGDs and participant observation), we gathered multiple data sets to help us trace causal mechanisms of drivers of youth involvement in VE, policy environment in which youth operate, causes of success or failure of state and non-state interventions towards P/CVE. Our interest was to link the causes to outcomes and give explanations of the why and how things have been done so that we advise on ways of improving or getting better outcomes. We also were interested in comparisons across countries and within the countries. Why is radicalization and violent extremism of youth in Kenya and Uganda similar or different yet both countries are in the lake region of Africa and in the IGAD region of Africa? How comes similar conditions or histories are not yielding similar outcomes? What are the intervening variables and how strong are they? This is important particularly where there are similar conditions in terms of history, geographical location or other reasons. We stressed on understanding the importance of context.

We also selected process-tracing technique to prove the theory that is guiding this study or build another theory. We have looked deeply into

causes of youth involvement in radicalization and violent extremism and the trends that we are experiencing today. We probed for links between causes and outcomes. Data analysis was also done using this process tracing technique.

1.10.4. Why the case study

Emphasis was put on the case study design approach that this project has adopted. It is a case in case study. First it is the IGAD region, then Kenya and Uganda and within Kenya and Uganda, there are selected study areas. This approach made it possible to make comparisons across countries and within the same country across different sites. Thus, due to the complex social dynamics of violent extremism and radicalization, comparisons within countries and across countries is critical. We hope to contribute to ongoing debates about why youth engage or don't engage in violent extremism, what drives youth into violent extremism and radicalization, how the various interventions and strategies by national governments to include youth in development manifest and if there are good practices of youth inclusive mechanisms in preventing and countering violent extremism. the case study approach allows the investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristic of real-life events. the need to use a case study approach arises whenever an empirical inquiry must examine a contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident. The case study method of research is a rigorous methodology that allows decision making processes and causality to be studied. It is suitable when, why and how questions are asked about a set of events. A case study examines a phenomenon in its natural setting, employing multiple methods of data collection to gather information from one or a few entities. The case study as a research strategy comprises an all-encompassing method, covering the logic of design, data collection techniques and specific approaches of data analysis. Case studies are frequently used in policy research as they offer the opportunity to examine the process of policy implementation and at the same time outline recommendations for future policy development and implementation.



1.11. Theoretical Foundations

This project was based on Social Control Theory by Hirsch (1969) who asserts that strong bonds to family, community and society are fundamental to violence prevention because they both provide a conduit for conveying social norms and expectations in addition to abiding by the norms. Community-Based Participatory Research is a branch, was adopted. Participatory research focuses on a process of sequential reflection and action, carried out with and by local people rather than on them. CBPR is an approach to research that looks at participants or consumers (especially vulnerable or disenfranchised participants) as key and equal partners. CBPR promotes community ownership of research. Key principles of CBPR include approaching the community as a “unit of identity” and working with community members as a group, enhancing strength and resources in the community, ensuring that community-research partnership is reflected in all stages of the project, valuing knowledge from all partners, using knowledge and action for the benefit of all participants, promoting co-learning, addressing social inequalities and contributing to “reciprocal

transfer of knowledge, skills, capacity, and power”⁵⁵. The outcome of this process is meant to benefit all stakeholders, including community participants, practitioners, and researchers, and result in greater connection between those who are being studied and those who study with greater benefit to both⁵⁶.

The community-based participatory research (CBPR) collaboration with the youth and the community in which they live treat them as an equal partner in the research project. They have a big stake in identifying the problem and solutions to the same problem. Community leaders in each of the study locations ensure that the study is mindful of the ways in which their community is unique. They helped us to interpret the usefulness of the project to the community and committed to dissemination of findings and implementation of interventions. In CBPR the community is regarded as a unit of identity, work with community members, enhance strength and resources of the community, ensure that community-research partnership is reflected in all stages of the project, value knowledge from all partners, use the knowledge and action for the benefit of the all participants, promote co-learning, address social inequalities and contribute to reciprocal transfer of knowledge. We brought together security development actors, policy makers, civil society organizations, youth, community members, academia and media personnel formed multi-sector platforms for collaboration and worked with all stakeholders to co-produce knowledge according to our objectives.

We applied the 5 strategies suggested by The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) namely: 1) focusing on prisons and delineating good practices on rehabilitating and reintegrating into society violent extremist offenders who have disengaged from violent extremism; 2) enumerating good practices on working with victims of terrorism in the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack; 3) exploring the importance of multi-sectoral (i.e., government institutions, agencies, the private sector, and civil society) approaches to P/ CVE; 4) examining the methods of P/CVE communications most resonant with key audiences; and 5) measuring the

⁵⁵Israel,B.A., Barbara A. Israel, Amy J. Schulz, Edith A. Parker, and Adam B. Becker(1998). Review of Community-Based Research: Assessing Partnership Approaches to Improve Public Health. Annual Review. Public Health.

⁵⁶ Viswanathan, M., Ammerman, A., Eng, E., Gartlehner, G., Lohr, K. N., Griffith, D., et al. (2004). *Community-based participatory research: Assessing the evidence* (Evidence Report/Technology Assessment No. 99; Prepared by RTI International-University of North Carolina). Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality.

effectiveness of P/CVE programming⁵⁷. We focused on strategies 2,3,4 and 5 with the aim of developing solutions relevant to the audience being addressed. Oblivious of the fact that there is growing importance of the Internet but radicalization to violence continues to take place primarily at the local level, often through face-to-face engagement. Therefore, locally-relevant P/CVE initiatives are central to the success of any strategy.

Community engagement and community-oriented policing are related tools that focus on building trust with local communities and engaging with them as partners to develop information-driven community-based solutions to local issues.⁵⁸ Such engagement is meant to raise community awareness about the threat of violent extremism, to provide them with the necessary tools, and to empower them to intervene and prevent radicalization and violence. The more aware communities are of potential threats to their security, the more empowered they are to be resilient against it and the better prepared they can be to counter the threats themselves. Community engagement therefore requires building trust between officials and community members in order to establish a relationship of collaboration. Experience proves that such relationships cannot be built overnight and should be cultivated and maintained over time in order to have effect.

Our approach was to first conduct research in order to understand local problems and grievances that local communities in target areas experience so that as we engage on interventions, these communities are not targeted for security reasons but are engaged for its own benefit. Through this research, we approached communities with basic knowledge of their local dynamics and the issues they face in order to demonstrate to the community that they are not engaging the community solely because of potential security threats arising within the community. We took a holistic approach to community engagement and community-oriented policing that involves all sectors of the society in order to find the right partners and sustain the engagement. Multiple sectors within a community are involved in the research at both the local household and community level and at the national level. Our goal was to develop trust with different levels in the community. We are oblivious of the fact that cooperative and constructive dialogue between society and government agencies, including at the municipal level, is a prerequisite to success in P/CVE.

⁵⁷ The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF)(2013). Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism.https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/159885/13Aug09_EN_

⁵⁸ Ibid

Figure 3: An al-Shabaab fighter waves a flag in the outskirts of Mogadishu, Somalia

Source: Gallo Images/Reuters

1.12. Ethical Considerations

The balance between the search for scientific knowledge and respect for the rights of those studied was carefully taken into consideration. Before the interview began, the researcher gave them a general explanation of the purpose of this study and asked them for their consent before the interviews began. At this point, three of the informants withdrew from the interview. Their wishes to not be interviewed were respected.

Additionally, the informants were assured of confidentiality, privacy and anonymity. To make sure those interviewed were comfortable, the researcher signed a Non-Disclosure agreement guaranteeing the respondents privacy and confidentiality since the interviews were being recorded. Notes were also taken during the interviews, particularly taking note of dynamics that could not be captured through the recordings such as facial expressions and gestures. We applied and were granted a research permit by National Council of Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). The researcher also obtained local approval from the respective County Government offices in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa counties. Due to the sensitivity of the research, the Ministry of Internal


Security sought to go through the manuscript before publishing it. We also agreed to share copies of our research output with NACOSTI.

All consent was written and signed off by the researcher and the interviewee. All the recorded interviews and information collected was stored safely on the researcher's personal laptop. The transcribed data does not contain any personal markers such as participant name, phone contact and was coded so as to ensure confidentiality. However, there were few cases of respondents who accepted to be video and audio-taped. Finally, all interviews were conducted in a private and closed room, often in the respondents' office. This enhanced the confidentiality of all the interviews.

2. Historical development of Terrorism in Kenya-The Rise of Alshabaab

The greatest terror threat in East Africa currently comes from al-Shabaab militia group. The group originated as an armed faction of the Islamic Courts Union a strict Sharia administration set up as an alternative to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was established in Somalia in 2004 as part of the terms to end the lengthy civil war. The Islamic Courts Union was defeated by government forces in 2006 but al-Shabaab remained. These groups retain a limited common agenda of defeating AMISOM and the TFG and extending an extreme interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) across Somalia. The TFG, with support from AMISOM, managed to expel al-Shabaab from Mogadishu in 2011; however, the group continues to launch attacks on the capital and has waged open warfare against the Federal Government of Somalia and AMISOM in southern Somalia. Al-Shabaab has also repeatedly targeted its attacks against Kenya, in retribution for the Kenyan authorities' contributing troops to AMISOM and for carrying out military operations against the terrorist organization in southern Somalia.⁵⁹

Figure 4: Number of terrorism incidents in Kenya, per county – 2011 to 2016



Source: Version 7 ACLED data (1996-2016), 2017. Retrieved from www.acleddata.com.

⁵⁹ Ndung'u I., Salifu & Sigsworth, R(2017). Violent Extremism in Kenya: Why women are a priority. Monograph 197/November 2017. Institute of Security Studies.

2.1 Terror Attacks till Today

Al-Shabaab, an al-Qaeda affiliate, is seeking to create an Islamic state in Somalia⁶⁰. There are also local factors that trigger Muslim-related terrorism. It should come as no surprise then that Kenya became a target of the Muslim-related terrorist attacks against American and Israeli interests in the country. Initially terrorism in Kenya did not intentionally target Kenyans. The intended targets were Israel and the USA, even though the majority of those killed invariably turned out to be Kenyan. The Norfolk Hotel (1980), Paradise Hotel in Mombasa (2002), Westgate (2005) and DusitD2 (2019) targeted Israeli establishments. Anti-American terrorist attack on Kenyans on August 7, 1998 targeted America's Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam while a third attack on the US Embassy in Kampala failed to come through. Kenyans did not become targets of Muslim-based terrorism until Kenya began serving as a proxy for American intervention in Somalia.⁶¹ Therefore, the origins, manifestation and support of most extremist groups in Africa should not be seen in isolation they stem from a vast number of factors, intermingled with allegiances and alliances that create a firm connection among them.

In the IGAD region, the fragile states like Eritrea, South Sudan and Somalia pose a threat to peace and security of the entire region.⁶² Somalia, which has experienced various forms of conflict since 1991, has often been seen as the source of extremism in the region, especially following the attacks on the United States (US) embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi on 7 August 1998. Yet closer investigation reveals that Somali nationals were not behind most of the incidents outside Somalia's borders. Somalia provides a safe haven, training camps and opportunities for extremists to fight the 'enemies of Islam', but al-Qaeda and later al-Shabaab have executed attacks in the region by relying on local assistance and support. At the same time, al-Shabaab managed to recruit Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian nationals to its ranks in Somalia.⁶³ Of the three countries

⁶⁰ Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2016, New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016,

⁶¹ Vadlamudi, S. (2007). *The U.S. Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in Forest*, J. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 103-127.

⁶² ⁶² Aronson, S.L (2011). *United States Aid to Kenya: A Study on Regional Security and Counterterrorism Assistance Before and After 9/11*. African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS, Vol.5, #s1 &2. ISSN 1554-3897.

⁶³ ⁶³ United Nations Report. (2012). *Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution*. Retrieved from http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/UN_REPORT_2012.pdf (Accessed on May 2, 2016)

mentioned above, Kenya has experienced the most attacks within its borders. Although Kenya's intervention in Somalia served to incite a terrorist response, the experience of Uganda, Ethiopia and Burundi, all of which have had troops in Somalia since 2006, showed different trends. Only the attacks in Uganda and Kenya were attributed to those countries' interventions in Somalia. And, despite the fact that those directly involved in these attacks were Ugandan nationals, Kenyans and Tanzanians helped plan and execute the attacks. These were not members of traditional Somali communities, an affiliate of al-Qaeda is al-Shabaab.⁶⁴ Al-Shabaab has launched attacks against government institutions, civilians, international organisations and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The group has become notorious for infiltrating local organisations to recruit and train Somali youth. Because of its contact with ideas from various parts of the Muslim world, the Muslim community in Kenya is under the influence of various schools of Islamic thought – Shafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali, Hanafi and even Shia.⁶⁵

Kenya is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multicultural society that is predominantly African in character. The Muslim community – roughly 30 per cent of the population – is drawn from the whole spectrum of Kenyan society and, like the rest of that society, the larger part of the Muslim population is young: 65 per cent of its members are between the ages of 18 and 35.⁶⁶ About 30 per cent of Kenya's Muslim population is of Somali origin but born in Kenya (Kenyan-Somalis), and another 10 per cent are of Borana ethnicity residing in the regions bordering Ethiopia. The remainder constitutes Muslim minorities living in Christian dominated regions. Kenyan Somalis are found in the north-eastern parts of Kenya bordering on Somalia and another large group is found in the Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi, which also hosts a large population of Somalis who sought refuge in Kenya from the civil strife that erupted after the 1991 collapse of the regime of Muhammad Siad Barre.

There is another very important Muslim settlement in Kenya – the coastal region, which hosts about 30 per cent of the Kenyan Muslim population, is considered the 'gateway' between the Islamic faith in the Arab world and the Islamic faith in Kenya and the entire East and Central African region, and links Muslims in these regions to a rich Islamic heritage that spans

⁶⁴ R Coomaraswamy, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325*, New York: UN Women, 2015, 222, <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/preventing-conflicttransforming-justice-securing-peace-global-studyimplementation>

⁶⁵ Botha, A. (2013). *Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*

centuries.⁶⁷ For decades the traditional Islamic centers along the East African coast have produced Muslim scholars who have been instrumental in spreading Islam to the interior of Kenya and other parts of the East African hinterland. And for all the years that Islam has existed in these regions, the Shafi'i school of Sunni Islam has been the dominant creed. But, as explained above, immigrants from South-East Asia and students who went to study in Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries have slowly but steadily introduced other forms of Islamic practice and thinking. With these new interactions, a kind of Islamic revivalism was set off in many parts of the Islamic world as Muslims, especially Sunnis, started experimenting with and comparing different schools of thought. Although the revivalism was characterized by protracted and often violent forms of resurgence in many majority-Muslim countries, the Muslim community in Kenya and the East African region was initially characterized by gradual but peaceful attempts to participate in mainstream political processes. However, the growing tide of violent Muslim extremism increasingly led to Kenyan nationals turning to violence to achieve their political and religious aims.⁶⁸

The wave of terror attacks could be said to have started with the twin bombings of the United States Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in August 1998. The first Islamist terrorist attacks in Kenya were not directed at the Kenyan population or state, but targeted American and Israeli interests in the country.⁶⁹ The suspect associated with the bomb that destroyed a wing of Nairobi's Norfolk Hotel in 1980. The bombing of the American Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania by Al-Qaeda affiliates in 1998 signaled a new phase in the conflict⁷⁰. Kenya's position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict featured in the bombing of the Israeli owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa and failed attempt to shoot down an Israel charter plane in 2001⁷¹. Early attacks in Kenya by Al-Shabaab's Islamist terror network were a response to Kenya's role as a proxy for American interventions in Somalia.

Radicalization of young people raised considerable alarm when a broad range of ethnic groups of Kenyan nationals were involved along with

⁶⁷ Hansen, S. J. (2013). *Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁶⁸ *Ibid*

⁶⁹ Aronson, S.L (2011). United States Aid to Kenya: A Study on Regional Security and Counterterrorism Assistance Before and After 9/11. *African Journal of Criminology and Justice Studies: AJCJS*, Vol.5, #s1 &2. ISSN 1554-3897.

⁷⁰ Vadlamudi, S. (2007). *The U.S. Embassy Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in Forest, J. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 103-127.

⁷¹ Beyer, A. C. (2008). *Violent Globalism: Conflict in Response to Empire*. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing.

Somali nationals. The context of youth being radicalized raised concerns when the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea reported that hundreds of impoverished Kenyan youths were recruited into Al-Shabaab⁷². The AlShabaab did not recruit only fighters from Kenya but also trained them as suicide bombers⁷³. Irrespective of exactly how many Kenyans have membership at Al-Shabaab, the cases identified are sufficient to justify closer scrutiny of the circumstances that increase the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalization and recruitment to organizations such as Al-Shabaab. Among them youth from impoverished regions (the Coast region) were very vulnerable as those who recruited new members used local vulnerabilities and contextual circumstances to their advantage. Kenya with its bulging youth population and the contextual factors provide a ripe situation for youth radicalization. Peace building efforts addressing ethnic and religious radicalization.

The dearth of socio-economic opportunities, discrimination resulting from marginalization, poor governance abetting the deteriorating state-citizen relationship, violation of human rights, and selective application of the rule of law contribute to coastal communities' collective grievances. The same factors act as push factors for recruits embracing violent extremism^{74, 75}. Al-Shabaab recruiters exploit these collective grievances in their radicalization and recruitment strategies by crafting ideologically driven narratives focusing on a common enemy in the form of the Kenyan state' and its Western government partners',⁷⁶ while highlighting the plight of communities and individual victims (Badurdeen, 2016). Recruiters follow up by responding to their needs in terms of materialistic and/or spiritual support⁷⁷ by addressing the collective grievances of the youth and communities that they live in. Al-Shabaab, thrives on narratives pegged to collective grievances

⁷² United Nations Report. (2012). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution. Retrieved from http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/UN_REPORT_2012.pdf (Accessed on May 2, 2016)

⁷³ Botha, A. (2013). Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

⁷⁴ Badurdeen, F.A. (2012). Youth Radicalization in the Coast Province of Kenya, Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, 5(1): 53-64.

⁷⁵ Botha, A. (2013). Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies

⁷⁶ R Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, New York: UN Women, 2015, 231.

⁷⁷ USIP, Women and Violent Extremism: A Growing Threat Demands Concerted Action, August 2015, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/08/women-and-violentextremism-growing-threat-demands-concerted-action>.

In March 1, 1975, a blast occurred in a lavatory at the Starlight Nightclub [which stood on the site of the modern Integrity Centre], while the second at the Information Bureau near the Hilton Hotel and the third, in which 27 people lost their lives, at the OTC bus station on March 1, 1975 which police tried to fix the populist Nyandarua North MP JM Kariuki.

The next shocking bomb attack in Nairobi would be at the Norfolk Hotel on New Year's Eve 1980. In the attack, a bomb flattened the Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, killing 20 people and injuring 80. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by an Arab group that said it was seeking retaliation for Kenya's allowing Israeli troops to refuel in Nairobi during the 1976 raid on Entebbe Airport in Uganda to rescue hostages from a hijacked aircraft.

SINCE the August 7, 1998 bomb attacks at the US embassy, Kenya has had no peace with terrorist attacks intensifying. The American embassy in Nairobi which was situated in the middle of the business sector and close to the busy railway terminus was the target of the terrorists under the command of Osama Bin Laden, the then chief of Al-Qaeda terror network.

The next time Kenya was hit by terror bombings was in the run up to the 2002 general election. On November 28, 15 people, including three Israeli tourists, were killed in a bomb attack on the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel near Mombasa. This attack was also blamed on al-Qaeda but arrests were made and people charged. However, in 2005 a judge acquitted three men accused of conspiracy in the attack and the charges against four others for the same crime were dismissed by the court.

On June 11, 2007, two people including a man suspected to have been carrying the explosive died outside City Gate Restaurant next to Hotel Ambassadeur during the 8am incident.

The Kenyan government in 2003 established the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) within the Kenya's Criminal Investigation Department (CID). Since its formation, the unit has been suspected of a series of extra-judicial killings and disappearances. According to Human Rights Watch, their "researchers found that suspects were shot dead in public places, abducted from vehicles and courtrooms, beaten badly during arrest, detained in isolated blocks and denied contact with their families or access to lawyers."⁷⁸

Human Rights Watch has documented cases of bodies found in shallow graves, mortuaries, or dumped in various locations in Kenya, which were ultimately determined to have been individuals last seen with Kenyan security officers. These cases raise serious concerns that at least in some instances, those who have been arrested and reported missing or feared

⁷⁸ Human Rights Watch (2014). Kenya: Killings, Disappearances by Anti-Terror Police. August 14, 2014. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/18/kenya-killingsdisappearances-anti-terror-police>, Accessed July 5, 2017.

disappeared have been killed while in custody. Among the 11 cases investigated, four people were last seen in the custody of KDF and seven were last seen being arrested or detained by various units of the Kenyan police⁷⁹. As a result, and as some of the reports in this volume suggest, Kenya's counter-terrorism strategies and actions are contributing to the very radicalization of Muslim youth that the state seeks to combat, making them receptive to recruitment by terrorist organizations and networks⁸⁰. The perceived inaction on the part of the state in the face of recurrent enforced disappearances contributes to the loss of confidence in Kenya's law enforcement bodies. This state of affairs has the potential of feeding directly into the propaganda machinery of terrorist groups, making sections of the youth vulnerable to their recruitment overtures.

In June 2010, there was an attack in Nairobi's Uhuru Park that police blamed on followers of al Shabaab. Three grenades exploded at a political rally in Uhuru Park killing six people and 30 injured.

Then in December 2010, three people died and 39 were injured in a grenade attack on a bus in Nairobi. It has never been revealed who was behind that attack and nobody has yet been charged.

On December 4, 2010, three policemen including two traffic police officers and an AP were killed in separate grenade attacks in Nairobi and about two weeks later, one person was killed, 26 injured after a grenade explodes at Kampala Coach bus terminus, River Road. In October 17, 2011, one person was killed in yet another grenade attack that also saw 15 injured after a grenade was thrown into Mwaura's pub in Nairobi. This was before another person was killed and eight injured after a grenade was thrown at OTC bus stage seven days later. The attackers who seemed to change tack visited Garissa's East African Pentecostal church on November 16, 2011 and killed two people in a grenade attack

On April 4 2011, two others were killed and 30 injured in grenade attacks at a church crusade in Mtwapa, Mombasa which was to be followed by another attack three weeks later which claimed one life and injuring 16 at the God's House of Miracles International Church in Nairobi's Ngara area. Four people were killed on October 27, 2011 when a grenade hit a vehicle carrying KCSE material in Mandera. Another three killed in twin grenade attacks on Garissa's Holiday Inn hotel on November 24, 2011.

There were two attacks in May which saw two people die. A security guard was killed after two grenades were lobbed into Bella Vista bar in Mombasa

⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch. (2016). Deaths and Disappearances: Abuses in Counterterrorism Operations in Nairobi and in Northeastern Kenya. New York: Human Rights Watch.

⁸⁰ UNDP. (2017). Journey To Extremism In Africa: Drivers , Incentives, and The Tipping Point For Recruitment. New York: United Nations Development Program Regional Bureau For Africa.

while one person died and 30 injured after an explosion rocked Assanands building along Moi venue in Nairobi on May 16 and 28 respectively. Another attack on June 25 killed one person and several others injured in Jericho pub in Mombasa.

But the worst came on July 1, 2011 when 17 people were killed and 45 wounded in grenade attacks at the Garissa Catholic and AIC churches. Among the dead were two police officers who lost two guns to the attackers in the raid at the local Africa Inland Church. The officers were guarding the church.

Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya intensified after Kenyan Defense Forces entered Somalia to create a cross border buffer zone in October 2011⁸¹. September 2013 Al-Shabaab militants struck the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, killing 67 people; in June 2014 at least 48 people died after Islamist militants attacked hotels and a police station in Mpeketoni on the coast, near the island resort of Lamu. In November 2014 Al-Shabaab targeted a bus full of teachers in Mandera County, executing 28 non-Muslims. In December 2014 the same terror group killed 36 non-Muslim quarry workers near the north Kenyan town of Mandera. In April 2015 the organization carried out a massacre at Garissa University College in north-east Kenya, killing 148 people, most of them young Christian students in 2015⁸². The attack on Garissa University is attributed to directly to a Kenyan military raid on the Suq Mugdi Market in Garissa and Operation Usalama Watch in the Nairobi neighbourhood of Eastleigh and in Mombasa in April 2014, during which the army 'indiscriminately targeted entire communities (mostly composed of ethnic Somalis) rather than focusing on suspected individuals.'⁸³

In January 2016 there was an assault on Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) military base at El Adde, in Somalia, causing more than 60 deaths. It appears that in the recent attacks also ISIS has been involved in one way or another. There is a ruthless competition on terror and recruitment between Al-Shabaab and ISIS. This makes the security situation even more volatile.

Kenya experienced multiple terrorist incidents, including small-scale, but high-profile, attacks in Mombasa on September 11 and in Nairobi on October 27, the first terrorist incidents in Kenya's two largest cities in more than a year. In May, on Kenya's southern coast, there were separate incidents in Kwale County in which presumed al-Shabaab gunmen killed one former al-Shabaab member and three community policing officers

⁸¹ Hansen, S. J. (2013). *Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group, 2005-2012*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁸² Cannon, B. J. and Pakalya, D. R. (2017). *Why al-Shabaab Attacks Kenya: Questioning the Narrative Paradigm*. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1-13

⁸³ Ndung'u I., Salifu & Sigsworth, R (2017). *Violent Extremism in Kenya: Why women are a priority*. Monograph 197/November 2017. Institute of Security Studies.

working with returned al-Shabaab fighters. In June, al-Shabaab attackers killed five police officers escorting a passenger bus in Mandera. In July, another al-Shabaab attack killed at least six bus passengers in Mandera County. In September, police killed three women who attacked officers at Mombasa's central police station. In October, al-Shabaab carried out two separate attacks in Mandera, killing at least six people at a worker's dormitory and at least 12 people at a hotel. In October, a police officer stationed outside the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi shot and killed a man who attacked the officer with a knife. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, but it is unknown if the perpetrator was, in fact, ISIS-affiliated.

Kenya experienced at least 200 terrorist attacks from al-Shabaab between 2008 and 2014, resulting in the deaths of over 500 people and injuring over 1000.¹² The number of attacks stepped up after 2011 in retaliation for Operation Linda Nchi, a Kenyan military operation that deployed Kenyan troops over the border in Somali conflict zones to engage al-Shabaab. Kenyan troops were later assimilated into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to help the Somali government suppress the al-Shabaab insurgency and bring stability back to the region. In September 2013, the Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi was attacked by al-Shabaab; 72 people were killed and 201 were injured.⁸⁴ In June 2014, 48 people were killed and three injured in an attack in Mpeketoni, in Lamu County on the Kenyan coast.⁸⁵ In the same month, at least 15 were killed during an overnight attack at Majembeni and Poromoko villages, near Mpeketoni, for which al-Shabaab claimed responsibility.⁸⁶ In April 2015 an attack by gunmen at the Garissa University College in north-east Kenya killed 147 and injured 79 staff and students.⁸⁷ In addition to the direct attacks, there are increasing numbers of radicalised Kenyan nationals leaving the country to join al-Shabaab as well as associating with and supporting al-Shabaab in Kenya. A UN investigation in 2014 found that al-Shabaab had 'created extensive funding, recruiting and training networks in Kenya', and it has been estimated that 10% of al-

⁸⁴ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database, www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201309210001.

⁸⁵ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database, www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201309210001.

⁸⁶ J Hall, Al Shabaab gunmen kill 15 in overnight raid on Kenyan coastal villages just 24 hours after killing 50 in nearby Mpeketoni, *MailOnline*, 17 June 2014, www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2659903/BREAKING-NEWSAl-Shabaab-gunmen-kill-eight-night-raid-Kenyan-coastaltown-Poromoko-24-hours-killing-50-nearby-Mpeketoni.html#ixzz4dMLV746V.

⁸⁷ National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database, www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201504020031.

Shabaab's militants are Kenyan nationals. The US Department of State maintained in 2015 that 'reports of violations of human rights by Kenya's police and military forces during counterterrorism operations continued, including allegations of extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and torture'.⁸⁸

More significantly perhaps is the Kenya's entry and participation in the invasion of Somalia with the explicit goal of attacking Al-Shabaab in October 2011 under the banner of Operation Linda Nchi. In the process, Kenyan forces are reported to have indiscriminately bombed and shelled "populated areas, killing and wounding civilians and livestock"⁸⁹. By all indication, that Kenyan offensive marked a critical juncture in the conflict between Kenya and Al-Shabaab. Choosing to become an active player in the anti-terrorism game worked to make more Kenyans a target in what started as anti-American terrorist attacks.⁹⁰ Since then, Kenya has experienced multiple Al-Shabaab engineered attacks, large and small, including horrendous acts of terrorism at the Westgate Mall on September 21, 2013, Mpeketoni on June 15, 2014, and Garissa University on April 2, 2015. Al-Shabaab have made clear their intentions to "revenge" from the very beginning of Kenya's invasion.

The National CVE strategy (NCVE), officially launched in September 2016 expanded the focus, of the fight against terrorism by incorporating collaborative CVE approaches bringing together the government, communities, civil society, the international community, and the private sector.⁹¹ Subsequently, CVE plans have been decentralized through the design of county-level CVE action plans. Partnerships with county governments and local community actors, particularly in those counties most affected, are required to increase the local legitimacy of interventions⁹² taking into account the local framing and historization of the context of violent extremism and the genealogy of evolving violent extremist ideologies.

⁸⁸ US Department of State, Country reports on terrorism 2015: Africa: Kenya, 2105, www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257514.htm.

⁸⁹ Human Rights Watch(2013). World Report 2013:Somalia. <http://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2013/country-chapters/somalia>, Accessed on July 3, 2017.

⁹⁰ Mazrui,A.,Kimani,N.,&Paul,G (2018). Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security. Twaweza Communications.

⁹¹ R Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, New York: UN Women, 2015, 222, <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/preventing-conflicttransforming-justice-securing-peace-global-studyimplementation>

⁹² Report of the UN Secretary-General, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, December 2015, www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674.

Since the expansion, al-Shabaab has gained strong foothold throughout Kenya, especially in the northeastern and coastal regions, but also in certain Nairobi neighborhoods. Despite the organization currently being weakened, their Kenyan sleeper cells remain active (Adow, 2015; Megged, 2015). Widespread corruption and bribery culture has eased the way for al-Shabaab members to roam freely in the streets of Kenya camouflaged as ordinary citizens (Githongo, 2015; Megged; 2015). Despite the lack of conclusive numbers on how many youths have joined al-Shabaab, the number is presumably high and increasing. Al-Shabaab frequently uses propaganda to attract new members and sympathizers. Beginning in 2010, recruitment films were subtitled in both Swahili and English, The movies directed towards Kenyans highlight the Kenyan government's discrimination toward Muslims and they often depict extrajudicial killings by the ATPU. By focusing on grievances al-Shabaab fuels the discontent. This can contribute to increased anger and resentment towards the government and al-Shabaab offers an arena where the youth can express their anger (Botha, 2014).

Table 2: Summary of Terrorist attacks in Kenya since 1980-2019

Year	Date	Incident	Town/ Area	No. of reported Deaths	No. of reported Victims	Responsibility
1980	December 30 th	The Norfolk Hotel	Nairobi	20	100	Popular Front for the liberation of Palestine
1998	August 7 th	The American Embassy	Nairobi	220	Over 5000	Al -Qaida
2002	November 28th	Paradise Hotel Kikambala	Mombasa	15	35	Al-Qaida
2011	October 24 th	Mwaura's Bar	Nairobi	1	Over 30	Al-Shabaab
		OTC terminus	Nairobi	1	28	Al-Shabaab
	November 5 th	Pentecostal Church	Garissa	1	5	Al-Shabaab
	November 24 th	Wajir, Mandera attacks	Wajir and Mandera	4		Al-Shabaab
		Ngamia Rd Cheges cafe	Garissa	5	unknown	Al-Shabaab
	December					

Year	Date	Incident	Town/ Area	No. of reported Deaths	No. of reported Victims	Responsibility
2012	5th January 1 st	Locus night club	Garissa	5		Al-Shabaab
	January 11 th	Gerrile Administration camp	Wajir	7		Al-Shabaab
	2012 March	Machakos Bus Station	Nairobi	6	63	Al-Shabaab
	April 29 th	Church Ngara	Nairobi	1	11	Al-Shabaab
	May 15	Bella Vista Bar	Mombasa	12		Al-Shabaab
	June 24	Jericho Bar garden	Mombasa	3		Al-Shabaab
	July 1 st	Catholic Church	Garissa	2		Al-Shabaab
	..	AIC church	Garissa	15	50	Al-Shabaab
	August 3 rd	Eastleigh Estate	Nairobi	1	6	Al-Shabaab
	August 28 th	Mombasa Port	Mombasa	3	12	Al-Shabaab
	November 18 th	Eastleigh Matatu attack	Nairobi	10	25	Al-Shabaab
	December 7 th	Joska Eastleigh	Nairobi	1	6	Al-Shabaab
	December 7 th	Eastleigh Mosque	Nairobi	5	8	Al-Shabaab
	December 9 th		Garissa	3		Al-Shabaab
2013	January 4 th	Dagahale	Garissa	2		Al-Shabaab
	January 7 th	Ngamia	Garissa	1	8	Al-Shabaab
	January 17 th	Hagdera Daadab	Garissa	2		Al-Shabaab
September 21 st	Westgate mall	Nairobi	67	200+	Al-Shabaab	
2014	May 16 th	Gikomba market	Nairobi	12	70	Al-Shabaab
	June 15 th - 17 th	Mpeketoni Attacks	Lamu	68		Al-Shabaab


Year	Date	Incident	Town/ Area	No. of reported Deaths	No. of reported Victims	Responsibility
	July 5/6	Hindi Attack	Lamu	29		Al-Shabaab
	November 22 nd	Mandera Bus attack	Mandera	28		Al-Shabaab
	December 2 nd	Mandera Quarry	Mandera	36		Al-Shabaab
2015	April 2 nd	Garissa University	Garissa	148	Over 700	Al-Shabaab
	December 21 st	Bus attack at Elwak	Mandera	2		
2019	January 15th	Dusit2 hotel	Nairobi	21		Al-Shabaab

Source: Reviewed literature

Table 3: Incidences per area

Place/Area	Number of Incidences	Reported Deaths	Reported causalities
Nairobi	13	366	5549
Mombasa	4	33	147
Garissa	11	189	238
Lamu	5	99	170
Mandera/Wajir	7	88	8
Total	40	795	6112


Figure 5: Incidences per area



Source: Authors' Own Conceptualization

Figure 5 shows that 32% of the terrorist attacks have been in Nairobi, followed by 27% in Garissa, 18% in Mandera, 13% in Lamu and 10% in Mombasa. It therefore means that the terrorist attacks are spread in three major regions of Kenya as per now thus Nairobi, Coast and North Eastern Region of Kenya. The North Eastern region has the highest percentage of 35%, followed by Nairobi and Coast.


Figure 6: Fatalities of Terror Attacks in Kenya per Area



Source: Authors' Own Conceptualization

Figure 6 complements figure 1. However, the fatalities of the terror attacks in Kenya are highest in Nairobi (45%), followed by North Eastern Region (36%) and Coastal region with 17%.


Figure 7: Casualties of Terror Attacks in Kenya by Region



Source: Authors' Own Conceptualization

Figure 7 summarizes the casualties of terror attack in Kenya by region. From it, we can see that 91% of the casualties have been recorded in Nairobi with North Eastern Kenya recording 4% and Coastal Kenya 5%.

Figure 8: Trends of Terrorism Fatalities and Occurrence in Kenya 1980-2019



Source: Authors' Own Conceptualization

The trends of terrorism fatalities in Kenya from 1980 to 2019 show that between 1980 and 2001, the terrorist attacks were high and so were the

fatalities. From 2002 to 2011, the attacks and fatalities were reduced tremendously but in 2011, there was a sudden high rise of attacks till 2017. These trends present interesting phenomena; just before an election like in 1998, 2012 and 2017, Kenya registers a high number of terrorist attacks. This could be attributed to too much energy and attention being paid to elections at the expense of the security of the citizens.

2.2. New Trends: Home-grown Radicalization

Home-grown radicalization in Kenya is on the rise given al-Shabab's growth in neighboring Somalia. Kenya has become a prime location for recruitment and radicalization for al-Shabab. In 2012, it was reported that *al-Shabab was attracting a large number of Kenyan converts to Islam. In December 2014, it was estimated that Kenyans comprised around 25 percent of al-Shabab. These Kenyan converts are typically described as "young" and "zealous" and can be difficult to detect and monitor since they are able to blend easily into the general population. Muslim areas in coastal Kenya in particular are areas targeted by al-Shabab for recruitment*⁹³. *In December 2014, it was estimated that Kenyans comprised around 25 percent of al-Shabab.*

Reviewed literature has revealed that Abdukadir Mohamed Abdukadir, a.k.a. Ikrima, is a well-known al-Shabab militia commander and recruiter. He is a Kenyan national of Somali origin and an effective liaison between extremists in the two countries. Militants with connections to both Kenya and Somalia like Ikrima pose a major threat to Kenya. Ikrima is able to freely travel between the two countries, and leverage his linguistic and cultural knowledge to radicalize young Kenyans and convince them to enlist with al-Shabab.⁹⁴

One notable example of homegrown radicalization is the case of Kenyan national Elgiva Bwire Oliacha. He was arrested in Nairobi following a grenade attack that wounded over two dozen people. At the time of his arrest, Oliacha was found to be in possession of grenades, ammunition, and guns. The 28-year-old pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment.⁹⁵

Another example is the case of Abdul Hajira. In April 23, 2014, a car exploded outside of a police station in Nairobi. Abdul Hajira, a Kenyan national and son of a Kenya Defense Force officer was identified as the perpetrator.

⁹³ Tristan, M (2014). Kenya's Case Study in Home-grown Terrorism. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-06-10/kenyas-case-study-homegrown-terrorism>

⁹⁴ BBC News (2013). Profile: Al-Shabab's 'Ikrima'. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-24442793>

⁹⁵ Tristan, M (2014). Kenya's Case Study in Home-grown Terrorism. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-06-10/kenyas-case-study-homegrown-terrorism>

We found out that Kwale County at the Coast of Kenya had the highest number of radicalized youths. In both Lamu and Kwale, there were many cases of abduction of returnees by either the security agencies or the Alshabab. The government had deradicalized 1,000 youth returnees in total. In Kwale alone, about 400 youth were deradicalized. Unfortunately, the government selected 48 of them to work with it. The rest of the returnees got angry and started killing the favoured returnees. The Nyumba Kumi Initiative officers and some returnees were attacked and killed. The Kwale returnees started looting M-Pesa shops and robbing houses. The poor youth Muslims have turned to Jihad as a way of avenging the government that has made them poor and marginalized them. Most youth in Kwale County do not have national identity cards. They have for long felt that the government has marginalized them and taken the land of the indigenous people. Additionally, instead of amnesty, they face extra-judicial killings.

This study found out that the high poverty and unemployment rates in coastal towns of Kenya greatly contributed to radicalization of youth. Other youth reported that revenge for police brutality was also a cause of radicalization and violent extremism. Other youth added that most youth fall prey to promises made to them by Alshabab recruiters. They also reported that the recruited youth are not only Kenyans but also Tanzanian youth. According to the respondents at Mombasa, the youth from Tanzania sought to go to Somalia for Jihad.

Kenya's National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), which is run by the office of president and coordinates all government counterterrorism efforts. Terror attacks in Nairobi, Mombasa and Garissa have declined, and the scale of attacks witnessed along the border with Somalia have been reduced. For years, Kenya's anti-terrorism efforts have focused largely on the deployment of the security forces, with the country sending troops into Somalia in 2011. Inside Kenya's borders the police have heightened border surveillance and carried out raids in neighborhoods in Nairobi and Mombasa, as well as in Garissa town (The Standard, April 14, 2014). Yet al-Shabaab has continued to pose a significant threat, evidenced by the Garissa University attack in April 2015 and the attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall on September 21, 2013.

The NCVE, which adds prevention and counter-radicalization elements to existing anti-terror approaches, has the prevention of extremist groups from radicalizing ordinary Kenyans as one of its key aims. A statement on the NCVE from the president's office stresses the importance of the rehabilitation of Kenyan nationals who are former al-Shabaab combatants.

There has been a shift in the principle terror threat Kenya faces – from that posed by Somali militants, to that posed by home grown terror cells⁹⁶.


Reports also suggest that members of al-Shabaab's Amniyat, the group's intelligence wing, have targeted the security forces. In July 2016, a police officer killed seven of his colleagues at a police station in Kapenguria, West Pokot County in what has been portrayed as a lone wolf attack. The officer was later gunned down by members of the elite Recce squad of the General Service Unit (GSU) following an eight-hour siege at the police station. Investigations revealed that the officer had a network within the service. According to some reports, he had attempted to bribe other officers to release a terror suspect held at the station, while his bank account is said to have contained more than \$30,000 that could not be properly accounted for.⁹⁷

In August 2016, a police raid targeting a former RECCE elite squad officer who had deserted the force discovered three AK47 rifles and 178 rounds of ammunition. The operation followed reports the officer had been radicalized and was planning to attack a GSU camp in the Ruiru area near Nairobi, which hosts the elite squad⁹⁸. He had reportedly been seen attending the radical Riyadhha Mosque in Nairobi, where hard-line sermons are preached.

⁹⁶ Sunguta, W (2016). Kenya Unveils New Strategy for Tackling Terror. Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 19. Terrorism Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/kenya-unveils-new-strategy-tackling-terror/>

⁹⁷ Ibid

⁹⁸ Sunguta, W (2016). Kenya Unveils New Strategy for Tackling Terror. Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 19. Terrorism Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation. <https://jamestown.org/program/kenya-unveils-new-strategy-tackling-terror/>

Figure 9: Trends in Terrorism in Kenya 1980-2019


Source: Authors' Own Conceptualization

3. Drivers of VE in Kenya: Factors that Predispose Youth, Male and Female to Engage in Violent Extremism in Kenya

We sought to know the motivating factors for youth to engage in violent extremism in Kenya. Literature reviewed has revealed that these are both push and pull factors. The ‘push’ factors are based on structural conditions (poverty, lack of employment) and “pull” factors that make violent extremist ideas and groups appealing, such as charismatic leaders, attractive ideas and causes, or financial, social, and material incentives. Other factors include: 1) lack of access to justice for women; 2) infringement on the rights of women; 3) no social or security cover for women making it easy for them to be easily abused either by government or the aggressors; 4) ideology or indoctrination; and 5) vulnerability of females due to their low economic power and lack of information, absence of information, ignorance, and distortion of facts.⁹⁹ In the three research areas that we conducted research in Kenya we found out that context matters and no one-size fits all. Each of the selected research sites had peculiar characteristics that were either the push or pull factors to VE and radicalization. We administered a questionnaire to them in which we had enlisted 7 possible push and pull factors as literature review identified, and asked them to number them in a descending manner from the main driver to the least. The quantitative data analysis revealed that the drivers of violent extremism and radicalization of youth included youth unemployment and underemployment, corruption, poverty, religious ideologies, political ideologies, migration and climate change in descending order. Youth unemployment, corruption and poverty were the main drivers of radicalization and violent extremism among youth in Kenya. Religious and political ideologies scored moderately while migration and climate change scored lowest of the drivers for radicalization and violent extremism among Kenyan youth. The responses generated findings that are presented in Figure 10 below:

⁹⁹ UNDP (2017). Understanding Push and Pull Factors in Kosovo: Primary Interviews with Returned Foreign Fighters and their Families.

Figure 10: Drivers of Violent Extremism in Kenya



Source: Field data


Qualitative data revealed that other drivers of youth radicalization and engagement in violent extremism include:

- i. The push factors/motivators for youth in Kenya to engage in violent extremism and radicalization include regional marginalization/fragmentation of the society; poorly governed/ungoverned spaces-borderlands; government repression/government violations; endemic corruption and elite impunity and cultural threat perceptions including religion (Islamophobia) and tribalism.
- ii. The pull factors include access to material resources, social status and respect from peers, extremist involvement/affiliation, seeking a sense of “belonginess”, adventure, self-esteem/personal empowerment, prospect of glory/fame, social networks and radical institutions.

In this study therefore the drivers of youth radicalization and engagement in violent extremism are varied.

We endeavoured to understand if these drivers were standard for all youth, male and female in different parts of Kenya. In Nairobi informal settlements, the responses generated the findings presented in Figure 11 below.

Figure 11: Drivers of violent extremism in Nairobi



Source: Field data

The quantitative data revealed that the leading driver of youth radicalization and engagement in violent extremism was corruption, poverty and unemployment. Political and religious ideologies scored moderately while climate change and migration scored lowest. A further interrogation into this issue revealed explanations to the quantitative data through the qualitative analysis. The Push factors include: police harassment and corruption, very high youth unemployment and curtailments, idleness leading to crime, gangs and drug abuse, marginalization of slums and the poor, racial and cultural/ethnic profiling, lack of social amenities among the poor, poverty, youth estrangements and frustrations and lack of a holistic approach to the youth bulge. The pull factors include: hero worship of extremist individuals, a radicalized religious environment, and misinterpretation of religious teachings, personal appeal of radical preachers, and the global brotherhood concept of the Muslim community, influence of cyber preachers and lack of parental guidance to the youth.

A close examination of drivers of VE and radicalization for Nairobi youth contradicts with perceptions of all respondents in this study from all the three research sites in Kenya and previous researches that have stated that the main driver of violent extremism among the youth is youth unemployment and Islamic religion. In this study, we found that corruption and poverty were the main drivers.

Youth unemployment: 88.2 million Youth are unemployed worldwide 47% of all unemployed (ILO), yet youth make up only 25% of working-age population. Over 90% of the world’s unemployed youth live in developing

countries. The regions with the largest shares of youth within the working age population fare the worst in terms of youth unemployment Africa is the youngest continent with a youth bulge of 60 %¹⁰⁰. Some researchers have described African youth as out of school, unemployed, loose molecules in an unstable social fluid that is threatened to ignite.¹⁰¹ Many researchers on conflicts in Africa too have focused on the role played by unemployment.^{102, 103} Research shows that insufficient jobs is the highest priority that youth believe should be addressed by their governments. The African Union Commission recognized the importance of investing in young people by adopting the African Youth Charter¹⁰⁴ about 12 years ago and later declaring 2009 through to 2018 ‘the African Youth Decade’¹⁰⁵. It went further to develop an action plan to empower the youth and promote their participation in politics. This was in a bid for the youth to be engaged at the leadership and decision-making level. In 2012, the African Union issued a document ‘Accelerating Youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development’ that focused on implementation of the Youth Charter.¹⁰⁶ Similarly, the High Level Panel (HLP) report on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, youth are given specific attention emphasizing that youth must be subjects and not objects of the Post 2015 development agenda.¹⁰⁷ All governments should strive to provide for their needs especially job creation and employment. After the end of the youth decade, there is not much evidence that governments have conceived let alone implemented youth targeted programmes to encourage their participation in the political processes (Ibid).

African Agenda 2063 aims at Africa being a strategic player in the global economy through improved education and the application of science and technology in development. Achieving these require aligning education research and innovation with long-term socio-economic objectives¹⁰⁸ Kenya has embraced and domesticated Agenda 2063 in various ways. Employment in Kenya for example is governed by the 2012 Employment Act Chapter 226¹⁰⁹. Other legislations and policies that prescribe general

¹⁰⁰ Mihyo, P.B & Mukuna, T.E (Eds) (2015). Urban Youth and Unemployment in Eastern and Southern Africa: Features, Challenges, Consequences and Cut-back Strategies. Addis Ababa: OSSREA. ISBN 97899944-55-83-6.

¹⁰¹ Kaplan (1996).

¹⁰² Urdal, 2006

¹⁰³ Kagwanja, 2005a

¹⁰⁴ AUC (2006). African Youth Charter. Addis Ababa.

¹⁰⁵ AUC (2009). African Youth Decade 2009-2018: Accelerating Youth Empowerment for Sustainable Development. Addis Ababa.

¹⁰⁶ ILO (2012)

¹⁰⁷ UN (2013)

¹⁰⁸ AUC (2016). The African Agenda 2063. Addis Ababa.

¹⁰⁹ Parliament (2012). Parliament. (2012). Employment Act 2007. Nairobi: Kenya Law

principles of employment in Kenya include the Labour Institutions Act, Labour Relations Act, Occupational Safety and Health Act and Work Injury Benefits Act, Persons with Disability Act 2003 and the National Policy and Action Plan on Human Rights 2014 (Office of the Attorney General and Department of Justice, 2014). In addition, the country has a vision 2030. Kenya has signed and ratified the UN Charter in which it adopts a set of 17 sustainable development global goals among them goal 5 on gender equality, goal 8 on decent work and economic growth and goal 10 on reduced inequalities.¹¹⁰ However, exclusion of youth is seen at the African Union despite the Youth Charter. Non-partisan youth groups are given the observer status. This excludes youth from political and policy arenas. This disfranchises and frustrates them.

Kenya suffers from high unemployment and underemployment, especially among the younger generation. Official numbers are scarce, but youth unemployment is estimated to be approximately 35 percent, compared to the national unemployment rate of 17.5 percent. Furthermore, 80 percent of unemployed Kenyans are below 35¹¹¹. About 30 percent of the young unemployed are between the age of 20 to 24, and 21 percent are 25 to 29. While these numbers are high, the unemployment rate does not consider the economically inactive population or those who have informal jobs¹¹². Youth unemployment has contributed to disillusionment, frustration and despondency which have been linked to political instability. Some observers have suggested that disillusioned youth are more likely to engage in organised crime, political violence or join militant groups like Al Shabaab^{113, 114}. Despite introducing free primary education (FPE) in 2003 and subsidized secondary education in 2008, the quality of education remains low and the dropout rates high¹¹⁵. Lack of formal education severely affects the possibility of securing future employment and the

¹¹⁰ UN. (2017). Sustainable Development Goals. Retrieved from United Nations: <http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-developmentgoals/>

¹¹¹ Villa-Vicencio, C., Buchanan-Clarke, S. & Humphrey, A. (2016). Community Perceptions of Violent Extremism in Kenya. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Retrieved from <http://life-peace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/IJR20Violent20Extremism20in20Kenya20final20web2028129.pdf>

¹¹² Munga, B & Onsomu, E (2014). The State of Youth Unemployment in Kenya. *Africa in Focus*. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/08/21/state-of-youth-unemployment-in-kenya/>

¹¹³ Kriegler, J. and Waki, P. (2009) Kriegler and Waki Reports on 2007 Elections, Nairobi: Primark Ventures

¹¹⁴ Muiya, M.B. (2014) 'The Nature, Challenges and Consequences of Urban Youth Unemployment: A Case of Nairobi City, Kenya', *Universal Journal of Education Research* 2.7: 495–503

¹¹⁵ Munyi, C.M & Orodho, J.A (2013). Efficiency Implications of Free Primary Education Policy on Quality of Public Day Primary Schools in Kyeni Division, Embu County, Kenya

majority of employed youths, both male and female, are working informal, vulnerable jobs¹¹⁶.

Reviewed literature has revealed that there was a significant increase in unemployment rate between the years 2008 and 2009 from 11.24 percent to 12.17 percent and it may have been as a result of the post-election violence that Kenya experienced after the elections in December 2007.¹¹⁷ Due to an uncertain political environment, investments in Kenya dwindled at this time. As from 2010, the unemployment rate begun to fall gradually and from the year 2014 the unemployment rate experienced a rapid decrease from 11.81 percent to 10.9 percent. Youth unemployment rate sharply increased from 2008 (21.98 percent) to 2009 (23.99 percent), and maintained its high levels between 2009 and 2013 (24.06 percent) but decreased from the year 2014.¹¹⁸ This can be attributed to the policies adopted by the ruling party to improve the economic participation of youth. The youth unemployment rate has however not managed to decrease to the level at which it was in 2007 at 21.48 percent. It stood at 22.17 percent in the year 2016.¹¹⁹

The national accord mediation process settled on initiatives aimed at creating employment for the youth that included: generation of an average of 740,000 new jobs each year from 2008 to 2012; revitalization and expansion of Youth Polytechnics in all districts to facilitate the training of young people in technical, vocational and entrepreneurial skills to enable them participate fully in productive activities; rehabilitation of youth empowerment centres and establish three new ones; development and enactment of the National Youth Council Bill; establishment of the youth enterprise and employment programmes to promote small and medium-size enterprises as well as self-employment among the youth; increasing the youth enterprise and development fund and putting in place mechanisms for easier access to credit and collateral. As we can see, the Government prioritized youth unemployment in its long-term plan – Vision 2030.

The Kibaki government in response to MDGs made primary and secondary education free. A number of steps have been taken to facilitate the youth to engage in income-generating activities by the current government (elected in 2013) that include: allocation of 30 percent tenders to women and youth; creation of “UwezoFund” that disburses small loans through the youth

¹¹⁶ ¹¹⁶Munga,B &Onsomu,E (2014) . The State of Youth Unemployment in Kenya. *Africa in Focus*. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/08/21/state-of-youth-unemployment-in-kenya/>

¹¹⁷ IEA(2017).Policy Brief: Unemployment Policy as an Agenda for Elections 2017. Institute of Economic Affairs. Issue No. 2 June 2017

¹¹⁸ Ibid

¹¹⁹ IEA(2017).Policy Brief: Unemployment Policy as an Agenda for Elections 2017. Institute of Economic Affairs. Issue No. 2 June 2017

enterprise fund to young people to start businesses; re-vamping of National Youth Service (NYS) to recruit 21,000 youth per year (up from 2000) and equip them with para-military training- ultimately to train 200,000 to be deployed among other places in counties to help with administration and inculcate patriotism through working on public programmes such as slum improvement, construction of dams and social amenities. Implementation, however, remains a challenge because of slow uptake and bureaucracy.

In regard to education and youth, Kenya has at least 5 entrepreneurial universities. Of course, entrepreneurship is a common course in all universities but Kenya has adopted a new trend in all higher education institutions to not only provide education but also incorporate research, innovation, commercialization of knowledge and entrepreneurship. This decision was reached so as to respond to the graduate unemployment and underemployment problem that researchers said was as a result of universities churning out unemployable graduates. Since the promulgation of the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, the main interest of the lobby groups has been to push for provision of jobs and decent education rather than participation in politics.

Over the past one decade, the issue of youth employment has gained growing prominence as key agenda of the government; several policies, programmes and initiatives have been launched to address this challenge. These policies, programmes and initiatives, though laudable, may not achieve the desired results. A number policy of priority programmes and projects have been implemented at national level. However, many of them are specific programmes that are narrow in scope and limited in time. The priority attached to them varies over time and is usually influenced by the business cycle. In addition, the emphasis is frequently placed on labour market entrants, with little attention to the poor working conditions of many young workers. Consequently, youth are prone to work longer hours under informal, intermittent and insecure work arrangements characterized by low productivity and earnings and reduced social protection.¹²⁰ Furthermore, it compromises on the capacity of companies and country to innovate and develop competitive advantages. In Kenya, a rising number of youth work in the informal economy¹²¹, where they earn low wages and are often subjected to poor or even exploitative working conditions. The key to reducing youth unemployment therefore lies in remedying deficiencies in the labour market as a whole rather than addressing isolated difficulties within specific subsections. Research reveals that

¹²⁰ Mukuna, T.E & Maloba, B.S (2015). Unprotected Youths on Kenyan Roads: Quest for Occupational Health and Safety for Boda-Boda Riders and Matatu. In Mihyo, P.B & Mukuna, T.E (Eds) (2015). Urban Youth and Unemployment in Eastern and Southern Africa; Characteristics, Challenges and Consequences. PP 117-155. ISBN 97899944-55-83-6 Addis Ababa: OSSREA.

¹²¹ Ibid

the real barriers facing unemployed young people are inexperience and a lack of specific employment skills.¹²² Many current and past sectoral policies have been formulated and implemented seeking to spur economic growth and create employment¹²³. Despite this, identifying policy priorities, programmes, projects, implementing the policies and evaluating outcomes of such policies remains a major challenge for the Kenyan government.

Besides, recent studies on youth unemployment in Kenya have revealed that the employers are dissatisfied with the tertiary level graduates because they find them unskilled. The employers have reported that they spend a lot of time and money training the graduates into the work programs. This is a sign of lack of preparedness for the world of work among the new graduates. There is therefore a disconnect between school to work. The University-Industry link in eastern and southern Africa universities is very weak and Kenya is no exception.¹²⁴ The tertiary level youth whom we interviewed told us that the Kenyan government has put in place a policy on paid internship but it has not been implemented. The trainees look for their own internships which in most cases are not supervised by either the employers or the colleges. Others told us that when they go to industries for internship, the human resource managers do not ensure that they gain employability skills. Most of them end up running errands for their superiors. They end up not learning anything nor being productive in the workplace. A lecturer in one of the universities advised that University –Industry links should be well structured with a proper framework that is beneficial to the graduates so as to give the youth employment opportunities.

On the other hand, a CSO representative on the issue of youth unemployment and under-employment said that there is an urgent need of transforming workplace policies so that they are more interactive for the youth to enjoy work. She emphasized the need for the government and the community to recognize and harness the potential of youth and treat them as an asset-human capital. She added that internships should be given to the youth to test their skills and as a transition from school to the world of work. She also emphasized the need to factor in the youth who were not in school, not in employment not training (NEET). This group formed the

¹²² Mihyo, P.B (2015). Challenging the Challenger: Tackling Youth Unemployment by Changing the Players, the Game and Rules of the Game In Mihyo, P.B & Mukuna, T.E (Eds) (2015). *Urban Youth and Unemployment in Eastern and Southern Africa: Characteristics, Challenges and Consequences*. PP 403-430. ISBN 97899944-55-83-6 Addis Ababa: OSSREA.

¹²³ Mihyo, P.B (2014). *Employment Policies and Unemployment in Eastern and Southern Africa*. Addis Ababa: OSSREA. ISBN: 978-99944-55-72-0

¹²⁴ Mihyo, P.B (2013). *University-Industry Linkages and Knowledge Creation in Eastern and Southern Africa: Some Prospects and Challenges*. *Africa Review*. Routledge. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09744053.2013.832066>

majority of youth. In as much as the government presently has enacted the TVET Act in which technical colleges have been opened in every sub-County in the Country, the NEET need special attention and seem to be left out in most of the policies, programs and strategies geared at job creation and reducing youth unemployment in Kenya.

Therefore, youth unemployment is a pressing issue in Kenya and failure to invest in youth inhibits both development and sustainability. Additionally, youth unemployment can threaten social cohesion, political stability, and economic growth. Failing to invest in youth prevents them from acquiring the skills needed to advance the country's development in the future¹²⁵. While there is currently no direct link between unemployment and radicalization, lack of stable economic income can result in relative deprivation, which could potentially lead to support for radical and violent extremist groups¹²⁶. Lack of employment opportunities, both formal and informal, can leave youth vulnerable to extremist groups, especially when framed as economic marginalization by the state. It may also fuel desperation for economic stability, making youth more inclined to accept false promises of financial rewards by AlShabaab and other extremist groups¹²⁷. Unemployment and lack of economic stability contributes to insecurity and "can potentially contribute to opening pathways to violent extremism among individuals in vulnerable communities"¹²⁸.

In this study, we found out that youth unemployment is the main driver of violent extremism and radicalization in Kenya. We delved into this finding to understand why this is the case. The youth told us the following:

"...We are disillusioned with exclusion. In as much as you may see us in political parties, community development projects, arts or sport, we are included for the sake of numbers. We need real genuine engagement where

¹²⁵ Obonyo, R. (2013, October 15). Reducing Youth Unemployment in Kenya [blog post]. World Policy Blog. Retrieved from <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/10/15/reducingyouth-unemployment-kenya>

¹²⁶ Bhatia, K., & Ghanem, H. (2017). How Do Education and Unemployment Affect Support for Violent Extremism? Evidence from Eight Arab Countries. *Global Economy & Development*, 102. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/global_20170322_violent-extremism.pdf

¹²⁷ Villa-Vicencio, C., Buchanan-Clarke, S. & Humphrey, A. (2016). Community Perceptions of Violent Extremism in Kenya. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation. Retrieved from <http://life-peace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/IJR20Violent20Extremism20in20Kenya20final20web2028129.pdf>

¹²⁸ Shetret, L., Schwartz, M. & Cotter, L. (2013). Mapping Perceptions of Violent Extremism: Pilot Study of Community Attitudes in Kenya and Somaliland. Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.globalcenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/02/Jan2013_MPVE_PliotStuday.pdf

society builds trust and confidence in us” (Male Youth in Mathare, Nairobi).

“... It is very difficult to get employment including” jua kali” (informal employment). We have curtails even in the construction sites for casual laborers. You must promise to pay them something otherwise you won't work.”(Youth in Dandora, Nairobi)

...Then there is the emergence of formation of youth gangs as a way of earning a living “informal employment” e.g Mungiki, Gaza gang etc. I believe the government can work together with local institutions and youth to fight this vice. Since they are already organized and vulnerable, it is easy to radicalize such youth. (Asst. Chief, Baba Ndogo, Nairobi).

“...As a youth leader, I believe we should strengthen youth connection and networks with the community to bring social cohesion. This will lead to solving problems that face us such as poverty, vulnerability, and conflict that make youth vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism.”(Female Youth, Mathare).

“...In this community, if we work on building relationships and trust between youth and parents, youth and teachers, youth and adults, youth and police, as well as youth and community leaders, we will be a strong cohesive society. It will help to fight radicalization and violent extremism. These relationships will extend to forming partnerships with community groups, civil society, private companies, and the government. I am convinced; this will solve the youth unemployment problem and reduce radicalization and violent extremism.”Asst. Chief Mathare.

“...Youth are not employed because Kenyans are highly educated and the jobs available are few. But even when there are vacancies, you cannot get the job unless you bribe. Merit is not observed in most cases. I have three children in my house right now, two with university education and one with a diploma but they have no jobs. I cannot afford to “buy”them jobs! They are at the Dandora dumpsite. I am a very sad parent.” (Mother of Youth, Dandora, Nairobi).

...We are really frustrated, we qualify for jobs advertised but we never get it. To make matters worse, the government has come up with funds like the Youth Enterprise Fund and the Uwezo Fund to help youth entrepreneurs to create jobs. Unfortunately, these programmes are marred with corruption and ethnicity. Only a few youth from particular ethnic groups get funding. For the rest of us, they look for flimsy reasons to disqualify us. This is very frustrating, that is why Alshabab become saviours” (Female Youth, Garissa).

“...Now that the Jubilee government came up with a policy of youth getting government tenders, we thought it will solve our problems. Some of the youths who would get would employ some of us. Unfortunately, the youth are just being used by the old rich people to apply for the tenders. Youth do not have money nor collateral to enable them get loans. Maybe those from rich families manage to become tenderpreneurs. The rest of us can only cheer them (Youth in Mathare, Nairobi).

“...most of us who are sitting here are idle. We used to work in the Mombasa port but the government in their wisdom decided to close activities at this port and take it to Naivasha. We have nothing to do. Most of the youth who lost their livelihoods are now drug addicts and are angry with the government. They are very vulnerable. If Alshabab approaches us, we cannot hesitate because it will restore our dignity. Look at us now. We are jobless, hungry and poor.” (Male Youth, Mombasa).

“...We do not even have an independent ministry as youth. We have been put together with women and children in the Ministry of Youth, Gender and Social Services. This means that the government doesn't take us seriously even though Kenya has a National Youth Policy” (Youth, Mathare, Nairobi).
“...The unfortunate thing about the government policies on youth unemployment is they are mere rhetoric. I say this because the government has created a law for youth to do business with government and encourages youth to get elected to parliament. Sadly, corruption and party politics have taken control of these two avenues of empowering youth as leaders. The poor unemployed youth like us feel excluded and used at the end of every electoral cycle. We are tired of the old tired phrase that we are leaders of tomorrow. Why can't they test us. (Male Youth, Mombasa).

“...Why does the government always see the youth in the slums like here in Dandora as idle, unemployed, criminals without innovative ideas? What we need are platforms to show case our skills and potential. See the Ghetto radio started by Youth-Peace Ambassadors. (Female Youth, Dandora, Nairobi)

From the above excerpts, it is clear that massive youth unemployment is real in Kenya and is a driver to radicalization and violent extremism. This problem is exacerbated by exclusion, corruption, non-implementation of government policy, lack of trust among community members in the youth and poverty. Additionally, AlShabaab attract many youths by offering financial rewards and promising them employment opportunities. Kenya's high unemployment rates and lack of formal education increases the socio-economic differences, which in turn can contribute to youth becoming more

vulnerable to recruitment¹²⁹,¹³⁰. Thus, unemployment disproportionately affects youth, leaving them in a state of desperation that makes them vulnerable to promises of significant cash rewards by AlShabaab recruiters”¹³¹.

Despite a number of steps taken to facilitate youth engagement in income-generating activities by the current Jubilee government, respondents told us that full implementation remains a challenge because of slow uptake, bureaucracy and corruption. Kenya needs a comprehensive evidence-based policy framework for youth empowerment that should go beyond peripheral job creation and entrepreneurship promotion to address root causes of youth alienation and disenchantment with the state and society. The youth need to be made to feel that they are useful and appreciated members of the Kenyan society if they are to be shielded from the temptations of radicalization.¹³² These sentiments were echoed by Senator Johnson Sakaja while responding to the decree by the Cabinet Secretary of Education, Ambassador Amina Mohammed to arrest university graduates who are HELB loan defaulters. He talked about the hopelessness of the youth, massive youth unemployment, corruption that denied youth opportunities, how youth are targeted simply because they are youth, and the danger of not regarding the youth as a great resource. He gave a solution-implementation of laws that have been passed in parliament. He defended the youth sharply as captured in the excerpts below:

¹²⁹Anzalone, C. (2016). The Resilience of al-Shabaab. *CTC Sentinel*, 9(4), 13-20.

Retrieved from <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-resilience-of-al-shabaab>

¹³⁰ Finn, M., Momani, B., Opatowski, M., & Opondo, M. (2016). Youth Evaluations of CVE/PVE Programming in Kenya in Context. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 7, 164- 224.

Retrieved from <http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/62>

¹³¹ Villa-Vicencio, C., Buchanan-Clarke, S. & Humphrey, A. (2016). Community Perceptions of Violent Extremism in Kenya. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation.

Retrieved from [http://life-](http://life-peace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/IJR20Violent20Extremism20in20Kenya20final20web2028129.pdf)

[peace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/IJR20Violent20Extremism20in20Kenya20final20web2028129.pdf](http://life-peace.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/11/IJR20Violent20Extremism20in20Kenya20final20web2028129.pdf)

¹³² Masinjila, M. (2018). Youth Radicalization in Kenya or Unemployment Crisis?

Collaborative Centre for Gender and Development (COCGD).

https://www.academia.edu/11657992/Youth_Radicalization_in_Kenya_or_Unemployment_Crisis


Figure 12: Senator Johnson Sakaja Presentation in Senate on Youth Unemployment

“...Mr Speaker on the Statement on education....a country that is at war with its people is a country that has no future. A country that is at war with its young people is a country that is cannibalizing itself Mr. Speaker....Our young people today have no hope, they are disillusioned, and disengaged....In Nairobi I have lost about 30 youth to extrajudicial killings....In this parliament, we have brought bills,...National Employment Authority ,I sponsored a bill in the last parliament .In this Bill ,these loan defaulters would have been engaged in compulsory paid internships which would pay those loans but they are not implemented....The Bill that has introduced 30% procurement preferences for young people, Governors, Ministers, PSs are giving their children and cronnie...How can we be talking of recovering loans from youth who are unemployed? In fact, this House should amend the law and remove interest on HELB loans. And number 2, no one should be asked to pay any penalty before employment...Why is it today it is a crime to be a young person? In parts of Nairobi County, the highest cause of death is youth! Just because you are a young person, you are at risk...You go out to look for a job, you are arrested. You ride a boda boda, it is taken yet it is not yours. You have to pay USD 250(Ksh 25,000) to get it. You open a kiosk in Nairobi, the City Council is on you...You are arrested...Let us get serious, the youth are the trustees of our country’s prosterity. And we don’t want a generation that is growing up in this country trying to get even.... Please let us return hope to this country...The

government should provide jobs by implementing the laws that we are passing in these Houses”¹³³.

Additionally, on the NTV Television Talk Show-Am Live hosted by Debearl Inea, Senator Wamatangi's explanation on why many of Kenya's youth are unemployed blamed it on poor governance in the economic policy and leadership that has killed all the industries in Kenya.

Figure 13: Senator Wamatangi on NTV AMLIVE – Reasons for Youth Unemployment



His statement was as follows:

“...Why are we surprised that we are in this situation? You see...since the time when we accepted and acknowledged the death of Rivatex, the death of KICOMI, the death of Mumias Sugar, the death of PanPaper, the death of more than 60% of the industries in Thika and Ruiru...The time when we accepted that we have formed an EPZ Zone that processes more than 80% of the goods imported. They process and repackage, not manufacture. The time when this country accepted that all the assembly lines in this country for motor vehicles are dead such that we import completely built units...even the simplest like tractors and trucks...then why would we be surprised when we accepted to be an economy that completely relies on

¹³³ Senate Hansard, 21st February 2019. <https://youtu.be/mcOpreNeamY>.


everything imported, including match sticks, tooth picks...you find a container load of eggs from South Africa. So why should we be surprised that our youth are languishing on the streets looking for jobs? The answer to this is very simple... a complete change and about turn in the economic policy and leadership of this country...Period. You see...This is no joke. This is about the lives of the young people in this country."¹³⁴

It is important to empower/invest in the youth because young people are a major human resource for development, often acting as key agents for social change, economic growth and innovation. Their imagination, ideals, energy and vision are essential for the future prosperity and stability of the Horn. Setting up an appropriate framework to support young people and equip them with quality education, skills, and resources will first and foremost result in their empowerment.¹³⁵ Youth have to be the central focus of P/CVE if governments and civil society desire to halt recruitment into violent extremist groups. Youth are linked with the violent extremism as targets, drivers, menders, and change makers for solidarity and resilience. Youth empowerment and engagement is crucial because it will enhance participation and involve one of the most vulnerable groups susceptible to violent extremism.

Our youth will never be safe as long as they are not well informed, not empowered and not engaged in P/CVE activities in their localities because they are far more susceptible to radicalization than adults. The process of countering violent extremism and terrorism should address the long-term social and economic impact on communities with an emphasis on youth. This process must put the community at the centre of the P/CVE the inability of governments' to improve social and economic conditions for youth; unemployment and economic grievances; the socio-cultural impact of decades of fighting and warlordism; and poor quality of education and the misinterpretations of Islamic religion guidelines, all play a role in youth recruitment into violent extremist organizations. Radicalization and recruitment often occur in local social spheres, such as universities, schools, social media platforms, and among disadvantaged youth groups who are unemployed, vulnerable to drug addiction, schools drop-outs and so on. In other words, CVE should adopt a more explicitly youth focus and more specifically target the different spaces and phases involved in radicalization.

¹³⁴ <https://youtu.be/DxinecqVoZU> : <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3h6Y0u5LH8>

¹³⁵ **Abdishakur Hassan-Kayd**(2018). Time to Empower and Engage Youth on Countering Violent Extremism. *Horn of Africa Bulletin*. Life and Peace Institute

Figure 14: Garissa and Mombasa:

Source: Field data

These two research sites exhibited a lot of similarities in the findings that the data generated. To start with the pull factors in both towns were among others radicalized religious environment, Islamic fundamentalism/misinterpretation of Islamic religious teachings, personal appeal of radical preachers, Islamophobia which has strengthened the global Islamic brotherhood, jihad, and influence of cyber preachers/sheikhs.

The push factors for Garissa and Mombasa include: police harassment and corruption, ethnic profiling, religious profiling, marginalization, historical injustices, youth unemployment, youth frustrations fueled by lack of parental guidance, poverty, proximity to Somalia, and proximity to Daadab camp.

In **Garissa** specifically, youth unemployment and corruption scored the highest mean meaning that they were the main drivers of violent extremism among youth in Garissa. Poverty, political and religious ideologies got moderate scores while migration and climate change scored lowest. This again departs from what is generally said about poverty and religious ideologies as the main drivers of youth extremism and radicalization in Kenya. The youth and community elders validated our findings and gave reasons as to why this was the case by stating that:

a) Youth unemployment was rampant because most youth did not have identity cards.

b). The government treated youth with *suspicion* claiming that they were not Kenyans but Somali refugees.

b) Ethnic and religious profiling of youth was too much to bear. They were profiled as Muslims and as Somali. No Muslim community in Kenya, however, has experienced the negative weight of the Kenyan state more

systematically than the Somali community. Their home region has been systematically neglected in terms of developmental projects of any kind. The influx of refugees fleeing from war in Somalia has renewed the problems bona-fide Somali citizens of Kenya experience regarding the issuance of passports and national identity cards; they continue to be harassed regularly by the police who exploit the citizenship issue to extort bribes. The latter problem reached new heights due to Operation Linda Usalama's harassment and mass arrests following the Westgate Mall attack of 2014. Despite the high level of Somali investment in Kenya¹³⁶, multiple reports on the condition of Somali refugees in Kenya has also documented the high levels of abuse – sexual and otherwise – in refugee camps and of extortion and harassment of Somalis of all persuasions by the police that is charged with the responsibility of protecting them. The Kenya government has also been accused of forcible and illegal relocations of deportations of Somali refugees¹³⁷. Kenyans of Somali origin have multiple reasons to be indignant about their government, and the security measures responsible for this have not reduced the threat of Al-Shabaab attacks on Kenya soil^{138, 139}

c) Historical injustices and marginalization by the colonialists and the government had led to the high level of poverty in the area. They felt that the government for a very long time did not value them and treat them as Kenyans. To make matters worse, their pastoralist nature made them not to be taken seriously.

d) Kenya's geographical proximity to Somalia: The respondents in Garissa, Mombasa and Eastleigh mentioned this as one of the drivers to radicalization and violent extremism. Kenya has relatively more porous borders, and the existence within its borders of a marginalized and aggrieved constituency of citizens of Somali and Muslim background among whom terrorists could both infiltrate and recruit potential sympathizers, have made the danger of Al-Shabaab as real as it could get.

In addition, the study found that lack of knowledge or education on the teachings of religion, in this case Islam provide the most important predisposing factor or catalyst through which youths acquire radical or

¹³⁶ Abdulsamed, F. (2011). Somali Investment in Kenya (Chatham House Briefing Paper) https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/bp0311_abdulmed.pdf.

¹³⁷ Manyala, F.B (2017). States' Response To Refugee Crisis: The Case Of Somali Refugees In Kenya. A Thesis Submitted to the School of Humanities and Social Sciences in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Master of Arts Degree in International Relations. United States International University-Africa

¹³⁸ Lind, J., Mutahi, P. and M. Oosterom. (2017). 'Killing a mosquito with a hammer': Al-Shabaab violence and state security responses in Kenya. *Peacebuilding*, Vol. 5 Issue 2: 118-135.

¹³⁹ Mazrui, A., Kimani, N., & Paul, G (2018). *Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security*. Twaweza Communications.

distorted views of religion.¹⁴⁰ These distorted messages are often propagated by roaming or independent preachers that are not officially accredited by traditional Islamic scholars. Economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural (poor parental upbringing or neglect of children) factors also increase young peoples' susceptibility to recruitment and radicalization by violent extremist or terrorist groups.¹⁴¹

This factor emerged as a driver of violent extremism at the coast. The respondents said that being at the coast and next to the Indian Ocean together with several islands in the ocean provided made the coastal region an easy target for recruitment. There is free movement to Somali, Tanzania and the gulf countries which makes it easy for recruiters to come in and out of the coast, and do their activities undetected.

"...whoever has an intention can sail with the youth to any of the islands, Tanzania, Somali or Mbooni forest to radicalize them undetected. They can do it as if it is the general movement of people from place to place. As a normal routine, youth and other people move along this coast a lot freely. Youth get excited about going abroad especially the Arab countries" (Male Respondent, Frere).

Another respondent said that they are disadvantaged being at the coast. Evil people can come as tourists yet they have intentions of smuggling our youth away and radicalizing them into violent extremists.

"... You know, in as much as being at the coast is a great advantage because of tourism, some of the tourists could be the same people who mastermind terrorism in our country. For example, the bombing in Kikambala...the bombers made friends with community members and got assimilated in the community. The same way we hear of a tourist who came to Lamu and stayed there, playing football with young boys. Nobody suspected him to be radicalizing them. Parents were surprised when their sons disappeared and it was said that they left with him." (Female Respondent, Majengo).

Another respondent felt that the geographical position of the coast is the coastal geographical location is the cause of poverty in the area. According to him, poverty was caused by the marginalization and exclusion of colonial masters.

"...The colonial masters saw nothing good in coast other than the beaches. They concentrated on the white highlands. This left us undeveloped. They

¹⁴⁰ ASPI (2017). Preventing and countering violent extremism in Africa The role of the mining sector. Hedaya Institute. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute Limited 2017

¹⁴¹ R Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, New York: UN Women, 2015, 231.

did not put much effort in improving the coast. This has made the coastal communities to be left behind.” (Male Elder, Kisauni).

P/CVE and Corruption: Corruption is stunting Africa’s development. It is about 17 years since the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC).¹⁴² The African Governance Architecture convened a high-level regional youth consultation under the theme “Leveraging Youth Capacities for the Fight against Corruption in Africa”. This was in line with the African Union theme for 2018-Winning the Fight Against Corruption: A Sustainable Path to Africa’s Transformation.¹⁵⁷ civil society organizations from 37 African Member countries wrote a letter to the AUC Chairman declaring war on corruption. They proposed 3 things:

- Use technology as an anti-corruption weapon. Thus, use internet to do data mining and social accountability;
- Political participation and civic engagement-engage youth in politics and governance;
- Use of social media to protest.¹⁴³

Unfortunately, Kenya is ranked 143 out of 180 of Transparency International’s corruption Index.¹⁴⁴ Corruption is deeply entrenched because of lack of public accountability and a strong influence of the informal systems of governance on the formal institutions and agencies.¹⁴⁵ There is answerability, responsibility and no enforceability. The challenge has been double standards in application of the law with informal systems (tribalism, friendship etc) interfering with formal systems (rule of law). The 2015 Afrobarometer survey showed that many respondents believed the police, government officials and law makers were the most corrupt. Devolution under the 2010 Constitution was to provide answers to the existing governance deficit^{146, 147}. The system of county governments has, however, fostered elite communities where employment opportunities are still based

¹⁴² Shakir, A (2018). Here are three ways Africa’s youth are defeating corruption.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Dahir, A. L (2018). High Profile Prosecutions Alone Won’t Solve Kenya’s Corruption Problem. QUARTZ AFRICA. <https://gz.com/Africa/1360591/is-kenya-serious-about-fighting-corruption>

¹⁴⁵ Mihyo. P.B., & Mukuna.T.E.2018.Interface between Formal and Informal Systems of Horizontal Accountability in Kenya’s State-Owned Enterprises. OSSREA; *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review, Volume XXXV, No. 2. June 2018.*

¹⁴⁶ Nyanjom, O. (2011). Devolution in Kenya’s New Constitution. Nairobi: Society for International Development.

¹⁴⁷ Badurdeen & Goldsmith(2018): Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya. Journal for deradicalization.(16) issn 2363-9849

on patronage and development rarely trickles down to the marginalized households.¹⁴⁸

In 2018, there were allegations that legislators were paid USD 100 in the parliament's toilets, to reject a critical probe into corrupt sugar deals.¹⁴⁹ Therefore in as much as Kenya has put institutions and laws in place, the informal mechanisms undermine accountability.¹⁵⁰ Further, a UN Somalia Report 2018 by Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG) sheds light on the nexus between corruption and insecurity. This report claimed that police officers along the Kenya—Somalia border take bribes to allow Al-Shabaab militia into the country. According to this report, the police took bribes of USD, 20 (Ksh, 2000) to allow Alshabab operatives to cross 5 times into Kenya from Somalia. This report was refuted by the police spokesman and Inspector General of Police stating that it was the police who averted the terrorism attack and arrested the vehicle full of explosives. They could therefore not foil the planned terrorist attack and at the same time take bribes to conceal it.¹⁵¹ Al-Shabaab recruiters' prey on disillusioned members of communities such as youth who are frustrated by the Kenya's political elite's culture of impunity.

In regard to corruption, most respondents said that corruption was so high in Garissa that local leaders and the youth reported that it was almost impossible to receive any service which one is entitled to without giving out a bribe. For example, most youth did not have national identity cards because they were expected to bribe the police, local leaders and officers before being issued one. Most of them out of frustration were registered as Somali refugees yet they were Kenyans. Since in Kenya every transaction is pegged on an ID number, this was a big frustration. It was no wonder that the youth unemployment and poverty was high in Garissa. The youth felt that the government was against them. Such youth were very vulnerable to VE and radicalization. In Garissa and some parts of the Nairobi informal settlements, some of the responses were as follows:

“... Individuals have been falsely accused of links to terrorist groups only to discover that they were in fact victims of police extortion. Large sums of money have been demanded from individuals if they wished to avoid unspecified action against them – action which, in the Kenyan context, has

¹⁴⁸ Bosire, C. M. (2013). Devolution for Development, Conflict resolution and Limiting Central Power: An analysis of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. Thesis. Cape Town: Faculty of Law, University of Western Cape.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid

¹⁵⁰ Mihyo, P.B. & Mukuna.T.E.2018.Interface between Formal and Informal Systems of Horizontal Accountability in Kenya's State-Owned Enterprises. OSSREA; *Eastern Africa Social Science Research Review, Volume XXXV, No. 2. June 2018.*

¹⁵¹ Cheronno,S (2018).Shame of Police Bribed to Let in Alshabbab Bombers. Daily Nation, Friday November 16,2018.

included extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance – even when they knew that they were innocent of the accusations by the security officers who contacted them. And, out of fear, many bribed their way out of those false charges. This has left many Muslims feeling more marginalized than before.” (Male Youth, Dandora, Nairobi).

“...It is very difficult to get a national identity card due to corruption. You must bribe the chief, the registration officers and police for you to get registered as a Kenyan. Everyone believes all the Somali come from Somalia and are not Kenyans. Not all of us are refugees” (Garissa male youth).

“...Corruption is rife and a reality here. Even these acts of terrorism like what happened here in Garissa University was largely as a result of corruption. The police on guard disappeared. They had been bribed. They knew the plan because the intelligence reports were all over. They received bribes to vacate the university and let the terrorists have an easy time butchering our students” (A Male Respondent-Garissa).

“...Corruption is the main driver of radicalization and violent extremism here in Garissa. The Uwezo fund is a good idea but it is marred with corruption. You must corrupt the officials for you to be listed to get funds. Even if you meet all the requirements but don't bribe, your name is removed from the list” (Female respondent-Garissa)

“...Corruption is a major driver of radicalization and violent extremism. In the first place we are marginalized historically, we are poor, our youth have no national identity cards so they can't even travel out of Garissa. They cannot own bank accounts let alone MPesa. It means they cannot do any business. We are ethnically and religiously profiled. The government has ignored our plea. The youth are usually left with no option but migrate to Somalia to join Al-Shabaab to get identity, a source of livelihood and to fight the government that is frustrating them” (A Community Elder-Garissa).

“...I can say to a very great extent corruption has fueled bad relations between the police and the youth. If someone doesn't like like you, they bribe the police then the police arrest you and claim you are a member of a gang or Al-Shabab. It is very unfair. Many youths have been shot dead or arrested here in Mathare and Dandora because of that. In sympathy with fellow youth, we hit back at the police or join Al-Shabab to come and hit them”. (Youth in Dandora).

“...As Youth Peace Ambassadors, we take care of all issues that affect youth's peace and security. We tell our youth to use the Ghetto radio and social media platforms to speak out against all evils including corruption. They should not be used by anybody or politicians to engage in violence

just because of being bribed to breach the peace” (Female respondent, Mathare).

“...Corruption is real. Here in Nairobi, if you ask youth across the board why they are not employed, they will tell you, it is because of corruption. You have heard about the NYS scandal. At the grassroots, it is worse. For example, those who are in the construction company as manual labourers must bribe their supervisors for them to be assured of remaining on the labourers list the next day. If you don’t do that, you will have no job. This really angers us as youth. Any opportunity to get out of this situation is welcome” (Dandora, Male Youth).

“...The students died because of corruption in the police force. We heard the information from Moyale that Alshabab had crossed into Kenya and they intended to attack Garissa university. We informed the security forces and they beefed up security at the university. Surprisingly, when they attacked the students, I called the police who were manning the university only to learn that they left 30 minutes before the terrorists came. I therefore strongly believe that they knew about it and were bribed to go away. I also feel bitter when I think of how those heavy machine guns moved all the way from Somalia to here yet we have a lot of police posts on the road. If we get rid of corruption, we shall be safe.” (Lecturer, Garissa University).

“...This issue of youth being given a slot to supply goods or do business with the government is good but laughable. Which youth has the kind of money to supply the County Government goods unless you come from a rich family? The truth is, money usually changes hands (meaning bribes) then the rich in that county merely use a youth group or company to supply goods and give youth something small. This is a syndicate of the politicians. They take advantage of the vulnerable youth” (Mathare Youth).

“... Many young people have the desire and capacity to transform the world and they have a potential to positively affect future anti-corruption efforts. As the new generation of politicians, entrepreneurs and civil society actors, they have an important role to play in bringing a new culture of integrity to all levels of the society, but they are also the most vulnerable. Therefore, they should be taught how to effectively detect, prevent and fight corruption. Building their capacity using appropriate empowerment strategies to raise their awareness and understanding about corruption should be prioritized.” (An CSO Leader).

“...As we teach peace education, I strongly feel that we should integrate in methods of preventing corruption. It should begin from the earliest of age at kindergarten and elementary school levels and spread throughout the whole curriculum. It should also include professional development of supervisors and other education staff in ethical questions in the process of life-long learning.” (Teacher, Garissa).

“... Corrupt education systems can prevent young people from achieving their potential by depriving them of adequate learning conditions and educational opportunities. Involving young people in anti-corruption work is the only way towards changing mentalities, and this involvement should start at the earliest age. Moreover, a corrupt education sector serves as a breeding ground for corruption itself, by teaching the younger generation that corrupt behaviour is acceptable.” (Lecturer, Garissa University).

“...In order for us youth to become and remain engaged in anti-corruption initiatives, we need to feel included as stakeholders in any policy development and implementation of anti-corruption strategies, and perceive the ownership of the actions we are involved in. The more the youth take the lead, the more the policies have the chance to succeed.” (Youth Peace Ambassador, Mathare).

From these responses, it is clear that corruption has paved way for terrorism in Kenya by either leading to the terrorist activities unreported or radicalizing youth to engage in violent extremism due to missed opportunities that they are denied by the corrupt. It is also tied to unemployment, poverty and poor youth-police relationships.

e) Migration was a driver to VE and radicalization. The respondents explained at length the link between the two saying that due to kinship, free movement of people and their geographical location, youth and their families moved in and out of Kenya to visit their relatives in Somalia, to trade or to join the Alshabab. They gave the example of the Garissa University attack where the youth from Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania were involved as terrorists. They also cited cases of terrorist attacks at the Kenyan coast to be caused by migration-the perpetrators were not Kenyan nationals nor local residents. The respondents also said that they want this issue on the link between migration and violent extremism or radicalization further investigated to put the record straight and avoid blaming local residents of Garissa and referring to them as Alshabab terrorists.

Other respondents attributed the radicalization and youth involvement in violent extremism to the conflicts in Somali that have led to many refugees migrating to Kenya. They reported that some of the refugees were involved in criminal activities like the case of the terror attack on Garissa University where over 148 students were killed. The terrorists came in from Somali and Tanzania.

Additionally, rural-urban migration persists. Youth move to towns despite the inequalities that they will experience there with the hope of getting a job and improving their family livelihoods. The youth that we interviewed in Nairobi and Mombasa told us that life in town was better than in rural areas. At least in town, they hoped to get a job or a wage and earn a living. Even if they live in slums, they did not desire to go to rural areas unless

they migrated to another town (County government headquarters). Others told us that if they go back to their rural areas, they would be going to fight with their siblings over land-in other cases the land is controlled by their parents. They therefore own nothing. This made them vulnerable to radicalization because they were doing manual jobs that were not paying them well, they had no savings while other jobs exposed them to health risks (dumpsite Dandora). In their desire to get a quick fix to their poverty and joblessness, Alshabab provided a good option.

f) Climate Change was an insignificant driver to violent extremism and radicalization. However, some of the respondents felt that as pastoralists, this was not a factor to be taken lightly. They explained that whenever drought strikes, they lose all their livestock which is their livelihood. They are often left with nothing hence poverty strikes. The youth become very vulnerable to joining Alshabab that promises a better life for themselves and their families. According to the Garissa residents, they felt that the government should look at the social protection issue more seriously to save their youth from poverty and vulnerability to radicalization and violent extremism.

Figure 15: The Monument of the Garissa University Terrorist Attack



Source: Field data

In **Mombasa** youth unemployment followed by poverty and corruption scored the highest mean. This implies that youth unemployment, poverty and corruption were the main drivers of radicalization of youth and their

involvement in violent extremism activities. Religious and political ideologies were surprisingly low scores with climate change and migration scoring even much lower. This was an interesting finding. Socio-economic opportunities, discrimination resulting from marginalization, poor governance abetting the deteriorating state-citizen relationship, violation of human rights, and selective application of the rule of law contribute to coastal communities' collective grievances. The same factors act as push factors for recruits embracing violent extremism^{152, 153},

Religious fundamentalism: Terrorism and violent extremism are not associated with any one religion or belief. Just like the Ku-Klux-Klan does not represent Christianity, ISIS does not represent Islam. And just like the Ku-Klux-Klan persecuted Catholics and other Christian minorities who did not follow their version of Protestantism, ISIS declares all Muslims who do not agree with their twisted and hateful views to be "apostates. While this study agrees with the general narrative about unemployment and poverty (economic reasons) are the main drivers of violent extremism among the youth in Kenya, it disagrees with what has been generally said about religion as a key factor in violent extremism among the youth. While the youth agree that religious fundamentalism has contributed to violent extremist acts and radicalization in Mombasa and the Kenyan Coast in general, majority of them argued that religious fundamentalism among Jihadists is what was fueling radicalization and VE. They also blamed it on police brutality, ethnic and religious profiling which targeted Muslims at the Coast. They stated unreservedly that this had contributed greatly to youth getting radicalized even more in sympathy with fellow youth.

Parental neglect, religion and VE: It emerged that the high rate of divorce in Mombasa led to single mothers and escalated poverty among families. This was related to the Islamic religion that allows men to be polygamous and divorce easily whenever they felt the need too. As a result the population of single mothers had greatly increased. These single mothers were overburdened with parental duties which they often neglected to go and fend for their families. Since they were too busy looking for food and other basic necessities for their children, they did not take good care of their children. Some admitted that they even allow their children to join Alshabab so as to bring them some income and lift the burden of poverty off their shoulders. Children from such families were so vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism. The family institution was weak and most men have abandoned their wives and children shifting the burden of parenting to women. These women are frustrated and lack the grip on caring for their children well. Most of the children suffer and get

¹⁵² Badurdeen, F.A. (2012). Youth Radicalization in the Coast Province of Kenya, Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, 5(1): 53-64.

¹⁵³ Botha, A. (2013). Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalization and extremism. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

themselves involved in criminal activities, gangs and drug abuse. This makes them vulnerable and easy targets for Al-Shabab recruiters.

They all agreed that the polygamous nature of the Islamic religion and the manner it has made it easy to divorce was to blame for the parental neglect and high rate of divorce cases in Mombasa and the coastal region. They blamed it on Islamic religion and the breakdown of the social fabric and morality. The men walked out of marriages and left single mothers with their children to fend for themselves. This made such children very vulnerable because most of them were poor. The divorced women are bitter and get too busy to fend for their children. Since Alshabab promises them a better life, many get easily hooked with the hope of getting money and improving their mothers 'and siblings' lives. Other respondents did not agree with this argument saying that the high rate of divorce was due to poverty which made men to run away from family responsibilities. They therefore leave children alone on their own. Such children are easy targets for radicalization and recruitment into VE. Again here, we see that in as much as parental neglect is the driver to violent extremism, it is tied to Islamic religion, poverty and lack jobs as a means of livelihood for women/mothers to take care of their children

Historical injustices, marginalization and the land question: This is an emotive issue at the Coast of Kenya. Several researches have addressed the land question in Kenya^{154, 155, 156}. In regards to conflicts in Kenya, the existence of historical injustices relating to access, ownership and use of land traceable to the legacy of colonial land alienation and dispossession of Africans is a problem that has refused to go away in any conflict discourse in Kenya. According to Kagwanja and Southhall, colonialism alienated and gave Kenya's best land to a small settler population concentrated in the 'White Highlands' and restricted the mass of dispossessed African population to tribally-defined 'native areas.' Colonial injustices against the Africans relating to land sparked the violence that characterized the anti-colonial war by the 'Land and Freedom Army' (or Mau Mau) fighters. Far from addressing these deeply entrenched injustices, reallocation of land in the late colonial and post-colonial period produced highly skewed and unequal patterns of land access and ownership- along class and ethnic lines. The post-colonial land settlement entrenched deeply felt resentments between ethnic groups by widening divisions between landed and the landless, the rich and the poor.

¹⁵⁴ Kagwanja, P. & Southhall, R., 2009. Introduction: Kenya a Democracy in Retreat? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27 (3): 259-277.

¹⁵⁵ IK Kanyinga, *Struggles to Access Land: The "Squatter Question" in Coastal Kenya*, (DIIS, June 1998)

¹⁵⁶ IRC(2007). Report of the Independent Review Commission on the General Elections held in Kenya on 27 December 2007.

In Kenya, the land question appears to be the fulcrum around which major political events revolve.¹⁵⁷ Land grievances reflecting the marginalization of the coastal region are a product of policies embraced by the succession of post-independence government policies. An investigation by the independent Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) in 2013 revealed that minority groups in Kenya suffer from systematic discrimination in relation to political participation and access to national identity cards, as well as experiencing collective punishment¹⁵⁸. The issue of land has played a core role in social movements in the coast, such as the Mombasa Republican Council and extremist groups like Kaya Bombo in Kwale, and was cited in the Al Shabaab statement justifying the raids on upcountry settlers in Lamu. Implementing the land reforms mandated by the new constitution and the issuance of title deeds demand immediate attention to address such long-standing issues. Land grievances reflecting the marginalization of the coastal region are a product of policies embraced by the succession of post-independence government policies. The issue of land has played a core role in social movements in the coast, such as the Mombasa Republican Council and extremist groups like Kaya Bombo in Kwale, and was cited in the Al Shabaab statement justifying the raids on upcountry settlers in Lamu. Implementing the land reforms mandated by the new constitution and the issuance of title deeds demand immediate attention to address such long-standing issues.¹⁵⁹

The ongoing construction of the Lamu Port as the hub of the South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) corridor is likely to both widen and exacerbate the politics of land ownership and economic marginalization, serving as yet another potential trigger for youth radicalization and violence in the area¹⁶⁰

... this land issue is not a small matter...we fought against the government in the Kayabombo and Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). Although the government diffused the conflicts, we are still bitter and the problem has not been solved. We join Alshabab or any other extremist group that can help us fight the government so that they can help us reclaim our land and our livelihood (FGD Majengo-Youth Respondent).

¹⁵⁷ Kagwanja, P. & Southall, R., 2009. Introduction: Kenya a Democracy in Retreat? *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27 (3): 259-277

¹⁵⁸The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (2013). Report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, Vol. IV. Retrieved from <https://www.scribd.com/doc/142790253/TJRC-Report-Volume-4>

¹⁵⁹ Badurdeen & Goldsmith: Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya

¹⁶⁰ Mazrui, A., Kimani, N., & Paul, G. (2018). *Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security*. Twaweza Communications.

...the truth is we are mistreated. We don't blame our husbands and sons. What option are they left with if their land has been taken away? We depend on them too. Fighting for our rights is in order. We support them to fight and reclaim our land even if it means getting assistance from outside. As long as we can secure the future of our children, we support them (FGD Majengo, Female Elder Respondent).

...It is foreigners who enjoy in our land. We own nothing. How does it feel foreigners coming here and growing rich when the indigenous people are poor and the government does nothing about it (Male Youth, Majengo).

In regard to historical social injustices, respondents from Mombasa in all the areas that we went to pointed out that the ten-mile coastal strip is the cause of all their problems. In the Focus Group Discussions, they indicated that the Coast Province of Kenya residents felt that they were marginalized since the colonial times. According to them, they were first colonized by the Arab traders who took the 10-mile coastal strip from them and made them slaves. When the Arabs left, Indians took over and monopolized trade along the coast and still enslaved them, treating them with cruelty. Other than Indians, the colonial masters gave power to non-coast leaders who took large tracts of their land. They further told us that most of the local communities are squatters on their own fathers' land! The local communities feel that they have been robbed of their birth rite and the government has not protected these vulnerable communities. Politicians take advantage of the poor youth whose elders have told their history. Local leaders affirmed that land was a major contributing factor to radicalization of the youth leading to violent extremism at the coast of Kenya. The elders said that they have not incited the youth against their government; the youth are seeking the second liberation from "the present-day colonialists". Earlier insurgent groups defending the coastal communities like Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) were diffused for example in the Kayabombo conflicts. The CSOs working on radicalization and VE at the Kenyan Coast told us that youth join Alshabab and any other extremist group that can hurt the government and help the local communities to reclaim their land. In this instance, we saw inter-generational links to historical social injustices and violent extremism.

"...The rich modern-day colonialists collude with the government and rob us of our birth rite. The government has not protected us either yet we are vulnerable. Instead, politicians take advantage of the situation to exploit us further" (FGD Majengo, Male Local Elder).

...the youth who have been told about this story of the 10-mile strip feel that they need to liberate their community from modern day slavery and second-generation colonialism (FGD Frere, Male Local Elder Frere).

Marginalization refers to the exclusion of certain individuals or groups and could be social, economic, or political. “Marginalization occurs when people are systematically excluded from meaningful participation in economic, social, political, cultural and other forms of human activity in their communities and thus are denied to opportunity to fulfil themselves as human beings”¹⁶¹. Members of ethnic and religious minorities may perceive their group as marginalized, which is the case with Kenyan Muslims¹⁶². Islam came to Kenya several centuries ago and approximately 11 percent of the Kenyan population identify as Muslims. Although Muslims enjoy considerable political influence in areas with a Muslim majority, Muslim leaders continue to express grievances and social exclusion^{163, 164}. Muslims in Kenya experience real or perceived grievances, which leads to them being considered a marginalized group. Marginalization of minority groups can result in anger and resentment towards the government. Representation of minorities on national, state, and local levels is crucial, because systematically excluding minorities and withholding their access to power and participation could result in many negative outcomes, including resentment and alienation from the state. As such, marginalization of minorities not only negatively affects the marginalized, it can also influence the overall stability in the country¹⁶⁵. Furthermore, Kenyan youth are victims of traditional power structures without proper outlets for young people to express their needs. Despite making up the majority of the population, youth lack proper representation and are not participating in decision-making processes relating to them.

In both Kenya, the participants emphasized that history of the communities should never be ignored in conflict situations. The historical analysis gives us the true picture of the current trend of events without which;

¹⁶¹ Rao, D. B. (2007). *Education for All. Issues and Trends*. New Delhi, IN: APH Publishing Corporation

¹⁶² Williams, P. D. (2014). *Is al-Shabaab Resurgent or Weakening? A Tale of Two Narratives*. IPI Global Observatory. Retrieved from <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/06/is-al-shabaab-resurgent-or-weakening-a-tale-of-two-narratives/>

¹⁶³ Oded, A. (2000). *Islam and Politics in Kenya*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, In

¹⁶⁴ Møller, B. (2006). *Political Islam in Kenya*. Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS. Retrieved from https://www.diis.dk/files/media/documents/publications/wp2006-22_web.pdf

¹⁶⁵ Brink, E. T. (2015). *Politicization of Ethnicity: a recipe of minority marginalization* (Master thesis). Leiden University, Netherlands. Retrieved from <https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/32837/Master%20Thesis%20E.%20ten%20Brink.pdf?sequence=1>

“.....we will be covering a wound instead of cleaning it and feeling pain as it heals. Or worse still, we will be treating symptoms of the disease instead of getting the correct diagnosis for proper treatment of the disease

...even if we tell them they won't listen to us yet we know the solutions to these problems. Let the government come back to us here at the grassroots level. You know they are ignoring us at their own peril. Cultural leaders should be at the centre of solving this problem. We must all come together and our contributions should be valued (FGD Majengo, Male Religious Leader).

This therefore means that historical injustices that led to marginalization of some communities coupled with land grievances remain a pivotal cause of anger and source of conflict in Kenya at the coast. The respondents stated categorically that it is the prime driver of radicalization and violent extremism at the Kenyan coast. Historical injustices against the Coastal Province communities and North Eastern Kenya contributed largely to strengthening the Islamic brotherhood, fundamentalism and Jihadist ideology. The cyber preachers are fuelling this. This is a great source of anger against the government that has been reluctant to implement the recommendations of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. Further, today, the government has embarked on the LAPSET project which according to the respondents was going to benefit the rich and not locals. Moreover, the government decision to shift the Mombasa port activities to Naivasha so as to make the Standard Gauge Railway line useful was adding insult to injury. It had led to massive job loss and increased poverty. These idle youths are a vulnerable target for radicalization into violent extremism. Therefore, historical injustices, the land question, government policy and youth unemployment compound the grievances of the youth and the community in which they live in. The elders told us that they passively supported the radicalized youth because for a very long time the government did not care about the Kenyan Coast. They were however optimistic that with devolution, things might change for the better.

Climate change, migration and VE: In regard to the relationship between climate change, migration and violent extremism, the respondents told us stories of strangers who came as tourists or otherwise to the coastal towns, befriended residents and lived among them. Only to later turn out as terrorists. They attributed this to ungoverned spaces on the coast (islands) and the coastal strip that attracted tourists. They also linked migration to radicalization and VE by saying that the proximity of Mombasa and Garissa to Somali and the Arabian countries was a facilitating factor. The Mombasa residents added that the free movement of people across the Indian Ocean could also be fuelling terrorist activities at the coast. So here again, youth radicalization and violent extremism is linked to climate

change, migration, tourism, proximity to fragile-conflict zone of Somalia and the porous borders of Kenya.

Women and violent extremism: Female respondents told us that many women and girls are increasingly engaging in radicalization and VE for various reasons. Some who are mothers confessed that even if they know their child or husband is an Alshabab, they cannot give them away. Muslim mothers told us that it is prestigious for one's daughter to be a bride of a Jihadist. They therefore cannot miss that great opportunity. Some married women reported that largely, they are the ones who push or encourage their husbands and sons to engage in violence by asking them "what kind of man are you?" Others send their children into radicalization with the hope of these children sending remittances to them to help them change their status of living. Other mothers confessed to supporting radicalization and violent extremism as a means to hit back at the government especially the police who were brutal and used excessive force on their children.

Further, some young girls told us that they are used by criminal gangs to carry guns for them and move them from one place to another. They told us that they do it for a fee. That it was easier for women to carry small arms from one place to another because the police do not suspect them.

This study found out that women/girls just like men join Alshabab for the same reasons. For example, they chase false dreams of a better life and employment. Others join because of a shared ideology with Alshabab or anger because their men/kin have been killed by the police. They do this to revenge. It was reported that the porous border between Somalia and Kenya provides an easy escape route through Mbooni forest. Other female youth join Alshabab to go and teach Quran. While there, they get trained in combat. We also found that the recruiters of the female youth into Alshabab advertise for jobs on bill boards at the coastal town. The unsuspecting youth apply for them without knowing that they are being trafficked to Alshabab or ISIS. Still, others are kidnapped. It was further revealed that some girls join as spies, others as suicide bombers while others join to become Jihadi brides. It emerged that a large number of the female youth who join Alshabab do not even understand Islamic faith well. Additionally, it was revealed to us that social connections by kinship played a great role in recruiting female youth into Alshabab. This finding contradicts what has been said over time about women and girls in violent extremism. They have all along been seen as victims. This study revealed that while a majority of the women may not necessarily be seen on the forefront of violent extremism or as perpetrators of radicalization and violent extremism, women plan and are passive participants in VE.

Relationship between the police, youth and their communities: The respondents identified the government /police as a driver of terrorism in what they referred to as "state-led terrorism". While police forces are

mainly responsible for counter-terrorism, they can also make a positive contribution to countering radicalisation. Community-based law enforcement programs can improve the relationships and generate trust between police forces and communities.¹⁶⁶ STRIVE II (Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism) has focused on promoting interaction between law enforcement and civil society by building the capacity of security sector and law enforcement authorities and civil society to collaborate in preventing violent extremism¹⁶⁷. These initiatives facilitate awareness raising for law enforcement agencies personnel about violent extremism drivers and CVE responses¹⁶⁸.

Community trust depends on the credibility of the security sector in respect to thorough and timely investigations into allegations of arbitrary detention, raids, arrests, extrajudicial killings and use of torture by the security forces.¹⁶⁹ States become part of the problem in nurturing violent extremism when institutions fail to implement laws, lack the capacity to effectively prosecute crimes related to violent extremism, or when they go beyond the existing laws or resort to non-conventional ways for dealing with violent extremism.¹⁷⁰ Such problematic state responses towards extremism are based on the tendency to over-react, resulting in vulnerable populations feeling they are the target of politically motivated and religiously biased security practices and unjust judicial systems.¹⁷¹

There have been credible claims that counterterrorism operations undertaken in Nairobi's Eastleigh area, Garissa, Mandera, Wajir and Mombasa have involved excessive use of force, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, and executions of terrorism suspects. For example, serious violations of human rights occurred during the 2014 *Operation Usalama Watch* in the predominantly Somali Eastleigh estate after a series of violent attacks on public transport vehicles suspected to have been carried out by Al Shabaab. Reports by the media and local and international human rights groups, as well as the testimony of local residents, established that the

¹⁶⁶ Badurdeen & Goldsmith: Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya

¹⁶⁷ Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) (2017). STRIVE: Lessons Learned. Nairobi: Royal United Services Institute

¹⁶⁸ Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies (2016). Preventing Violent Extremism in Kenya: Policy Options. Nairobi: CHRIPS. <https://UNDP-JourneyToExtremism-report-2017-english.pdf>

¹⁶⁹ Ayiera, E. A. (2015). Local Policing Accountability in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities for Action. Nairobi: Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies.

¹⁷⁰ Sodipo, M.O. (2013). Mitigating Radicalism in Northern Nigeria, African Security Brief, No.26.

¹⁷¹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2016). Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach. Retrieved from: https://UNDP_RBA_Preventing_and_Responding_to_Violent_Extremism_2016-19_2.pdf

operation was marred by arbitrary arrests, rape, torture and extortion. The involvement of security agencies in a series of killings and disappearances of Muslim leaders, business people and preachers has still not been ruled out.¹⁷² Police have also been accused of detaining individuals for long periods of time in undisclosed locations without providing them access to lawyers or contact with their families as required under the Kenyan constitution. The manner in which these counterterrorism operations have been conducted has fuelled resentment among many ethnic Somalis and Muslims. To make it worse, injustice and corruption catalyze recruitment into Alshabab which has an impact on youth-government dynamics. Improving the state-society relationship, in addition to intercommunity and intergenerational relationships, is critical to building community resilience to violent extremism¹⁷³. On state-led terrorism, the respondents said the following:

“...The police provoke the youth. They don’t even investigate some of the actions of the youth before they arrest them. The government makes it worse with the ‘shoot to kill’ order. This angers the youth and their families. What do they mean? Aren’t we Kenyans? Dont we have rights? The only option is to join Alshabab” (Male Youth, Majengo).

“...The Kenya Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) has carried out a series of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The government seems disinterested in investigating alleged killings, disappearances, and other abuses by the unit and holds those responsible to account. Human Rights Watch has been following them but affected families especially here in Mombasa, Eastleigh Nairobi and Garissa are tired of waiting. This begs for sympathizers and fans the fire of radicalization and violent extremism” (Male Religious Leader, Majengo).

“...Our chests are full. The police use excessive force on us. It is as if our sight disgusts them. We don’t even want to see the police.” (Female Youth Respondent).

“...The hard approach that the police use is too much and leads to sympathizers siding with youth. The youth get filled with anger and opt to take the hard stand of Alshabab. Some other youth are just victimized.

¹⁷² R Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, New York: UN Women, 2015, 222, <http://reliefweb.int/report/world/preventing-conflicttransforming-justice-securing-peace-global-studyimplementation>

¹⁷³ <http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Kenya>

ViolentExtremism_EN_2016.pdf

When arrested by the police, they disappear. Their families get filled with rage” (Male Youth Respondent).

“...Now that even if I surrender, I will be endangering my life, it is better to remain silent after returning. This amnesty is a lie. It is a lie.” (Male Youth, Majengo)

“... Tell the government to pay attention to our cries. It should listen to us and not silence us by killing us or imprisoning us. Let them start by returning our land and sharing resources equitably otherwise we shall continue fighting.” (Male Youth, Frere).

“...We feel totally neglected by this government. And it is not like they don't know we are hurting. They know. They have politicized everything. Our life is in their hands but they don't care. Even victims are usually harassed by the police. The government knows that we are being exploited by the gulf countries. There are brokers here who smuggle our youth to Arabia for lack of what to do. My two children went there. One was tortured and came back mad. It really hurts. The other one has disappeared. I won't be surprised to learn that he has gone to Somali to join Alshabab or to Arabian countries to join ISIS. Even when those who work in Arabian countries raise an alarm that they are suffering, the government does nothing. Their families become easily radicalized to revenge. (Female Elder, Majengo).

“...Does this government care? If the government cared about the youth, they would not be killing us carelessly. They are making things worse for us in Mombasa. Our livelihoods have depended on the Port of Mombasa and the Cashew nuts. Now we hear that they are shifting it to Naivasha and the cashew nuts industry moved to Nakuru. This will make the poor coastal region poorer because our jobs are being taken away. The youth of Mombasa are angry. Anyone who can help us fight the government is really welcome including Alshabab. The government is an enemy to the youth” (Male Youth Respondent Majengo).

“...the police don't work in a coordinated manner. When they clash, they unleash their rage on youth. I doubt if ATPU, IPOA and GSU share information. This confusion should be solved by the government through better governance” (Male Youth Leader, Frere).

“...No one can solve our problems unless we do it ourselves. Trust is key but the police are sell-outs. They usually sell out informers therefore cannot be trusted” (Female Respondent, Kisauni).

Some government officials acknowledged that although some mistakes may have been made by the government in how it responded to violent extremism, these were being investigated. The majority of government officials, however, denied the existence of harsh Counter-Terrorism

responses such as mass arrests, profiling and disappearances. Some government officials attributed the women's experiences of police brutality to ignorance about their husbands' or sons' involvement in violent extremism. Others said that sensationalist media reports were misleading people about police response.

The officials also indicated that there were other ways that the government had been making efforts to respond appropriately to violent extremism. One of the most effective ways is through "community policing."¹⁷⁴ Policing becomes easier, and communities safer, if police forces are not seen as distant authority figures who only turn up when there is trouble, but are part of the communities they serve, build relationships, and gain people's trust. Especially among communities which have traditionally been hard to reach or suspicious of state authority. The hoped-for results are increased community resilience, more cooperation, and the ability to de-escalate tensions and avoid vicious cycles of polarization. In practice, community policing boils down to three core principles. The first is an emphasis on partnerships with community organisations and leaders, including youth, women, religious and ethnic minority groups, as well as business and other civil society organisations, which police should engage and seek to build honest, long term relationships with. The second is problem-solving, which means that police should listen to communities and be responsive to their concerns, even when they are not high on its own list of priorities. Finally, community policing is meant to be proactive and preventive because it seeks to educate and mobilise people before a problem has festered or turned into criminal activity¹⁷⁵.

Studies have shown that community policing can be effective in increasing people's trust in the police. Poor governance and corruption is responsible for the lack of trust in the government, generating disillusionment in many coastal communities. Al-Shabaab recruiters' prey on disillusioned members of communities such as youth who are frustrated by the Kenya's political elite's culture of impunity.¹⁷⁶ Kenya's security sector must reassess its counterterrorism strategy's consequences for marginalized groups¹⁷⁷. Good

¹⁷⁴ Newman,P(2017). Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region. CIO.GAL/189/17. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London.

¹⁷⁵ Newman, P. (2017). Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region. CIO.GAL/189/17. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King's College London.

¹⁷⁶ Badurdeen & Goldsmith: Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya

¹⁷⁷ Badurdeen, F. A. (2017). An evaluation of the Anti-Terrorism Laws in Kenya. Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference on Law and Religion in Africa, African

relations between the police and community are considered central to the success of such approaches which incorporate elements of public diplomacy to increase public support for countering violent extremism initiatives. Capacity building in cultural literacy, long lasting and far reaching investigations and intelligence gathering, processing and dissemination are essential for developing police 'preparedness' for responding to mass casualty events and anti-terrorism.¹⁷⁸

We found out that the relationship between the youth, their communities and the police in Kenya was very bad. This is because of lack of trust between them. The police treated every youth with suspicion while the youth looked for every opportunity to fight back for their rights. The youth and the community felt that the "hard approaches" used by the police in countering violent extremism were inciting more youth to be radicalized and join Alshabab who would help them fight the police in self-defence or in solidarity with fellow youth who were being harassed by police. The youth and their families complained that extra-judicial killings of the youth suspected to be radicalized or their disappearance only fanned the fires. In the eyes of the youth and the affected families, they saw this as "state instigated terrorism" because the police acted on behalf of the government.

The police on the other hand defended themselves and emphasized that "the shoot to kill order" was declared in special circumstances. They also told the community and youth present that the government has put mechanisms in place to ensure that the human rights of all citizens are upheld according to the rights-based constitution of 2010 of Kenya. For example, the government has established the Independent Policing Oversight Agency (IPOA) to provide for civilian oversight over the work of the police in Kenya. This is in a bid to promote trust, accountability and confidence in the National Police Service. Part of its work is to prevent police impunity and enhance professionalism in the interest of the public. The effectiveness of the Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) is crucial in investigating all forms of police misconduct including deaths in custody and serious injuries as a result of police action as it has the authority to investigate complaints against the police, monitor police operations and to look into particular incidents if delayed. The respondents in the FGDs agreed that the policies and institutions are good if they are followed with implementation.

They were also happy that OSSREA had provided a platform for dialogue to share their grievances and frustration, which was a positive step towards social cohesion. The local leaders told the law enforcers that it was important to harness the synergies of each other and work together to

prevent radicalization and violent extremism of the youth. Overlooking the local community and stereotyping youth as violent worked against the efforts that are being made to prevent VE and radicalization. They also promised to commit to working with the peace ambassadors and the law enforcers to report any suspicious youth radicalization activities. However, they emphasized that the police should avail the youth who had disappeared and were arrested as suspects of Alshabab. The local communities also requested the policy makers to ensure that law enforcers, CSOs, media and youth were trained and their capacity developed with soft skills in preventing violent extremism. They also asked for more joint knowledge sharing and awareness creation events with different stakeholders especially law enforcers on matters of P/CVE.

Still, other respondents suggested a combination of intelligence and law enforcement strategies. They were in support of invigorated policing operations to starve terrorist groups of their freedom of action through denial of space, finances and safe havens and prevent their growth by acquiring an intimate knowledge of their local environment and out-manoeuvring them politically within that space. They suggested that all avenues to promote radicalization and violent extremism should be sealed by addressing issues such as money laundering, drugs, smuggling networks and international groups involved in organized crime. They stated that policing should emphasize the development of networks and partnerships at national and international levels and foster partnerships among different police services as well as between the police and judicial agencies, security services, the financial sector and private business. There was consensus that the sharing of intelligence, cooperation in initiatives and capacity building are considered central aims of these networks and partnerships. They also agreed in the FGDs that border security should emphasize technological innovations, technologies for detecting explosives and solutions (digital skills).

ICT and social media in P/CVE: This study found out that extremist media plays a great role in influencing the radicalisation of fundamentalist Muslim youth. Violent extremists and terrorist organisation also use the media for “critical processes such as recruiting, training, propaganda, planning, surveillance, coordination and communication. New approaches to countering violent extremism and terrorism are increasingly oriented to networked communication technologies such as the internet and World Wide Web¹⁷⁹. There was general consensus among the participants that ICT and social media have played a great role in radicalization and propagating violent extremism but can also be used to de-radicalize them by developing counter narratives on VE. For example, the respondents agreed that the Islamic fundamentalist preachers incited the youth and radicalized others

¹⁷⁹ Shefet,D(2016). Policy options and regulatory mechanisms for managing radicalization on the Internet.Paris;UNESCO.

against Christians and even fellow moderate Muslims. Below are some of the excerpts from their responses:

“...They take to social media to preach solidarity with Islamic brotherhood who are being persecuted for their religion.” (Muslim Sheikh, Mombasa).

“...Social media spreads the word very fast. They also share videos of how to carry out the violent acts and hate speech.” (Male Youth, Garissa).

“...Through media, they share information on how operations will be carried out and by whom, when and where.” (Female youth, Mombasa).

A Muslim Cleric in Majengo Mombasa said:

“...Good Islam is a victim in this matter. Counter-measures need to be directed towards the flow of information and should aim to create disturbances that interrupt the flow or generate disinformation to confuse and subvert the message of violent extremists.” (Male Sheikh, Mombasa).

“...Here in Kenya, we are so advanced technologically. If our youth developed M-Pesa, what is so hard for them? The government needs to develop IT capacity to learn how to monitor terrorist activity online and also develop cultural and linguistic capacity for assessing online content. This will diffuse a lot of radicalization and terrorism in Kenya.” (Lecturer, Garissa University).

Social media platforms directly support the growing trend of online radicalization and recruitment for the Al-Shabaab. These sites channel young people vulnerable to extremist websites and forums to online radical forums and networks. Monitoring online platforms and websites for extremist content is an ongoing necessity for countering online radicalization and recruitment.¹⁸⁰ This highlights the need for community leaders and law enforcement officials to be equipped with the knowledge and technical skills needed to employ technology. There should be greater investment at the school and community levels to encourage safe use of the Internet through skill training programs and initiatives to encourage parents to be aware what their children are browsing.¹⁸¹ Online literacy programs developed for schools and universities can help promote critical thinking among the youth and students equipping them with the skills to challenge and counter ideas promoted online by extremists. Critical discussions and debate on relevant topics related to violent extremism stimulate thinking and influence related decisions while amplifying the voice of Muslims leaders committed to raising awareness and reducing radicalization and

¹⁸⁰ CC Harmon and P Holmes-Eber, *Women in Terrorist Undergrounds*, 2014, *CTX*, 4:4, 5.

¹⁸¹ M Bloom, *Bombshell: Women and Terrorism, Gender Issues*, 28:1-2, 2011, 2, 3.

recruitment.¹⁸² These measures, however, should not be misused for government surveillance of opposition movements or public dissent

The participants emphasized the need for capacity building in digital and soft skills for preventing violent extremism and radicalization. In the discussions that ensued, there was consensus that ICT and social media were a strong medium of passing on information. There was also upsurge of cybercrime, propagation of hate speech, propaganda, Photoshop and challenges of filtering or blocking some sites that enticed the youth to join Alshabab and ISIS. The participants agreed that actively exploring the potential of new media platforms like blogs and social networking sites to propagate counter-narratives as part of the broader countering violence extremism project. They also suggested use of strategies to disrupt or censor media online through technical or legal restrictions or monitor the use of media by terrorists in order to gather intelligence on ideology and motivation.

We found out that there are already interventions towards the ICT and media as a driver of violent extremism and radicalization. Salaam, a Mombasa-based radio station and Ghetto radio in Mathare are engaged in producing radio features and discussions on radicalization and recruitment.

Ideology and the dynamic nature of radicalization and violent extremism among youth: Ideology is a belief in something that appeals to a majority. It provides recruits and potential recruits with a framework for making sense of, and articulating their grievances. Radicalization and violent extremism are highly dynamic and have kept changing. Extremists' ideologies are not a new phenomenon and nor is it exclusive to Islam. Ideology is considered a driver of violence through radicalisation and extremism^{183, 184} Many radicalisation models and therefore de-radicalisation strategies stem from the underlying assumption that thought comes before action, i.e. it displays a cognitive bias. Radical Islamist Ideological strategies to countering violent extremism include religious dialogue, counselling, education and mentoring to challenge “maladaptive beliefs” counselling programs and dialogue, advisory and advocacy

¹⁸² Badurdeen, F. A. (2018). Roles, Motivations, and Recruitment Pathways of Kenyan Women Recruited into the Al-Shabaab, in Mazrui, A., Njogu, K., and Goldsmith, P. (Eds.). *Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya: Between the Rule of Law and the Quest for Security*. Nairobi: Twaweza Communications, 151-168.

¹⁸³ Bergin, A., Jones, D. M., & Ungerer, C. (2007). *Beyond Belief: Islamism, Radicalisation and the Counter-Terrorism Response*. Australian Strategic Policy Institute.

¹⁸⁴ Jacobson, M. (2010). Learning Counter-Narrative Lessons from the Cases of Terrorist Dropouts Countering Violent Extremist Narratives (pp. 72-83). The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

campaigns¹⁸⁵. Ideological approaches to countering violent extremism “should not try to convince the target audience that ‘their view’ is wrong, while ‘our view’ is right. Challenging the vision for a better world promised by revolutionary Islam is the best means for fighting the ideology. With every terrorist attack, the formats and procedures that were explained to the researchers differed. Ideology is a strong driver of radicalization and violent extremism.

In Kenya, an extremist brand of Islam has provided recruits to Al Shabaab with the faith-based ideology for justifying their violence. Extremist preachers have used some mosques and exploited social media such as Twitter and Facebook to recruit new members and spread their violent ideas. Online newsletters such as “Gaidi Mtaani”¹⁸⁶ as well as online videos such as ‘Mujahideen Moments’, have featured Kiswahili speaking extremists who legitimize their calls for violence on account of the “humiliation suffered by Muslims in Kenya,” the “Christian occupation of coastal land,” and the “revenge for the killing of prominent Islamic preachers.” These corrupted ‘religious’ ideologies play a central role in radicalising young Muslims, recruiting and indoctrinating them into terrorist ideology, and eventually asking them to commit acts of violent extremism or acts of terror.

In this study, there was support of the idea that ideology is a strong driver of radicalization and violent extremism while others defended ideology. Due to inter-generational tensions, the older generation believes that the youth cannot be trusted and are not proud of the youth. This excludes the youth and makes the youth rebellious. On the other hand, the youth feel that the older generation do not know anything and are primitive. This power dynamic driven by ideology are not helpful in the radicalization and violent extremism discourse. In the same vein, due to Islamic fundamentalist ideology that disregards everyone else who does not profess Islam, radicalization and extreme violence among the youth has taken root. Contrary to what was trending for years that led to ethnic and religious profiling of Somali and Muslims respectively, non-Muslims are among the terrorists who have been either killed or arrested in Kenya. There has been a shift in the principle terror threat Kenya faces – from that posed by Somali militants, to that posed by home grown terror cells.¹⁸⁷ At first the radicalization and recruitment efforts targeted youth in majority Muslims regions like Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighborhood, northern Kenya and the coastal region of Mombasa, but this appears to have changed. Militants now also recruit from non-traditional Muslims regions. This cancels the

¹⁸⁵ Qureshi, T., & Marsden, S. (2010). Furthering the Counter-Narrative via Educational and Social Grassroots Projects Countering Violent Extremist Narratives (pp. 132-143). The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism.

¹⁸⁶ <https://jihadology.net/category/gaidi-mtaani/>

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

stereotypes and negativity surrounding Muslims that has led to Islamophobia hence fuelling radicalization and VE.

It has also emerged that poverty is not the main driver of VE because even children from rich families are perpetrators and masterminds of terrorist acts in Kenya. For example, the mastermind of the Garissa University massacre was a son of a chief and a university of Nairobi student.¹⁸⁸ Further, it is interesting to note that Alshabab are now targeting security forces to recruit them¹⁸⁹. Respondents also reported that members of al-Shabaab's Amniyat, the group's intelligence wing, have targeted the security forces. There was evidence of a police officer killing seven of his colleagues at a police station in Kapenguria, West Pokot County in what has been portrayed as a lone wolf attack. The officer was later gunned down by members of the elite Recce squad of the General Service Unit (GSU) following an eight-hour siege at the police station. It was reported that that investigations have since shown that the officer had a network within the service. Media reports have also revealed that a network of young doctors on internship in Kenya and Uganda were planning a bio-terrorism attack on the hospitals. It took the network of National Intelligence Services in Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda working closely with the National Counter Terrorism Centre to have them arrested. This means that it is not unemployment that is a main driver of VE. Ideology may be playing a higher role than youth unemployment, poverty and religion.

Increasingly Kenya's security agencies have reported the problem of radicalization within local communities. In schools and universities over the last few years, the Principals have grappled with concerns that al-Shabaab agents have penetrated their institutions, allegedly influencing students and recruiting some to their cause¹⁹⁰. When asked to comment on this issue in Mombasa, the religious leaders responded:

...Islam has not been understood by most people. True Muslims do not hurt anyone. Which Muslim kills another in a mosque? These are just businessmen who have been paid to harm people. They make genuine Muslims suffer for nothing (FGD, Religious Leader Majengo).

¹⁸⁸ Momanyi,B(2015).Slain Garissa Terrorist Studied Law at Nairobi University. Capital News. <https://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2015/04/slain-garissa-terrorist-studied-law-at-nairobi-university/>

¹⁸⁹ Ombati,C(2016). Gunman in Kapenguria attack was a police officer at the station. Standard media group. <https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000208633/gunman-in-kapenguria-attack-was-a-police-officer-at-the-station>


¹⁹⁰ MOE(2017). Prevention and Management of Emerging Forms of Violence in Learning Institutions in Kenya: Perceptions of Education Stakeholders Situational Assessment Report 2017.

...Islamic religion uses the brain. You are supposed to think and choose the right and wrong. People choose according to their interests. Even those who kill others because they call them infidels (kafir) is a matter of choice and belief. In the same way, some people also have Islamophobia. They assume that violent extremism and terrorism is meted by Muslims alone. We have evidence here in Kenya that this is not true (FGD Religious Leader Frere).

...Beliefs like “pwani sio Kenya” (Coast is not Kenya) and “ukoloni mambo leo” (modern day colonialism) are used by insurgent groups here at the coast to terrorize people who do not come from this region or to fight the government. These groups join the opposition party and are discontented and disgruntled citizens. They propagate the exclusion and marginalization rhetoric to the youth to incite them. This could be one of the pull factors into radicalization and violent extremism (Chief, Majengo Sub-location).

...the truth of the matter is, even small Muslim children in nursery school could not share a desk or food or play with Christian counterparts. Radicalization starts at an early age, when the children attend Madrassa (Islamic classes). I could hear these small children abusing Christians as “infidels-non believers, pork eaters”. Since they are taught this from early childhood, they develop a strong belief against Christians. When such children grow into youth, if told to kill the infidels as Alshabab does, they will not hesitate (Female Teacher, Majengo).

Figure 16: Summary of drivers of violent extremism in Kenya:Context matters



Source: Authors' own conceptualization

3.1 Emerging Issues from the Drivers of Violent Extremism

The role of IT and Social media communications

The role media and communications play in responding to and contributing to terrorism, violent extremism and the countering aspects is manifold. First, the media whether in its negative portrayal of Arabs and Muslims or the uncensored images of Arab satellite channels *Al-Jazeera* or *Al-Arabbiya* - have contributed to the anger and radicalisation of the affected communities, as well as forged further distrust of the media and Western foreign policies.¹⁹¹ With more independent news channels emerging, and countering dominant narratives of conflicts and crisis, the reality is that media and presentation of political developments will vary according to region, culture and affiliation. This in turn, has considerable consequences on 'how the general public perceives and experiences terrorism and how it affects their personal lives. There is further scepticism towards the media's agenda, for example, the lack of good news stories on the day-to-day services provided by religious charity groups - instead media focuses on the negative socio-political and religious tensions and conflicts.¹⁹² It has been noted that since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, there are an estimated 5000 terrorist related websites now available¹⁹³. It is a concern that with the fast-paced evolution and accessibility of technology that future terrorist attacks may be more lethal¹⁹⁴.

Violent extremists and terrorist organisation also use the media for "critical processes such as recruiting, training, propaganda, planning, surveillance, and coordination and communicating. New approaches to countering violent extremism and terrorism are increasingly oriented to networked communication technologies such as the internet and World Wide Web¹⁹⁵ Actively exploring the potential of new media platforms like blogs and social networking sites to propagate counter-narratives as part of the broader countering violence extremism is one of the Strategies used by practitioners to disrupt or censor media online through technical or legal restrictions or monitor the use of media by terrorists in order to gather intelligence on ideology and motivation. Counter-measures need to be directed towards the 'flow' of information and should aim to create

¹⁹¹ DSTO-TR-2522 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a543686.pdf>

¹⁹² Ibid

¹⁹³ Jongman, B. (2007). Research Desiderata in the Field of Terrorism. In M. Ranstorp (Ed.), *Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction* (pp. 255-291). Oxon: Routledge.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid

¹⁹⁵ Stevens, T. (2010). *New Media and Counter-Narrative Strategies Countering Violent Extremist Narratives* (pp. 112-123). The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism

disturbances that interrupt the flow or generate disinformation to confuse and subvert the message of violent extremists.

To effectively generate intelligence from online media,¹⁹⁶ Kohlmann argues that governments need to develop IT capacity to learn how to monitor terrorist activity online and also develop cultural and linguistic capacity for assessing online content. In terms of media coverage following a violent attack, a number of commentators in the literature have made calls for or have offered recommendations for media guidelines to inform ‘responsible’ coverage emphasising the deployment of a diverse range of counter-narratives¹⁹⁷.

Extremist groups were some of the internet’s earliest adopters, and continue to be among its most enthusiastic users. The growth of hate speech and incitement to violence often directed against minorities, such as Muslims and Jews – is closely linked to the rise of social media.¹⁹⁸ Policymakers and technology companies have long grappled with this phenomenon. The most obvious solution is to remove illegal content, although this can be technically difficult given its volume and the number of channels through which it is disseminated. Moreover, not all content that is hateful, offensive, or extremist is necessarily illegal, which means that content removal or censorship can only ever be part of the answer.¹⁹⁹ Another approach is to push back against extremist content, for example through so called counter-narratives or alternative narratives.²⁰⁰ From this perspective, the internet is not a threat which needs to be curtailed or censored, but an opportunity to reach people, challenge their views, and prevent them from being sucked into extremism. “Counter-speech“, as it has recently been called, seeks to counter extremist content as well as engage with people who are looking for answers and may be vulnerable to extremist radicalisation and recruitment²⁰¹. This can take many forms: videos and advertisements, comments on Facebook pages, or one-on-one conversations that eventually move from online to offline. The key to producing more and better content is to reverse the top-down approach that many governments

¹⁹⁶Kohlmann, E. (2006). The Real Online Terrorist Threat. *Foreign Affairs*, 85(5), 115-124.

¹⁹⁷ Chowdhury, A., & Krebs, R. R. (2010). Talking about Terror: Counterterrorist Campaigns and the Logic of Representation. *European Journal of International Relations*, 16(1), 125-150.

¹⁹⁸ DSTO-TR-2522 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Literature Review <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a543686.pdf>

¹⁹⁹ Ibid

²⁰⁰ Nesser, P. (2015). *Islamist terrorism in Europe: a history*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.

²⁰¹ Grossman, M. (2014). Disenchantments: counterterror narratives and conviviality. *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, 7(3), 319–335. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17539153.2014.937097>


instinctively favour, and instead empower young people and civil society to take the lead. This may happen through contests, grassroots funds, or projects like Peer to Peer (P2P) which organises counter-speech competitions among university students.

Terrorist organisations have increasingly seized upon the opportunity afforded by the rapid emergence of new internet technologies as an avenue for recruiting individuals and mass dissemination of their ideologies. Online technologies are not the cause but rather serve as facilitators of radicalization.²⁰² Extremist organisations have carefully and strategically tailored their online strategies of recruitment so as to particularly lure young people through job offers and promises of academic scholarship opportunities. Technology users in search of religious information are likely to also find themselves lured by recruiters online. As is the trend with terrorist groups, the lure of romance and the motivation of revenge are also drivers with regard to the recruitment of women. The online frontier in terms of recruitment may seem like the problem however, political and socio-economic issues which are manifested offline are the real drivers to extremism.

In this study we sought to know the perceptions of the youth towards the role of ICT and media. The questionnaire that we administered to youth generated the responses in Figure 17 below:

Figure 17: Perceptions of the youth towards the role of ICT and media

Social media such as Facebook, twitter, YouTube, Instagram play a role in driving the youth to violent extremism.



Source: Field data

A majority of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed that the internet, social media like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Instagram and WhatsApp

²⁰² UNESCO (2017). Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media :Mapping the Research. ISBN: 978-92-3-100245-8

play a big role in radicalizing youth and leading them into violent extremism. They further told us that the internet is the fastest way to pass information. With advanced technology, it was easy to reach a wider audience and silently pass information that one has. They cited the example of fundamentalist Muslim preachers who radicalized youth online as cyber preachers. They also reported that sometimes false information is passed on and it angers the Muslim brotherhood or in cases of ethnic profiling. The youth then sympathize with fellow youth or tribesmen or Muslims. The youth also indicated that money laundering to support Alshabab and ISIS activities was easy due to on-line banking.

Children's involvement in radicalization and violent extremism: This issue emerged in almost all the FGDs that we conducted in Nairobi, Garissa and Mombasa research sites. The respondents told us that there was need to understand the background of the youth who are radicalized. They reported that radicalization starts early in the life of children, for example, as Muslims teach their children the Quran, they warn them not to associate with "eaters of pigs"-infidels or unbelievers. Muslim women in Mombasa reported that when packing lunch boxes for their nursery school children, they stress to them that they should not eat with non-believers. The respondents also agreed that it is true in some of the madrasa, children are not only taught the Islamic religion but are also radicalized. Again here, the link between radicalization and religion is brought to light.

Other than these, respondents in Nairobi informal settlements told us that children as young as 10 years were also part of terror gangs, were abusing drugs and were used as porters of guns by criminal groups. These were not necessarily Muslims. Most of them were involved in crime because of poverty. The criminals used children because they easily got away with so much. The extremists also found them easy to recruit. The respondents in all the research sites suggested that peace education may be integrated into the formal curriculum in schools and institutions of higher learning. Considering the new trends in violent extremism and radicalization in Kenya, the participants suggested that all agents of socialization may be sensitized about radicalization and VE. These include schools, religious institutions and media. The government should invest in capacity building of all stakeholders. Further, the Kenyan government should consider revising the curriculum to integrate P/CVE so as to create awareness and build resilience to VE. This is also because we found out that the process of radicalization starts as early as 3 years of age and that even children between 7-10 years were involved in violent extremism.

Cultural dimensions of P/CVE: This study found out that the traditional structures of governance, peace and security are very important but have been overlooked by the present national governments in Kenya. The respondents stated that culture has a great influence in solving conflicts. Cultural leaders in some instances were listened to more than the government of the day especially when dealing with land issues. They

stressed that cultural systems must be upheld. In Garissa the respondents expressed their respect for cultural elders as custodians of their natural resources. They also told us that there were clan and religious conflicts among them. These conflicts to some extent played into the radicalization and violent extremism experienced in the area in the sense that they lacked community cohesion to tackle the issue. It emerged that all problems centred around land go back to historical injustices of the colonialists and successive governments. Home-grown solutions are the only pragmatic way to solve these problems. African-Centred Solutions to African Peace and Security problems²⁰³ can lead to sustainable peace.

The local leaders also called on the policy makers and law enforcers to ask the Kenyan government to implement the recommendations of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission through open dialogue between communities and the government. They asked for inclusion of youth in these discussions. They went further to add that the TJRC should include cultural/traditional governance structures, local leaders, religious leaders, government officials, civil societies dealing with conflict transformation, media, gender specialists, grassroot actors and academia. They suggested that since communities were attached to their customary land, this is a pertinent issue touching on security and should not be ignored. They offered their support to try the TJRC as a first step to strengthening home-grown solutions and cultural leadership in conflict transformation.

Education: Family and school are the two social environments in which young people spend most of their time. Schools are particularly important, because they are places where young people make their first friends and begin to shape their ideas on society and the world around them. Radicalization is just the latest in a long list of social ills that teachers are meant to cure. When schools teach critical thinking, make students reflect and question, or help them understand nuances, they create resilience against the uncritical acceptance that is usually demanded by extremist groups. Equally, when schools promote diversity, counter stereotypes, create belonging, and make young people understand differences, they protect students against extremist narratives which rely on “us versus them. At the same time, schools can be places in which the first signs of radicalization become obvious. For many teachers, this creates a dilemma.²⁰⁴

While wanting to create safe spaces in which young people can experiment with ideas and engage in free and open debate, they have a responsibility. Rather than creating checklists, which are often too rigid to capture a

²⁰³ Touray, O.A. (2005). ‘The Common African Defence and Security Policy’, African Affairs, 104(417), pp.635-656

²⁰⁴ UNESCO (2017) Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media: Mapping The Research. ISBN: 978-92-3-100245-8

complex social phenomenon, many countries have chosen to offer teachers training on how to detect and respond to radicalisation, while obliging schools to establish procedures for dealing with potential cases swiftly and appropriately.²⁰⁵ We found out that training of teachers in P/CVE in Kenya has not yet started. In as much as peace education has been integrated into the curriculum, it was being taught under life skills that are not examinable. Most teachers therefore ignore teaching life skills education. This is quite unfortunate considering the threat of terrorism in Kenya and the role of the youth in it. There is an urgent need in developing teacher training curriculum and materials on P/CVE and rolling out the program. Approaching P/CVE through schools and the curriculum can go a long way in creating awareness about the drivers of violent extremism, policies in place, state and non-state actors' roles in P/CVE, what has worked, what has not worked and why. Students will be sensitized about early warning signs of radicalization and building resilience to impacts of terrorism.

This research found out that the level of education of the youth is a critical factor in youth unemployment which is the main driver of violent extremism in Kenya. While the graduates of tertiary institutions were hopeful, those with basic education and the youth out of school, training, not in employment felt more hopeless. Therefore, we concluded that the high unemployment rate in Kenya is due to a myriad of factors. Youth might lack the training, physical space, or legal capacity to participate in public life and engage in P/CVE-related programming the same way the government, CSOs, community and other stakeholders may lack knowledge on how to engage the youth. Our discussions with local and national level government officials indicated that the Kenyan government officials may not feel that they have the resources, time, or staff to work with youth in understanding the drivers of violent extremism or in developing P/CVE policy and programming, despite the interest, policies, programs and political will to do so. Further, and despite best intentions, a lack of institutional capacity and corruption may result in government promises that cannot be fulfilled, further stoking feelings of frustration and disenfranchisement. However, this study revealed the importance of education in the society. Education is one of the major tools that P/CVE programming can use to de-radicalize youth, empower them with knowledge and skills for job creation and de-radicalization narratives.

We sought to know how best the youth want their curriculum to look like so that it is outcomes/competency based. The youth told us that they were aware of the efforts being made by the government to revise the curriculum to become competency-based, the partnership of the government with the private sector to help the students get on-job training, the partnership with INGOs to promote vocational education, job creation and entrepreneurship.

²⁰⁵ UNESCO (2017). Preventing Violent Extremism through Education: A Guide for Policy-Makers.

However, the Kenyan government is still struggling with massive youth unemployment with little hope for change of this situation due to most industries closing down. The country was also grappling with issues surrounding the quality of education that is offered in basic and tertiary education institutions in Kenya. The curriculum offered was devoid of the 21st Century skills-digital and soft skills to enable youth get jobs today and tomorrow.

This study found out that TVETs were highly recommended as beneficial and solution to youth unemployment by the African Charter and in the Decade of Youth Action. The African Development Bank followed up this by supporting 17 African states in setting up education plans for TVETs. However, these programmes continue being marred with a myriad of problems. They have not been able to address the mismatch of skills and labour market needs, they have failed to prepare youth adequately for transformative digital jobs of today and tomorrow, their curriculum lacks soft skills, the public have a negative attitude towards TVET and the curriculum has not been revised for decades, making it obsolete. The youth whom we interviewed told us that they prefer the general education because it had better career mobility and wages than TVET. They also told us that in their view, TVET graduates faced a bleak future with the collapse of manufacturing industries in Kenya. They told us that to the best of their knowledge, TVETs did not have well-structured work-based programmes on jobs/internships. As such they saw youth employment as a pipe dream. Furthermore, the curriculum was too theoretical. The government has not equipped the laboratories with modern equipment nor trained the TVET lecturers in new methodologies of teaching.

Prison: Prisons are frequently described as “hotbeds “of radicalisation, because they are places in which (predominantly) young men experience personal crises and are cut off from traditional social relationships, such as family and friends. At the same time, prisons can offer opportunities for de-radicalisation and disengagement, and enable terrorists to re-integrate into society safe and orderly prisons should be every government’s first priority. Another important measure is the training of prison staff, especially frontline guards who are typically the first ones to notice suspicious behaviours. Having officers who can recognise signs of radicalisation and extremist recruitment not only ensures that such activities can be detected, but also guarantees prisoners ‘right to practice their religion. This should be complemented by sophisticated systems of reporting and intelligence, which make it possible for prison authorities to report information and consult with national authorities and intelligence systems. In this study, we did not interview youth in prisons.

Returnees: Although the threat from returnees can easily be exaggerated, studies demonstrate that returnees have diverse motivations, which means that each case needs to be dealt with individually. Some are disillusioned and want to turn away from extremism, while others are traumatised and

need psychological treatment. Yet others are dangerous and pose a significant risk, not least because they have taken part in a violent conflict, acquired fighting skills, and have integrated into international terrorist networks.²⁰⁶ Moreover, there are women and children who have not participated in fighting but may have been radicalised to varying degrees. Based on United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, many countries have made it easier to stop individuals from participating in foreign conflicts and prosecute them upon their return. Even so, prosecution may not always be appropriate, effective, or sufficient. In many cases, prosecutors find it hard to prove individuals 'membership in a terrorist organisation or their involvement in atrocities, resulting in acquittals or very short sentences. Given the large number of ongoing investigations, governments have prioritised cases in which the evidence is clear or when suspected individuals pose an imminent danger.

Returnees are marginalized, making them quite vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism. They are considered to be culturally "unclean" and are not trusted by their communities, government and families. Some families and communities demand that they should be cleansed. In spite of amnesty, returnees in Kenya are targets to the police brutality. This study found out that many returnees keep hiding and moving to other towns to avoid stigmatization. The reintegration and rehabilitation are weak so most returnees seek to go back to Alshabab. If their families don't welcome them, the youth reported that the rejected returnees often turn to gangsterism and drug addiction. We also found out that in most cases, the returnees do not have a source of livelihood, nor skills for job creation. It is sad to also note that the government of Kenya has not yet put in place a psychosocial support and social integration framework of ex-combatants of Alshabab under the amnesty law.

According to the Kenyan National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism, one of the priority areas of focus is 'Rehabilitation and Returnees' and it is further stated that the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is mandated to coordinate the provisions of "counseling, critical reasoning tools and knowledge to shift their mind-sets and enable them to be peaceful and law-abiding citizens." Despite the mention of rehabilitation and returnees in the National Strategy and National Action Plan there is no clarity on whom exactly is categorized as a "returnee" or "extremist" not just by the state but also the community²⁰⁷. In addition,

²⁰⁶ Badurdeen, F. A. (2017). An evaluation of the Anti-Terrorism Laws in Kenya. Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference on Law and Religion in Africa, African Consortium for Law and Religion Studies (ACLARS), International University of Rabat, Morocco 14-16 May 2017.

²⁰⁷ Badurdeen, F. A. (2017). An evaluation of the Anti-Terrorism Laws in Kenya. Paper presented at the Fifth Annual Conference on Law and Religion in Africa, African

there is lack of framework expounding on the procedure of handling those that the state has labelled as “terrorists” and “violent extremists” especially after they have returned and what exactly the process of rehabilitation encompasses, the manners in which it is to be conducted and the entities, if any, that will work alongside NCTC. Policy ambiguity and deficiency has led to uncertainty among returnees as to whether this will proliferate their profiling by security actors once they leave Al Shabaab. In this study, youth expressed great interest and enthusiasm in being engaged to advise the government on reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-Alshabab recruits.

Youth whom we interviewed also felt that amnesty was a hoax. The returnees we interviewed reported that they were very frustrated because they were wanted by both Alshabab-as traitors and by the security agents. Already they were frustrated by the fact that what Alshabab promised them in terms of salary and a good life was not true. Coming home, they were not welcome and were treated with suspicion by everyone. They gave examples of cases in Mombasa and Isiolo where even after surrendering as ex-Alshabab soldiers, some ex-combatants were put on a bill board by the government as wanted criminals. When the government met them, they did not wait for any explanation from them. They just shot them.

Refugees, migration and P/CVE: One of the most hotly debated political issues in recent years has been the connection between migration and terrorism there is no empirical evidence to support the claim that migration as such causes terrorism. Instead, the link seems to change depending on the circumstances in which migration takes place and the kind of terrorism it may (or may not) produce. It is important to keep in mind that only a miniscule percentage of migrants will ever turn to terrorism. Just like all other populations that are thought to be “at risk“, the vast majority will remain peaceful. Fake migrants- terrorists pose as refugees and use migration routes in order to cross international borders. Genuine migrants become vulnerable to radicalization as a result of their migration experience. The underlying driver may be a sense of cultural and social dislocation – being removed from family and friends, overwhelmed by a new country, culture, and language, and with no clear perspective or certainty for the future. Over time, this sense of dislocation can be amplified by thwarted expectations, experiences of rejection, and economic frustrations. From the extremists ‘perspective, such migrants offer a pool of grievances and potential resentments that can be activated and channeled into violence.

It is necessary to analyze the linkages between migration and violent extremism for a number of reasons: First, there have been isolated incidents

of violent extremism perpetrated by migrants and we need to try to understand why these occurred. Second, it is important to bring data and evidence to bear on an often-misinformed public debate, acknowledging from the outset important research and data gaps. Third, there are linkages between migration and violent extremism, but not those that normally attract attention. Finally, looking to the future, the risk of radicalization among migrants may grow unless evidence-based policies and interventions to prevent violent. Data on the intersections between migration and violent extremism are even scarcer. Some refugees may be fleeing direct experiences of violent extremism; other migrants may be leaving their homes because of factors related to the emergence of violent extremism, for example, lack of opportunities to make a living for themselves and their families. Some migrants and refugees may themselves perpetrate acts of violence because of their traumatic migration experience; others partly due to conditions in the countries where they arrive, or for reasons not related to either situation extremism is developed now.

Almost all the examples discussed here concern cross-border or international migration, although there is also limited evidence of radicalization to violent extremist agendas among internal migrants and internally displaced persons (IDPs). While statistical systems on migrants and migration remain underdeveloped – especially for irregular migration, which may be particularly relevant for analyzing violent extremism – they are certainly more robust than data on violent extremism. Where such data do exist, they tend to focus more on incidents and victims, rather than on perpetrators. It to the in-[immigration] or out-movement [emigration] of (groups of) people from one place to a usually distant other location, with the intention to settle at the destination, temporarily or permanently. This process can be voluntary or forced, regular (legal) or irregular (illegal), within one country or across international borders.

Refugees are a sub-group of international migrants who seek asylum or have obtained protection abroad under the terms of the UN Refugee Convention of 1951. Causes of forced migration include civil war, government repression, state failure, or (also) something else.

The refugees that we interviewed in Garissa reported that they are no longer migrants, because they were born in Kenya, speak its language, and – in many cases – are full citizens. Refugees experience crises of identity which result in them questioning their sense of belonging. While they no longer identify with the culture and traditions of their parents or grandparents, whose countries they often only know from holidays, they are equally alienated from their countries of residence, where they feel unaccepted and sometimes experience discrimination (counter-terrorism). Creating resilience (countering violence extremism), and wider political efforts, such as human rights education, promoting inclusion, as well as combating intolerance and discrimination are linking migrants and migration with the rising threat of violent extremism. Terrorism migrants,

asylum seekers and refugees are more likely to be the victims of violent extremism than the perpetrators the relationship between migration and violent extremism.

Prejudices about migrants' nationality, race and religion create tenuous ties to terror.

Fragile, weak or failing states have been associated with terrorism for some time. Somalia which, since the ousting of Mohamed Siad Barre (who had been Somalia's dictator from 1969 to 1991), has drifted from one crisis to the next. The country, formerly colonized by Italy and Great Britain, broke up into several parts (Puntland, Somaliland, Jubaland and the Federal Republic of Somalia) and has seen the rise of al-Shabaab which, in addition to the "work" already done by various warlords, further devastated the country. After a futile intervention of Ethiopia in 2006, the terrorist organization al-Shabaab came out on top and produced further large refugee outflows, especially in the direction of Kenya where Dadaab, the largest refugee camp in the world (in fact a complex of three camps, with, as of 2016 330,00074 refugees – down from half a million) was in existence since 1991. Despite the presence of UN and AU troops, al-Shabaab has not been defeated.

Many governments' first priority is the detection of "fake migrants", that is, terrorists who pose as refugees in order to cross international borders. This is the principal responsibility of law enforcement and the intelligence services, although awareness raising efforts among the employees and volunteers at refugee holding centers, as well as the refugees themselves, can contribute to making sure that suspicious individuals are found and reported. Indeed, as various examples have shown, it is by enlisting the support of the vast majority of law-abiding refugees that the authorities are most likely to detect the small number that are intending to cause harm.

To prevent (genuine) refugees from becoming vulnerable to radicalization, it is essential to provide the full spectrum of counter-radicalization responses. Where possible, the authorities need to prevent extremist groups from gaining access to refugee centers and monitor refugees who are believed to have been recruited, while staff, volunteers and the refugees are well positioned to recognize early signs of radicalization and pay attention to changes in behaviour. This means that reporting, intervention, and support mechanisms that are available to non-refugees need to be tailored – and made available – to refugees. Most importantly, given that refugees are likely to feel overwhelmed by a new culture, language, and environment, and many experience feelings of dislocation and anxiety (which – in turn – can be exploited by extremists), it is vital for policymakers to create certainty, establish clear pathways, ensure that decisions are taken transparently and swiftly, and support their integration as soon as it has been decided that they can stay. There are no in-depth studies on the intersection of the two phenomena.

International migration is driven not just by political violence, armed conflict and state repression but just as much by economic and environmental factors. This type of migration is likely to grow enormously in the years to come due to climate change and loss of employment opportunities due to globalisation. Migrants can be terrorists and terrorists can be migrants. The arrival of large refugee populations, when not properly handled, increases the risk of attacks in the recipient country by both domestic and transnational terrorists. The interface between terrorism and migration is a rich field for research that deserves all the attention it can get so that well- and ill-founded concerns can be separated and policies can be built on solid evidence

There have been examples of refugee (and IDP) camps becoming spaces for violent extremism in at least three ways. One is where camps may become bases for violent extremist fighters to rest and recuperate. A second and related example is where refugee camps may become recruitment grounds for violent extremist groups. The Kenyan authorities have also expressed similar concerns that Al-Shabaab may be recruiting in the Dadaab camp complex in the north of the country. Third – and perhaps the most pervasive example of the intersections between refugee camps and violent extremism in the still limited literature – is the risk of refugees becoming radicalized to violent extremism. Existing literature highlights three particular conditions that allow for radicalization to violent extremism to take root in refugee camps: poor education, especially where the gap is filled by extremist religious indoctrination; a lack of work; and the absence of freedom of movement any effective programme will require the collaboration, sharing of information and alignment of objectives among donors, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the local population and the host government, as much as with the refugees.

Addressing economic and financial needs is also important, even if these are not the main drivers of radicalization. Refugees seek means to support their families and skills that might be useful for the longer term. Those needs must be fulfilled within the country of refuge, where refugees may compete with local people for both jobs and consumer goods. This means that attempted solutions should engage local players not usually directly involved in refugee issues, such as the business community.

Interviewees recommended that funding streams by donors need to be flexible and less “siloes” to accomplish this successfully. Another common problem with international relief funds is that they are available at the start of a crisis, but dwindle over the long term. Policymakers and stakeholders can increase their dialogue about long-term financial planning for refugee crises.

At the same time, jobs and education are only a partial answer. Psychological and security needs are key components. Refugees have experienced trauma in escaping their country of origin and often face abuse, humiliation and powerlessness in their place of refuge. This arena is

where militant groups may step in and try to radicalize vulnerable populations with narratives of empowerment through violence. Providing refugees opportunities to participate in their own governance, such as in camp administration, can also help mitigate this risk. A fourth intersection between migration and violent extremism takes place after migrants and refugees have settled; there is wide acknowledgment that radicalization to violent extremism among settled migrants and refugees and their descendants is a symptom of social exclusion (Undocumented, no IDs, feel excluded, sympathize with Somali).

Refugee camps are characterized with a continuum of inclusion/exclusion conditions with unequal access to resources, capabilities and rights, which then leads to inequalities. But we are seeing new trends where terrorist attackers are Kenyan citizens. But who work with other immigrants from Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania. Most of those radicalized have been targeted by jihadist groups after they have left their home countries. Many migrants, asylum seekers and refugees have experienced difficult situations in their lives and face discrimination. Furthermore, they are also often tainted by false or dubious assertions concerning their impact on the economy, social cohesion, ideological beliefs and motivations, and national identity. To portray them additionally as a threat to national security and seeing them as potential terrorists only adds to their hardship. It may result in the unintended consequence of further alienating them, thus increasing their susceptibility to violent extremist narratives and agendas.

Refugee camps tend to be insecure places as they are generally under-policed. Refugee camps are often synonymous with misery and lack of perspective for those who have to wait there for a change to the better. Like prisons, they can become breeding grounds for terrorism. Slightly more than half of the world's refugee population is younger than 18 years old. Young people are more prone to join terrorist groups than older people. Open-ended residence in such camps offers recruitment opportunities for terrorists and guerrilla fighters. Anecdotal evidence also links other refugee camps to terrorist recruitment, e.g. in Kenya where up to half a million of Somali refugees found shelter. Some of them become the targets of recruiting efforts of opposing forces in the civil war. In the case of the terrorist attack on Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall on 21 September 2013, one of the perpetrators was, according to press reports, a refugee from the Kakuma camp. Another suspect in that attack appeared to make a phone call to someone in Dadaab, Kenya's largest camp of Somali refugees.¹²⁵ 67 people died in that attack, while 175 suffered injuries from the four terrorists. Militants from Al-Shabaab as well as some of those who oppose Al-Shabaab, recruit in camps like Dadaab, sometimes under false pretences, making promises to gullible young men which they are not going to keep. Radicalisation to violent extremism and recruitment for terrorist groups becomes more likely where refugee camps are in direct contact with fighters from an ongoing conflict.

Two themes have been central to global security debates over the past few years: migration and violent extremism. These two phenomena are happening at the same time and are consequently often conflated, but are they really related? In East Africa, there is yet no empirical evidence that confirms any direct link between migration and violent extremism, says Dr Simon Nyambura, director of the Intergovernmental Agency on Development's Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. He says when taken within the context of the masses of people migrating, 'those who engage in violent extremism are statistically insignificant'. This assertion, at a time when populist discourse attempts to suggest that any and all migrants from communities affected by terrorism are themselves terrorists, is important. It doesn't deny that some migrants may engage in activities relating to violent extremism, but it clarifies that the actions of a few individuals should not be conflated with the whole. Nyambura was speaking at a recent technical workshop on migration and countering violent extremism convened by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). The workshop is part of ongoing applied policy research being carried out by the ISS that aims to improve policies and practices on both issues.

Anti-immigrant sentiments suggesting that the recent rise in forced migration is, at least partly, responsible for violent extremism are not being effectively countered by facts, research has shown. A lot of these sentiments are rooted in stereotypes and prejudice. Effective responses need to move away from these generalisations, and focus on the facts that explain these dynamics. The actual relationship between migration and violent extremism remains largely unexplored. Attempts to understand both migration and violent extremism through a global lens have largely ignored issues relating to xenophobia and racism, losing sight of key facts and nuances needed to guide action. However, some critical conversations have begun to confront the emerging realities of migration and violent extremism. These must be guided by evidence over rhetoric.

What we know so far is that conflict, instability and repression are driving many people away from their communities. Dr Khalid Koser, executive director of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, notes that it is critical to understand 'migration as a consequence, not a cause, of fragility'. Indeed, in Africa – from Northern Nigeria across the continent to Somalia – some people, dreading continued insecurity and terrorism, are leaving their homes to seek (and hopefully find) refuge elsewhere. The majority of Africans forced to move are internally displaced and/or settle in neighbouring countries, while others travel further afield, to other parts of Africa, to Europe, the Middle East and the Americas.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that about 5.1 million Syrians have fled the country and are now refugees. The majority of Syrian refugees are currently in neighbouring countries (specifically Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey), while just over one

10th have fled to Europe. Approximately 6.5 million are internally displaced.

Attempts to understand migration and extremism haven't taken xenophobia and racism into account. At the same time, there has been significant migration within and out of Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan, owing, in part, to volatility in some parts of those countries. The people moving include victims and witnesses to atrocities and acts of terrorism in search of peace, stability and a better future – for many, just a future. However, beyond this, and without detailed studies that include interviews with migrants on their reasons for leaving, the actual relationship between migration and violent extremism, particularly from a causal point of view, remains largely unexplored.

There is also a dearth of research into links between migrating communities and their involvement in violent extremism. It is this latter issue that is most contentious and has been used in populist and nationalist rhetoric geared to rejecting inward migration. The best policies and practices are ones rooted in evidence and informed by experience. Building that evidence base is key. Mass migration and violent extremism must be examined separately and in conjunction. Both are important, and both require careful thought and action. White House Summit to Counter Violent Extremism, displacement should be on their agenda.

Concerns are being expressed that internally displaced person (IDP) and refugee camps may become fertile recruitment grounds for violent extremism. There is certainly evidence in countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, of radicalization leading to violence within refugee camps. Making the link between displacement and violent extremism may reinforce efforts to find solutions for refugees. The risk of radicalization is especially heightened where IDPs and refugees find themselves in protracted situations: marginalized, disenfranchised, and excluded. Finding solutions for displaced populations should be an urgent priority for humanitarian reasons but also as a security issue. The engagement of development actors is particularly needed to ensure that IDPs and refugees find solutions—whether return, local integration, or settlement elsewhere—that are sustainable. As a way to counter violent extremism collaboration between development and humanitarian organizations should now become an urgent priority. The link to displacement can illustrate that countering violent extremism is as much about human rights, development, and empowerment, as it is about military, intelligence, and security interventions a rights-based approach to displaced persons can be an integral component of the global effort to counter violent extremism.

Systemic mistrust and profiling the youth remains one of the most significant impediments to increased inclusion of young people in P/CVE decision-making. This stems from a general tension between government and security forces and young people. Within government, a closed-door approach to security matters and the perception that youth are either

troublemakers or are not credible or qualified counterparts may discourage otherwise champions from pushing for greater youth cooperation and partnership (an opinion voiced in four of the consultations). In parallel, youth are wary of ulterior motives behind government engagement, particularly in environments with a history of domestic spying. Such dynamics of mistrust also discourage otherwise peace ambassadors or champions from partnering with other stakeholders on P/CVE. It also fuels the frustrations and grievances of the youth, further making them vulnerable to radicalization and violent extremism. When we asked the youth whom they trust, they responded as follows:

...I doubt if the youth trust anyone else other than fellow youth. You see, we are treated with suspicion everywhere we go...in the community, by police, by the government. In fact they look at us as trouble makers."

...If only the government and community realized the great potential in youth, they would partner with us than mistrust us. It seems to be something deep rooted in them and we cannot change that."

Lack of voice: Channels for youth input and collaboration at the local and national level are often unknown, unclear, or nonexistent – from curricula reform promoting tolerance to budget allocation for youth-led job force training programs and effective counter-messaging campaigns. The youth are not consulted on matters that affect them. Decisions are made for them. This angers them. A lack of open and equitable access to policy and decision-making processes in general, but particularly related to P/CVE, is a challenge. If consulted, the youth told us that they can partner with the government, CSOs, media, academia and other stakeholders to openly share their knowledge and experiences especially the ex-combatants/returnees. They wanted their views to be incorporated in policies of youth employment, rehabilitation, reintegration, prison reforms, and relationships with police, education curricula, anti-corruption dialogues etc.

"The spider web and amoebic "nature of drivers of terrorism and radicalization has revealed that it is neither economic reasons, nor Islamic religion that are the main drivers of VE. Drivers of violent extremism are like a spider web. They are interconnected, intertwined and interwoven. No single driver can stand on its own. While we have explicit drivers, others are implicit and act as catalysts to others. There is need to refocus on ideology powered by ICT as the main driver of VE. This is a threat to human security and all have to be on a high alert."

Truphena Mukuna

4. Global, Regional and National Progress towards P/CVE

The United Nations Security Council increasingly emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach to countering the spread of terrorism and violent extremism. In its resolution 2178(2014), the council underscores that CVE is an essential element in addressing the threat to international peace and security. The council encourages Member States to engage with local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to prevent and counter violent extremism. It also calls on Member States to address the conditions conducive to the spread of VE, including empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders and all concerned civil society in promoting social inclusion and cohesion. This is a rejoinder to the UN Security Council Resolution 1624(2005) which calls states to commit acts of terrorism and counter incitement motivated by extremism and intolerance. It led to the formulation of a UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 calls for a holistic and inclusive approach to counter terrorism. The strategy re-asserts the position that an effective counterterrorism strategy must combine preventive measures with efforts to address both real and perceived grievances and underlying social, economic, and political conditions.

The UN Secretary General's Plan of Action of 2016 provided impetus to the growing focus on prevention, reasserting the call to member states 'to enhance efforts to counter this kind of violent extremism The *Plan of Action* advanced a 'whole of society' approach, and states were encouraged to complement counter-terrorism strategies with proactive measures to deal with the range of factors associated with the growth of violent extremism. The plan promoted efforts such as dialogue and conflict prevention; strengthening good governance, human rights and the rule of law; engaging communities; empowering youth; promoting gender equality and empowering women; facilitating education, skill development and employment; and strategic communications, including the use of the Internet and social media.⁴ It affirmed that both security and development actors were necessary contributors to solutions and that non-state actors should have a stake in these processes. National action plans on PVE were promoted as the means for achieving these goals.

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) United Nations, New York. Here, the council stresses the role of media, CSOs, business communities and academia in broadening the dialogue on P/CVE to promote understanding and inclusion. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (hereafter the 'Strategy') adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2006 represents an important milestone in our collective pursuit towards strengthening the global response to terrorism, based on a common strategic and operational framework. Four pillars of action underpin the Strategy, namely: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; Measures to prevent and combat terrorism; Measures to build States' capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this

regard; and Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.

The Strategy calls on Member States to ensure its implementation at the national, regional, and international levels, and for enhanced coordination and coherence within the United Nations system in promoting international cooperation in countering terrorism. However, despite this expression of political commitment and important institutional progress, widespread and integrated implementation of the Strategy remains elusive in many regions of the world. In addition to the general capacity challenges confronting a wide range of Member States, a contributing factor to this is the lack of in-depth knowledge and understanding of the Strategy in several capitals and the role that different stakeholders, including the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), can play in supporting national, regional, and sub-regional implementation. The CTITF Office in partnership with the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, organized a Regional Workshop for Member States of the Eastern African region and relevant international partners that was aimed at increasing awareness and understanding of the Strategy and thereby attaining broader political support from officials of ministries and agencies in capitals and the wider sections of civil society. The discussions at the Workshop provided positive indications towards enhanced regional efforts to implement the Strategy in all its dimensions, with the support of the United Nations system through the CTITF framework.

Since the February 2015 White House CVE Summit, the international community has increasingly converged and coordinated on two multilateral agendas: that of CVE and that of Youth, Peace and Security. Milestones such as the Amman Youth Declaration and the Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism later that year paved the way for the adoption of the first-ever United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Youth, Peace, and Security in December 2015, UNSCR 2250²⁰⁸. Calling for youth inclusion in peace and decision-making processes that affect their lives, UNSCR 2250 highlights the need to engage and invest in young women and men as partners in preventing conflict and pursuing peace. The convergence of these two agendas presents an opportunity to build partnership between youth and government, at all decision-making levels and across sectors, in preventing and countering violent extremism (referred to as P/CVE throughout the rest of this document)²⁰⁹. Making that happen requires a tangible shift in policy.

Government and youth can work together in addressing violent extremism at the national and local level, recognizing youth as partners in peace and agents of positive change. Injustice and corruption; lack of (quality)

²⁰⁸ <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc12149.doc.htm>. December 2015.

²⁰⁹ 2016 US State Department and USAID Joint Strategy on CVE,

education, socioeconomic marginalization and unequal opportunity, alienation, and lack of voice are vices that should be worked on. There is global momentum and recognition behind the need and value of working with youth at all levels of decision-making to effectively address violent extremism²¹⁰ and programming. The 2016 UNDP report *Preventing Violent Extremism through Promoting Inclusive Development, Tolerance and Respect for Diversity* emphasized the complexity of PVE and the structural factors contributing to the problem.

Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violent Extremism and Promote Peace produced at the Global Youth Summit against Violent Extremism²¹¹ revealed that many CVE initiatives frame youth as either perpetrators of violent extremism or as possible victims of recruitment into violent groups. But this narrative fails to capture the fact that most young people are part of the solution. They are not turning to violence but working to build peace and prevent violent extremism. Violent extremism needs meaningful youth participation at all levels. To effectively address the drivers of violent extremism and promote peace, youth must be engaged as partners in the design and implementation of relevant programs and policies. With commitments to learning, to partnership, to innovation, to prevent and counter violent extremism, young people and youth organizations around the world are already building peace and preventing violent extremism.

The Youth Action Agenda is focusing on preventing violence and recruitment into violent groups; facilitating young people's disengagement from violent groups; producing and amplifying new narratives; fostering effective and meaningful partnerships; providing opportunities to partner with young people to counter violent extremism and build positive peace. They are also taking part in multidisciplinary task forces and other initiatives to counter violent extremism at the national, regional, and global level. Some of these initiatives include:

- Initiating partnerships with local and national governments, intergovernmental organizations, civil society, the private sector, and the media;
- Undertaking contextual research and use the findings to guide and inspire policy and programs; and
- Working together with other youth and youth-led organizations working on countering violent Extremism

Other policies/programs and strategies at the global level in P/CVE include:

²¹⁰ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674

²¹¹ <https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-Youth-Action-Agenda-1.pdf>

- Guiding Principles on Youth in Peace building: A Practice.²¹²
- Young Peoples Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note²¹³
- Youth Global Programme for Sustainable Development and Peace (Youth GPS) 2016-2020²¹⁴
- United Nations Secretary-General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism²¹⁵
- Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals²¹⁶

4.1. IGAD and P/CVE Action

The 9/11 attacks in New York, regarded as a watershed moment in major international terrorism, led to a widespread military campaign against terror. In Africa, however, national, regional and continental efforts to address this growing crisis have been underway as far back as the early 1990s. African Union Commission had been blamed for long for not have a well-coordinated counter terrorism strategy yet most of her Member States who are also signatories to the UN Security Council expected concerted efforts towards P/CVE at the regional level. Besides, researchers have identified Africa to be the 5th most targeted region after Latin America, Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East. In October 2017, African Union and European Union had their first Annual US-African Union Countering Violent Extremism conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. However, Africa has a Continental Framework for Counter-Terrorism which is made up of the 1999 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. This was supplemented in 2004 by the AU Action Plan for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. AU has appointed a Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Co-operation in 2010. The 2004 supplementary protocol has only 15 ratifications out of the 41 Member States of the OAU. This protocol mandates the AU Peace and Security Council powers limited to information gathering and sharing to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on terrorist activities. According to Article 7(i), the Peace and Security Council must ensure the implementation of the AOU convention at the regional level. For example, from 1992 onwards, the Organisation of

²¹²<http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Practice%20Note%20Youth%20&%20Peacebuilding%20-%20January%202016.pdf>

²¹³

<http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/pdf/Practice%20Note%20Youth%20&%20Peacebuilding%20-%20January%202016.pdf>

²¹⁴

http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Youth/Youth-GPS%20-%20Overview_final_UNDP50logo.pdf?download.

²¹⁵ http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/70/674

²¹⁶

African Union (OAU) had adopted various counterterrorism frameworks that focused on the efforts of cooperation and recognising terrorism and violent extremism as criminal acts. These frameworks were refined and expanded after the transition of the OAU into the AU.

In 2002, the AU adopted the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which embraces practical measures that substantially address Africa's security challenges. It takes into consideration measures in areas such as police and border control, legislative and judicial measures, the financing of terrorism and the exchange of information. A key outcome of the 2002 Plan of Action was the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which serves as a structure for centralising information, studies and analyses on terrorism and extremist groups. It further promotes the "coordination and standardization of efforts aimed at enhancing the capacity of member states to prevent and combat terrorism".⁷ The AU's Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism, adopted in 2004, takes cognisance of the links between terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organised crime, money laundering and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

In 2007, the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) created AMISOM. Initially with a six-month mandate, the mission aimed to provide support to the transitional government of Somalia and to take all necessary measures appropriate and, in coordination with the Somali national defence and public safety institutions, to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups,¹² among other responsibilities. AMISOM has been working together with the Somali National Army (SNA) and through coordinated efforts during the course of 2014, gained back some towns initially seized by the insurgents. Whilst some progress has been made by AMISOM and the SNA's counter-efforts, al-Shabaab continues its attacks, specifically targeting these military operations. Apart from the attacks and human rights abuses orchestrated by al-Shabaab, reports by Human Rights Watch indicate that government security forces, AU troops and allied militias have also been responsible for indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and detention.

Given the challenges and hostilities that result from military intervention, alternate approaches must be considered – for example, a dual-track approach where mediation is used together with military intervention, or other soft power approaches. African leaders and delegates attend the Africa Union Peace and Security Council Summit on Terrorism in Nairobi, Kenya (2 September 2014) and propose creating a special fund to combat Islamist militant groups growing in strength from Kenya to Nigeria.

The African Youth Decade, 2009-2018 Plan of Action (DPoA) is a framework for multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional engagement of all stakeholders towards the achievement of the goals and objectives of the African Youth Charter. The Regional Economic Communities are called

upon to mainstream the DPoA in their youth related strategies and programmes, advocate for the accelerated implementation of the DPoA and contribute to resource mobilization efforts at regional and country levels. Bilateral organizations, multi-lateral agencies, including the UN system, Civil Society and non-governmental organizations, the private sector as well as, the Pan African Youth Union and other youth organizations are equally urged to align their activities over the next decade with this Plan of Action and to mainstream youth perspective into their programmes and interventions.

Agenda 2063, Aspiration 6 underscores the importance of engaging and empowering youth. It holds a lot of promise for the youth of Africa stating that they shall be socially, economically and politically empowered through the full implementation of the African Youth Charter; Africa will be a continent where the talent of the child and the youth will be fully developed, rewarded and protected for the benefit of society²¹⁷; All forms of systemic inequalities, exploitation, marginalization and discrimination of young people will be eliminated and youth issues mainstreamed in all development agendas.²¹⁸; Youth unemployment will be eliminated, and Africa's youth guaranteed full access to education, training, skills and technology, health services, jobs and economic opportunities, recreational and cultural activities as well as financial means and all necessary resources to allow them to realize their full potential; Young African men and women will be the path breakers of the African knowledge society and will contribute significantly to innovation and entrepreneurship; The creativity, energy and innovation of Africa's youth shall be the driving force behind the continent's political, social, cultural and economic transformation.²¹⁹

The AU's Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism, adopted in 2004, takes cognisance of the links between terrorism, drug trafficking, transnational organised crime, money laundering and the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Somalia also presents an example of a primarily military intervention to counter al-Shabaab. In 2007, the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) created AMISOM. Initially with a six-month mandate, the mission aimed to provide support to the transitional government of Somalia and to take all necessary measures appropriate and, in coordination with the Somali national defence and public safety institutions, to reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups,¹² among other responsibilities. AMISOM has been working together with the Somali National Army (SNA) and through coordinated efforts during the course of 2014, gained back some towns initially seized by the insurgents. Whilst some progress has been made by AMISOM and the SNA's counter-efforts, al-Shabaab continues its attacks,

²¹⁷ AUC(2014).The African Agenda 2063.Addis Ababa,Ethiopia

²¹⁸ Ibid

²¹⁹ AUC (2014).The African Agenda 2063.Addis Ababa,Ethiopia.

specifically targeting these military operations. Apart from the attacks and human rights abuses orchestrated by al-Shabaab, reports by Human Rights Watch indicate that government security forces, AU troops and allied militias have also been responsible for indiscriminate attacks, sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and detention.¹³

In January 2016, the United Nations Secretary General presented to the General Assembly a Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/RES/70/254 -PVE) which is a comprehensive approach to countering violent extremism as well as systematically preventing drivers of violent extremism at the local, national, regional and global levels. In July 2016, the Assembly adopted a resolution with reference to the Plan of Action and invited Member States, regional and sub-regional organizations to consider national and regional plans of action for P/CVE. AMISOM, which held a conference on the role of women in P/CVE in December 2015, has been involved in efforts aimed at ‘strengthening the role of Somali women in countering violent extremism in Somalia, [and] providing support to the government in developing the appropriate policy framework to support protection of their rights’²²⁰.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development which comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda – and UN Women signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2016 that prioritizes women and countering violent extremism.²²¹ Meanwhile, the European Union’s (EU) Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) project has been engaging with women’s organizations ‘to contribute to building greater resilience in communities vulnerable to radicalization’. Part of this initiative has been to conduct training workshops that ‘provide guidance to women’s organizations on how to increase engagement with security providers. at both the state and clan level, in order to establish or improve de-radicalization initiatives’²²².

Violent extremists not only cause death and destruction, they poison societies with hateful ideologies, and hinder peaceful development, dialogue, and cooperation. There can be no doubt that violent extremism – in all its forms and manifestations – will continue to represent one of the major challenges to peace and security in the IGAD region.

²²⁰ United States Department(2017). Country Reports on Terrorism 2016. Bureau of Counterterrorism. United States Department of State Publication

²²¹ Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD and UN Women to promote gender and resilience initiatives within the IGAD region, July 2016, <http://africanewswire.za.com/igad-and-un-women-to-promote-gender-and-resilience-initiatives-within-the-igad-region/>

²²² European Commission, STRIVE for Development, Luxembourg: European Commission, 2015, 20.

- IGAD countries need to create awareness of the importance of dealing with persistent political and structural drivers of radicalization.
- New issues, such as the security implications of migration.
- intensify its capacity-building efforts
- re-examine their own policies and actions.

There is practically no country in the IGAD region that has not been affected by violent conflicts some of which have led to extremism. Violent extremists not only cause death and destruction, they poison societies with hateful ideologies, and hinder peaceful development, dialogue, and cooperation. Threats from violent extremism are constantly changing, and they come in different forms and manifestations. expressed their concern about violent extremism as a persistent threat to peace and security. multi-faceted nature of the problem, and called on states to pursue “comprehensive and sustainable efforts” in countering “the manifestations of terrorism“ as well as the “various social, economic, political and other factors, which might engender conditions in which terrorist organizations could engage in recruitment and win support. Furthermore, the Declaration made it clear that countering violent extremism was not just the responsibility of governments or security agencies, but should involve, where appropriate, “young people, families, women, victims of terrorism, religious, cultural and educational leaders, civil society, as well as the media. one of the principal objectives in writing the report was to offer practical suggestions, nearly half of the document consists of examples of good practice that I have found. My motivation for doing so was to demonstrate that countering violent extremism is not a revolutionary new idea that countries can learn – and benefit – from each other’s ‘experiences.

The strength of countering violent extremism lies in offering a systematic framework for the mobilization of groups and individuals that are not typically involved in security issues. By giving a role to mayors, teachers, religious leaders, youth workers, bloggers, and even students, it reaches out to all sectors of society and defines the struggle against violent radicalization as a collective task. In doing so, it recognizes the social roots of the problem, enables early interventions, promotes non-coercive solutions, and serves as an early warning system for emerging conflicts and grievances. Indeed, even governments who have been suspicious of the “CVE agenda” tend to agree that, in the long term, threats from violent extremism cannot be contained through security measures alone. Critics have pointed out that the effects of countering violent extremism programmes can be difficult to measure²²³ Others have argued that countering violent extremism has “securitized” civil society by turning

²²³ Newman, P(2017). Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR), King’s College London

religious leaders and educators into government “spies“, while failing to address the underlying structural drivers and root causes from which manifestations of violent extremism cannot be separated²²⁴.

In April 2018, the **Inter-Governmental Authority on Development** inaugurated its Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Djibouti. The ICEP/CVE centre is an institution that is offering a dedicated platform to institutionalize the prevention and countering violent extremism in the Horn and Eastern Africa. This centre is expected to serve as a resource to CSOs, media, academia, governments, youth, religious and cultural leaders, peace and security experts, business practitioners and all partners interested in P/CVE. This centre endeavours to empower youth, women, religious leaders, CSOs to enhance resilience and build capacity in CVE. It will engage in training and learning, networking, counter-messaging, state and non-state actors working together, research and innovation. The ICEPCVE has developed a regional strategy that mainly targets efforts of harnessing soft power in dealing with radicalization and violent extremism. It aims at deepening the understanding of the drivers of VE, the role of research and analysis in deepening the understanding of drivers of VE for evidence driven policy responses, capacity development, and strategic communication on matters/CVE. This centre works closely with the IGAD Peace and Security Sector Program together with the Conflict Early Warning and Response unit (CEWARN-IGAD).

Attempts at dialogue and mediation produced some positive results. These attempts provided an opportunity for the perpetrating groups to present their grievances and have these issues addressed, to an extent, as in the case of Mali. The second lesson is that where mediation and dialogue took place, although it may have not resolved the conflict, the ceasefires prevented further violent conflict from occurring for a period of time.

The past few years have witnessed the rapid expansion of P/CVE initiatives climaxed by the establishment of the P/CVE Centre of Excellence at Djibouti. It is intended to contribute to the growing body of information about P/CVE, and promote an effective evidence-based approach to addressing terrorism.

Coordinated and harmonised efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism are underway among and between states, together with regional, continental and international organisations. These efforts include collaboration on border security, sharing intelligence, and the development of strategies and frameworks, such as the African Union’s (AU) Counter Terrorism Framework and the United Nations’ (UN) Global Counter-terrorism Strategy awareness-raising was described as, for example,

²²⁴ Ibid

enlightening the youth on the need for peaceful coexistence, patriotism, accountability, obedience to rule of law and good governance.

The Eastern African region continues to face serious counter-terrorism problems due to limited State capacity, inter-State disputes, socio-economic challenges, porous borders and, more recently, radicalization and extremism. Almost all States in the region have experienced terrorists' attacks. Terrorists exploit geographical spaces where State penetration is limited, inter-ethnic strife, differences in governance systems and judicial procedures, lax or non-existent border controls and a variety of transnational organized criminal networks to carry out their activities. Somalia, which has increasingly become a hub for terrorists to recruit and train, presents a growing challenge for States of the region and the international community (CTITF,2011). The objectives of the meeting were four-fold: to promote more effective leadership at national and regional levels to address key challenges under the respective pillars of the Strategy; enhancing operational cooperation within the region on key areas relevant to the Global Strategy; a regional action plan for the implementation of the Global Strategy in the region and enhancing and recognizing the role of civil society in the implementation of the Global Strategy. This meeting was building on P/CVE work that was already underway in the region under the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development's (IGAD) Capacity-Building Programme Against Terrorism (ICPAT), the Strategy on Combating Terrorism in East Africa of the East African Community (EAC) and the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO). The US East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative – intended to improve police and judicial anti-terrorist capabilities of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. On 2 September 2014, African leaders and delegates attend the Africa Union Peace and Security Council Summit on Terrorism in Nairobi, Kenya and propose creating a special fund to combat Islamist militant groups growing in strength from Kenya to Nigeria.

Figure 18: African leaders and delegates attend the Africa Union Peace and Security Council Summit on Terrorism in Nairobi, Kenya



Source: GALLO IMAGES/REUTERS

4.1.1. Women and P/CVE activities in the IGAD Region

Women also play important roles on the front lines of countering violent extremism and working against radicalisation at various levels. At the most basic level, women play an important role as agents of positive change within the family because of their position within families and communities, ‘women are well placed to detect early warning signals of oncoming violence or radicalization that men may miss’²²⁵. Grassroots women’s groups often enjoy privileged access in their communities and are therefore able ‘to provide essential information to those working to counter extremism’²²⁶ and mediate local conflicts, disseminate narratives that counter violent extremism and reach out to vulnerable people. In some areas, female imams have begun preaching religious tolerance in their communities in an effort to counter violent extremism.²²⁷ The Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism (KCPCVE) specifically emphasizes ‘the role that women can play as strategic partners and actors in countering violent extremism’, and includes women as stakeholders in the plan. Critical initiatives at the policy level in Kenya do not adequately respond to the needs of women either as actors in or victims of violent extremism. The fact that women’s challenges and needs are invisible or oversimplified within existing policy frameworks suggests that Kenya is at risk of losing intervention opportunities that would help to address this challenge.

AMISOM, which held a conference on the role of women in P/CVE in December 2015, has been involved in efforts aimed at ‘strengthening the role of Somali women in countering violent extremism in Somalia, [and] providing support to the government in developing the appropriate policy framework to support protection of their rights’²²⁸. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development which comprises Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda and UN Women signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2016 that prioritises women and

²²⁵ M O’Reilly, Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies, Inclusive Security, October 2015, www.inclusivesecurity.org/publication/why-women-inclusivesecurity-and-peaceful-societies/.

²²⁶ Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, Women and Countering Violent Extremism, 2014, 4, <https://giwps.georgetown.edu/sites/giwps/files/Women%20and%20Countering%20Violent%20Extremism.pdf>.

²²⁷ R Coomaraswamy, Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, New York: UN Women, 2015, 226.

²²⁸ AMISOM, AMISOM Conference on the role of women in countering extremism ends in Djibouti, December 2015, <http://amisom-au.org/2015/12/amisom-conference-on-the-role-of-women-in-countering-extremism-ends-in-djibouti/>.

countering violent extremism.²²⁹ Meanwhile, the European Union's (EU) Strengthening Resilience to Violence and Extremism (STRIVE) project has been engaging with women's organisations 'to contribute to building greater resilience in communities vulnerable to radicalisation'. Part of this initiative has been to conduct training workshops that 'provide guidance to women's organisations on how to increase engagement with security provider sat both the state and clan level, in order to establish or improve de-radicalisation initiatives'.²³⁰ In May 2016 several major donors, UN agencies and women's organisations met in Nairobi 'to discuss ways in which women can be pushed to the front of the security agenda' in P/CVE.²³¹ The intention is that the inputs to the discussion will be used to draft a joint programme aimed at strengthening women's abilities to counter violent extremism, including 'training for mothers on how to respond and react to children when they express radical thoughts and opinions as well as a call for more research into women's roles in extremist organisations.

4.2. Kenya and P/CVE:

Kenya is a strong counterterrorism partner of the United States throughout East Africa. Kenya faces an ongoing terrorist threat from the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab, against which the Kenya Defence Forces have engaged in military operations in Somalia since 2011 as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Kenya remained a target of al-Shabaab terrorist attacks, most of which occurred along the northern border region with Somalia. ISIS also claimed responsibility for at least one attack that occurred in Nairobi. The magnitude of the youth radicalization and recruitment problem prompted the state's security agencies and development partners to formulate and execute counter terrorism, radicalization and de-radicalization policies (Prevention of Terrorism Act – 2012; Security Laws (Amendment) Act – 2014; and, the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, in 2016) based on the globally framed countering violent extremism (CVE) discourse²³². Youth radicalization into the Al-Shabaab poses as a security threat.

²²⁹ Intergovernmental Authority on Development, IGAD and UN Women to promote gender and resilience initiatives within the IGAD region, July 2016, <http://africanewswire.za.com/igad-and-un-women-to-promote-gender-and-resilience-initiatives-within-the-igad-region/>

²³⁰ European Commission, STRIVE for Development, Luxembourg: European Commission, 2015, 20.

²³¹ F Bagenal, Somali Women Raise Voices Against Extremism, *News Deeply*, May 2016, www.newsdeeply.com/womenandgirls/somali-women-raise-voices-against-extremism/.

²³² USAID. (2011). The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice. Washington, DC: USAID.

Radicalization of young people raised considerable alarm when a broad range of ethnic groups of Kenyan nationals were involved along with Somali nationals. These Kenyan youths mainly came from the North Eastern, Coast regions and urban informal settlements such as Majengo (informal settlement in Nairobi's Eastlands). The context of youth being radicalized raised concerns when the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea reported that hundreds of impoverished Kenyan youths were recruited into Al-Shabaab²³³. The AlShabaab did not recruit only fighters from Kenya but also trained them as suicide bombers²³⁴. Kenya with its bulging youth population and the contextual factors provide a ripe situation for youth radicalization. Some of the driving factors for youth radicalization were as follows: discrimination, grievances, poverty, lack of opportunities in employment and education²³⁵.

Kenyan security services expanded efforts to counter terrorist threats to urban and rural areas in Kenya, some resulting in the reported arrests of suspected operatives associated with al-Shabaab and ISIS. Reports of violations of human rights by Kenya's police and military forces during counterterrorism operations continued, including allegations of extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and torture. Kenyan officials cooperated closely with the United States and other partner nations on counterterrorism, including investigating and prosecuting terrorism cases.

4.2.1 Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Constitution of Kenya provides an important framework for addressing the contextual, political, economic, and social factors that feed violent extremist ideology. If well implemented, devolution will decentralize political power and give communities more decision-making power in choosing leaders, determining developmental priorities, and demanding accountability and the transparent use of public resources. Article 238 of the Constitution of Kenya provides guidance on how to promote and better guarantee national security. Specifically, Article 238 (2) (b) provides that "national security shall be pursued in compliance with the law and with the utmost respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms."²³⁶ The Constitution takes into account that security organs can be the cause of the violation of the rights of innocent Kenyans

²³³ United Nations Report. (2012). Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea pursuant to Security Council resolution. Retrieved from http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/UN_REPORT_2012.pdf (Accessed on May 8, 2017)

²³⁴ Botha, A. and Abdile, M. (2017). Reality versus Perception: Toward Understanding Boko Haram in Nigeria. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*,

²³⁵ Badurdeen, F.A. (2012). Youth Radicalization in the Coast Province of Kenya, *Africa Peace and Conflict Journal*, 5(1): 53-64.

²³⁶RoK. (2010). The Constitution of Kenya. Kenya Law Reports. <http://www.kenyaembassydc.org/pdfs/The%20Constitution%20of%20Kenya.pdf>

in their quest of fighting terrorism. Extra-judicial killing should result in the perpetrators being tried for murder in the 2006 bill, entitled Kenya Anti-Terrorism Bill 2006.²³⁷ A revised bill was finally passed in 2012 and became law under the name ‘The Prevention of Terrorism Act, No. 30 of 2012’.

The Kenya Government has created the National Counter-Terrorism Centre, designed to function under the National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) and as part of the East African Counterterrorism Initiative established by the American government. Though created in 2004, the Centre was not established by law until the passage of the Security Law Amendment Act of 2014 September 2016, of the National Strategy to Counter Violence Extremism (NSCVE), supposedly a multi-layered and multi-level approach to “rally all sections of Kenyan social, religious, and economic life to emphatically and continuously reject violent extremist ideologies and aims in order to shrink the pool of individuals whom terrorist groups can radicalize and recruit.”²³⁸ In September, Kenya’s president launched the government’s National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism²³⁹. The National CVE strategy (NCVE), officially launched in September 2016 expanded the focus, of the fight against terrorism by incorporating collaborative CVE approaches bringing together the government, communities, civil society, the international community, and the private sector. Subsequently, CVE plans have been decentralized through the design of county-level CVE action plans in Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, Mombasa, and several counties in northern Kenya.²⁴⁰ Counties have been encouraged to produce their own anti-terrorism strategy documents that address their own specific circumstances. The National Counter-Terrorism strategy launched in 2016 marked the commitment of the government to incorporate soft approaches aimed at prevention complementing the state’s hard security measures for countering terrorism.²⁴¹

²³⁷ *Ibid*

²³⁸ Ombati, C. (2017). Taskforce to counter violent extremism launched in Nairobi. *Standard Digital*, March 27. (<https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001234212/taskforce-to-counter-violent-extremism-launched-in-nairobi>), Accessed on November 18, 2017.

²³⁹ UNDP (2017). Support to the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Kenya. http://www.ke.undp.org/content/dam/kenya/docs/Peace%20Building/FF3LT%20-%20Support%20to%20the%20Prevention%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20Kenya_Final.

²⁴⁰ Ogada, M. (2017). *Emerging Developments in Countering Violent Extremism and Counter terrorism in Kenya*. Nairobi: Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies

²⁴¹ Ruteere, M. and Mutahi, P. (2018). *Civil Society Pathways to Peace and Security: The Peace and Security for Development Programme in Coastal Kenya*, in Mazrui, A., Njogi,

Kenya's 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2011 Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, and 2010 Prevention of Organized Crime Act together provide a strong legal framework under which to prosecute acts of terrorism. The Security Laws (Amendment) Act 2014 The Security Laws (Amendment) Act introduced a new amendment to the Prevention of Terrorism Act expanded the intelligence services' powers by introducing a specific section on "Special Operations" related to national security. The Security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 (SLAA) altered 20 laws to strengthen Kenya's legislative framework to fight terrorism, including: criminalization of participating in terrorist training; establishing a framework for a coordinated border control agency; strengthening the mandate of Kenya's National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC); and broadening evidentiary standards to allow greater use of electronic evidence and recorded testimony in terrorism prosecutions. The Kenyan judiciary continued to demonstrate independence, exemplified by the High Court's actions in 2015, when it struck down some provisions of the SLAA as unconstitutional and demonstrated capacity to handle cases related to terrorism. The judiciary remained hampered, however, by insufficient procedures to effectively use plea agreements, cooperation agreements, electronic evidence, and undercover investigative tools. Allegations of corruption in the judiciary, including in the High Court, have persisted. Government counterterrorism functions were divided among the three branches of the National Police Service – the Kenya Police (including the paramilitary General Service Unit), the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (including the investigative Anti-Terrorism Police Unit, the Bomb Disposal Unit, and the Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit), and the Administration Police (including the Rural Border Patrol Unit) – as well as non-police agencies, such as the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and elements of the Kenya Defense Forces.

The Registration of Subscribers of Telecommunications Services Regulations (2014) of the Kenya Information and Communications Act (KICA, 1998) impose data disclosure requirements on operators. An operator is required to provide the CA "access to its systems, premises, facilities, les, records and other data to enable the Commission inspect" them. It also provides access at the Telecommunications Providers. In Kenya, law enforcement agents are physically present within telecommunications operators' facilities, formally, with providers' knowledge Social Media Monitoring.

In May 2016, the government relocated NCTC, NIS, and the National Security Council to the Office of the President. Interagency coordination improved, particularly in information sharing; however, shortages in

resources and training, corruption among some personnel, and unclear command and control hindered operational effectiveness. The government continued, with donor support, to work on a single crisis response command center as a result of lessons learned from the 2015 attack at Garissa University College in which al-Shabaab terrorists killed at least people. Kenyan officials participated in a range of U.S. government-sponsored capacity-building programs funded and implemented by the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice. Programs included training in crisis response, border operations, investigations, and prosecutions. Notable among these was the Department of State's third annual East Africa Joint Operations Capstone exercise, a month-long crisis response training series hosted in Kenya for Kenyan, Tanzanian, and Ugandan law enforcement personnel. The exercise culminated in a large-scale simulated response to a terrorist incident in multiple locations over a 20-hour period, and included community engagement and human rights-related issues, as well as a senior-level tabletop exercise.

Border security has remained a challenge for Kenya due to vast, sparsely populated border regions and largely uncontrolled land borders. This has been exacerbated by security agency and other government resource gaps and corruption at multiple levels. Kenyan officials have emphasized the importance and challenges of border security in their discussions with U.S. counterparts. Kenya is one of six countries participating in the President's Security Governance Initiative (SGI), focusing on the management, oversight, and accountability of the security sector at the institutional level. In Kenya, SGI program priorities include border security and management, administration of justice, and police human resource management, with countering violent extremism (CVE) a cross-cutting issue for all three focus areas. The Kenyan government is working on preventing the transit of foreign terrorist fighters, including Kenyan nationals, attempting to join al-Shabaab in Somalia or ISIS in Iraq, Libya, or Syria. SGI-supported exchange visits with U.S. border security officials have helped to improve Kenyan interagency coordination efforts and refinement of a country border control strategy, as well as legislative changes. Gaps in border security and national identification systems continue to hamper law enforcement agencies' ability to identify and detain potential terrorists entering and leaving Kenya. Terrorist screening watchlists, biographic and biometric screening, and other measures are largely in place at major Kenyan ports of entry, but screening procedures are sometimes inconsistently or minimally applied, particularly at smaller border posts and airports.²⁴²

Kenya has continued its partnership with the United States to strengthen traveller screening using the Personal Identification Secure Comparison

²⁴² Cherono, S (2018). Shame of Police Bribed to Let in Alshabbab Bombers. Daily Nation, Friday November 16, 2018.

and Evaluation System (PISCES) at major ports of entry.²⁴³ The Kenyan government works to prevent the transit of foreign terrorist fighters, including Kenyan nationals attempting to join al-Shabaab in Somalia or ISIS and those returning from fighting with these groups abroad.²⁴⁴ In October, Kenyan prosecutors obtained the first conviction under the 2015 SLAA, which criminalized travel to receive terrorist training. Under the ruling, a Kenyan man was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment after being arrested in Somalia and returned to Kenya. Kenyan security services detected and deterred terrorist plots during 2016 and responded to dozens of claimed, or presumed, terrorism-related incidents. Kenyan law enforcement did not repeat the widely criticized large-scale security operations of 2014 that appeared to target certain communities. Nonetheless, there were numerous allegations in 2016 that the government or its agents committed arbitrary and unlawful killings, particularly of known or suspected criminals, including terrorists²⁴⁵.

Kenya's Independent Policing Oversight Authority has continued to make progress in fulfilling its mandate by investigating multiple cases of police misconduct and referring cases to the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions. Kenyan law enforcement agencies work with regional organizations and the broader international community, including the United States, to increase their counterterrorism capacity and to secure land, sea, and air borders.

4.2.2. Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF) regional body. The Kenyan government implements relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including 1373 and the ISIL (Da'esh) and al-Qa'ida sanctions regime for preventing the financing of terrorist acts. It has made progress on its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime since its June 2014 removal from review by the FATF for strategic deficiencies. Kenya's financial intelligence unit, the Financial Reporting Center (FRC), has continued to build its capacity to monitor the formal financial system. The government has not yet appointed a permanent director to the FRC because of lack of essential resources. It is also facing challenges meeting minimum staffing, physical security, and information technology requirements. The FRC also needs an electronic reporting system for analyzing suspicious transactions. The Central Bank of Kenya has continued to encourage Kenyan citizens and residents to use the formal financial sector, which is subject to regulatory oversight, to increase overall

²⁴³ Ibid

²⁴⁴ ²⁴⁴ Cherono,S (2018).Shame of Police Bribed to Let in Alshabbab Bombers. Daily Nation, Friday November 16,2018.

²⁴⁵ Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, <https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/>

financial transaction integrity through greater financial inclusion, but the use of unregulated informal financial mechanisms has continued. Non-governmental organizations are required to report suspicious transactions to the FRC, but compliance is not always enforced²⁴⁶.

The Government of Kenya has demonstrated leadership and political will through the formation of a national taskforce on Countering Violent Extremism, aimed at ensuring that all relevant Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) acting within their mandates, will undertake coordinated efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. It is working closely with bi-lateral partners like UNDP, JICA, USAID, EU among others including private practitioners with investments in the country. The government has launched an unprecedented multi-agency security operation. Investments have been made in technology, skills, and innovating new approaches to countering terrorism. One of the crucial tasks being built on this strategy is the disengagement and rehabilitation of returning foreign terrorist fighters who completely disavow the use of violence and any adherence to the ideology and aims of terrorist groups including prevention and returnee reintegration efforts. The strategy is coordinated by the National Counter Terrorism Centre at the Office of the President. Among other priorities, the strategy highlighted the importance of engagement with civil society and development of county-level countering violent extremism (CVE) action plans.²⁴⁷

The Lamu, Kwale, and Mombasa county governments established county-level CVE strategies in 2016. Kenya's government has increased its efforts and coordination with international partners to advance P/CVE, including counter-radicalization to violence, counter-messaging, and the rehabilitation and reintegration of foreign terrorist fighter returnees. The government has continued some small-scale efforts to rehabilitate and reintegrate former al-Shabaab fighters, facilitators, and sympathizers, but efforts were constrained by the lack of a clear legal framework and supportive public messaging. The national P/CVE strategy has identified this as a key area of importance. The Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism (KCPCVE), launched in February 2017, was developed to 'define the manifestation and practical measures for countering radicalization and violent extremism in Kwale County.'²⁴⁸

²⁴⁶ The 2017 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: <http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>.

²⁴⁷ UNDP (2017). Support to the Prevention of Violent Extremism in Kenya. Fact Sheet. <http://www.ke.undp.org/content/dam/kenya/docs/Peace%20Building/Fact%20Sheet%20-Support%20to%20the%20Prevention%20Violent%20Extremism%20in%20Kenya>.

²⁴⁸ Republic of Kenya and Human Rights Agenda, Kwale County Plan for Countering Violent Extremism, February 2017, www.researchgate.net/publication/314119072

Kenya's second-largest city, Mombasa, is an active member of the Strong Cities Network.²⁴⁹ Kenyan civil society organizations are working to address the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism in Kenya, often with assistance from the United States and other international partners. International and Regional Cooperation: Kenya is an active member of the African Union, including on the Peace and Security Committee, and is a troop-contributing country to AMISOM. Kenya remains engaged with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and hosted several consultative meetings on IGAD's development of a regional P/CVE strategy during the year. Kenya is also a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism. Although not a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Kenya is an active participant in relevant GCTF activities and is participating in the GCTF endorsed International CT/CVE Clearinghouse Mechanism as a pilot country, which is being developed as a means to help countries and donors optimize civilian counterterrorism and CVE capacity-building programs.²⁵⁰

We sought to find out what the opinion of the youth was towards P/CVE policies. In the first instance, we were interested in knowing their knowledge base in P/CVE in Kenya. Their responses are presented in Figure 9 below: The majority of the youth disagreed that there was adequate awareness towards issues and policies of P/CVE among them. Their knowledge base was low.


We then gave them a follow-up question to ascertain their answer. We asked them to agree or disagree with the idea that understanding the perception and expectation of youth is crucial to design effective P/CVE policies and programs. A majority of them agreed. Their responses are presented in Figure 10 below. This was followed by another statement that sought them to agree or disagree with whether engagement of youth in violent activities might be due to their limited participation in P/CVE policy debates and practices. Again, majority agreed to this statement. Their responses are presented in Figure 11 below. Finally, in regard to youth engagement in P/CVE in Kenya, we sought to know to what extent the youth were consulted. Again, a majority disagreed that they had not been consulted on the programs or policies in place by the Kenyan government and other non-state actors. All these responses indicate that youth are excluded from matters that concern them in as far as policy is concerned.

Kwale_County_Plan_for_Counteracting_Violent_Extremism_
The_first_of_its_kind_in_Kenya_by_Human_Rights_Agenda.



²⁴⁹ United States Department of State Publication (2018). Country Reports on Terrorism 2017. Bureau of Counterterrorism

²⁵⁰ United States Department of State Publication (2016). Country Reports on Terrorism 2016. Bureau of Counterterrorism

Figure 18: Youth Knowledge on P/CVE Policies



Source: Field data






Table 5: Summary of Global, Regional and National Policies, Programs and Strategies of PCVE

<p>Global Policies/ Protocols</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (2005) • UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006) • Amman Youth Declaration and the Global Youth Summit Against Violent Extremism • Resolution 2178 (2014) • UNSCR 2250-United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) on Youth, Peace and Security (2015) • UN Security Council resolutions, including 1373 • United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism (A/RES/70/254-PVE) (2016) • UN Women MoU on Women and Countering Violent Extremism (2016) • UN Sustainable Development Goals 5, 8, 10 & 16 • Youth Action Agenda to Prevent Violent Extremism and Promote Peace • Guiding Principles on Youth in Peace building: A Practice. • Young Peoples Participation in Peacebuilding: A Practice Note • Youth Global Programme for Sustainable Development and Peace (Youth GPS) 2016-2020 • United Nations Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism
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<p>Regional P/CVE Policies/Strategies (AUC & IGAD)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • From 1992 onwards, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had adopted various counter terrorism frameworks. • AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (2002) • African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) • AU's Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism (2004) • AMISOM (2007) • The African Youth Decade, 2009-2018 Plan of Action (DPoA) • Agenda 2063 Aspiration 6 • AU's Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism adopted in 2004 • AMISOM Conference on Role of Women in P/CVE(2016) • IGAD-Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (2018) • The ICEPVE Strategy (2018) • Collaboration on border security • Sharing Intelligence • The development of strategies and frameworks such as African's Union Counter Terrorism Nations (UN) Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Awareness Raising • IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism (ICPAT) • The Strategy on Combating Terrorism in East Africa on the East African Community (EAC) • The Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) • The Kenyan National Youth Policy (KNYP-2006) • A Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MOYAS) • The Youth Enterprise Development Fund (2006)
<p>National Policies/ Strategies &Programs (Kenya)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDP- 2006) • Kenya National Youth Council Act (2009) • Youth Enterprise Development Fund (2009) • National Action Plan on Youth Employment 2007-2012. • The Kenya National Youth Policy and Youth Employment Marshal Plan • Kazi kwa Vijana Programme (jobs for Youth) • Youth training and skills development though National Youth Service and Youth Polytechnics • Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) • Women Enterprise Development Fund (• Labour Intensive public works programme • Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP)

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Labour Institutions Act • Labour Relations Act • Occupational safety and Health Act and • Work injury benefits act • Persons with Disability Act 2003 • The National Policy and Action Plan on Human Rights 2014 • Uwezo Fund 2013 • The National Youth Service Training (NYS) • Youth Empowerment Center • Youth Empowerment Scheme • Entrepreneurship Training for Youth out of school • Youth and ICT Development • Sports and recreations Programme • The National Youth Talent Academy • Affirmative Action Policy for Youth • Kenyas vision 2030 (2006) • Kenyas National Action Plan (KNAP) for implementation of the United • Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 • The establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC-2016) in CVE by the security Law Amendment Act, 2014 • A National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism (2016) • The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-money Laundering Act,2009 (POCAMLA) • The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002/POTA) • Nyumba Kumi Initiative • Revision of Kenyan Education Policies • Kenya's Prevention of Terrorism ACT/2012) • Prevention of Organized crime Act/2012) • The security Laws (Amendment) Act of 2014 (SLAA) • Kenya's Independent Policing Oversight Authority (IPOA) • Article 238 of the constitution of Kenya (2010) • Kenya Anti-Terrorism Bill 2006 • The Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 30 of 2012 • The 2012 Employment Act/220 • Security Governance Initiative (SGI) • National taskforce on Countering Violent Extremism (2017) • Multi-agency security operation • Revision of the Kenyan Education Policies to promote employability
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5. Interventions by State and Non-State Actors to Engage and Empower Youth in P/CVE in Kenya

For policymakers and practitioners, (early) interventions are the most tangible element of countering radicalisation. They are meant to deal with individuals who have exhibited changes in behaviour or started being vocal in their support for extremist groups, but have not committed any chargeable offences. Rather than doing nothing, interventions seek to support individuals ‘voluntary exit from extremism, typically through individually tailored packages of measures, which may include psycho-social support, housing, theological debate, or assistance with employment and education. In essence, interventions are mini-deradicalization programmes that aim to stop and reverse processes of radicalisation at an early stage – ideally before people ‘s views have hardened and they have isolated themselves from moderating influences such as family and friends.

5.1. State actors/the government of Kenya have enacted various policies, strategies and Programs targeting the youth. Considering that the narrative that has been there in regard to drivers of youth involvement in radicalization and violent extremism is economic factors, it is hoped that these interventions will divert the attention of the youth from VE to work. They are discussed in-depth below:

5.1.1. The National PVE Plans of Action: In December 2015, the UN Secretary-General’s plan of action on preventing violent extremism encouraged member states to “consider developing a national plan of action to prevent violent extremism which sets national priorities for addressing the local drivers of violent extremism.²⁵¹ The document urges “the need to take a more comprehensive approach which encompasses not only ongoing, essential security based counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of violent extremism that have given rise to the emergence of these new and more virulent groups²⁵². National policies can provide a platform to ensure that youth have opportunities to participate in programs and activities, receive training and education, develop socially and economically, and contribute to their nations. Each UN Member State was expected to develop a National P/CVE Plan that sets national priorities to address the local drivers of violent extremism and complements national counter terrorism strategies where they already exist. Kenya is a signatory to the UN Security Council and has enacted policies and laws geared towards P/CVE.

²⁵¹ UN General Assembly, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General, A/70/674, 24 December 2015, para. 44.

²⁵² Ibid

On 7 September 2016, the Government of Kenya launched its National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism, which was announced by H.E. President Kenyatta. The strategy involves all parts of government, communities, civil society, private sectors and international partners to prevent and counter radicalization. Other than this, Kenya has enacted several policies, programs and strategies geared towards preventing and countering violent extremism. However, this research found out that these policies are faced with a myriad of challenges especially at the implementation stage. The challenges are influenced by Kenya's political, social and economic history.

5.1.2. Establishment of the Youth Division in the Ministry of Gender, Sports, Culture and Social Services (MGSCSS): This division took the lead on youth issues, having prepared a Youth Policy in 2003. It was charged with coordination of youth issues in other ministries. Other government agencies with a role to play in youth policy include the Ministry of Education (general education and vocational training), the Ministry of Labour (youth employment), the Ministry of Planning and National Development (population, sexual and reproductive health education, and adolescent reproductive health), the Ministry of Health (health and HIV/AIDS issues), and the Ministry of Transport and Communication (information and communication technology). We found out that each of these ministries has developed policies related to young people. Literature review revealed that the greatest and most common challenge across all the ministries was that they are all finding it difficult to translate their policies into actions partly because young people's issues cover so many different sectors.

5.1.3. Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MOYAS): The Kenya Government has made a number of efforts to address the problems faced by the youth. A Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (MOYAS) was created in 2005.

5.1.4. The Kenya National Youth Policy (KNYP-2006): This policy aims at enhancing youth participation in national development goals and to ensure that programs are well-coordinated to address the interests of youth²⁵³. Specific objectives of the National Youth Policy include sensitizing policymakers to the need to identify and mainstream youth issues in national development, identifying ways to empower youth, and exploring ways of engaging youth in economic development. This was followed by the development of the first Strategic Plan (2007 – 2012) targeting the youth.

²⁵³ GoK (2006). Kenya National Youth Policy 2006.

http://www.youthpolicy.org/national/Kenya_2006_National_Youth_Policy.pdf

5.1.5. Youth Enterprise Development Fund (2006): This policy aims at increasing access to capital for young entrepreneurs and to provide business development services, facilitate linkages in supply chains, create market opportunities locally and abroad for products and services of youth enterprises, and facilitate infrastructure to support growth of youth businesses.²⁵⁴ The YEDF was established in Kenya to respond to the problem of access to credit, particularly the need for collateral and the inflexible payment procedures that affected young entrepreneurs. The youth fund was also viewed as part of a strategic national policy agenda to introduce young people into the labour market, and thereby address high under- and unemployment. The Youth Employment and Enterprise Development Division is engaged in facilitating the establishment of youth groups and youth-managed savings and credit organizations (SACCOS), providing leadership and entrepreneurship training to groups, and facilitating linkages with larger credit schemes, such as the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF). So far, 100 Youth SACCOS have been created across the country under the UWEZO fund.

However, the fund also suggests a shift in state policy, where the state moves from being the primary employer, to a facilitator or enabler of employment opportunities for youth. These aimed to transform youth from 'jobseekers' to 'job creators and employers'.²⁵⁵ However, for a young person to qualify for a project loan, he or she must finance 20% of the project's cost. Thus, youth groups are expected to raise a deposit of 10 per cent of the loan amount as shares.²⁵⁶ This requirement was put as a condition to encourage youth to begin to save so that they can qualify for a loan. However, the youth we interviewed reported that they lack the collateral and savings to enable them take the loans. We also found out that most of the youth are not properly informed about the loans which make it a challenge in accessing them.

Respondents reported that in cases where youth have formed groups and been given the loans, the money they are given is so little and that they cannot make meaningful investments with it. Another challenge about the YEDF was the mode of disbursement of loans to groups which poses operational challenges. Loans are given to groups whose membership is 15-20 youth. They are given loans as a group then they share. So if a group has 15 members and a loan is given to them of Ksh 30, each member goes home with Ksh 2,000(\$20). This money is far too low to start any meaningful business or support an on-going business venture. Other impediments to youth employment and job creation reported by

²⁵⁴] Youth Enterprise Development Fund, <http://www.youthfund.go.ke/>.

²⁵⁵ GoK (Government of Kenya) (2008) Youth Enterprise Development Fund: Status Report, Nairobi: Ministry of Youth Affairs

²⁵⁶ GoK (Government of Kenya) (2012) National Youth Enterprise Development Authority Bill, Nairobi: Government of the Republic of Kenya

respondents include lack of technical knowledge to write proposals, long waiting period for loan processing and approval at the financial institutions. Young people have to wait between six months and one year in order to receive the funds. To make it worse, communication about the status of their application is a huddle.

The respondents reported that other than mismanagement of the YEDF funds, there is rampant corruption in the dissemination of YEDF funds. Corruption has enabled well-connected individuals and some outside the eligibility criteria to access the YEDF. They explained that these individuals often have connections to the political class or the management of the YEDF at the constituency level. In some cases, people get funds without merit. Thus, in as much as the YEDF is a noble policy, all these obstacles stifle it benefitting the youth in a manner it was meant to do.

The YEDF eligibility policy is primarily based on age. This is in accordance with the Kenyan constitution that defines youth as all persons ‘who have attained the age of eighteen years, but have not yet attained the age of thirty-five years’²⁵⁷. This fails to take into account the unique experiences among youth in various geographical regions in the country. Youth are not a homogeneous group. They are very diverse. Besides, interests of youth who are 15-20, vary greatly with those of youth in their early, mid or late twenties. There is even a generational gap between those youths in their twenties and those in their thirties. The interests and perceptions of youth in rural areas differ with those in urban areas. The impact of youth unemployment among male youth differs with the female youth. Same to the youth in pastoral areas, teenage parents, those with disabilities, the youth in school and those out of school etc. This age-based definition of youth is inadequate because it does not account for the cultural, sociological and functional forces that also shape youth livelihoods in various contexts. For example, due to cultural practices, a teenage parent becomes an adult and might not qualify for community-level programmes or opportunities geared towards young people. An interviewee stated:

... *“I am a grandfather at 35. People do not see me as a youth. In fact, I am a village elder with in-laws. In such a case, I am not expected to join youth groups and apply for funds. Even the Sub-Chief cannot sign my form.”* (Male Youth in Garissa).

Reviewed literature revealed more disappointments in regard to YEDF. According to investigations by the Criminal Investigation Departments and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission of Kenya (EACC), senior

²⁵⁷ National Council for Law Reporting (2010) The Constitution of Kenya (2010), [www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the constitution of kenya.pdf](http://www.kenyaembassy.com/pdfs/the%20constitution%20of%20kenya.pdf)

officials diverted youth funds to their personal accounts^{258, 259}. The EACC stated that ‘senior leaders at the YEDF have been trying to cover up huge losses of funds’²⁶⁰. In other cases, well-connected adults have registered companies and used them to tender for youth funds. The Vision 2030 Youth Entrepreneurs Associates claimed that YEDF ‘money had been irregularly awarded to family members. They explained that the lending procedure is convoluted with unclear eligibility criteria.’²⁶¹

Further, the Small and Micro-Enterprises who were the intermediary financial institutions, do not provide youth-friendly products and services. They fail to consider the fact that young people may not have the entrepreneurial or business attitudes or skills to enable them to establish or run successful businesses. They conduct very short haphazard trainings, lasting 3-5 days. This is not adequate to equip the youth in proposal or business plan development, or provide skills in identifying and running an enterprise or writing business proposals. Furthermore, the youth reported lack of mentorship courses either to enable youth to learn about business opportunities and risks, as well as develop the social networks that are essential for running a successful business. implementation framework is too narrow and there is a lack of support structures. The weak support structures around the YEDF not only contribute to the exclusion of many young people, but also reduce the success of the loans that are made. In addition, YEDF suffers from unclear eligibility criteria, mismanagement of funds and corruption.

Moreover, is the challenge of politicisation of youth programme. During election campaigns political parties draw manifestos which speak largely about curbing youth unemployment and making youth inclusive policies that are gender-sensitive. They woo youth with such narratives so as to be elected into various positions that they are contesting for. YEDF then falls victim of such rhetoric making youth to perceive it as a political project, and a strategy to buy loyalty to a particular political party or regime. The links between youth funds, political parties and government reduces the sustainability of state-funded youth initiatives.²⁶² Politicians ride on the

²⁵⁸ Agoya, V. (2016) ‘Suspended Youth Fund Pair Face 12 Counts of Corruption Charges’, Daily Nation, 26 August, Nairobi, www.nation.co.ke/news/Suspended-Youth-Fund-bosses-charged-with-corruption/1056-3358980-format-xhtml-u0emi2/index.html

²⁵⁹ Kibet, L. (2016) ‘Corruption is Rife at Kenya’s Youth Fund, Stakeholders Youth’, The Standard, 22 February, Nairobi, www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000192517/corruption-is-rife-at-kenya-s-youth-fund-stakeholders-youth

²⁶⁰ Ibid

²⁶¹ Barasa, K.M. and Githae, P.P. (2015) ‘The Effect of Lending Conditions on Accessibility of Funds for Youth Entrepreneurs in Matungu Constituency, Kakamega County, Kenya’, *European Journal of Business and Social Sciences* 4.6: 30–9

²⁶² Sikenyi, M (2018). Does Kenya’s Youth Enterprise Development Fund Serve Young People? Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk.

government policies and take advantage of the ignorant youth to gain political mileage. The youth reported that there was a disconnect between what was said about the interventions when advertised and what happened in reality. For example, conditions put in place for getting the loans for their Income Generating Activities (IGA) were too many and did not favour the youth. They also realized that all the loans that were given to them through banks had hidden charges that were not disclosed to them in the beginning. This made it difficult to pay their monthly loan instalments.

Overall, young people appear to have gained little from what is supposed to be a flagship programme. There is consensus among the youth that state-owned interventions promote youth exclusion and social disharmony because they have no merit, are marred with corruption and ethnicity and have poor targeting. The youth told us that they know about some of them and have heard or seen on media those involved praising them but these interventions only reach a few.

5.1.6. Kenya National Youth Council Act (2009): Later, the parliament passed a Kenya National Youth Council Act (2009). It is generally agreed that youth employment promotion is a cross-sectoral challenge, with a myriad of public offices and agencies as well as private stakeholders involved. Apart from the ministry in charge of youth affairs, main public players include the ministries of education, including higher education, and labour, the new National Youth Council (NYC), the Office of the Prime Minister, the Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF) and the National Youth Services (NYS).

5.1.7. Kenya's Vision 2030: The Kenyan government has been lauded in the African region for making several attempts to promote youth unemployment so as to reduce poverty and the vulnerability of youth to engage in violent extremism and radicalization. Various sector policies developed under the umbrella of the *Vision 2030* national development framework have contributed from different angles to the emergence of initiatives and approaches that affect employment chances of youth. Since the mid of the 2000s, however, the increased concern about youth unemployment and the related risks for social peace and political stability has led to the formulation of policies and plans specifically targeting youth.

Vision 2030 is Kenya's development blueprint covering the period from 2008 to 2030. It aims to encourage savings and other investments among economically active Kenyans and reduce the burden of economic dependency among the under-14 and over-65 age groups in the working population. The blueprint also envisages improving access to formal

financial services and products for a much larger number of Kenyans²⁶³. However, reviewed literature revealed that the country may not attain the Vision 2030 (Ruwaza ya Kenya 2030) objectives defined in 2008 to transform the country into a “newly industrializing, middle-income (income exceeding World’s average currently at US\$10000) country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens by 2030 in a clean and secure environment”²⁶⁴. This is because, according to the World Bank (2016b), the most notable impediments to growth and job creation include:

- Political risks and corruption;
- Economic over-regulation, informality, and protectionism;
- Sub-optimal decentralization program (Devolution process);
- Uncoordinated and overlapping governmental agencies;
- Non-favourable business environment (starting a business, getting electricity, registration,
- taxes, cross-border trading, contracts, insolvency);
- High inflation rates (regularly over 10 per cent), low and declining domestic and public
- savings, poor exchange reserve position, as well as slow activities in the money market;
- Stagnating manufacturing and agriculture productivity;
- Energy and transport sector bottlenecks; and
- Poor higher education system.^{265 266}

In spite of the aforementioned, World Bank (2016a) recommends the main priorities for improving the employability of youth in Kenya as (i) better evaluation of existing programs that would inform policy; (ii) better coordination of youth policies; (iii) improved access to vocational training, particularly for the poor; (iv) better targeted support to entrepreneurship; and (v) improved design of training programs to meet employers’ needs.²⁶⁷

5.1.8. Youth Employment Policies: A recent report (Youth Employment in Kenya, 2011) reviewing Kenya’s various youth policies reported a number of impacts, including:

- Training on entrepreneurship for approximately 8,000 youths
- Employment of 24,000 youths in the Trees for Jobs program

²⁶³ Republic of Kenya (2007). Kenya Vision 2030. https://theredddesk.org/sites/default/files/vision_2030_brochure__july_2007.pdf

²⁶⁴ Ibid

²⁶⁵ World Bank (2016a). Kenya – Jobs for Youth. Report No. 101685-KE, February 2016.

²⁶⁶ World Bank (2016b). Kenya – Country Economic Memorandum: From Economic Growth to Jobs and Shared Prosperity. Washington, DC

²⁶⁷ World Bank (2016a). Kenya – Jobs for Youth. Report No. 101685-KE, February 2016.

- Training of 16,000 youths in industrial skills
- Establishment of 6 youth empowerment centres.

5.1.9. Peace and Security Policies/Programmes and Strategies: For a long time, the Kenyan government, and security agencies in particular, relied on security-focused measures to address violent extremism. These measures have not been effective due to weak inter-agency coordination, policy fragmentation, resource constraints and weak public communication. This has not discouraged the government in its efforts towards P/CVE. Such efforts include:

- i. ***Kenya National Action Plan*** for implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 which reaffirms the vital role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts. However, this KNAP pays little attention to the role of women in radicalization and violent extremism. It does not clearly state whether the women are perpetrators, agents of prevention or victims of violent extremism. This notion has been misconstrued by feminists to promote the narrative of gender inequality and show that women are excluded.
- ii. The establishment of the ***National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)*** in CVE by the Security Law Amendment Act, 2014. It is a multi-agency instrument of security agencies intended to provide a coordinating mechanism for counter terrorism. It is located in the Office of the President and reports to Chief of Staff, His Excellency the President of the Republic of Kenya. It holds briefs with the National Security Advisory Committee.
- iii. ***The development of a National Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism*** in September 2016. It is anchored on 8 pillars namely media and internet, psychosocial support, faith-based and ideological support, training and capacity building, Arts and culture, Education and Security and the legal and policy framework of the Kenyan Constitution. All these pillars are reinforcing each other. For many years, Kenya used anti-terrorism efforts which are hard approaches and have not stopped radicalization of youth and violent extremism. This new strategy adds prevention and counter-radicalization elements to existing anti-terror approaches. It also stresses rehabilitation of ex-combatants or recruits of the Al-shabab. For example, when the former Minister for Interior, the Late Joseph Nkaissey announced amnesty for Alshabab recruits, the Star Newspaper on October 21, 2015 reported that over 700 youth had returned to the country. Other than these, Kenya has enacted laws to support the strategies and NCTC. These include:
- iv. ***The Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009(POCAMLA)***

v. ***The Prevention of Terrorism Act,2002(POTA)***

The Kenyan government with the coordination of the NCTC has embarked on various activities of P/CVE using a multi-agency approach. Among them are:

- i. Sensitization, awareness creation and training to build capacity of state and non-state actors on VE;
- ii. Research and knowledge creation
- iii. Engagement with policy makers and other stakeholders especially researchers to feed new knowledge into their system;
- iv. Incorporation of CSOs and private practitioners in in P/CVE initiatives and activities;
- v. Encouragement and establishment of inter-faith and intra-faith communities as P/CVE initiatives;
- vi. Extensive investments in technology, capacity building and intelligence;
- vii. Working with regional organizations like IGAD (CEWARN, P/CVE centre) and the Great Lakes Region by sharing information;
- viii. Enhancing regulations to monitor money remittance firms and to check on Terrorism Financing (Financial Reporting Commissions);
- ix. Encouraging County Governments to develop County Strategies for P/CVE;

5.1.10. Kenya Youth Enterprise Programs differ with respect to target groups and type of intervention. Some programs are limited to one specific kind of intervention such as training or access to finance. The vast majority, however, in one way or other combine different interventions and services such as finance, training, market linkage, follow-up services, mentorship, etc. These programmes include:

- i. The Kenya National Youth Policy and Youth Employment Marshall Plan
- ii. Kazi Kwa Vijana Programme (Jobs for Youth)
- iii. Youth training and skills development through National Youth Service and Youth Polytechnics
- iv. Youth Enterprise Development Fund (YEDF)
- v. Youth Empowerment Centers
- vi. Youth Employment Scheme
- vii. Entrepreneurship training for youth out of school

- viii. Youth and ICT Development
- ix. Sports and recreation programmes
 - x. The National Youth Talent Academy
 - xi. Affirmative action policy for youth

Whereas these programmes have been drawn to castigate the governments National Youth policy and Vision 2030, youth unemployment still persists. Some of the challenges hindering the effective implementation of the programmes have been identified as:

- i. The country's education system that produces graduates who are neither properly equipped for entry to the job market nor possess the necessary life skills;
- ii. Lack of harmonization of various programmes by other Government Ministries, youth organizations and NGOs;
- iii. Health issues -especially youth reproductive health and HIV and AIDS;
- iv. Poverty;
- v. Youth bulge; and
- vi. Socio-cultural practices.

5.1.11. Early warning systems have supported the law enforcement officials with pertinent information from the community on particular radical activities, suspected individuals or extremist preaching. Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) gathers information at the community level from key individuals and groups of individuals for identifying violent activities and early signs of radicalization of individuals.

5.1.12. The Nyumba Kumi initiative based on a ten-household security clusters have earned praise for gathering information on risk factors of radicalization and reporting either to the local police stations or the initiative's chief administrator at the village level. This system has, however, generated problems in Kwale County where extremists have reportedly assassinated Nyumba Kumi personnel after reporting of extremists and their activities to the law enforcement officials.

5.1.13. Amnesty for ex-combatants: The Kenyan government announced amnesty of Alshabab recruits in October 2015. The government is on record reporting over 700 Alshabab ex-combatants returned and were rehabilitated and reintegrated into their communities. Some of the returnees said that they have been stigmatized and the police particularly treat them with suspicion always. The returnees reported no psycho-social counseling for the them and their families nor any formal reintegration and rehabilitation program by the government. They told us that they were instead stigmatized and treated as outcasts or suspects all the time. This increased their frustration and were likely to relapse and rejoin Alshabab.

They reported that they were in dire need of life skills so as to get empowered and lead better lives. They told us that NGOs had tried to rehabilitate and reintegrate them including working with them to be change agents as peace ambassadors but the onus lay on the government.

5.1.14 Heightened security in Kenya: To fight radicalization, terrorism and violent extremism in Kenya, security had been heightened both within and without the borders. Kenya had specially trained forces to smoke out terrorists. It has intensified intelligence security surveillance in the country and increased her budgetary allocations to the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and security forces. As a Member State of the African Union, IGAD and the East African Community, Kenya is guided by the statutes of the Peace and Security protocols in these regional bodies. For example, Kenya has sent KDF to join AMISOM that is keeping peace in Somalia-the home of Alshabab since 2011.

5.1.15. Public-Private Partnership in P/CVE: In Kenya too, Public-Private Partnership for preventing and countering violent extremism was very strong. The National Counter Terrorism Centre that is coordinating all activities related to P/CVE has made PPP one of its pillars. The private companies suffer the most in case of a terrorist attack in terms of loss of property and lives. As such, they collaborate with the government to work together towards getting solutions to the menace and build resilience to violent extremism. They are collaborating not only in security matters but also poverty alleviation and reduction of youth unemployment. Some NGOs work with private practitioners to improve youth livelihoods. For example, the Private sector internship - implemented by Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA). This was created in the spirit of the Youth Employment Strategy. The Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP) has allowed the creation of 879 internship opportunities for youth since its inception in 1997.

5.1.16. Strengthened community-police relationships: In Kenya there is a deliberate attempt to improve the relationship between the police and the civilians especially the youth. The youth reported that they are sworn enemies with the police. The government has transformed the police force into the police security services with an Independent Police Oversight Authority (IPOA). The government has also embarked on a rigorous program of police reforms to change the present image of the police from oppressors and violators of human rights, abusers of office and most corrupt officers. The National Police Service Reform Program has put in place structures to achieve a harmonized approach to deal with security challenges in the country. This is a positive step towards community cohesion that will deradicalize the youth. As explained in section 1 above, extra-judicial killings by the police and police brutality and harassment against the youth compounded by disappearances of suspected youth continues to drive youth into violent extremism. They perceive the police

harassment as state-led terrorism. However, establishment of IPOA is a step in the right direction although its work is still at a nascent stage.

5.1.17. Revision of Kenyan Education Policies: The Kenya government underscores the importance of education as the core of the country's human and economic development. In 2012, the Kenya government revised the education policy to align it with Vision 2030 and the new constitution of 2010. Youth unemployment, poverty, radicalization and youth involvement in violent extremism especially after the 2007/8 post election violence made the government to rethink its development strategy. Entrepreneurship education (EE) was integrated into both the basic and higher education so as to build capabilities, skills, and mind-sets about or for the purpose of entrepreneurship.

Reviewed literature revealed that there is a widespread mismatch in skills and inappropriate curricula in Kenya. This implies that employers are finding graduates, male and female alike, not sufficiently prepared for the workplace, and that industry is advancing faster technologically than the institutions training graduates.²⁶⁸ It is reported that employers feel outdated instructional methods, unmaintained equipment, trainers not undergoing continual learning, inflexible curricula, and low life skills training contribute to this²⁶⁹. Additionally, despite the opportunity for graduates to apply for mid-level jobs in other countries, either by emigrating or working remotely, the local Kenyan curricula are not incorporating global labour demands.²⁷⁰

We found out that in spite of higher education improving employability the access of those students who have attained university level education to social and professional networks, invaluable for entrance to the labour market, is significantly higher than those who do not.²⁷¹ Despite these fairly negative perceptions, employers perceive education, particularly TVET, as being important in preparing young people for the labour market, and improvements must therefore be made to meet to demands²⁷². Currently,

²⁶⁸African Development Bank (2015). Growth, Poverty and Inequality Nexus: Overcoming Barriers to Sustainable Development; Chapter 5 Africa's youth in the labour market. African Development Bank Report 2015, pp. 113-146.

²⁶⁹ Nyerere, J. (2009). Technical & Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Sector Mapping in Kenya. Edukans Foundation.

²⁷⁰ Ngure, S. (2015). An Empirical Evaluation of Technical, Vocational, Education and Training (Tvet) Processes In Kenya. *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal*, 2(12), pp. 159-173.

²⁷¹ Gitonga, K. (2014). Navigating the Transition from College to Work: a study of baccalaureate graduates of a private university in Kenya. PhD Thesis. Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

²⁷² Ngure, S. (2015). An Empirical Evaluation of Technical, Vocational, Education and Training (Tvet) Processes In Kenya. *Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal*, 2(12), pp. 159-173.

the Global Competitiveness Report notes that Kenya is ranked 97/138 for higher education and training, but dragged down by its secondary and tertiary education rates. The lack of preparedness of the workforce is reported as a lower priority problem than structural issues such as lack of infrastructure and corruption.²⁷³

Other reports do note that employers have positive perceptions of graduates possessing good communication skills, professionalism, safety consciousness and openness to innovation, which are amongst the transferrable skills highly valued by industry²⁷⁴. The mismatch between the skills taught to young people through various education systems and the skills demanded by the labour sector, has resulted in the youth population being underprepared for the labour market. Education policies influence the patterns of youth entering the labour market and their chances for employment. Keeping youth in school longer raises the education and skills level of new labour market entrants. It increases the average age of youth joining the labour force, and therefore their chances to smoothly enter into employment. The unemployment risk of youth is going down when youth grow older, and the chances for decent work are increasing with higher educational attainment. Better education also increases the options for further education and training at later stages in life, and with this the ability to adjust to changing economic conditions and labour market requirements.

5.2. Non-State Interventions

5.2.1. Addressing the Ideology of Extremists: Counter measures include addressing the ideology of the extremist group, closing channels in which ideologies are promoted, or removing the promoter of the ideology or the recruiter²⁷⁵. Initiatives such as the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM), and Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism (BRAVE, SUPKEM and CIPK focus on a prevention strategy based on using the role of religion to design inter-faith and intra-faith dialogues between diverse actor interventions to focus more predominantly on ideology. Public awareness aimed at discouraging individuals to disengage or not join extremist groups have been the core of many awareness programs conducted by non-governmental organizations such as the Kenya.

5.2.2. The Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) Dialogues: Community Support Centre, Muslim for Human Rights (MUHURI) and

²⁷³ World Bank (2017d). Egyptian Youth Speak their Minds in Essays: We Need Better Skills for More Jobs. www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2017/02/21/egyptian-youth-speak-their-minds-in-essays-we-need-better-skills-for-more-jobs

²⁷⁴ MasterCard Foundation (2017). Skills at Scale: Transferable Skills in Secondary and Vocational Education in Africa. MasterCard Foundation.

²⁷⁵ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2017). Journey to Extremism in Africa: Drivers, Incentives and the tipping point for recruitment. New York: UNDP.

HAKI Africa have formed the Coast Inter-faith Council of Clerics. The Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) in Mombasa, conducts inter-faith dialogues between youth, religious leaders and government officials to promote relationship building using faith as a driver for CVE. The Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) and the Interfaith Dialogues by the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) engage moderate religious leaders to reach and build capacity of youth to detect early signs of radicalization. They also train mosque monitors to systematically assess the quality and content of sermons and to observe mosque attendance. The focus of this initiative is to strengthen preaching skills with a focus on issues important for youth, and to better understand the processes of individual radicalization while safeguarding the reputation of mosques. This initiative also focused on increasing mosque attendance immediately after the mosque closures in 2014. This initiative was accompanied by strengthening the resilience of religious institutions by improving the administration of mosques, their leadership, and madrassa curriculum development. This inter-faith forum in Mombasa and Nairobi is helping discuss the way forward in P/CVE and to insulate the Muslims from Islam-phobia. In Garissa town, we found a mosque built in a catholic church where children were having their madrassa classes. The catholic priest told us that this act had changed the mindset of both the Christians and Muslims towards each other.

5.2.3. Strengthening Women abilities in P/CVE: In May 2016 several major donors, UN agencies and women's organizations met in Nairobi 'to discuss ways in which women can be pushed to the front of the security agenda' in P/CVE.²⁷⁶ The intention is that the inputs to the discussion will be used to draft a joint programme aimed at strengthening women's abilities to counter violent extremism, including 'training for mothers on how to respond and react to children when they express radical thoughts and opinions as well as a call for more research into women's roles in extremist organizations.'²⁷⁷ Although much of the current literature points to the need for women's inputs and involvement in P/CVE initiatives and programmes at all levels international, national and community there is very little detail outlining actual initiatives or programmes. Although recognition of the importance of including women in P/CVE in the East African context is growing, not much has been drafted, implemented or progressed far enough to evaluate.

Youth are not a homogenous group. Interventions that target the youth in VE and radicalization should be contextualized and take this in account....the definition of youth, and the way society regards youth, varies

²⁷⁶ F Bagenal, Somali Women Raise Voices Against Extremism, *News Deeply*, May 2016, www.newsdeeply.com/womenandgirls/somali-women-raise-voices-againstextremism/.

²⁷⁷ Ibid

across time and space, as well as within societies. It can be defined chronologically (as a period between certain ages), functionally (a transition from childhood to adulthood marked by rituals or physical changes), and culturally (the role that individuals play in a given social context) (UNDP 2005:5).



6. What has worked, not worked and why?

This study sought to know what intervention/policy has worked, not worked and why. This was important in relation to our theory of change in which we seek to reduce the radicalization of youth into violent extremism using a community participatory appraisal and build the resilience of the communities in which they live to terrorism. We shall categorize selected interventions accordingly.

6.1 What has worked?

6.1.1 Early warning systems have supported the law enforcement officials with pertinent information from the community on particular radical activities, suspected individuals or extremist preaching. These include The Nyumba Kumi Initiative based on a ten-household security clusters has earned praise for gathering information on risk factors of radicalization and reporting either to the local police stations or the initiative's chief administrator at the village level. Another NGO early warning system developed by the Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) gathers information at the community level from key individuals and groups of individuals for identifying violent activities and early signs of radicalization of individuals.

6.1.2. Peace Ambassadors as agents of change: Young people have a unique and critical expertise in P/CVE, based on their understanding of what drives recruitment at the community level and the programs and policy necessary to address it. Their proximity to local realities, systemic grievances, and messaging that may lead to radicalization result in unique insight on how to effectively de-radicalize those who have chosen to join extremist groups. In addition to expertise, youth are more connected to each other and the rest of the world than ever before. Both in-person and online, young people are able to create networks, form communities around shared ideals, and reach out to the most marginalized. From community discussion groups and peer to peer programming to regional and international platforms, social media movements and applications, youth are able to connect and build relationships across social, cultural, generational, and religious divides. Additionally, there is a global momentum and recognition behind the need and value of working with youth at all levels of decision-making to effectively address violent extremism. Global rhetoric, including the Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, is pushing for greater collaboration and partnership with young women and men in P/CVE.

In this study, we did a situational analysis of opportunities that are available for youth in Kenya to engage in P/CVE activities and found out that youth have formed youth groups of peace building with the aim of preaching peace and dissuading fellow youth from radicalization or engaging in violent extremism. The peace ambassadors were helping returnees to settle

back in their families, championing for them to get involved in income generating activities and linking them to psycho-social services as role models. We learnt that young people have a unique and critical expertise in P/CVE, based on their understanding of what drives recruitment at the community level and the programs and policy necessary to address it. Their proximity to local realities, systemic grievances, and messaging that may lead to radicalization result in unique insight on how to effectively de-radicalize those who have chosen to join extremist groups. There is evidence from this study that youth are more connected to each other and the rest of the world than ever before.

In Kenya, the Mathare youth peace ambassadors have Ghetto Radio FM Station which they use as a de-radicalization platform and to connect with other youth. In Mombasa, there is Radio Salaam. These give the youth a voice in the community. They use the radio and social media platforms for de-radicalization campaigns and sending out counter-narratives. This is in a bid to change the mindset of the youth who are the main listeners, with the aim of avoiding and reporting violence and symptoms of radicalization. They also use the FM radio as a platform to educate fellow youth on early warning signs of radicalization/terrorism, problem-solving and teaching them life skills e.g how to flee from terrorist groups, job creation, trafficking in persons etc. The peace ambassadors provide leadership in highlighting issues related to radicalization and violent extremism.

From this study, we can see that the youth ambassadors in Kenya are sending a strong message to the world that youth are agents of change and a great asset to the nation. They should not be looked at as a burden. Instead, there is need for youth to government; youth to community partnerships in preventing and countering violent extremism. This also sends a strong message to all P/CVE stakeholders to change the wrong notion held about the youth as violent. From these two groups of youth, we found out that most of them are peaceful and do not like violence. Circumstances force youth into violence or radicalization. We also found out that media and the usually paint a bad image about the youth. Not all youth are violent.

The Peace Ambassadors in Mathare-Nairobi and those working with MUHURI suggested that the government should increase its investment in capacity building on peace and conflict. They also sought partnership with the government to help in demystifying the National Counter Terrorism Strategy through their radio stations and other forms of social media for awareness creation. They stated that youth should be understood because violent extremism is only an outcome of inner drivers. They felt that all stakeholders need to interrogate the process that leads to radicalization and violent extremism and not over generalize issues. For them, they were championing soft approaches to violent extremism over the hard approaches that the government was using.

The youth ambassadors complained that despite the good work that they were doing, the government had ignored them. Only CSOs and FBOs were

keen to partner with them and fund them. They needed funding and more capacity building so as to expand the good work that they were doing. To these peace ambassadors, peace building and conflict resolution should be at the heart of the government's development agenda and should take a human approach. By this, they emphasized the individual, household, community, national and regional approach to PCVE. They therefore faulted the government for not giving P/CVE a youth-led approach. Funding for their activities was by international donors only. They sought grants from the government especially Ministry of Internal Security and institutions like IPOA, National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the IGAD P/CVE Centre of Excellence among others. They also wanted more women and girls to join them and their role may be strengthened because more women were getting radicalized and engaging in violent extremism. The peace ambassadors suggested that youth programmes should be geared towards empowerment of women so that more women leaders can help others and the community in peace building, leadership, problem-solving, critical thinking and collaboration. In our research report, we shall profile these youths and their work.

6.1. What has not worked and why?

6.2.1 *Ethnic and religious profiling of youth and their communities:* In Kenya we found out that the Somali ethnic community and the Muslims were on the radar of the anti-terrorism police. This instead had led to resentment of the government and strengthening the Muslim brotherhood spirit in which they defend each other. Additionally, the government has designed some interventions programmes targeting Muslims. The Muslims have treated such programs as promoting Islam-phobia and stigmatization of the Muslims. This has made them feel targeted and vulnerable. They have become frustrated and feel excluded. They are therefore vulnerable to radicalization so that they can hit back at the government.

6.2.2 *Slow action by security forces when given early warning:* In Kenya the accountability strategies by government officers who respond to terrorism lack harmonization with the justice system. This poses a problem in hastening convictions for the culprits.

Non-involvement in youth policy/program formulation and design: The youth told us that the government does not include them in policy or program designs targeting them. They felt that needs assessment before enacting a policy or program was poorly done if there was any because they were not consulted. According to them, the interventions that the government was putting in place to reduce youth unemployment and poverty was not their choice. The youth did not like the top-down approach of the government. They wished to be consulted and asked what was good for them instead of forcing a project that was not of their choice on them. For example, many used agri-businesses as an example of a project that was being forced on them when in the present knowledge economy, they preferred using ICT to explore their various talents as artists. Respondents

reported about youth who had fled from home or sold family land to repay the UWEZO and YEDF loans. The irony of it is that what was supposed to help the youth get empowered has ended up disempowering them, leaving them frustrated, making them vulnerable to recruitment into rebel groups against the government.

On the other hand, the youth reported that non-state actors were serious and committed to helping them. They had good action plans with monitoring and evaluation plans to ensure achievement of their objectives. They enumerated several NGOs working in their localities and explained how the procedures of empowering them differed a great deal with those of the government. They reported that most of them who had received start-up capital from the NGO had succeeded and were good examples to fellow youth. They also reported that the NGOs had mentoring and capacity building programs to build the entrepreneurial skills of the youth.

6.2.4 Use of the hard approaches-Counter-Terrorism by security forces have led to the police using excessive force on the civilians. In Kenya for example, there is a “shoot to kill” order for terrorists- not negotiating with terrorism. There are exceptional cases where this order has led to extra-judicial killings and the justice system has not held perpetrators accountable once human rights are violated. This has infuriated youth and the communities that they come from because as was reported to us, some innocent youth lose their lives in the process. It later incites other youth to get radicalized and engage in VE with the hope of revenging on the police and the government that gave the order. As such, the youth named the police as their enemy number one and were ready to fight them at the slightest opportunity. It was reported that due to high corruption in the police force, sometimes community members settled their scores by bribing the police so that s/he accuses a particular youth with radicalization and VE acts. Even before proper investigations are done, the youth would be arrested and sometimes disappear. Other youth also reported that some of the police were accomplices in radicalization and violent extremism. In all these cases, it fuelled VE.

6.2.5 Indiscriminate Repression: When terrorists attack a society, governments are under pressure to formulate a strong and immediate response that protects people’s lives and preserves the integrity of the state. When doing so, they can be tempted to show strength and satisfy public demands for action by targeting the supporters of a wider political, ethnic, or religious cause. After all, members of such communities often have similar ideas or aspirations and are less difficult to find than the actual terrorists. Yet research demonstrates that indiscriminate acts of repression are usually counterproductive.²⁷⁸ When governments lash out against

²⁷⁸ Newman, P. (2017). Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: Ideas, Recommendations, and Good Practices from the OSCE Region.

communities based on their presumed association with a terrorist group, this strengthens the terrorists' narrative, makes people conclude that non-violent opposition is futile, and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy, as previously uninvolved community members become more inclined to shelter, support, or even join the terrorists. What governments sometimes fail to consider is that their (excessive) response may, in fact, be part of the terrorist's plan. Many terrorist groups actively seek to provoke an over-reaction, which targets entire populations and allows the terrorists to portray themselves as "defenders" of their communities. They peddle the narrative "that this government is unjust, incapable of solving problems which creates a "breeding ground" of disaffection, alienation, and the desire for retaliation in which terrorist groups could radicalise people and recruit new members.²⁷⁹ The consequences of indiscriminate repression extend far beyond a single country and travel across boundaries, and help extremist groups in promoting a narrative in which their violence is portrayed as a response to "global oppression". The Kenyan case is a perfect example as explained in section 1 (drivers of violent extremism). The victims take photos of police brutality and share them widely on social media among people who identify with the ethnic, religious, or political communities that have been targeted. These images can create feelings of shock and trauma, al-Qaeda and IS used them in their propaganda in order to justify their own brutality, portray themselves as "defenders of Islam.

6.2.6 Mistrust in reintegration of returnees: While the reintegration process of the returnees poses concerns of their personal security, there is lack of trust Kenyan police and some government officials. The returnees are fearful of being stigmatized, killed or exposed to terrorist networks that hunt them down. There are no frameworks or structures for the rehabilitation process.

6.2.7 The Exclusion of youth in decisions that concern them: The youth in Kenya confirmed the assertion that "youth are excluded from decision making in matters that concern them". The youth stated that this was one of the causes of their frustration with the government and communities in which they lived. The government of Kenya underscored the importance of youth and their contribution to national development²⁸⁰. They were also concerned about the high unemployment and underemployment rates of

CIO.GAL/189/17. International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), King's College London.

²⁷⁹ Badurdeen & Goldsmith(2018): Initiatives and Perceptions to Counter Violent Extremism in the Coastal Region of Kenya. Journal for deradicalization.(16) ISSN 2363-9849

²⁸⁰Sikenyi, M (2018). Does Kenya's Youth Enterprise Development Fund Serve Young People? Institute of Development Studies

youth in their countries.²⁸¹ As stated in section 2 and 3 of this report, Kenya has gone an extra mile in developing policies, laws and programs aimed at reducing youth unemployment. However, these policies have overemphasized entrepreneurship to alleviate poverty and youth unemployment. This research revealed that most of these policies took a top-down approach with the Ministries of Youth and Gender coming up with blanket programmes for all the youth and expecting them to accept and implement them. Instead of these policies on youth unemployment being an intervention, they have further aggravated frustration and driven youth into VE. The respondents emphasized that the policy makers should realize that youth are a heterogeneous group of people. Youth between 18-35 years have different needs because they are at different stages of their life. Treating them as a homogenous group and making decisions about them and for them without engaging them was an act of exclusion. It sparked anger in youth who resorted to fight back.

They went further to explain that perceptions of urban and rural youth on employment and poverty also differed a great deal. We found out that there were disparities in expectation of different categories of youth on youth employment and job creation. For example, the youth with basic education were comfortable with any wage employment while graduates were the most selective and angry with the government for not creating job opportunities for them. The youth reported that even among them, the most vulnerable group were those not in school and not in employment. Neither their families nor the government gave them any attention or a voice to be heard. At least those in schools and universities had a voice. The youth reached a consensus that to promote social cohesion and inclusivity in communities, engaging the youth means not only giving them a voice but also partnering with and allowing them to lead the choice of what is good for them. This should be a guided process that promotes relationship building and not ordering youth to do this and that. The approach should shift from top-down to bottom-up approach with explanations to youth groups on why certain decisions have been made. An inclusive process will build social cohesion, trust and a common purpose to PCVE.


6.2.8 Weak State and non-state actors' partnership and coordination in P/CVE: Civil society ensures the existence of public spaces of debate and deliberation, where divergent and conflicting demands can be argued and negotiated without resorting to violence. It is civil society that gives a voice to different social groups and provides a channel of expression for the minorities and the dissenters. This promotes diversity of culture and

²⁸¹ ²⁸¹ Gitonga, K. (2014). Navigating the Transition from College to Work: a study of baccalaureate graduates of a private university in Kenya. PhD Thesis. Graduate College of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

develops tolerance and pluralism.²⁸² In this study, we found out that most of the interventions in place for preventing violent extremism and de-radicalizing youth were done by civil society organizations.

The respondents also emphasized the fact that the government should invigorate its efforts in preventing violent extremism by forging Public-Private Partnerships. The broadening focus to incorporate the private sector arises in part from uncertainty regarding potential targets for violent attacks since the critical infrastructure that might be targeted by violent extremists “are about 90 percent owned by private sector providers.” These partnerships need to be systematic for better outcomes. They suggested that good practices should be documented and shared widely for replication elsewhere. For example, in Kenya some private practitioners like UNDP, EU, JIKA and GIZ have supported CBOs and the government in developing programmes geared towards PCVE. The participants added that the governments should take up a holistic approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization. Most of the interventions are in silos with even security agencies in one government not sharing information and non-state actors being in competition. A harmonized and holistic approach will be helpful.

²⁸²Newman,P (2005). I Towards a Democratic Response The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism:Volume III. Club de Madrid.

Figure 21: Summary of what interventions have worked and what has not worked

7 Conclusions

From the foregoing discussions, we have drawn several conclusions

- i. Violent extremism is a threat that knows no borders. All societies are vulnerable. It has no religion, nationality, culture or ethnic group, this threat affects the security, well-being and dignity of many individuals living in both developing and developed countries, posing a global risk for sustainable development and lasting peace.
- ii. Terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization of the youth in the IGAD region is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that requires multi-stakeholder and multi-agency approach to build resilience of communities to its impacts. This is important so as to harness each other's synergies for unity of purpose and for peace and security of all.
- iii. Terrorism and violent extremism is a multi-layered threat to security. It affects individual, household, community, national, regional and global security. However; most researchers have targeted the communities, national and global threats and ignored the individual and household dimension. Therefore, micro and macro levels of engagement need to be factored in all aspects of P/CVE.
- iv. Context matters in P/CVE. Context affects all the facets of radicalization and growth into violent extremism. Approaches to P/CVE should interrogate national, inter-country, inter-regional as well as intra-regional contexts. For example, the drivers of violent extremism across Kenya and Uganda were similar but different. Intra-country comparisons also confirmed that drivers of violent extremism at different locations in the country greatly varied. However, the drivers of violent extremism and radicalization are like a spider web. They are intertwined and interwoven. They are so dynamic and unpredictable like an amoeba. No single driver can stand on its own. They should not be oversimplified but analysed deeply because what is presented explicitly has embedded catalysts.
- v. State-led approaches to radicalization and violent extremism are high-handed and have backfired. Assumptions that the main drivers of violent extremism are economic (poverty and unemployment) and religious factors is a misconception.
- vi. Youth engagement in P/CVE is partial but youth lack the voice to advocate for inclusivity. Also, only a small percentage of youth engage in radicalization and violent extremism. The majority are peace builders.
- vii. Youth are not a homogeneous group. State and non-state actors should put into consideration the youth diversity, their interests, abilities and context in provision of interventions for P/CVE because no-one-size fits all.

- viii. Good practices on youth-led P/CVE in Kenya have not been well documented and therefore go unnoticed. Awareness of the peace building efforts and positive work being done by a majority of peace ambassadors is undocumented. This is mainly because of under-funding of these efforts and the negative mind-set that both the communities and the government have towards the youth.
- ix. Youth are not engaged or consulted in P/CVE policies or policies and programs that affect the youth directly, either by the government or non-state actors working on P/CVE.
- x. P/CVE policies and frameworks at the global, regional and national level are well articulated but implementation is at a nascent stage. In the case of Kenya, implementation of the policies is marred with corruption, poor leadership and lack of technical capacity of both the government and youth in question.
- xi. There is lack of coordination of P/CVE activities in the country and even at the County level. The government-community partnership, public-private partnerships or NGO-NGO partnerships are not strong. Where they exist, there are gaps in coordination, competition and duplication of activities. There is also lack shared information and suspicion.
- xii. There are emerging trends in radicalization and violent extremism such as upsurge of women terrorists, radicalization of children, home grown terrorism and radicalization of security forces. Viewing women and children as vulnerable victims is a misconception.
- xiii. Ideology powered by ICT and social media is emerging as the main driver of violent extremism and radicalization in the IGAD region.

8 Recommendations: Youth-Inclusive Mechanisms in P/CVE

To develop an effective response strategy to counter violent extremism, it is important first to identify the problem and focus on key groups or focal areas by using information from various sources. Scientific field studies or regular screening surveys conducted by academic or research institutions can help to complete the picture in understanding the dynamic structure of violent extremist groups and new emerging threats. The information flow from multiple sources likely will enable states to develop deeper understanding of the problem. Based on the key findings stated above, we have proposed the following recommendations to help build resilience to terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization of youth in the IGAD region. This will be done by improving youth inclusion in P/CVE policy and programming in mutually benefiting ways for youth and communities that they live in. These recommendations are formulated with full understanding that their implementation must take on all-community and all-government approach involving a broad range of stakeholders thus policy makers, local and national leaders, bilateral partners, media, CSOs, FBOs, local communities and youth-led organizations. We hope to contribute to knowledge and theory and add a voice on how P/CVE programmes are designed and implemented. The recommendations include:

8.1. Ensure the Use of a Multi-level Engagement: An All-Government and All-Community Approach to Give Youth a Voice and Space in P/CVE

Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism in Kenya and the IGAD region should take an all government and all-society approach whereby collaboration and partnership should cut across policy makers, community, youth organizations, academia, CSOs, media, private and bi-lateral partners. None of these stakeholders can operate in isolation as far as P/CVE is concerned. And even across youth-led organizations, CSOs and government ministries, partnerships should be meaningful and strengthened. This all-community and all-government approach is the bottom up-top-down approach that we are recommending for P/CVE in Kenya and the IGAD region. It encompasses the micro and macro level of the community in which youth live thereby analyses the individual, household, community, county, national, regional and global dimensions of P/CVE programming and policy. It is a holistic approach to P/CVE that will amplify the voices of the youth and those who support their good work. For example, with this approach, social institutions supported by the government like schools, religious centres, markets can be used to reach the youth and their families in P/CVE.

8.2. View and Engage Youth and Youth-led Organizations as Critical Trustworthy Beneficiaries, Partners and Leaders in a more Systematic Way

Recognize and acknowledge the youth as agents of change with great potential and ideas to share in P/CVE. All stakeholders should engage youth at three levels: as beneficiaries, collaborators and leaders of the P/CVE programs/strategies or policies. As such, they should be engaged as critical trustworthy beneficiaries, partners and leaders in P/CVE. When youth are profiled and denied recognition and a voice in matters that concern them, they mistrust the government and the community in which they live and feel excluded, alienated and frustrated. Youth-led development: An approach to development driven and guided by young people that draws upon their energy, creativity and skills to create positive change. It implicitly values young people as an asset for society. It envisages young people actively creating a better future for themselves and their communities; developing projects and initiatives designed and implemented by young people addressing a broad range of community needs; youth taking leadership roles not only in the future when they become adults, but in the present and going beyond adult-initiated, youth-serving programs to giving youth full ownership and thus full engagement. Youth-led engagements in P/CVE activities can take the approaches summarized in Table 6 below:


Table 6: Working with and for youth (inclusivity) through participatory approaches

Working with Youth as Beneficiaries	<p>Why target youth?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Because they desire inclusion and engagement; -They are adequately informed as a target group about their needs; -They are a fertile ground of engaging as partners in preventing violent extremism and de-radicalization
Engaging Youth as Partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Collaborative interventions where youth are fully informed and consulted; -Implies mutual cooperation and responsibility of all the stakeholders; -At this level, we inculcate confidence and trust in youth by mentoring them to take leadership positions for decision-making, to dialogue and communicate their needs and aspirations, to offer solutions to root causes of violent extremism and radicalization, to identify early warning signs of radicalization, to identify strategies of home-grown solutions for problem-solving and promote social cohesion in the communities that they live.

	<p>Beyond the “Youth Desk” or “Youth Ministry” - Meaningfully engaging youth at all levels of policy development and governance. -Youth recognized in the full spectrum of decision-making as stakeholders in every aspect of life, from waste management and energy use to housing, employment and transportation. -Advocating a system-wide approach to young people’s participation in development, a broad integration of youth into the structure and activities of development organizations and the convergence of youth interests with those of other members of society. -Youth exercising rights and interests will enrich the quality of life for all.</p>
<p>Engaging Youth as Leaders in P/CVE</p>	<p>-Recognizing youth as leaders in their communities -Emphasizing youth capacity and interest in contributing to decisions that affect their lives -Mainstreaming youth in all local and national policies and programs. This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Formal youth representation in P/CVE decision-making bodies; • Consultations with youth on P/CVE policy; • Adult-youth partnerships in P/CVE planning & programming; • Peer-to-peer P/CVE mentorship education and training (drug education, youth at-risk): builds on the shared culture of youth and their local experience, and is given in a nonjudgmental way and information seen as credible. • Youth involvement in developing and designing P/CVE programs with local institutions (inclusive planning processes) • Recognition and support of youth-led P/CVE agencies/organizations (community based, national and multinational organizations) <p>Strategies at the Leadership Level include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governance –engage youth as delegates at governance councils and international forums; • Involve youth in participatory budgeting; • In policy planning and development • In community development thus setting

	<p>priorities for provision of basic social necessities such as education, health, food security, employment;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Engage youth in violence prevention (youth-patrolling), peace building & conflict mediation and crime prevention • Capacity Building workshops for youth. • Use sports, cultural activities, recreation, income generating activities and dialogue to help enlist vulnerable youth in constructive activities. • Young people serve as planners, organizers, advisers, policymakers, advocates, citizens, and vital change agents
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Figure 22: Working with and for youth (inclusivity) through participatory approaches



8.3. Prioritize, Fund and Invest in Formal and Informal Youth-led Multi-stakeholder Partnerships

Invest in partnerships that are cross-cutting to harness on each other's synergies but in a well coordinated manner. Thus, the state and non-state interventions in place need a multi-stakeholder and multi-agency National Working Group or legal/policy framework to enforce operational coordination mechanisms among all related official, agencies within the National Counter-Terrorism Centre. The NCTC is mandated to implement the P/CVE strategy by coordinating policy makers, academia, civil society organizations, media, private practitioners and bi-lateral donor agencies,

youth organizations and communities in which youth live. These stakeholders should create formal and informal channels for collaboration and coordination of P/CVE at the national and County Government level. These could be youth advisory boards at the local level; designated offices within municipal bodies, public administration, and school associations for youth engagement and collaboration across sectors; outreach by and access to representatives of relevant ministries and government agencies; youth Parliaments at the national level and increased funding mechanisms supportive of youth-led P/CVE programs. It will lead to development of shared understandings of the nature of violent extremism in the relevant County, nationally, regionally and globally among governmental agencies and non-governmental actors.

Academic partnerships with law enforcement organizations can enhance interventions disrupting different recruitment pathways.²⁸³ These partnerships could operationalize studies related to the offline and online channels of communication with the aim of reducing online radicalization and recruitment Interventions specific to local communities should take into account contextual differences like the local factors conditioning embedded webs of community relationships.²⁸⁴ Solutions need to be localized where the communities own the process and local CSOs play a vital role by utilizing their local expertise. In these cases, caution is necessary to avoid a small group of local elite CSOs taking control of the CVE interventions.²⁸⁵

The youth-led partnerships with other stakeholders on P/CVE programming require continual learning and adjustment. They should address grievances or injustices voiced; address inequalities arising from tribe, ethnic group, clan, family, or urban/rural affiliation; create channels for youth-specific, as well as multi-stakeholder engagement; contribute to the whole of community, whole government approach; support youth independent, yet inclusive participation; address drivers of radicalization and violent extremism; provide opportunities for youth to engage with the government and community individually and in a youth group; open channels of communication in the community and with government. If youth, communities and government are already working together on P/CVE, the partnerships should strengthen the level at which they are operating, thus

²⁸³ N Chowdhury Fink, R Barakat and L Shetret, *The Roles of Women in Terrorism, Conflict, and Violent Extremism: Lessons for the United Nations and International Actors*, Centre on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, April 2013, 3.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid*

²⁸⁵ Newman, P (2005). *I Towards a Democratic Response The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism: Volume III*. Club de Madrid.

whether at is the policy and decision- making level or program implementation level.

There should be effective monitoring and evaluation of progress to check the performance depending on the indicators stated in the logical framework. All success stories should be documented and up-scaled. All challenges should be treated as lessons and trigger further investigation for example policies, programs, or decision-making structures hindering youth participation in unintended ways.

Preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) should move beyond community-based projects to address the structural factors associated with violent extremism. Governments should highlight their achievements in addressing development, governance and justice issues in local areas and more broadly. Organizations working in this field should find more effective ways to measure progress and hold governments accountable for their obligations relating to governance, justice and development.

8.4. Recognize and Address the Implementation of the Human-Rights Approach to P/CVE

The UN 2006 Strategy on CVE proposed a human rights approach and individual safety to promote social cohesion. Kenya as a signatory to the UNSC should embrace international human rights norms and standards, promote good governance, uphold the rule of law and eliminate corruption. It should create an enabling environment for civil society and reduce the appeal of violent extremism. It should enact and implement policies and initiatives that are firmly grounded in human rights and are essential to ensuring the inclusion of individuals or communities that are vulnerable to violent extremism. It should strengthen the rule of law, repeal discriminatory legislation and implement policies and laws that combat discrimination and exclusion. There is also a need to find ways to strengthen trust between government institutions and communities to prevent real or perceived marginalization and exclusion. Narratives of grievance, actual or perceived injustice, promised empowerment and sweeping change become attractive where human rights are being violated, good governance is being ignored and aspirations are thwarted. This means that States should promote tolerance and facilitate dialogue in society to build communities which appreciate their differences and understand each other. States should promote democratic values, human rights, pluralism, and freedom through education and outreach programs. The inter-faith dialogue in Mombasa and the Mosque in the Catholic Church in Garissa are good examples that should be up-scaled. The establishment of IPOA is another good example as long as the policy is effectively implemented. The curriculum on peace education that has been integrated into the Kenyan curriculum should be broad so as to create awareness about drivers of radicalization and violent extremism, early warning signs of radicalization, processes of radicalization, and stories from ex-combatants/returnees, rehabilitation and reintegration mechanisms, and characteristics of

vulnerable youth among others. It should also contain awareness creation of different forms of prejudice and hostility in communities might be implemented to prevent intolerance and discrimination. It should encourage moderate voices that promote tolerance, dialogue, and mutual understanding to speak out and self-monitor violent extremist rhetoric or, at least, to mitigate its negative effects.

It also means that PCVE should be pursued through a human security lens. Policies that do not promote human security and dignity and infringe upon fundamental freedoms and jeopardize the rights of individuals should be avoided. For example, shoot to kill order, not issuing identity cards because of religious and ethnic profiling, lack of freedom of speech etc must be checked. Donors and practitioners should ensure that human rights violations, discrimination and stigmatization do not occur in P/CVE initiatives. They should investigate reports of violations, establish codes of conduct and inform the public of actions taken against offenders.

8.5. Drive Forward and Ensure the Use a multi-stakeholder, multi-pronged and multi-layered approach in P/CVE for Drivers of Radicalization and violent extremism

Considering violent extremism to be a mere security issue can be misleading. It is a multi-faceted problem that requires multi-disciplinary and multi-institutional responses. Common conditions conducive to violent extremism – such as real or perceived grievances, collective or personal humiliation, inequalities, injustice, unemployment, exclusion from economic, social and political participation. There is a need to take a more comprehensive approach which encompasses not only ongoing, essential security-based counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventive measures which directly address the drivers of violent extremism that have given rise to the emergence of these new and more virulent groups. There is need to build a collective commitment to making prevention work. We propose that the government, CSOs, academia, media, private practitioners, youth organizations and communities should build a coalition of like-minded individuals and organizations, from government and youth-led organizations to advocate for specific partnership and collaboration. They should partner with youth to sensitize government and public institutions about the objectives of P/CVE and its value, particularly at the local level. This should include acknowledging the state-specific drivers of violent extremism, as well as distinguishing between P/CVE and Counterterrorism.

Since youth are not a homogeneous group, interventions geared towards deradicalization and prevention or counter violent extremism should not be declarations that are over generalized. They should be gender-sensitive with focus on age, sex, education level, income, culture, among other variables. No-one size fits all. All actors on P/CVE must consider the diversity, abilities, context and interests of different youth. P/CVE

programming should place a specific emphasis on youth at risk of radicalization and recruitment. Youth should be viewed as part of the solution to countering violent extremism, not just a potential violent-extremism problem.

At-risk youth should be active partners in PCVE program design and implementation. It should build and support youth peer groups, as youth are often more receptive to their peers than to adults. At the same time, such programming should involve mentors, families, and communities.

This approach should consider analyzing and finding out the extent to which the policies and programs by the government address the identified drivers of VE in Kenya; how the youth engage in P/CVE independently, and with government based on current programs and policies; how youth communicate their feelings, grievances, successes and failures; how youth are engaged in decision-making at the program or implementation level; what challenges youth face when engaging with state and non-state actors on P/CVE; If government policies, programs or decision-making structures hinder youth participation in unintended ways; how to address obstacles and amplify good practices; and how to strengthen partnership between youth-led organizations with other stakeholders.

The government needs to avoid more homogenous national programmes that fail to address the needs of the population they seek to assist. Youth in rural areas and urban slums need specific policy initiatives that support their efforts at livelihood building. Third, and perhaps most importantly, governments and non-state actors must move towards a comprehensive, coordinated approach to youth employment and livelihoods that incorporates education and training, industrial partnerships and vocational training. This kind of approach will help counter the limitations of self-employment and entrepreneurship programmes like the YEDF.

8.6. Adopting and Integrate a Soft-Power Approach to P/CVE

As stated in sections 1-4 above, the factors that contribute to terrorism and violent extremism are complex and need to be handled carefully. It is not enough to counter violent extremism – we need to prevent it. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, adopted unanimously by the General Assembly by its resolution 60/288, explicitly addresses prevention and foresees balanced implementation across all four of its pillars: (a) tackling conditions conducive to terrorism; (b) preventing and combating terrorism; (c) building countries' capacity to combat terrorism and to strengthen the role of the United Nations system in that regard; and (d) ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law while countering terrorism. Over the last decade, there has been a strong emphasis on the implementation of measures under pillar II of the Global Strategy, while pillars I and IV have often been overlooked. The hard approaches by the government have been counter-productive. Therefore, adopting soft power approaches is a long-term but necessary solution to

preventing and countering radicalization of youth and violent extremism. The government and communities in which youth live should embrace the soft-power approach and build their capacities and that of youth-led organizations at the micro and macro-level.

Soft power approaches can take various forms for example, violent extremists teach young people to hate – we must teach them peace. Violent extremists promote fear and division – we must respond with opportunities for civic engagement, with skills for intercultural dialogue. Violent extremists preach exclusion and hatred – we must teach human rights, dignity, tolerance and solidarity. Violent extremists breed on mistrust and fears of others, on a lack of confidence in the future. For sustainable peace and building of resilience towards radicalization and violent extremism among youth, the 21st Century skills of leadership, collaboration, critical thinking, and problem-solving, embracing cultural diversity, collaboration / partnership, inclusion and peace-building need to be inculcated.

The government and communities in whom youth live should equip young people with the knowledge, skills and values that empower them to engage as responsible global citizens and to be resilient to any form of abuse or manipulation, including radicalization and violent extremism. We must provide young women and men with a renewed sense of belonging to society and the global community, with a new vision of the future. The government should empower young women and men with the right values, skills and behaviours to make the most of diversity, to engage fully in their societies, to find decent employment, to live as global citizens, defending human rights and fundamental freedoms in every instance.

8.6.1. Invest in social cohesion: The first step is to incorporate youth and engage them as beneficiaries, collaborators and leaders of the P/CVE initiatives. Strong positive and integrated relationships and inclusive identities are perceived as indicative of high social cohesion, whereas weak negative and fragmented relationships and exclusive identities are taken to mean low social cohesion. This can be done through various means, among them initiating dialogue and mediation. Interpersonal relationships are vital in mediation and dialogue. Kenya as a signatory to the SDGs should work towards implementing them. The SDGs seek to eradicate poverty, deepen sustainability, and leave no one behind. To do this, we must use a multi-stakeholder approach that will combine several SDGs, starting with those on education and gender equality, and extending to SDGs 5 (gender equality), 8 (decent work and economic growth), 10 (reduced inequalities), 11 (sustainable cities and communities) and 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions). Kenya should endeavour to implement the UNSC plea of refocusing their priorities, strengthening their application of justice, and rebuilding the social compact between the governing and governed. It should pay attention to why individuals are attracted to violent extremist groups. To address these issues, the Secretary General said that creation of

open, equitable, inclusive and pluralist societies, based on the full respect of human rights and with economic opportunities for all, represents the most tangible and meaningful alternative to violent extremism and the most promising strategy for rendering it unattractive.

Additionally, Kenya should strengthen nationhood and patriotism by civic education of the public, especially the youth, on their political, social and economic values. This includes education on social capital and social resilience, social exclusion/social inclusion, shared values and shared vision, community engagement, as well as identity formation. It adds a sense of belonging – Isolation, inclusion, participation, recognition, legitimacy, collaboration and equality²⁸⁶. We propose social inclusion of youth through greater levels of civic participation, reducing poverty and disadvantage that some communities experience. The education in both formal and informal institutions should build the defences of peace within learners through values, skills and behaviours that reject violent extremism, and by strengthening their commitment to non-violence and peace.

Youth should be encouraged to dwell in places that are not breeding grounds for violent extremism and exclusionary world views. They should be encouraged to advance human rights and tolerance, mutual respect and understanding. This will help them to build communities and environments where people can network build bridges and attain support. The Kenyan constitution which upholds indiscrimination should be fully implemented so as to tap into the social capital that the youth possess. This will strengthen community cohesion and social harmony.

8.6.2. Nurture and empower youth: Capacity building of youth which includes nurturing and empowering them through skills development, training and the new forms of engagement is urgent. In as much as the Kenyan government has done a lot in terms of enacting policies and programs for youth empowerment, a lot still needs to be done. Realizing that the Security Council Resolution (SCR) 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security puts young people at the very heart of efforts to address the root causes of violent extremism, we recommend that the government and communities that youth live in should do the following:

- Engage young peace builders in countering extremism;
- Work with youth organizations to improve their skills and capacities and address any challenges they face;
- Work with partner organizations to develop national youth policies;
- Evaluate digital youth platforms and encouraging civic participation through social media;

²⁸⁶ Markus,A & Kirpitchenko,L(2007).Conceptualizing Social Cohesion.DOI:10.1017/CB09780511481574.004

- Organize events to promote participation of youth in addressing radicalization;
- Undertake research on the root causes of radicalization to better understand the social, political and economic factors that lead to violent extremism;
- Raising stakeholder awareness of the issue;
- Strengthening local resistance to equip individuals and youth networks with values, knowledge and skills to exchange, communicate and cooperate peacefully across social and cultural boundaries; and
- Foster youth participation in decision-making and processes for ensuring peace and security, thus supporting good governance and countering violent extremism.
- Provide practical and clear channels for youth voices to be heard and listened to through: local legislation and consultative bodies, community and state-level offices of the Ministries of Labor, Religious Affairs, Poverty Alleviation, Development, and Education, as well as Youth Councils and Parliamentary bodies²⁸⁷.

8.6.3. *Enhancing the use of mediation:* Mediation is an effective soft power approach for resolving conflicts. It entails resolving a conflict through a political settlement, which calls for a process of inclusiveness that represents all sectors of society and those directly affected by the conflict. This would ideally include the representation of women, youth and perpetrators. An inclusive process is beneficial, as it provides vital information on how various groups are affected by the conflict. It also provides the opportunity for perpetrators to raise their grievances, thus providing insight on some of the root causes that lead to terrorism and violent extremism. Mediation can also bring about a ceasefire, which may to a minimum degree suspend the immediate violence.

8.6.4. *Sharing of information and research to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism:* The paucity of vital information still remains a challenge, as extensive research is required to analyse and understand threats and vulnerabilities in countering terrorism and violent extremism. This research report has attempted to give details on drivers of violent extremism, the policy environment in which youth live, state and non-state interventions towards P/CVE, what has worked, what has not worked and why. This information has been shared widely with all stakeholders in a bid to bring about understanding among different interest groups. Information sharing, online and off-line will go a long way in

²⁸⁷ UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace, and Security, December 2015.

P/CVE. It will create avenues for creativity, collaboration and innovation that are needed in P/CVE.

8.6.5. Strengthening the link between development and peace processes:

We recommend the government improving the political, social and economic pillars of society which would, in effect, weaken the elements that promote insurgency groups. This can be done through supporting young people's participation in local and national government processes and decisions that affect their lives, from improved public service delivery to the issuance of national ID cards and community policing.²⁸⁸ From a social perspective, there needs to be rehabilitation efforts for local and foreign fighters, so that they are reintegrated into society and do not feel the need to continue the cycle of violence. This is a necessary and essential countermeasure in preventing the continuation of terrorism and violent extremism. "While it is clear that some foreign fighters return home hardened and committed to violent extremism, others do not. They find themselves disillusioned by the gap between the propaganda and the reality of foreign conflict."²⁰

Collaborative efforts and engagement initiatives cannot be limited to the role played by continental and regional actors. It is important for states to take the lead in initiating engagements at a national level on ways in which to improve development processes, while also reaching out at a community level to gain a better understanding of the dynamics among communities. States have a responsibility to create an enabling environment that promotes employment for youth. The youth in fragile states, who often find themselves unemployed, are easily manipulated into joining and continuing the cycle of extremism. Thus, the state's role in creating an environment in which sustainable development will be enhanced could possibly limit the influence of extremist groups from gaining youth support and more recruits.

8.6.6. Creating legislation to guide policy implementation of national youth policies:

Less political policy, and legislative documents to guide the implementation of national youth policies, is essential to ensuring both effective accountability and sustainability. The programmes designed to promote self-employment through business development must prioritise training and social network support, as well as create an enabling business environment for start-up businesses to flourish. The youth must be engaged to review, draft, and amend national policies and programs on youth employment, anti- terrorism, freedom of speech, assembly, and association laws to protect civic space and human rights in writing and implementation at local and national levels. Secondly, young people should be treated as key stakeholders who must be continually engaged in the implementation of state-level initiatives. In particular, state initiatives must pay attention to

²⁸⁸ Guiding Principles on Young People's Participation in Peacebuilding, April 25, 2014.

the pluralities and unique challenges that various categories of young people experience.

8.6.7. Nurturing cultural diversity for P/CVE: Culture is a powerful and unifying force that can help prevent violent extremism and facilitate peace-building and reconciliation. It nurtures a sense of belonging, fosters mutual understanding and opens spaces for critical thinking. The government and community at large should advance cultural literacy, to defend humanity's shared cultural heritage, new approaches to bolstering media and digital literacy, to strengthen the resilience of societies against the false siren calls of violent extremism, to strengthen the unity of all women and men as members of a single family, sharing aspirations and rights, a past and a future. Stakeholders should endeavour to foster intercultural learning and exchanges, promote a pluralistic view of society, and deepen young people's understanding of the benefits of cultural diversity. This will reduce/eliminate prejudices that lead to intolerance, religious and ethnic profiling or stigmatization of returnees.

8.6.8. Embracing digital learning programmes: Violent extremists are active in using the Internet and social media to promote hatred and violence among the youth. All stakeholders should endeavour to develop and advance their digital skills and use them to counter online radicalization against extremist ideologies and radicalism. Media and Information Literacy (MIL) skills so as to expand their social choices, build new forms of global citizenship, and become more resilient to manipulation when using Internet and social media. The government of Kenya with its partners and youth-led organizations should collaborate on teaching the public professional journalism to counter the negative impacts of fabricated news stories, propaganda and rumours. They should support youth using the cyberspace safely to learn, socialize, express and realize their aspirations in the spirit of dialogue and tolerance. Credible journalism based on facts and critical analysis is essential for sustaining policies that recognize human rights and dignity. The youth should be encouraged to use the Internet as a force for exchange, innovation, creativity, and, ultimately, peace and security. The internet should be used to provide an opportunity to exchange experiences, to explore ways of preventing discrimination and radicalization leading to violent extremism. Instead the internet can promote a culture of peace by countering online propagation of violence and to consolidate youth defences against extremist thought.

Increasing entrepreneurial skills in TVET education^{289, 290}, nurturing public-private partnership and investment^{291, 292}, and meaningfully including the

²⁸⁹ Kikechi, W., Owano, A., Ayodo, T. and Ejakait, E. (2013). Do Entrepreneurial Skills Acquired from Technical Subjects Help Secondary School Graduates in Self-Employment in Kenya. *International Journal of Education and Research*, 1(8).

voice and aspirations of young people in government policy development²⁹³, will be instrumental in Youth Employment in Kenya Samuel Hall 40 tapping into the potential of digital technology and innovation in young people's income generating strategies. However, with growing digital innovation both locally and internationally, comes a greater need to develop policies and innovations, such as the Digital Learning Programme²⁹⁴, that ensure equal access, as well as digital literacy, is viable for communities throughout Kenya, or already marginalised and disadvantaged youth could be further left behind.

8.7. Gender equality and empowering women: In line with Security Council resolution 2242 (2015), we must ensure that the protection and empowerment of women is a central consideration of strategies devised to counter terrorism and violent extremism. Mainstream gender perspectives across efforts to prevent violent extremism; (b) Invest in gender-sensitive research and data collection on women's roles in violent extremism, including on identifying the drivers that lead women to join violent extremist groups, and on the impacts of counter-terrorism strategies on their lives, in order to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses; (c) Include women and other underrepresented groups in national law enforcement and security agencies, including as part of counter-terrorism prevention and response frameworks; (d) Build the capacity of women and their civil society groups to engage in prevention and response efforts related to violent extremism; (e) Ensure that a portion of all funds dedicated to addressing violent extremism are committed to projects that address women's specific needs or empower women.

8.8. Measuring the Youth-Inclusive Mechanisms in P/CVE

How do we measure the youth engagement? This study proposed to use the Hart, R (1992) model of Children's' participation from Tokenism to citizenship developed by UNICEF, Innocent Research Centre. It is composed of 8 steps as follows:

²⁹⁰ Lohento, K. and Ajilore, O. (2015). Africa Agriculture Status Report. Chapter 5: ICT and Youth in Agriculture. AGRA, pp. 118-143.

²⁹¹ Gathege, D. and Moraa, H. (2013). Draft Report on Comparative Study on Innovation Hubs Across Africa. iHub Research.

²⁹² The LBJ School of Public Affairs (2015). Technology Entrepreneurship in Indonesia and Kenya. Austin: The University of Texas at Austin.

²⁹³ Proctor, F. and Lucchesi, V. (2012). Small-scale farming and youth in an era of rapid rural change. London, The Hague: International Institute for Environment and Development, Hivos.

²⁹⁴ ICT Authority (2016). Digital Literacy Programme Progress May 2016 – ICT Authority. <http://icta.go.ke/digital-literacy-programme-progress-may-2016>.

Table 7: Evaluating Youth-Inclusive Mechanism

Rung	Characteristics
NON-PARTICIPATION	
Rung 1	Young people are manipulated
Rung 2	Young people are decoration
Rung 3	Young people tokenized
YOUTH-LED DEVELOPMENT	
Rung 4	Youth assigned duties and informed
Rung 5	Youth consulted and informed
Rung 6	Adult-initiated shared decisions
YOUTH ENGAGEMENT	
Rung 7	Youth lead and initiate action
Rung 8	Youth and adults (community elders) share and make decisions

Source: Adopted from Hart, R (1992) model of Children's' participation from Tokenism to citizenship developed by UNICEF, Innocent Research Centre.

8.9. Building Community Resilience to Youth Radicalization and VE

Communities have long been understood to be critical to violence prevention across a spectrum of violence types. Social connection is at the heart of resilient communities and suggests that any strategy to increase community resilience must both harness and enhance existing social connections while endeavouring to not damage or diminish them. First, social connection within and between communities specifically mitigate risk factors associated with violent extremism. Resilient communities require a great degree of trust and communication between community members and government representatives. Strong partnerships between communities and institutions or government have been acknowledged as central aspects of resilient communities sharing of power with community members, rather than token involvement, is critical. Finally, successful initiatives involved policy-building around issues identified as important and relevant by community members. Within communities refers to individuals that share similar social identities (termed social bonding), and between communities refers to groups composed of individuals with diverse social identities but who share a common sense of community in some other way (termed social bridging). Second, the role of social connection between communities and institutions or governing bodies (termed social linking) provides an opportunity for addressing social injustice and building structures for intervention with youth who begin down that path.

We recommend Community-Based Participatory Approaches (CBPRA), a model of community engagement and partnership in research, to provide a road map for how to enhance these types of social connection and build resilient communities. Resilience has been defined as “the process of, capacity for or outcome of successful adaptation despite challenging or

threatening circumstances”²⁹⁵. In relation to violent extremism, the challenge or threat can be understood as the potential for violent extremists to recruit individuals to their cause and potentially even engage in violence; successful adaptation to this threat would be a community that comes together in such a way that its members are no longer vulnerable to the threat. In short, the process of becoming a resilient community would need to inherently reduce potential vulnerabilities or risk factors, and promote protective experiences or conditions.

Pfefferbaum and colleagues (2015)²⁹⁶ suggested that social connections, social groups, social networks and social capital are fundamental to community resilience in relation to disaster preparedness, and that building social capital is fundamental to increasing community resilience. They further suggested that developing community teams that include diverse stakeholders and, in particular, engage community members who are typically marginalized or underrepresented, is an important means of increasing community resilience. They also note that the very process of building partnerships around a team can build social capital, and is as important as the outcome of having a team in place to prepare for disasters²⁹⁷. Promoting tolerance and acceptance of diversity, and enhancing opportunities for minority youth to experience themselves as integral members of the larger community and nation are therefore key components of community resilience.

²⁹⁵ Tupet, Y., Byron, E. & Sroufe, L.A. (2003). Rethinking resilience: A developmental process perspective. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282845536_Rethinking_resilience_A_developmental_process_perspective

²⁹⁶ Pfefferbaum, R. L., B. Pfefferbaum, and R. L. Van Horn. (2011). Communities advancing resilience toolkit (CART): The CART integrated system. Oklahoma City, OK: Terrorism and Disaster Center at the University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center.

²⁹⁷ Ibid

